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Summary 
This study calls into question the use of sovereign bond yield differentials (spread) as an 
indicator of fear of default during the euro crisis. The spread between the German bund 
and other euro area sovereign bonds has been widely employed by academics and 
regulators primarily as an indicator of the financial markets’ perception of sovereign 
default risk. I argue that the fixation with fear of sovereign default as the key driver of 
market sentiment stems from a significant gap in the literature regarding the mechanisms 
underpinning the provision of bank funding in the euro area. On the one hand, sovereign 
bonds are the main source of collateral in repo contracts, key financial instrument banks 
use to access short-term funding in the euro area. On the other hand, central counterparty 
clearing houses (CCPs) clear a significant proportion of repo trades in the euro area, 
which means that these companies play a fundamental (yet neglected) role in the 
connection between sovereign debt and bank funding in Europe. One of the arguments 
made here is that the ways in which European financial integration has been carried out 
has made sovereign debt markets in the euro area vulnerable to what I call CCP-induced 
collateral crises. Indeed, the key finding of this study is that the sudden increase in 
collateral requirements by LCH.Clearnet, one of the world’s largest CCPs, reduced the 
liquidity of Irish, Portuguese, Italian and Spanish sovereign bonds as collateral to access 
short-term funding in repo transactions. This led banks in the euro area to conduct large-
scale bond sell-offs of the abovementioned securities, destabilising sovereign debt 
markets and widening spreads. This project concludes that the widening of the spreads 
from 2010 to 2012 was therefore also an indication of investors’ concerns with liquidity 
risk, and not only of fear of sovereign default. 
 
 1 
Introduction 
 
Silvio Berlusconi, who spent nearly two decades atop the world of Italian politics, 
resigned as prime minister Saturday night [12/11/2011] after lawmakers rushed 
through a budget bill seen as the first step toward winning back investor 
confidence and preventing the collapse of the world’s eighth-largest economy. 
 
Ultimately forced out of office by a debt crisis instead of personal scandal, the 
flamboyant billionaire’s departure appeared to pave the way for a staid, serious 
economist, Mario Monti, to attempt to form an interim government and try to pull 
Italy back from the brink (Faiola, 2011, writing for the Washington Post). 
 
During a bilateral summit with President François Hollande on 3 December 2012, Mario 
Monti – then Italy’s Prime Minister – set the target of 287 basis points spread between 
Italy and Germany’s government bonds as a goal of ‘particular significance’ (Monti, 
2012, my translation). Sovereign bond yield spread, henceforth referred to as spread, is 
the differential in the interest rates that investors charge when trading government bonds 
in secondary markets. Following Monti’s statement, the press began referring to that 
specific level of bond yield spread as the Soglia Monti (the Monti Threshold) indicating 
the Prime Minister’s numerical threshold as a policy objective to be reached in order to 
reassure the markets about Italy’s public debt sustainability and remove the risk of 
sovereign default (see Corriere Della Sera, 2012; Lops, 2012; Polidori, 2012). As cited in 
Italy’s leading business newspaper Il Sole 24 Ore: 
 
Monti had already told us. Spread can get down to 287 basis points, halving the 
575 basis points that he inherited [from Berlusconi] before getting into office last 
November. It may have been a joke, or it could have been a clear message to the 
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markets about the improved sustainability of [Italy’s] public debt (Lops, 2012, 
my translation, emphasis added). 
 
Political debates during the height of the Italian crisis centred around the country sliding 
into sovereign default, whereby spread was often employed as an indicator of the markets’ 
perception of sovereign default risk. More importantly, lowering the spread as a policy 
objective to reassure markets about Italy’s public debt servicing sustainability played a 
central role in the transition from Silvio Berlusconi to the appointment of technocrat Prof. 
Mario Monti (see Culpepper, 2014; Hopkin, 2012). The use of spread by politicians and 
the media is still being retained in Italy today, but in a slightly different context, with the 
so-called populist and anti-establishment parties – the Movimento 5 Stelle (in English, the 
5 Star Movement) and the Lega (in English, the League, formally the Northern League) 
– now leading the Italian executive. Spread movements have either been invoked by 
mainstream media and politicians to describe the markets’ disapproval of the public debt 
sustainability of the new government’s policy proposal, or by anti-establishment 
movements as a political coup by financial speculators to sabotage the new government 
with the support of the European Union (EU) (e.g. Petrini, 2018; Spezzaferro, 2018; see 
also Pirro and Van Kessel, 2018).  
 
Hence, the uses of spread as a proxy of market behaviour remains an issue of central 
political importance in Italy, although in more nuanced ways than during the euro crisis. 
More generally, this is evidence that the political relationship between the EU and Italy 
in the aftermath of the euro crisis is still a matter of ongoing negotiations. While this 
anecdote highlights some of the important factors that shaped political processes in Italy 
during and after the crisis, it also provides context to understand the importance that 
spread and fear of default have had for our understanding of the dynamics of the euro 
crisis more broadly. 
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This project questions the uses of sovereign bond yield differentials (spread) as an 
indicator of sovereign default fears during the euro crisis, a view that pervades much 
academic literature and most policy responses to the crisis. Indeed, as we see below, fear 
of sovereign default has been identified as being one of the main factors that destabilised 
sovereign debt markets in the euro area from 2010 to 2012. The main objective of this 
thesis is thus to overcome the association of spread movements primarily with respect to 
sovereign solvency, and to emphasise instead the importance of sovereign debt in relation 
to the provision of funding liquidity in the euro area. In order to achieve these objectives, 
the analysis conducted in this project answers the following research question: what 
factors contributed to destabilising sovereign debt markets during the height of the euro 
crisis from 2010 to 2012?  
 
The problem 
 
There is a tendency in the euro crisis literature to utilise sovereign bond yield spreads as 
a de facto proxy for market sentiment towards sovereign solvency. As is explained in 
more detail below, this thesis refers to market sentiment as the various concerns that 
investors may have when trading specific securities in financial markets. Research on the 
euro crisis tends to assume that spread movements were reflecting the investors’ changing 
perception of sovereign default risk during the unfolding of the crisis (e.g. Arghyrou and 
Tsoukalas, 2011; Lapavitsas et al., 2012; De Grauwe and Ji, 2013; Pepino, 2015). While 
the reasons that triggered fear of default have been extensively debated, i.e. deterioration 
of macroeconomic fundamentals, self-fulfilling expectation of default risk, lack of intra-
European solidarity, a consensus exists that ascribes the widening of the spreads from 
2010 to 2012 to heightened sovereign default risk perceptions. 
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This understanding of spread is not circumscribed to academia and is reflected in more 
general understandings of the euro crisis as in essence a crisis of confidence in the public 
debt servicing sustainability of the euro area, which also manifests in the policy responses 
put in place during and after the crisis. For instance, right in the middle of the Portuguese 
crisis, the Portuguese Central Bank said: 
 
The strong deterioration of the prospects of international financial markets players 
on the sustainability of the public finances situation in Portugal has been reflected 
in a strong increase in the risk premium on sovereign debt (Banco de Portugal, 
2010, emphasis added). 
 
The three largest Economic Adjustment Programmes (EAPs) for Greece, Ireland and 
Portugal, and the Financial Sector Adjustment Programme (FSAP) for Spain, all had a 
strong emphasis on implementing fiscal consolidation measures (EC, 2010: 6, 10; EC, 
2011a: 17, 19, 31; EC, 2011b: 16; EC, 2012a: 14, 46). This was to restore market 
confidence in the public debt servicing sustainability of the affected sovereigns, whereby 
spread would be used as an indicator of such sentiment. Unquestionably, restoring market 
confidence was also highlighted in relation to deteriorating bank solvency, as well as 
collapsing consumer and housing markets that required other equally important forms of 
structural adjustments than just fiscal consolidation. Nonetheless, references to spread as 
an indicator of market sentiment towards sovereign solvency, and the implementation of 
fiscal consolidation programs to restore market confidence towards public debt 
sustainability, appeared consistently throughout EAPs and the FSAP. For instance, the 
EAP for Greece, while discussing the previously miscalculated statistics of Greek public 
debt and deficit, says: 
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This delayed implementation of corrective [accounting] measures surprised the 
markets, which became concerned about fiscal sustainability. Leading rating 
agencies downgraded the sovereign, and the yield on sovereign bonds…spreads 
increased sharply since the end of 2009 (EC, 2010: 6) 
 
Similarly, in the EAP for Ireland:  
 
Since late summer 2010, financial markets have questioned the solvency of the 
Irish sovereign. Spreads of Irish sovereign bonds vis-à-vis their German 
counterparts widened to record levels (EC, 2011a: 17). 
 
Hence, it is clear that deteriorating sovereign solvency has been retained as the key aspect 
that underpinned our understanding of market behaviour during the euro crisis, as well as 
of the ways in which regulators have responded to it. The fixation with sovereign 
solvency as the main driver of spread during the crisis is particularly interesting, given 
that that the euro crisis demonstrates ‘the strong interconnection between financial crises 
and bank funding’ (Rixtel and Gasperini, 2013: 25). Indeed, the declining value of euro 
area sovereign bonds in financial markets during the crisis rendered those assets less 
valuable to use in repurchase contracts (repos), which are the main short-term funding 
tools for banks. In other words, it is surprising that spreads are mainly discussed in 
association with sovereign default risk perception, given that sovereign bonds play a 
crucial role in the provision of short-term funding for banks. 
 
This is a key point. This thesis seeks to take a step away from the association of sovereign 
debt primarily in relation to default, dominant in the euro crisis literature, emphasising 
instead the relationship between government bonds and the provision of short-term 
funding in the euro area. This important analytical move allows us to improve our 
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understanding of the dynamics underpinning the euro crisis, because it explores the 
interconnections between sovereign debt markets and bank funding, an area of enquiry 
that has been almost entirely ignored. 
 
More specifically, the distinctive way in which the use of central counterparty clearing 
houses (CCPs) and sovereign debt characterise the functioning of European repo markets 
has been recurrently overlooked. The absence of repos and CCPs in the euro crisis 
literature is somewhat surprising, given that both repo markets and CCPs have 
exacerbated credit squeezes several times during financial crises (e.g. Gorton and 
Metrick, 2012; Hills et al., 1999). This neglect prevents the examination of the European 
interbank funding market as a potential source of sovereign debt market instability. 
Further, it prevents to sufficiently accounting for the importance of sovereign bonds in 
relation to liquidity, which does not allow us to move beyond sovereign default risk 
perception as the main driver for spreads during the euro crisis. 
 
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. I first provide a few technical details 
about spread. I then move on to show how the euro crisis literature discusses spread in 
relation to sovereign default risk perception. The significance of the repo market as a lens 
to understand the euro crisis is thus discussed. I then highlight my original contributions 
to the literature, before moving on to discuss methodology and case study selection. The 
key analytical notions employed in this thesis are thereafter discussed, before concluding 
by providing a summary of the five substantive chapters, as well as explaining the key 
findings and arguments. 
 
Introducing spread 
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Spreads are calculated on secondary markets against a given benchmark, which is 
considered more creditworthy and is therefore taken as the point of reference (see 
Choudhry, 2006). Hence, a bond’s yield relative to its benchmark becomes that bond’s 
spread and is calculated in percentage change in the value of a bond. These are also called 
basis points (bp), where one bp equals to 0.01% change. For example, a bond’s 150bp 
spread means that it is yielding 1.50% more on secondary markets than its benchmark.  
 
German government bonds (bunds) act as the benchmark in the sovereign debt markets 
of the euro area, due to the perceived stability of the German economy, particularly with 
respect to inflation. As put by economist and former Head of Treasury at KBC Financial 
Products in London, Moorad Choudhry: 
 
Although Germany no longer offers a deutschmark as the anchor currency for 
Europe, the German bond market is the continent’s safe haven for global 
investors. This reflects the size and strength of the German economy and its 
superior performance in maintaining relatively stable inflation levels in the post-
war period (Choudhry, 2006: 74). 
 
When it comes to government bonds, widening spreads reflect a relative increase in the 
public debt servicing cost of a country vis-à-vis the benchmark. However, while widening 
spreads driven by a country’s rising yields against the benchmark on secondary markets 
do not immediately increase the cost of public debt servicing, governments’ funding costs 
in the euro area do tend to rise in the long-term with sustained rising yields (see Scheinert, 
2017 for an overview). Furthermore, a bond’s price and its yield retain an inverse 
relationship, in the sense that the higher a bond’s price, the lower the yield and vice versa. 
Hence, the sudden widening of the spread means that the price of a sovereign bond traded 
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on secondary markets is declining vis-à-vis the benchmark, which can indicate the 
presence of large-scale sell-offs of that bond.  
 
There are undoubtedly many factors at play that can influence the price and yield of a 
bond in secondary markets, such as the interest rates set up by central banks (see Pimco, 
2018). Additionally, there is a vast amount of evidence suggesting that it was largely bond 
sell-offs that widened the spreads during the euro crisis (e.g. Oakley and Jones, 2010; De 
Grauwe and Ji, 2013; Pepino, 2015; Baldwin et al., 2015). This is an important point to 
retain for the scope of this project, because Chapter 5 demonstrates that some of the large-
scale sell-offs that took place from 2010 to 2012, leading to a widening in the spreads, 
occurred because of the reduced value of specific sovereign bonds as collateral to access 
short-term funding, irrespective of considerations regarding sovereign solvency. 
 
Before going any further in explaining how I achieve the above-mentioned goals, it is 
worth outlining the analytical and argumentative boundaries of this project. First, I do not 
question the extent to which spread is a reliable indicator of a country’s sovereign default 
risk. The precise relationship between prices on secondary and primary markets has not 
been examined in great detail and remains a largely contested issue (e.g. Broner et al., 
2010; Davis, 2017). Furthermore, as spread is calculated on 10-year issues, the effect of 
a widening spread on the cost of public debt servicing will vary greatly depending on the 
specific public debt structures, average maturities and on the timing of sovereign debt 
issuing of individual countries. While this remains an interesting question, it goes beyond 
the scope of this project, which instead sheds light on the ways in which sovereign debt 
in the euro area is significant to investors beyond considerations of sovereign solvency. 
 
Second, I do recognise fear of default as an important factor that influenced the dynamics 
of the euro crisis. Indeed, as I show in Chapter 1, the unfolding of the Greek crisis around 
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its fiscal dimension contributed to crystallising concerns regarding sovereign solvency in 
the euro area, which influenced the actions undertaken by a particular important actor that 
is examined in this thesis: one of the world’s largest CCPs, LCH.Clearnet. As I argue in 
the next section, the limitation on public debt servicing sustainability imposed by a 
monetary union can make spread an effective indicator of sovereign default risk.  
 
In short, this project neither disregards the importance played by default risk perception 
during the euro crisis, nor challenges spread as an indicator of sovereign default risk as 
such. Rather, I seek to examine the extent to which factors other than sovereign default 
risk perception have contributed to a widening in the spreads. Specifically, this thesis 
shifts the analytical focus from the factors that exposed sovereign debt markets to 
heightened default risk perception to the reasons that increased concerns regarding the 
use of sovereign bonds to access short-term funding. Through this analytical shift, I shed 
light on a largely unexplored aspect of the euro crisis: the structural weaknesses affecting 
the provision of interbank liquidity in the euro area. Ultimately, I emphasise the 
importance of sovereign bonds to investors with respect to their concerns regarding access 
to short-term funding, and besides sovereign default risk perceptions. 
 
Spread and fear of default in the euro crisis literature 
 
Since the introduction of the euro, spreads have been employed as indicators of sovereign 
default risk in the euro area (e.g. Codogno et al., 2003). The rationale goes as follows. 
Before the euro was introduced, European countries were highly exposed to exchange 
rate volatility. Indeed, investors often speculated against European currencies by 
exploiting the fixed exchange rate regimes introduced following the collapse of the 
Bretton Woods system (see Eichengreen, 2007). After the introduction of the euro, 
participating countries abandoned national currencies and gave up their monetary 
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sovereignty to European institutions, whereby exchange rate volatility effectively 
disappeared. At the same time, governments in the euro area have also become unable to 
guarantee public debt servicing, lacking the possibility of a devaluation of their currencies 
in order to reduce the real value of their debt, or to print extra cash to pay out to creditors, 
should such necessity arise. Thus, ‘[t]he common theory about spreads in the government 
bond rates in the euro area is that these spreads reflect default risks’, because governments 
have lost their ability to unilaterally guarantee public debt servicing through conventional 
monetary tools (De Grauwe and Ji; 2012: 866). In short, a country’s spread in the euro 
area is understood to provide an indication of its government’s sovereign default risk 
relative to Germany. 
 
However, the euro crisis literature has brought this understanding of spread one step 
further, by effectively utilising spread as a proxy for the markets’ perception of sovereign 
solvency. As concisely put by political economist Pepino, ‘[f]or Eurozone countries, 
where exchange rate risk differentials have disappeared, bond spreads to Germany are 
generally considered to reflect outright default risk perceptions’ (Pepino, 2015: 10, 
emphasis added, see also Rommerskirchen, 2015: 758). 
 
Remarkably, this conceptualisation of spread is not only present across different 
disciplines, namely, political science, economics, political economy and financial 
economics, but also across several theoretical strands, including orthodox and heterodox 
economics, rational choice and comparative political economy, comparative political 
science and institutional economics in the field of varieties of capitalism. For example, a 
wide range of political scientists, economists, and political economists have ascribed the 
deterioration of macroeconomic fundamentals as to one of the main factors that led to the 
erosion of market confidence in the public debt sustainability of Greece, Ireland, Portugal, 
Italy, and Spain. This contributed to the bond sell-offs that widened their spreads from 
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2010 to 2012 (e.g. Arghyrou and Tsoukalas, 2011; Buiter and Rahbari, 2010; Lapavitsas; 
2012; Hopkin, 2012, Culpepper, 2014; Jones, 2012; Hall, 2014).  
 
There is a clear divide in this group, between those who ascribe the deterioration of 
macroeconomic fundamentals to domestic factors (e.g. Arghyrou and Tsoukalas, 2011; 
Hopkin, 2012) or European-level weaknesses (Lapavitsas et al., 2012; Hall, 2014; 
Gambarotto and Solari, 2015). Yet, they all acknowledge, to different degrees, that the 
deterioration of macroeconomic fundamentals led to a decline in investors’ confidence in 
public debt servicing sustainability, which led to a widening in the spreads. For example, 
as in the words of economists Arghyrou and Kontonikas on Greece: 
 
Overall, the tentative evidence emerging from our estimates is that during the 
current crisis period Greek spreads have become even more responsive to the 
movements of macro-fundamentals (Arghyrou and Kontonikas, 2012: 673). 
 
Or, as put by political scientists Pasquino and Valbruzzi examining Italy: 
 
As to Monti, we could say that he was fundamentally asked to reduce the 
spread between the Italian and the German bonds, to reform and redesign the 
domestic market to make it more competitive, and to lift the plummeted prestige 
of Italy in Europe (Pasquino and Valbruzzi, 2012: 619). 
 
Spread as an indicator of market sentiment towards sovereign solvency has also been 
employed in studies that examine factors beyond macroeconomic fundamentals as a key 
driver of market sentiment during the crisis. For instance, Chang and Leblond argue that 
the lack of intra-European solidarity contributed to erode market confidence in public 
debt servicing sustainability in the euro area (Chang and Leblond, 2015).  
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Even more distinctively, there is a large literature in financial economics that examines 
the actual variables that determined spreads before and after the euro crisis (e.g. Maltritz, 
2012; Bernoth and Erdogan, 2012; Aizenman et al., 2013; Beirne and Fratzscher, 2013; 
Falagiarda and Gregory, 2015). One of their main findings is that investors seem to have 
reacted to fundamentals differently overtime, in the sense that spread movements were 
less affected by fundamentals before the onset of the euro crisis in 2009 (e.g. Bernoth and 
Erdogan, 2012; Aizenman et al., 2013; Beirne and Fratzscher, 2013). A few notable 
authors, such as De Grauwe and Ji (2013), go even beyond this to argue that a certain 
amount of spread movements during the height of the crisis (from 2010 to 2012) were 
completely disconnected from fundamentals, and were rather due to self-fulfilling 
negative sentiments in financial markets. However, even those authors ultimately anchor 
their analyses on an understanding of spread as being primarily driven by fear of default. 
 
For example, Bernoth and Erdogan, who found that investors reacted differently to 
fundamentals over time: 
 
Financial markets learned that sovereign default is not impossible and that a 
differentiation between sovereign borrowers is necessary, which will be reflected 
in more pronounced yield spreads in the future (Bernoth and Erdogan, 2012: 651). 
 
Or De Grauwe and Ji, when discussing that part in the widening of the spreads during the 
crisis was entirely disconnected from fundamentals: 
 
There is a self-fulfilling element in this dynamics. When investors fear default, 
they act in such a way that default becomes more likely. A country can become 
insolvent because investors fear default (De Grauwe and Ji, 2013: 17, emphasis 
added). 
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In short, the euro crisis literature examined in great detail how and why investors lost 
confidence in public debt servicing sustainability within the constraints imposed by a 
monetary union, which ended up destabilising sovereign debt markets. However, one 
aspect has received far less attention in this debate: the ways in which interbank liquidity 
is provided in the euro area, and how this can be a source of sovereign debt market 
instability. 
 
Understanding the functioning of the European repo market and why it is 
important 
 
Without a doubt, liquidity (or the lack thereof) has been acknowledged as having played 
a key role in exacerbating banking crises around the continent, particularly in the case of 
Ireland and Spain, which contributed to widening their sovereign spreads (e.g. Lane, 
2011; Quaglia and Royo, 2015). Furthermore, it should be noted that the reduced liquidity 
of specific sovereign bonds is sometimes mentioned in relation to spread (e.g. Bernoth 
and Erdogan, 2012; Herrero and Mencía, 2015). However, these analyses mainly examine 
the ways in which banking crises affected sovereign debt markets, and do not sufficiently 
account for how the reduced liquidity of sovereign bonds affects interbank liquidity. 
 
More generally, liquidity is rarely employed as a main analytical focus in these studies, 
often because of the lack of an adequate framework that explains how interbank liquidity 
is actually provided in the euro area. The lack of a proper framework to assess the impact 
of liquidity on spreads can best be exemplified by Herrero and Mencía (2015), who try 
to isolate the different effects that liquidity and credit risk perceptions can have on 
spreads. They assess liquidity risk perception through the simple absence of credit risk, 
which is measured by looking at credit default swap (CDS) rates. Hence, the authors do 
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not devise a specific measurement to assess the investors’ concerns with the liquidity of 
euro area sovereign bonds. 
 
I argue that the reason why liquidity is insufficiently accounted for in the euro crisis 
literature is due to a neglect in examining the functioning of the European repo-based 
interbank funding market. Given how repo markets established extremely close ties 
between sovereign debt and bank funding, this gap is somewhat surprising in a debate 
that is highly concerned with sovereign debt market instabilities (see Gabor and Ban, 
2016). Indeed, Gabor and Ban show that the structural transformation of European 
finance after the introduction of the euro has strongly increased the importance of 
sovereign debt as collateral in repo-based operations in the euro area. Hence, the main 
original and novel aspect of my research is the focus on the mechanisms underpinning 
the provision of short-term funding in the euro area, namely repos and central clearing, 
as the analytical lens through which understanding the unfolding of the crisis. 
 
Repos are short-term collateralised loans, key funding instruments for banks. As a matter 
of fact, repos are the main short-term funding tools for banks in the euro area. Hence, 
sovereign bonds are closely linked to the funding needs of banks in Europe. Crucially, 
the repo market was highlighted as a source of systemic instability during the 2007-08 
global financial crisis (GFC), because the sudden lack of repo collateral had dried up 
liquidity in the financial markets of the United States of America (US), effectively making 
the country’s banking system insolvent (Gorton and Metrick, 2012). Yet, the relationship 
between repo markets and systemic instability has been largely ignored in the euro crisis 
literature.  
 
Indeed, Chapter 3 shows that the collateralised nature of repo trading retains a highly 
destabilising potential in financial markets, because it can exacerbate existing liquidity 
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squeezes in times of financial distress. This is particularly relevant for our understanding 
of the euro crisis. As I demonstrate in Chapter 4, sovereign debt markets in the euro area 
are highly vulnerable to the repos’ destabilising potential. The ways in which the process 
of European financial integration has been carried out placed sovereign bonds as the main 
form of collateral in the European repo market. I argue that such an arrangement exposed 
the sovereign debt markets of the euro area to the same set of vulnerabilities that affected 
the US banking system during the GFC. 
 
Furthermore, this thesis sheds light on another key, yet neglected aspect characterising 
the provision of short-term funding in the euro area: CCPs. CCPs are financial companies 
that clear transactions between two traders, guaranteeing each trader’s contractual 
obligations (see Norman, 2011; Gregory, 2014). CCPs have become one of the 
cornerstones of the international efforts aimed at reforming the financial system in the 
aftermath of the GFC. Indeed, in 2009 the Group of Twenty (G20) leaders pledged to 
make the central clearing of most over-the-counter derivatives mandatory, which has 
contributed to an unprecedented expansion in the use of CCPs in global finance. 
However, while the mandatory clearing commitment was aimed at improving global 
financial stability and avoiding new too-big-to-fail scenarios, I argue that the ways in 
which CCPs operate and are now interconnected in financial markets can actually be 
highly detrimental for systemic stability. 
 
In Chapter 2, I demonstrate that the ways in which CCPs interpose between traders and 
utilise collateral to shield themselves against the risk of counterparty default make these 
companies powerful actors in financial markets. CCPs are able to exert particular 
influence on the liquidity available to investors, because CCPs can suddenly increase the 
collateral demanded to clear a specific financial transaction. Furthermore, CCPs suffer 
from risk concentration, because the way in which they operate entails a transfer of risk 
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exposures from the traders to the CCPs themselves. These mechanisms have underpinned 
the failures of several CCPs during the 20th century. Indeed, the sudden increases in 
collateral by CCPs reduced the availability of liquid assets to investors during several 
financial crises, who then failed to make their payments to the CCPs on time, leading to 
the default of the CCPs themselves (see Hills et al., 1999). Further, because of the sheer 
amount of risk exposures they accumulated, the failure of a CCP can shut down the 
markets where they operate. In short, I shed light on the neglected importance of CCPs 
for assessing systemic stability in the euro area.  
 
This neglect is remarkable, given that CCPs cleared around 70% of the entire European 
repo market in 2015 (see ECB, 2015). Furthermore, in the euro area most repo activity is 
concentrated in one single CCP, which is crucial for considerations regarding systemic 
stability. In Chapter 4, I argue that the politics surrounding the consolidation of the 
European exchange industry has led to the creation of the world’s largest CCP: 
LCH.Clearnet, which has become the largest player in the provision of clearing services 
in the European repo market. Hence, I argue that the sovereign debt markets in the euro 
area are highly vulnerable to the systemic risks inherent to central clearing, because most 
of the entire repo market is centrally cleared, and due to how repo exposures are 
concentrated mainly in one CCP. 
 
In short, this thesis locates the European-interbank repo market as a distinctive and 
important source of sovereign debt market instability. 
 
Underlying research question 
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The analysis conducted in this thesis aims at answering the following research question: 
what factors contributed to destabilising sovereign debt markets during the height of the 
euro crisis from 2010 to 2012? 
 
The reason that prompted me to develop this research question is that sovereign debt 
market instabilities are one of the key features characterising the euro crisis. As will 
become clear in Chapter 1, the roots of the crisis are not necessarily linked to government 
debt markets per se, as the financial distress in each country was often caused by a 
banking crisis and the credit crunch in the aftermath of the GFC. Nevertheless, sovereign 
debt markets were one of the main channels through which financial instabilities 
manifested during those years. Despite the importance of sovereign debt markets, the 
factors that contributed to destabilise government bond prices receive little attention and 
are often taken for granted.  
 
Indeed, it is usually assumed that it was the deterioration of market confidence in public 
debt servicing sustainability that greatly contributed to sovereign debt market instabilities 
from 2010 to 2012, which was triggered by a variety of debated factors (e,g, Arghyrou 
and Tsoukalas, 2011; De Grauwe and Ji, 2013; Pepino, 2015). Thus, rather than 
examining the actual factors that destabilised sovereign debt markets, I argue that the euro 
crisis literature is largely concerned with examining the factors that eroded market 
confidence in sovereign solvency. Yet, the sovereign debt market-specific factors that 
caused financial instabilities have not been examined in detail, which does not allow us 
to look beyond fear of sovereign default as the key explanatory variable for spreads.  
 
The original approach undertaken through this research question is therefore rooted in 
examining the specific destabilising mechanisms that affected and influenced sovereign 
debt markets in the euro area. One of the main advantages of this research question is that 
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it does not force my analysis to retain an a priori assumption on what drove investors to 
sell government bonds during the euro crisis, such as the argument that a heightened fear 
of default caused large-scale bond sell-offs. Rather, this research question allows me to 
take the opposite direction analytically. I explain the reasons that induced investors to 
sell-government bonds by identifying the specific factors that contributed to destabilising 
sovereign debt markets in the first place.  
 
In a nutshell, the dominant view in the euro crisis literature is that a taken for granted fear 
of default contributed to destabilising sovereign debt markets. However, the literature 
does not actually explain how a potential increase in sovereign default risk may have 
prompted a heightened fear of default among market participants and thus sell-offs, a link 
which again is often taken for granted (i.e. fear of default did strengthen and sell-offs 
followed as a consequence). Instead, I examine a set of specific market mechanisms that 
I demonstrate contributed to destabilising sovereign debt markets, i.e. the systemic 
weaknesses of the European repo market, in order to arrive at an understanding of what 
drove investors sell a large amount of sovereign bonds during the euro crisis, i.e. concerns 
regarding the use of sovereign bonds to access short-term funding. 
 
The novel approach of this research question advances our understanding of the euro 
crisis on two grounds. First, by providing a thorough understanding of the often-neglected 
market mechanisms underpinning the provision of short-term funding in the euro area, 
which also shed light on their destabilising potential for sovereign debt markets. Second, 
by developing an understanding of what drove investors to sell government bonds during 
the euro crisis beyond concerns regarding sovereign default risk perception. 
 
Contributions to the literature 
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The main contribution of this thesis is to the broader euro crisis literature and is the 
provision of a more nuanced understanding of what drove investors to sell large quantities 
of sovereign bonds during the euro crisis. Thanks to the insights and findings gathered 
throughout the next five chapters, I argue that market sentiment towards liquidity risk 
was a key driver for the spreads in the euro area during the period examined. In answering 
this project’s research question, I find that the actions of LCH.Clearnet in the crisis-prone 
structure of the European repo markets contributed to destabilising sovereign debt 
markets, leading to a widening in the Irish, Portuguese, Italian, and Spanish spreads. The 
main argument that I make in this project is that some of the most destabilising large-
scale bond sell-offs that took place during those years occurred due to investors being 
concerned with the use of sovereign bonds to access short-term funding, and not just with 
sovereign default risk. That is because the collateral practices of LCH.Clearnet from 2010 
to 2012 reduced the value, and thus, the liquidity, of specific sovereign bonds as collateral 
in repo transactions, which led to the bond sell-offs that widened the spreads of the 
affected securities.  
 
Hence, the key contribution that I make in this thesis is that spread movements during the 
euro crisis were not just indicating market sentiment towards sovereign default risk, but 
also with respect to liquidity risk. This contribution shifts the focus away from 
understanding government debt primarily in relation to sovereign default (e.g. Arghyrou 
and Tsoukalas, 2011; Featherstone, 2011; De Grauwe and Ji, 2013; Pepino, 2015), and 
stresses instead the use of sovereign bonds in connection to the provision of interbank 
liquidity in the euro area. While providing this main contribution, the analysis conducted 
in this project allows me to make another four, secondary contributions. 
 
First, this project makes a broader interdisciplinary contribution to our understanding of 
the euro crisis by bringing several disciplines into conversation with one another. While 
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I refer to the euro crisis literature as one single body of work, studies examining the 
origins and development of the euro crisis come from a variety of subject fields, most 
prominently political science (e.g. Hopkin, 2012; Hall, 2014), political economy (e.g. 
Kirby, 2010; Gambarotto and Solari, 2015), economics (e.g. Arghyrou and Tsoukalas, 
2011; Baldwin et al., 2015), and financial economics (e.g. Maltritz, 2012; De Grauwe 
and Ji, 2013). Without a doubt, interdisciplinarity is a feature retained in several political 
economy studies that assessed the development of the euro crisis (e.g. Quaglia and Royo, 
2015; Pepino, 2015; Dooley, 2015). However, these tend to import insights from financial 
economics, without actively engaging into a critical understanding of their findings, 
which, with a few exceptions (e.g. Rommerskirchen, 2015; Chang and Leblond, 2015), 
are taken for granted.  
 
An interdisciplinary approach is thus particularly important with regard to the objectives 
set out in this project, because it is able show that, despite disciplinary, methodological 
and argumentative differences, these different literatures retain a similar understanding 
of market behaviour and spread movements. While this interdisciplinary approach is 
present throughout the whole thesis, in the sense that every chapter relies on insights 
originating from different fields, Chapter 1 examines similarities and differences across 
disciplinary boundaries in a more systematic manner. Chapter 1 contributes to our 
understanding of the euro crisis literature by showing that spread is largely employed as 
an indicator of default risk perception across the different disciplines that discuss the 
origins and development of the crisis.  
 
There is some debate as to the explanation of the drivers of default risk perception. For 
example, some argue that it is driven by deterioration of macroeconomic fundamentals 
caused by domestic- or European-level factors (e.g. Arghyrou and Tsoukalas, 2011; 
Lapavitsas et al., 2012). Others argue that the lack of intra-European solidarity (e.g. 
 21 
Chang and Leblond, 2015), or self-fulfilling expectations of default fear (e.g. De Grauwe 
and Ji, 2013) are key drivers for such sentiment. Despite these differences, I argue that 
spread movements in the literature are almost always associated with the markets’ 
changing perception of sovereign default risk. 
 
Second, this thesis makes another broad contribution to the euro crisis literature by 
emphasising the importance played by the repo market as a source of systemic instability. 
A few rational choice political economists and post-Keynesian economists do 
acknowledge the impact that the declining liquidity of sovereign bonds in repo markets 
had in exacerbating the funding needs of banks in the euro area during the crisis (e.g. 
Katsimi and Moutos, 2010; Moro, 2014; Pepino, 2015). However, a detailed account of 
the functioning of repos, as well as how repos are relevant with respect to the funding 
needs of banks and systemic stability more generally, is a clear gap in the euro crisis 
literature. Therefore, Chapter 3 discusses the development of repo markets during the 20th 
century, in order to showcase how this market has historically been exceptionally 
important with respect to both the provision of short-term funding for banks, as well as 
for its broader relevance for triggering collateral crises. In short, I contribute to the euro 
crisis literature by locating the repo market as a source of liquidity as well as systemic 
instability in financial markets.  
 
Specifically, I shed light on the mechanisms that make repo markets extremely prone to 
the sudden lack of usable collateral, which can cause liquidity crises and make specific 
types of securities unusable in short-term funding operations. This is highly relevant for 
understanding the development of the euro crisis. On the one hand, Chapter 4 will show 
that the ways in which European financial integration was conducted between the late 
1990s and the early 2000s exposed the sovereign debt markets of the euro area to the 
vulnerabilities of repo-based collateralised finance. On the other hand, Chapter 5 will 
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demonstrate that it was not just heightened default risk perception from 2010 to 2012 that 
widened the spreads in Ireland, Portugal, Italy, and Spain, but also how LCH.Clearnet 
reduced the value for using these countries’ bonds as collateral to access repo-based short-
term funding. 
 
Third, I examine the development and power of CCPs in financial markets, contributing 
to both the narrower literature on the political economy of global finance, as well as to 
the euro crisis and EU integration literatures more broadly. The role played by CCPs in 
financial markets has been largely neglected in these two scholarships, though to different 
degrees and with a few important exceptions. Over the past few years, research in political 
economy has begun to recognise the relevance of these actors in the re-regulation of 
global finance in the aftermath of the GFC (Helleiner, 2014; Lockwood, 2018). 
Furthermore, studies on EU financial integration and on the euro crisis noted the 
potentially destabilising role CCPs played during the height of the euro crisis, although 
central clearing was not the focus of their analyses (e.g. Jones, 2012; Pepino, 2015, Gabor 
and Ban, 2016). Indeed, these studies lack an understanding of the core mechanisms at 
the heart of central clearing. This is a significant neglect, because it prevents examination 
of the distinctive ways in which CCPs operate, which in turn prevents an assessment of 
how CCPs can materially influence financial stability.  
 
Chapter 2 contributes to these literatures by showing how CCPs have developed to 
become the legal counterparty in each trade, while performing their historical role of 
contract performance guarantors. I argue that this specific characteristic of CCPs allows 
them to exert a significant amount of power to investors through the unilateral imposition 
of collateral requirements, which can be highly destabilising in times of financial distress. 
This is particularly relevant for scholars working on the euro crisis and EU economic 
integration, because it shows that the specific way in which CCPs are positioned between 
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traders and collect collateral can destabilise financial markets. Furthermore, this chapter 
provides an important contribution to the political economy of global finance by showing 
that CCPs have been central to the development of financial markets since the 18th 
century, when brokers began to develop into rudimentary CCPs. Given that CCPs have 
existed for such a long time, the limited scholarly attention paid to CCPs, with the 
exception of a few studies in financial history (e.g. Norman, 2011; Gregory, 2014; 
Steigerwald, 2015), is a remarkable finding. 
 
Fourth, the research conducted in this thesis seeks to contribute to the subsection of the 
euro crisis literature that mostly ascribes the development of sovereign debt market 
instabilities to the process of European monetary integration, a group of literature that I 
refer to as the ‘European-level explanations’. This scholarship includes many 
contributions by heterodox economists, both post-Keynesian and Marxist (e.g. Lapavitsas 
et al., 2012; Moro, 2014; Pettis, 2013) as well as research in varieties of capitalism by 
political scientists and institutional economists (e.g. Hall, 2014; Gambarotto and Solari, 
2015). These studies argue that European monetary integration has created an asymmetric 
trade regime that compromised the competitiveness of the euro area’s periphery (Greece, 
Portugal, Spain, Ireland) at the benefit of the core (mainly Germany and the Netherlands).  
 
In short, these authors argue that European monetary integration has contributed to the 
development of macroeconomic imbalances, which created an unsustainable debt-
dependant and deficit-driven growth regime in the periphery. Once the 2008 credit crunch 
struck Europe, these authors argue that the vulnerabilities of the monetary union came to 
the forefront due to the lack of available credit, exposing the sovereign debt markets of 
the periphery to the declining confidence of investors in public debt servicing 
sustainability. 
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This thesis contributes to the European-level explanations scholarship by showing that 
sovereign debt market instabilities did not develop only through monetary integration, 
and by showing that these instabilities were generated by factors other than 
macroeconomic imbalances. I argue that sovereign debt markets during the crisis were 
also destabilised due to the vulnerabilities developed during the process of European 
financial market integration. In that respect, the political processes that supported this 
process played a key role in the development of systemic instabilities, an area of inquiry 
that has been largely neglected by the European-level explanations. Indeed, Chapter 4 
contributes to this scholarship by arguing that the political developments that underpinned 
the creation of a single European financial space have made sovereign debt markets in 
the euro area particularly prone to what I call ‘CCP-induced collateral crises’. 
  
Methodology and case study selection  
 
In order to show how investors behaved with respect to liquidity risk during the euro 
crisis, this study examines the mechanisms underpinning the provision of short-term 
lending in the euro area. The analysis proceeds in several steps and employs triangulation 
to bring together different forms of qualitative and quantitative evidence. Chapters 2 and 
3 provide an in-depth historical assessment of the development of central clearing and the 
repo market respectively. Chapter 2, which examines the development of central clearing 
from the 18th century, relies on a variety of historical material, ranging from central banks 
and international institutions’ reports to secondary sources (e.g. Rees, 1981; Schaede, 
1989; Hills et al., 1999; Moser, 1998; G20, 2009; OECD, 2011; Wendt, 2015). These 
resources are selectively employed to reconstruct a history of central clearing based 
around the features that make this technology distinctive from traditional intermediation. 
The material used in this chapter allows an assessment of how the historical function of 
central clearing – that is, to guarantee the performance of every contract – characterises 
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the unique way in which CCPs still operate nowadays, which in turn I argue underpins 
their destabilising potential in financial markets. 
 
In a similar fashion, Chapter 3 relies extensively on both secondary sources and (mostly) 
reports and studies from central banks, in order to position the significance of repos in 
relation to the provision of short-term funding for banks (e.g. Fed, 1981; Bundesbank, 
1996; Bank of England, 1997; Meltzer, 2003; Gabor, 2016). I also discuss the limited 
empirical evidence that estimates the role of the repo market on systemic stability, which 
I use to draw contours of continuity and change with respect to understanding the 
unfolding of financial crises (e.g. Gorton and Metrick, 2012; Copeland et al., 2014). The 
material discussed above allows me to shed light onto what appears to be a contradiction 
inherent to the development of modern repos: their essential role in the provision of short-
term funding as well as their destabilising potential on liquidity during financial crises. 
 
Chapters 4 and 5 empirically assess the European repo market. Chapter 4 relies on 
institutional reports by representatives of the financial industry, the European 
Commission (EC) and the European Central Bank (ECB) to understand the different 
factors that have pushed for the expansion of the use of repos in the euro area (e.g. 
Giovannini, 1999; EC, 1999; ECB, 2002a). Chapter 4 also utilises secondary sources and 
reports by international organisations in order to understand the different interests at stake 
in the consolidation of the European exchange industry (e.g. Garfield, 1999; Milner, 
1999; G10, 2001; OFT, 2003; Norman, 2011). Overall, Chapter 4 employs these different 
sources to identify the factors that have shaped the European repo market to be so 
distinctively reliant on sovereign bonds as collateral and on CCPs. I argue that this 
reliance rendered sovereign debt markets in the euro area extremely prone to my novel 
notion of CCP-induced collateral crises. 
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Chapter 5 assesses the implication of these arrangements on sovereign debt market 
stability during the euro crisis. The analysis is based upon daily spread data for Ireland, 
Portugal, Italy, and Spain from 2010 to 2012, whose daily movements are observed in 
relation to the collateral requirements set up by LCH.Clearnet in repo markets during the 
period examined. The daily data on spreads was taken from Thomson Reuters’ Eikon 
platform, a professional software widely employed by traders to analyse financial 
information and trends (Eikon, n.d.). The information about the timing and size of the 
collateral requirements were gathered from LCH.Clearnet’s online database 
(LCH.Clearnet, n.d.). The chapter seeks to identify when a sudden increase in collateral 
requirements, such as a margin call on specific sovereign bonds, was followed by a 
widening of the spreads on the day of the call itself, as well as on the following day. This 
is a widely used technique to assess the short-term impact of financial shocks on asset 
prices (e.g. Reuters, 2011, 2012a; Cotterill, 2011). In a nutshell, this chapter examines 
whether an increase in the cost of using specific sovereign bonds as collateral in repo-
based short-term funding operations has contributed to bond sell-offs and a subsequent 
widening in the spread of the respective bonds.  
 
To provide as much context as possible, I have examined these occurrences by 
considering other factors that are considered to have acted as short-term shocks on 
spreads during the euro crisis. This includes credit rating downgrades, announcements by 
the ECB, domestic political upheavals, bank failures and bailout requests (see for example 
Falagiarda and Reitz, 2015; Falagiarda and Gregori, 2015; Zoli, 2013; Gärtner et al., 
2011). Furthermore, the analysis conducted in Chapter 5 is also complemented by a 
qualitative component. The impact of LCH.Clearnet’s collateral policy on spreads is 
triangulated with qualitative evidence on the specific political and economic contexts 
particular to each case study, such as the roots of their respective crises, the status of their 
banking sectors, as well as the crisis-specific developments during the period examined. 
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The assessment also accounts for other studies, reports and market analyses that discuss 
the implication CCPs’ margin calls on spread during the euro crisis.  
 
In terms of case study selection for Chapter 5, first, I look at the role played by 
LCH.Clearnet. I chose LCH.Clearnet because it is the CCP in the euro area that clears 
almost the entire euro-denominated repo market. Hence, the impact of LCH.Clearnet’s 
collateral policy on sovereign debt markets is disproportionately larger than those of other 
CCPs in the euro area. Second, I examine the impact of margin calls on the spread of 
Irish, Portuguese, Italian, and Spanish sovereign bonds because LCH.Clearnet only 
implemented margin calls on those sovereign debt markets during the period examined. 
Hence, my case study selection represents the totality of the countries that were affected 
by margin the policies of LCH.Clearnet during the height of the euro crisis. 
 
Analytical notions 
 
It is necessary to clarify two key analytical notions employed in this thesis. The first 
concerns funding liquidity. Liquidity refers to the extent to which a particular security or 
asset can readily be sold or purchased in a market without affecting its price. Hence, a 
liquid asset means that it can be sold very quickly with little to no loss in value. 
Conversely, illiquid assets are those that are more difficult to sell, and where its 
conversion into cash entails a loss in the value of the original investment. More 
specifically, I refer to funding liquidity as ‘the ability to settle obligations immediately 
when due. Consequently, a bank is illiquid if it is unable to settle obligations on time’ 
(Drehmann and Nikolau, 2009: 5). It follows that funding liquidity risk refers to the 
possibility that, due to the lack of available funding, a bank may be unable to settle its 
obligations on time.  
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In this respect, the ready availability of short-term funding is an essential part of a bank’s 
operations that allows them to settle obligations on time, as banks go bust if short-term 
funding is halted or becomes insufficient (Baldwin et al., 2015: 8). Hence, there is a 
relationship between the liquidity of an asset and the funding liquidity of banks, because 
the declining convertibility in cash of a particular security can influence the ability of a 
bank to have sufficient funding to meet obligations on time (Brunnermeier and Perdersen, 
2009). This is particularly the case when it comes to repos, because repo contracts entail 
the sale and repurchase of collateral as a means to access funding. Hence, the declining 
availability of liquid repo collateral can negatively influence a bank’s funding liquidity, 
as happened in the US banking system during the GFC (see Gorton and Metrick, 2012). 
 
This project thus relies on the notion of liquidity and funding liquidity to examine the 
extent to which the declining value of sovereign bonds in repo transactions from 2010 to 
2012 contributed to the large-scale bond sell-offs. I found that LCH.Clearnet’s actions in 
repo markets led to a decline in the liquidity of sovereign bonds as collateral, which 
contributed to the destabilising of sovereign debt markets and widened the affected 
countries’ spreads. Likewise, the ways in which LCH.Clearnet’s actions influenced the 
liquidity of sovereign bonds plays a key role in understanding the factors that contributed 
to putting pressure on the funding liquidity of banks in the euro area. This helps explain 
why they sold the less liquid sovereign bonds. 
 
The second analytical notion to be clarified concerns the term ‘market sentiment’, which 
I employ differently from its common usage in behavioural finance (e.g. Shiller, 2000; 
Brown and Cliff, 2004). In behavioural finance, market sentiment, investor sentiment, or 
simply sentiment, refer to ‘a belief about future cash flows and investment risk that is not 
justified by the fact at hand’ (Baker and Wurgler, 2007: 129). Market sentiment was 
developed to overcome some of the limitations of standard finance models, which 
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understand investors as entirely rational and emotionally unaffected; therefore, capital 
market prices are inferred to be equal to the rational face value of expected future cash 
flows (ibid). The numerous stock market crashes that characterised financial history 
during 20th century, which caused dramatic changes in stock market prices, prompted 
researchers to question whether purely rationally-driven understandings of investor 
behaviour are helpful in understanding those crashes. As a result, scholars in behavioural 
finance argue that investors are also affected by emotional factors when making financial 
decisions (Shu and Chang, 2015: 206), and have explored whether this so-called 
sentiment can impact prices and contribute to stock market volatilities (e.g. Siegel, 1992; 
Shiller, 2000; Brown and Cliff, 2004).  
 
This scholarship advances our understanding of investor behaviour by moving beyond 
framing investors acting as purely rational actors. However, this understanding of market 
sentiment falls outside the scope of this study, because it remains anchored upon a 
dichotomy between investors acting rationally and sentimentally, where sentiment is seen 
as impairing otherwise rational financial decisions (Dow, 2011). This study is neither 
concerned with whether investors were acting more rationally or according to sentiment 
during the euro crisis, nor does it seek to devise new indicators for measuring such 
sentiment. Nevertheless, this study remains interested in understanding the reasons that 
prompted investors to sell large amounts of sovereign bonds from 2010 to 2012, which 
widened the spreads in the euro area.  
 
Thus, this study employs a more general understanding of market sentiment as referring 
to the various concerns that investors may have when trading specific securities in 
financial markets, such as default risk, liquidity risk, or exchange-rate risk, although the 
latter does not apply in the euro area. The same applies to related concepts used in this 
thesis, such as market confidence and market behaviour towards a particular type of 
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concern, such as default risk or funding liquidity risk. With respect to the objectives set 
out in this thesis, I seek to highlight the contextual factors that have likely contributed to 
raising concerns regarding funding liquidity risk during the height of the euro crisis, from 
2010 to 2012.  
 
More broadly, this thesis also engages with the meaning of ‘the market’, with the 
objective of questioning the universality of the term (see Watson, 2018; see also Watson, 
2005). Markets are often invoked in the euro crisis literature in relation to spread 
movements. As I discussed above, spread movements reflect a change in the relative price 
and yield of a given sovereign bond against the benchmark. Therefore, the euro crisis 
literature retains an implicit understanding of the market which refers, in essence, to the 
financial operators who affect spreads through the purchase and sale of sovereign bonds. 
However, scholars engaging in the euro crisis debate do not provide an actual explanation 
of who these investors were, and generally use the word ‘markets’ to simply describe 
investors in sovereign debt securities (e.g. Featherstone, 2011: 194; Lane, 2012: 60; 
Falagiarda and Gregori, 2015: 293). 
 
Rather than understanding markets as an ensemble of indiscriminate investors, this thesis 
specifies the type of actors that were involved in the bond-sell offs during the period 
examined, and that were therefore responsible for the widening of the spreads. Through 
a detailed understanding of the mechanisms underpinning the functioning of the European 
repo market, I argue these financial market operators were mostly European banks 
lending to themselves in the interbank lending market, and not an undistinguishable group 
of investors investing in sovereign debt securities as discussed in much of the literature. 
 
Chapter summaries, main arguments, and key findings 
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The rest of this thesis is structured into five chapters. Chapter 1 provides an overview of 
the euro crisis literature, which is an ensemble of studies coming from different 
disciplines and theoretical standpoints that are concerned with understanding the origins 
and unfolding of the euro crisis. I identify three different analytical groups, the domestic-
level explanations, the European-level explanations, and the financial economics 
literature. While overlaps between these different categories most certainly exist, as is 
evidenced in Chapter 1, the groups retain some key differentiating elements.  
 
The domestic-level explanations bring together contributions from orthodox economics, 
political science, and political economy, and ascribe the onset of the crisis to domestic 
factors. The dominant view portrayed in this group is that poor domestic economic 
governance has led to the deterioration of macroeconomic fundamentals, which eroded 
market confidence of public debt servicing sustainability, destabilising sovereign debt 
markets and widening the spreads (Arghyrou and Tsoukalas, 2011; Hopkin, 2012; Pereira 
and Wemans, 2012). I argue that this scholarship, particularly that looking at Greece, is 
highly important because it contributed to establishing an understanding of the crisis that 
revolves around the mismanagement of public finances. In turn, this scholarship 
contributed to crystallising the idea that market behaviour during the crisis was largely 
driven by default risk perception (e.g. De Grauwe and Ji, 2013; Pepino, 2015). 
 
Although the European-level explanations also ascribe the deterioration of 
macroeconomic fundamentals as one of the key drivers of market behaviour, they 
radically depart from the domestic-level explanations as they blame poor economic 
governance at European level. Indeed, those authors, mainly heterodox economists (post-
Keynesian and Marxist) and scholars working on varieties of capitalism, criticise the 
ways in which European monetary integration has been carried out (e.g. Lapavitsas, et 
al., 2012; Hall, 2014; Gambarotto and Solari, 2015; Stockhammer, 2016). According to 
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these authors, the introduction of the euro has established an asymmetric trade regime 
that split the euro area between a deficit, debt-driven, and credit dependant periphery, and 
a surplus and export-oriented core. Like the domestic-level explanations, European-level 
scholars ultimately argue that the deterioration of macroeconomic fundamentals – as a 
consequence of this asymmetric arrangement – contributed to weakening market 
confidence in public debt servicing sustainability, which destabilised sovereign debt 
markets and widened the spreads.  
 
The financial economics literature is comprised of a number of scholars that employ 
econometric modelling to isolate the specific variables that influenced spreads before and 
after the crisis. While a few align with the domestic- and European-level explanations 
discussed above, in that they identify the deterioration of macroeconomic fundamentals 
as the main determinant of spread, the most recent contributions to this scholarship take 
significant steps beyond fundamentals as the sole explanatory variable. Indeed, these 
authors argue that the changing perception of sovereign default risk after the GFC became 
a self-fulfilling prophecy in 2010 and drove the large-scale sell-offs that destabilised 
sovereign debt markets and widened the spreads (e.g. Bernoth and Erdogan, 2012; 
Aizenman, et al., 2013; De Grauwe and Ji, 2013). 
 
Hence, the main finding of Chapter 1 is that spread is overwhelmingly employed across 
the literature as an indicator of sovereign default risk perception during the euro crisis, 
despite the disciplinary and theoretical differences among these groups. Very little is 
discussed in relation to the provisions of liquidity and the mechanisms underpinning its 
provision. 
 
Chapter 2 examines the development of central clearing. I showcase the historical 
embeddedness of CCPs in the making of financial markets, which helps to understand 
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their pivotal position in European finance during the unfolding of the euro crisis. The 
main argument portrayed in this chapter is that the mechanisms at the origins of central 
clearing, which are centred around the provision of contract performance guarantee, have 
been kept by modern-day CCPs and retain a highly destabilising potential in financial 
markets. I trace the origins of central clearing to 18th century Japan, when brokers in the 
Dojima rice market of Osaka developed into clearing houses to protect traders against the 
price fluctuations of rice. I then examine the evolution of central clearing through specific 
clearing innovations in Le Havre, France, and in Minneapolis, US, during the 19th 
century.  
 
The chapter then moves on to examine the contemporary relevance of CCP with respect 
to the financial reform agenda put forward by the G20 in 2009, which made the central 
clearing of almost the entire over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives market mandatory. I 
found that, following the introduction of the clearing mandate for OTC derivatives in 
2009, both the use of central clearing and risk concentration in CCPs has reached an all-
time high. This brings me to discuss another key aspect regarding central clearing: its 
relationship with financial stability. I survey the role played by CCPs during some key 
moments in 20th century financial history, concluding that the ways in which CCPs 
replace each side of a trading relationship and impose collateral requirements have 
contributed to exacerbating liquidity pressures on traders during periods of financial 
instabilities.  
 
The inability of traders to meet the collateral demands led to their default and, in turn, the 
failure of the CCPs themselves. Hence, the main conclusion to be retained from Chapter 
2 is that while, on the one hand, central clearing has always played a central role in 
financial markets since the 18th century, on the other hand, the ways in which CCPs 
operate also retains a highly destabilising potential during financial crises, because they 
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can reduce the already limited liquidity available to investors. This finding is particularly 
important for the scope of this project, because it provides a theoretical lens to understand 
the involvement of LCH.Clearnet during the euro crisis. Indeed, this chapter provides a 
framework to understand how LCH.Clearnet reduced the liquidity of specific sovereign 
bonds in repo operations, prompting investors to sell-off the affected securities and 
contributing to destabilising sovereign debt markets. 
 
Chapter 3 discusses the modern repo market, emphasising the importance of these 
financial instruments to the banks’ short-term funding needs, as well as their significance 
as a crisis-transmission channel. The development of repos is closely linked to the 
transformation of monetary policy in the US and Europe during the 1900s. This chapter 
identifies the origins of the modern repo market to the beginning of the 20th century in 
the US, when the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (New York Fed) utilised repos to 
provide cheap financing to underfunded banks. Hence, I argue that the modern repo 
market has historically been linked to the funding liquidity needs of banks. Crucially, the 
use of repos greatly expanded in the aftermath of World War II, as the renewed 
independence given to the Federal Reserve System (Fed) shifted emphasis towards rising 
interest rates to maintain inflation under control. High interest rates thus made repos a 
much more appealing source of funding for non-bank securities dealers, due to their 
cheaper, short-term and collateralised nature.  
 
At the same time, the fast growth of public debt issuing by the US’s Treasury provided 
security dealers with more collateral through which to conduct repo operations. This is 
crucial, because it marks the moment when the provision and cost of short-term funding 
began to be increasingly determined in financial markets; this development is known as 
market-based finance. This is a key point with respect to answering the project’s research 
question, which seeks to uncover the factors that contributed to the destabilisation of 
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sovereign debt markets during the euro crisis. Indeed, I argue that it is precisely the 
handling of sovereign collateral through market-based practices that contributed to the 
destabilising of government debt markets of the euro area.  
 
I then examine the development of repos in relation to financial stability. First, the 1998 
Russian currency crisis showed how the sudden lack of repo collateral can trigger 
liquidity crises, which prompted the international community of central bankers to find 
consensus around expanding the use of sovereign debt as a safe collateral in repo markets. 
This is key for the scope of this thesis, as expanding the use of government bonds as 
collateral in repos brought sovereign debt and bank funding closer together, which I argue 
is one of the factors that underpinned the sovereign debt market instabilities during the 
euro crisis. Relatedly, by reviewing the empirical evidence available, I found that the use 
of repos was highly destabilising during the GFC. The declining availability of sub-prime 
collateral triggered collateral requirement increases that further decreased the value and 
the availability of those assets, which, in a procyclical way, further contributed to make 
the US banking system insolvent.  
 
Chapter 4 identifies the different factors that have made the European repo market 
distinctively reliant on sovereign bonds as collateral and on CCPs. The general argument 
made here is that such an arrangement is the result of the politics underpinning the 
integration of European financial markets following the introduction of the euro. The 
chapter first examines the involvement of the Giovannini Group, an ensemble of public 
and private financial market experts set up by the EC to provide advice on financial 
market integration. In this respect, it is important to point out that the integration of 
European financial markets was a key political strategy by the EC to reconcile France and 
Germany’s contrasting interests during the process of European economic integration. 
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Hence, European financial integration became a political imperative for the EC and, at a 
later stage, the ECB. 
 
The Giovannini Group argued that the poor level of cross-border financing in the euro 
area was largely due to the fragmentation of repo and collateral markets along national 
lines. This diagnosis prompted the Giovannini Group to make recommendations to 
harmonise legal rules for the cross-border use of collateral, as well as to promote a set of 
trading conventions around the handling of collateral along market-based practices. It 
should be noted that the promotion of market-based practices to handle sovereign 
collateral was part of the EC’s political strategy to appease Germany’s worries about 
weak fiscal discipline by higher inflationary countries. More broadly, the aim of the 
Giovannini Group was to push for the integration of European financial markets through 
repo trading, which essentially envisaged a single Europeanised repo market as the 
cornerstone for the provision of liquidity in the euro area.  
 
I then examine the key role played by the ECB in bringing sovereign collateral as the 
centrepiece of repo-driven financial integration in Europe. In line with the Giovannini 
Group, the ECB argued that the fragmentation of securities markets was one of the main 
obstacles for financial market integration. Thus, the ECB introduced a mechanism to 
allow any euro area sovereign bond to be used interchangeably as collateral for its own 
repo operations, whose pricing would also match those in financial markets. Despite 
being aware of the potentially destabilising potential of such an arrangement, I argue that 
the ECB prioritised the imperative of financial market integration over concerns 
regarding systemic stability. By making any euro area sovereign bonds equal for 
collateral purposes, and by adopting the same stance of private market actors in the 
handling of collateral, the ECB established the blueprint for the use of sovereign collateral 
in the European repo market.  
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Decisions regarding the use of collateral are also closely linked to the politics surrounding 
the monetary policy architecture of the ECB. Indeed, the choice of the ECB to opt for 
market-based practices for the management of sovereign collateral was due to the 
perceived political legitimacy of its monetary policy, particularly in the eyes of German 
authorities. Germany worried that allowing any sovereign bond to be used as collateral 
interchangeably could weaken the fiscal discipline of inflationary member states. Thus, 
the ECB decided to adopt a market-based stance on the use of sovereign collateral in 
order to shield itself against implementing discretionary monetary policy decisions, 
which would undermine its political independence and favour weak fiscal discipline. 
These findings are particularly important for the scope of this thesis, because they allow 
me to show that the way in which LCH.Clearnet handled sovereign collateral during the 
euro crisis is deeply rooted in the specific way the process of European financial 
integration was carried out by the EC and the ECB. In turn, it is precisely these practices 
that I argue triggered a collateral crisis that contributed to the destabilisation of 
government bond markets during the euro crisis. 
 
The analysis conducted in Chapter 4 continues to examine another key process that 
shaped financial market integration in Europe: the politics underpinning the consolidation 
of the exchange industry. I discuss the different interests at stake among European 
exchanges, which led to several consolidation initiatives that aimed at establishing a 
single European CCP. On the one hand, the insistence of the Paris stock exchange against 
its German counterpart to maintain central clearing as a key technology consolidated the 
future of CCPs in the euro area. On the other hand, discussions between European 
exchanges and British users led to the creation of LCH.Clearnet, Europe’s first truly pan-
European CCP, which grew to become one of the world’s largest by clearing volume. 
This is crucial, because it is the compromises underpinning the creation of LCH.Clearnet 
that made European financial markets susceptible to the instabilities inherent to central 
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clearing discussed in Chapter 2. Ultimately, I argue that the architecture of the European 
repo market exposed sovereign debt markets to what I call CCP-induced collateral crises. 
 
Chapter 5 provides an examination of the involvement of LCH.Clearnet during the euro 
crisis, which builds on the theoretical and empirical insights obtained through the 
previous four chapters. I examine the role played by LCH.Clearnet’s collateral 
management practices in repo markets during the Irish, Portuguese, Italian, and Spanish 
crises from 2010 to 2012. Through the combination of qualitative and quantitative 
evidence, my findings suggest that the sudden increase in collateral requirements by 
LCH.Clearnet led to a widening in the spreads of every case study except Spain. I explain 
the dynamic as follows. The increase in collateral requirements reduced the liquidity of 
the aforementioned bonds, because it made it more expensive to use them as collateral in 
repo transactions. In order to meet the increase in collateral requirements and to get access 
to more valuable collateral, investors began large-scale sovereign bond sell-offs of the 
affected securities, which widened their spreads against the German bund.  
 
The impact of LCH.Clearnet’s actions varied greatly depending on the size of the 
increases and on other factors. For instance, in Ireland and Portugal the extent of the 
increase was so significant that the increases in collateral requirements is likely to have 
had a procyclical effect on their spreads, creating a feedback loop between declining bond 
prices and higher collateral demands. In the case of Spain, the spread did not widen 
immediately after the increases in collateral requirements, because domestic banks had 
increased their reliance on Spanish sovereign bonds and repos after the 2008 credit 
crunch. Hence, they could not get rid of sovereign bonds that easily, despite the increases 
in collateral requirements, since they could not rely on other securities to fund themselves. 
Conversely, the highest peaks in spread experienced by Italy came right after collateral 
requirement increases. In general, the evidence collected in this chapter suggests that the 
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increases in collateral requirements reduced the liquidity of the bonds affected, which 
contributed to the destabilisation of sovereign debt markets and widening the spread. 
 
The main conclusion drawn from this thesis is that spread movements during the height 
of the euro crisis were not only an indication of the markets’ fear of sovereign default, 
but also of their concern with the use of specific government bonds as collateral to access 
short-term funding via repos. In that respect, the structural vulnerability of the European 
repo market to CCP-induced collateral crises is a central part of this story.  
 
The next chapter will begin developing the argument by reviewing the euro crisis 
literature and how it discusses spread in relation to sovereign default risk perceptions.  
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1 Spread and Fear of Default in the Euro Crisis Literature 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
The euro crisis literature has extensively assessed how investors have become concerned 
about the potential sovereign default of Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Italy and Spain1. These 
countries all witnessed significant sovereign debt market distress from 2010 to 2012, 
which manifested in the widening of their sovereign bond yields spreads against the 
German bund. I should stress straightaway that while I may refer to the euro crisis 
literature as a whole, these studies do not belong to a single subject field. Indeed, the 
events that took place from 2010 to 2012 prompted researchers from a variety of 
disciplines and theoretical standpoints to examine the roots of sovereign debt market 
instabilities.  
 
Contributions came mostly from political science, political economy, economics and 
financial economics. One of the key arguments made in this litearture is that investors’ 
confidence towards public debt servicing sustainability eroded during the crisis, and that 
this was in turn largely due to the deterioration of macroeconomic fundamentals 
(competitiveness, balance of payments, fiscal deficits, inflation rates) since the 
introduction of the euro. As argued by these studies (e.g. Arghyrou and Tsoukalas, 2011; 
Royo, 2010; Gaulier and Vicard, 2013; Hopkin, 2012; Culpepper, 2014; Gambarotto and 
Solari, 2015; Hall, 2014), the deterioration of economic fundamentals, together with the 
                                                        
1 Whereas Cyprus has also experienced severe sovereign debt market turmoil during its banking crisis in 
2012, the country has not generally been a key focus in the literature, due to the relatively small size of its 
economy when compared to the other distressed countries of the euro area (for an overview, see Thompson, 
2015; Baldwin et al., 2015; Panico and Purificato, 2013). 
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withdrawal of an implicit government debt servicing guarantee by Germany in 2010, 
negatively affected sovereign default risk perception, leading to bond sell-offs that 
widened those countries’ spreads. This view is shared by what I call domestic-level and 
European-level explanations of the euro crisis, and, in a slightly different (but equally 
significant) way, by the financial economics literature. 
 
Whereas the euro crisis literature explored in great details the different issues arising from 
the macroeconomic imbalances generated within the monetary union, one area has 
received far less attention: the weaknesses generated by the mechanisms underpinning 
liquidity provision in the financial markets of the euro area. By focusing on financial 
markets weaknesses, I seek to shift the attention of the debate away from the significance 
of sovereign debt in relation to sovereign default perception. Rather, this study is 
interested in showcasing the idiosyncrasies of government debt in fuelling the liquidity 
in the financial markets of the euro area.  
 
Shifting the attention towards the ways in which liquidity is provided in the euro area 
allows us to emphasise another equally crucial set of factors which are not related to 
sovereign solvency that drove investors to sell off euro area sovereign bonds during the 
height of the crisis. As shown in Chapter 4, the ways in which sovereign debt, bank 
liquidity and CCPs are intertwined with one another in the European repo-based interbank 
funding market have contributed to make European sovereign debt markets extremely 
prone to CCP-induced collateral crises. Indeed, Chapter 5 demonstrates that 
LCH.Clearnet’s increase in collateral requirements to use Irish, Portuguese, Italian and 
Spanish sovereign bonds in repo operations from 2010 to 2012 led to large-scale sell-offs 
of the affected securities amid concerns about the use of those securities as collateral in 
repo operations, which widened those countries’ spreads with Germany. This is 
particularly important with respect to our understanding of the euro crisis, insofar as 
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spread movement as a reflection of markets’ concerns with sovereign solvency has 
strongly influenced the policy responses to the crisis. Hence, the findings provided in this 
study suggest that policies based on reducing public debt and deficit to restore investors’ 
confidence towards sovereign debt servicing sustainability, or those concerning the 
recovery and resolution of large financial institutions, did not help to overcome the 
weaknesses existing within the European repo-based interbank funding markets. 
 
I should stress that this study does not reject the argument that sovereign default risk 
perception was an important driver of market sentiment during the euro crisis, far from 
it. As will be shown later, the fiscal dimension underpinning the unfolding of the Greek 
crisis played a major role in shaping the terms of the euro crisis around material concerns 
with sovereign solvency. Indeed, Chapter 5 discusses how the increased sovereign default 
risk perception was one of the main factors that pushed the LCH.Clearnet to change its 
collateral management approach. 
 
On the one hand, the domestic-level explanations, which bring together contribution from 
orthodox economics, political science and political economy, ascribe the deterioration of 
macroeconomic fundamentals to domestic shortcomings: lack of competitiveness 
(Arghyrou and Tsoukalas, 2011; Royo, 2010; Gaulier and Vicard, 2013), unsustainable 
fiscal regimes (Buiter and Rahbari, 2010; Pereira and Wemans, 2012) and different wage 
setting mechanisms, which led to different inflation rates across the euro area (Hancké, 
2013; Johnston et al., 2014: 1794). Other domestic-level studies have examined the role 
played by dysfunctional state practices. These range from corruption, tax evasion and 
clientelism in the case of Greece (see Manolopoulos, 2010), the role of the state in 
undermining the so-called Celtic Tiger in Ireland (see Kirby, 2010), to how the 
fragmented power structure of Italian politics prevented successive governments from 
enacting institutional reforms (Hopkin, 2012).  
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On the other hand, the European-level explanations, comprised primarily of heterodox 
economists (post-Keynesian and Marxists), and institutional economists researching on 
varieties of capitalism, blame the role played by the institutional design of the euro (e.g. 
Lapavitsas, et al., 2012, Stockhammer, 2016; Hall, 2014; Gambarotto and Solari, 2015). 
According to these views, the monetary union is essentially incomplete, lacking both an 
effective system for the supervision and regulation of the financial sector and automatic 
fiscal stabilisers to overcome macroeconomic imbalances. Indeed, the monetary union is 
claimed to have fostered an asymmetric trade regime, which constrained the 
competitiveness of certain European economies, dividing the euro area into an export-
oriented and credit-driven core (Germany and, initially, the Netherlands) and an import-
dependent and debt-driven periphery (Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain) (see Lapavitsas 
et al. 2012; Becker and Jäger 2012; Bellofiore 2013; Stockhammer 2016; c.f. E. Jones 
2016). Other authors make similar claims, yet ascribe economic divergence to the 
irreconcilable integration between Northern and Southern European varieties of 
capitalism (see Hall 2014; Gambarotto and Solari 2015). 
 
Despite their differences, both group of scholars ultimately claim that it was primarily the 
deterioration of macroeconomic fundamentals that contributed to raising concerns among 
market participants about the public debt servicing sustainability of the euro area’s 
periphery, leading to bond sell-offs that widened the spreads. That is because, as investors 
feared default of a given sovereign, they got rid of that country’s government debt in 
order to reduce their exposure. As concisely put by Pepino: 
 
For Eurozone countries…bond spreads to Germany are generally considered to 
reflect outright default risk perceptions (Pepino, 2015: 10, emphasis added, see 
also De Grauwe and Ji, 2012) 
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In other words, spread movements are used as a proxy for investors’ default risk 
perception. However, a number of authors have taken significant steps towards showing 
that it was not simply the deterioration of macroeconomic fundamentals that led to 
widening spreads. Some economists and financial economics have argued that, since the 
onset of the crisis in Greece, fear of sovereign default spread to Ireland, Portugal, Italy 
and Spain not because of deteriorating fundamentals per se, but because of investors’ 
doubts about the potential future public debt servicing ability of these countries (e.g. 
Pagano, 2010, De Grauwe and Ji, 2013; Arghyrou and Kontonikas, 2012). This is often 
referred to as fear of default contagion. 
 
The financial economics literature assesses this dynamic in a more explicit manner. Some 
scholars in this group are perfectly in line with the rest of the literature discussed above, 
arguing that it is mainly changes in fundamentals that affect investors’ perception of 
default risk in the euro area and, therefore, the spreads (e.g. Maltritz, 2012; Hilscher and 
Nosbusch, 2010). However, later studies have demonstrated that risk perception towards 
sovereign debt in the euro area is not fixed, but time-dependant, in that the investors’ 
sensitivity to deteriorating fundamentals increased after the 2007-08 global financial 
meltdown (e.g. Oliveira et al., 2012; Beirne and Fratzscher, 2013). Some others, like De 
Grauwe and Ji (2013) and Aizenman et al. (2013), go even further to argue that part of 
the widening of the spreads from 2010 to 2012 was completely unrelated to changes in 
macroeconomic fundamentals. Rather, these spread movements were due to a sudden 
negative sentiment towards sovereign debt servicing sustainability, which is related to the 
constraints imposed by a monetary union like the euro area, lacking fiscal unity and 
unilateral debt guarantee. In short, despite the move beyond fundamentals, financial 
economists also anchor their analyses on an underlying interpretation of market behaviour 
as driven primarily by concerns regarding sovereign solvency during the euro crisis.  
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Differently from these approaches, the analysis conducted in this project enables us to 
understand another extremely important, yet neglected aspect surrounding the unfolding 
of the euro crisis: how spread movements also indicated the extent to which sovereign 
bonds mattered to investors with respect to their funding needs. The rest of this chapter 
is structured as follows.  
 
Section 1.2 explores the segment of the literature that most explicitly recognises 
macroeconomic imbalances at the root of the crisis, which is divided between domestic-
level and European-level explanations. This section will pay a great deal of attention to 
Greece. Even though Greece is not one of the case studies examined in Chapter 5 of this 
project, the fiscal dimension of its crisis is worth examining in detail because it played a 
key role in fostering an understanding of the euro crisis as closely linked to markets’ 
concerns with sovereign solvency. Section 1.3 examines the financial economics 
literature, which also focuses on fundamentals, but then moves on to explore the 
unpredictability of market behaviour during the euro crisis. Section 1.4 introduces 
liquidity and the functioning of the European repo market as a lens through which to 
understand market behaviour at the height of the euro crisis. Section 1.5 is dedicated to 
the concluding remarks, which are that the literature tends to employ spread only in 
relation to the markets’ perception of sovereign default risk, largely neglecting the 
dimension surrounding liquidity. 
 
1.2 Macroeconomic imbalances and the euro crisis 
 
A significant part of the literature on the euro crisis examines the macroeconomic 
imbalances that exposed certain euro area economies (Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain 
and Italy) to sovereign bond market turmoil in the aftermath of the GFC. Economists, 
political scientists and political economists belonging to this category identify the 
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deterioration of macroeconomic fundamentals as one of the key drivers that raised 
concerns among market participants about the sovereign debt servicing sustainability 
(and thus of sovereign default) of governments in the euro area in the aftermath of the 
financial crisis. On the one hand, scholars have pointed to different factors that have 
contributed to the development of said macroeconomic imbalances. On the other hand, 
some orthodox economists have also acknowledged the existence of psychologically-
driven behaviour, detached from fundamentals, which presumably influenced investors’ 
concerns with sovereign default beyond Greece. This section of the literature provides 
what I call ‘domestic-level’ and ‘European-level’ explanations. I will examine the former 
first.  
 
1.2.1 Domestic-level explanations 
 
The domestic-level explanations ascribe the deterioration of macroeconomic 
fundamentals to domestic shortcomings, including lack of competitiveness, unsustainable 
fiscal regimes, corruption and different wage setting mechanisms. Let us begin where the 
euro crisis is regarded to have started: Greece. I should provide an explanation as to why 
Greece is examined in so much detail in this chapter, while it does not belong to my list 
of case studies. This project examines the interconnection between sovereign debt, repo-
based interbank funding and CCPs as an explanatory tool for understanding part of the 
wave in bond sell-offs from 2010 to 2012, which caused a dramatic widening in the 
spreads of specific countries in the euro area. In order to achieve these objectives, the 
main empirical chapter conducting this assessment (Chapter 5) looks at the involvement 
of LCH.Clearnet in the European repo market during the euro crisis. While dealing with 
Irish, Portuguese, Italian and Spanish government securities, LCH.Clearnet was not 
clearing Greek sovereign bonds at the time (Burke, 2011). Thus, whereas LCH.Clearnet’s 
involvement during the euro crisis allows an evaluation of the impact of its actions in the 
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Irish, Portuguese, Italian and Spanish repo-based interbank funding markets, a similar 
analysis cannot be carried out for Greece.  
 
Yet, the unfolding of the Greek crisis is important to examine because its fiscal dimension 
established the first wave of domestic-level studies blaming fiscal misconduct, which 
remains key to understanding the literature’s and policymakers’ fixation with sovereign 
solvency as the main driver for spread during the euro crisis. Indeed, even those who put 
the emphasis on European-level factors tend to acknowledge the domestic weaknesses of 
the Greek economy and how these contributed to the crisis, particularly with respect to 
endemic corruption and fiscal mismanagement (e.g. Katsimi and and Moutos, 2010; 
Featherstone, 2011). In turn, I argue that the origins and unfolding of the Greek crisis 
around its fiscal dimension played an important role in the development of the 
conventional wisdom of spread as being an indication of markets’ concern with sovereign 
default. 
 
1.2.1.1 Greece 
 
In the case of Greece, almost all of the abovementioned domestic issues are highlighted 
to have contributed to the country’s descent into crisis. For example, deteriorating 
competitiveness was accounted for by orthodox economists as one of the key factors that 
made Greece too weak to resist the external shocks caused by the GFC, which 
compromised the country’s GDP growth and tax revenues when credit halted (e.g. 
Arghyrou and Tsoukalas, 2011; Buiter and Rahbari, 2010). Greece’s lack of 
competitiveness stems from its debt-led economic model adopted in the run up to the 
euro. This model emerged following a number of economic reforms conducted since the 
second half of the 1980s as a means to join the single currency, which were aimed at 
liberalising credit creation and fostering investments in public infrastructure (see OECD, 
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1994). Nevertheless, together with the decline of the industrial sector, the investments 
that flowed into Greece’s newly investment-friendly economy were largely channelled to 
the non-tradable sector, primarily private consumption, which made the economy less 
competitive and led to the accumulation of significant trade deficits (see Markantonatou, 
2012).  
 
Upon joining the euro, however, competitiveness and trade deficits would deteriorate 
even further. The low interest rate regime introduced with the Treaty of Maastricht 
allowed for cheap cross-border borrowing to push debt-led private consumption to record 
levels (see Polychroniou, 2013). Thus, while Greece’s GDP grew at a staggering 3.5% 
rate yearly since joining the Economic and Monetary Union of the European Union 
(EMU) (only behind Ireland), its current account deficit doubled, and its annual average 
credit growth rate was among the highest in the euro area (see Pagoulatos and Quaglia, 
2013). In addition, Greece’s recurrently higher-than-the-EMU average inflation rate since 
joining the single currency, together with much higher increases in real wages than the 
rest of the euro area, also negatively impacted the country’s purchasing power parity. In 
turn, declining purchasing power parity led to a loss in competitiveness vis-à-vis other 
countries in the euro area, while contributing to the accumulation of large current account 
deficits (Arghyrou and Kontonikas, 2012). The debt- and deficit- driven model of 
Greece’s economy helps to explain why it had lost much competitiveness, which made 
the country particularly vulnerable to the credit crunch that followed the GFC (Dooley, 
2015: 96). However, what sets Greece apart from the other countries discussed in the 
literature is the more distinctive fiscal dimension, an issue which has been extensively 
examined by both orthodox and Keynesian economists (e.g. Baldwin et al., 2015; 
Arghyrou and Tsoukalas, 2011; Krugman, 2011). 
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Indeed, among the economies of the euro area that received the largest financial assistance 
programs during the euro crisis (Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain), Greece was the 
only country whose public finances have been considered as largely unsustainable in the 
run-up to the crisis (see Buiter and Rahbari, 2010; Arghyrou and Tsoukalas, 2011; 
Krugman, 2011). The literature has ascribed the growing fiscal imbalances during the two 
decades prior to the GFC to the close ties between political parties and industrial interest 
groups. Since coming into power in 1981, the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) 
began implementing a range of socioeconomic policies.  
 
These massively expanded the state enterprise, raised social spending and wages through 
public borrowing as a means for gathering popular party consensus (see Dooley, 2015: 
68; see also Manolopoulos, 2011). Thus, throughout the 1990s and the 2000s, the Greek 
state began providing generous entitlements and other age-related benefits, while also 
fostering a poor administration for tax collection and a ‘bloated public sector’, all of 
which are considered to have contributed to the deterioration of Greece’s fiscal position 
(Buiter and Rahbari, 2010: 3). By 2009, Greece’s budget- and public-debt-to-GDP 
positions were among the worst in the euro area, at around 13.5% and 11.5% respectively. 
It should be pointed out, however, that year-to-year fiscal deterioration and increase in 
public debt-to-GDP ratios before the onset of the GFC were certainly not unique to 
Greece, or the euro area for that matter, affecting other large world economies like the 
US and the United Kingdom (UK) (ibid).  
 
However, the case of Greece was distinctive in that growing deficits and debt took place 
against the backdrop of extensive cases of corruption and clientelism. In exchange for 
political support, PASOK’s (and, later, also New Democracy’s) close connection to 
various industrial interest groups allowed for the provision of generous state subsidies. 
This was particularly the case with farmers, who ended up receiving around €570 per 
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hectare in public subsidies in 2009, more than twice the EU average of €250 
(Manolopoulos, 2011: 90).  
 
Further, in 2009 PASOK swiftly responded to interest group protests with more generous 
subsidies in the form of minimum guaranteed prices for agricultural products, freezes on 
loan repayments, tax-free fuels and pension increases. Additional cash-subsidies were 
also provided: €75m subsidies to cotton producers, €100m to wheat producers, and €75m 
of immediate funds available through the Agricultural Bank of Greece, totalling around 
€500m in subsidies that year (see Bloomberg, 2009). As noted by Manolopoulos (2011: 
90), these kinds of subsidies were not unique to 2009, as it was a trend that had lasted 
throughout the previous 20 years, where successive Greek governments provided easy 
subsidies in the aftermath of protests in order to preserve political consensus. 
 
Nevertheless, it was not just the accumulation of large fiscal deficits per se that raised 
doubts about Greece’s public debt servicing sustainability, but also that in 2009 and 2010 
the deficit figures were revised to be much higher than initially thought. Following a snap 
election on 4 October 2009, the new government led by PASOK’s Papandreou provided 
a revised figure for the country’s budget deficit for that year to 12.7% of GDP, up from 
the previous official calculation of 6%. The announcement of the revised deficit figure 
has been considered as the most immediate trigger for the euro crisis, because of the 
impact it had in creating sudden panic among financial market participants. As put by 
Baldwin et al., ‘[e]very crisis has a trigger. In Europe, it was revelation of the Greek 
‘deficit deceit’’ (Baldwin et al., 2015: 7). Just a few months later, in April 2010, the 
government provided another revision to that figure, bringing it up to 13.7%.  
 
In short, within a matter of months, official budget deficit figures for Greece more than 
doubled, which raised sudden panic in financial markets about Greece’s fiscal 
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sustainability within the context of the on-going credit crunch. The revision of Greece’s 
deficit figures was followed both by credit rating downgrades from the world’s largest 
credit rating agencies (CRAs) (Moody’s; Fitch and Standard and Poor’s) and, as shown 
in figure 1, by a large widening of the Greek 10-year sovereign spread against Germany, 
precisely between November 2009 and April 2010. 
 
(Fig. 1) Greece’s 10-year sovereign bond yield spread against Germany (in %) 
Source: Eurostat, own compilation. 
 
Indeed, credit rating downgrades have been deemed pivotal in the widening of the Greek 
spread, because they provided investors with an increased default risk assessment for 
Greek sovereign bonds (see De Santis, 2012). Thus, the conventional wisdom in the 
literature is that the widening of the Greek spread during the euro crisis indicated rising 
concerns among investors of the fiscal sustainability of the Greek government, against 
the backdrop of decades of fiscal irresponsibility (e.g. Buiter and Rahbari, 2010; De 
Santis, 2012; Arghyrou and Tsoukalas, 2011; Pepino, 2015). 
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Without a doubt, Germany’s withdrawal of an implicit, unconditional guarantee on Greek 
debt contributed to crystallising fears among investors of a possible Greek sovereign 
default, which therefore can be considered as another crucial factor that led to the 
deterioration of market confidence towards sovereign solvency. As noted by Arghyrou 
and Tsoukalas (2011), amid increasing pressure on Greek sovereign bonds the German 
government made it clear in February and March 2010 that they would not be prepared 
to bail out Greece unconditionally. Such position by German authorities led to further 
downward pressure on Greece’s government bonds, which, as shown in figure 1, led to 
an acceleration in the widening of the Greek spread, because it ‘introduced a previously 
non-existent default risk’ (Arghyru and Tsoukalas, 2011: 181). 
 
In other words, the literature recognises the fiscal position and debt sustainability of the 
Greek government before and during the crisis as the key factors that underpinned its 
sovereign debt crisis. More importantly, for the sake of this project, the Greek crisis 
established the blueprint for understanding spread as a reflection of market behaviour 
during the crisis as being primarily driven by sovereign default fears. This can be best 
exemplified by showing how the literature has often made references to fear of sovereign 
default contagion from Greece to other countries in the euro area (e.g. Buiter and Rahbari, 
2010; Beirne and Fratzscher, 2013; Pepino, 2015; De Grauwe and Ji, 2012; Hall, 2012; 
Lane, 2012).  
 
Fear of default contagion during the euro crisis seeks to provide an explanation as to how 
investors’ fears that the sovereign debt markets distress affecting Greece could spill over 
to other euro area economies, which in turn became reflected in the widening of their 
respective spreads (figure 2). The timeframe between the beginning of 2010 and summer 
2012 represents what I describe as the height of the euro crisis, the period when sovereign 
debt market turmoil intensified beyond Greece. As clearly evidenced in the figure below, 
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although spread spikes occurred for each country at different points in time, they also 
overlapped at specific moments; particularly for Ireland and Portugal at the end of 2010 
and summer 2011, and for Italy and Spain at the end of 2011 and July 2012.  
 
(Fig. 2) 10-year sovereign bond yield spreads in the euro area against Germany (in 
%) 
 
Source: Eurostat, own calculations. 
 
Sovereign debt market contagion during the euro crisis, illustrated by looking at spreads 
trends in the euro area, is understood as having taken place against the backdrop of the 
self-fulfilling fear that sovereign default would spread from Greece, affecting one country 
after another (e.g. Pagano, 2010; Constâncio, 2012; De Grauwe and Ji, 2013). The 
processes underpinning this self-fulfilling dynamic will be explored in more detail in 
Section 1.3. For the moment, it is important to retain that contagion in the euro crisis 
literature is understood with explicit reference to fear of default, which began from 
Greece and affected, in turn, Ireland, Portugal, Italy and Spain, widening those countries’ 
spreads (e.g. Pagano, 2010; Arghyrou and Kontonikas, 2012). 
 
0.00
5.00
10.00
15.00
20.00
25.00
30.00
20
10
M
01
20
10
M
02
20
10
M
03
20
10
M
04
20
10
M
05
20
10
M
06
20
10
M
07
20
10
M
08
20
10
M
09
20
10
M
10
20
10
M
11
20
10
M
12
20
11
M
01
20
11
M
02
20
11
M
03
20
11
M
04
20
11
M
05
20
11
M
06
20
11
M
07
20
11
M
08
20
11
M
09
20
11
M
10
20
11
M
11
20
11
M
12
20
12
M
01
20
12
M
02
20
12
M
03
20
12
M
04
20
12
M
05
20
12
M
06
20
12
M
07
20
12
M
08
Ireland Greece Spain Italy Portugal
 54 
Indeed, as put by economist Pagano, when addressing the question of contagion during 
the euro crisis: 
 
As the Greek crisis unfolded, investors started to suspect that other countries with 
high levels of public debt, namely Portugal, Spain and Italy, would find 
themselves in a similar situation. But as governments of these countries rushed to 
point out, their fiscal position is not as dramatic as the Greek on. So why are 
investors so concerned? Because, as economists say, in this game between 
sovereign states and investors there can be “multiple equilibria”. Even if the 
government is not highly indebted, investors might start questioning its 
willingness to raise taxes above a level considered “politically sustainable”. In the 
future, it might seek a renegotiation of the debt, its monetisation, or both. Fear 
that this will happen can push interest rates to a level so high that the investors’ 
prophecy will eventually come true. At the prevailing interest rates a country 
which would have otherwise been able to service its debt ends up needing a 
renegotiation or a monetisation of the debt to avoid full repayment. So the outcome 
depends on investors’ confidence. If there is confidence, the “good equilibrium” 
with moderate interest rates and stable markets prevails; when confidence 
disappears, the economy jumps to a “bad equilibrium”, where a fiscal crisis 
occurs. The contagion generated by Greek crisis has been exactly of this type. It 
has weakened investors’ confidence in countries which would have otherwise 
been in a safe situation. Moreover, the burden of Greek bail-out itself is affecting 
negatively the fiscal position of Portugal, Spain, and Italy. This too may have 
contributed to weaken confidence in their ability to service the debt (Pagano, 
2010: 1-2, emphasis added). 
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In short, according to this view, the Greek experience of the euro crisis with its strong 
fiscal dimension eroded market confidence in the future public debt sustainability of other 
economies in the euro area. The fears of default that spilled over to Ireland, Portugal, 
Spain and Italy became reflected in rising interest rates in the countries affected by this 
contagion dynamic, widening their respective spreads against the German bund. As also 
put by the Governor of the Central Bank of Ireland, Philip Lane:  
 
[t]his revelation of extreme violation of the euro’s fiscal rules on the part of 
Greece also shaped an influential political narrative of the crisis, which laid the 
primary blame on the fiscal irresponsibility of the peripheral nations, even though 
the underlying financial and macroeconomic imbalances were more important 
factors. These adverse developments were reflected in rising spreads on sovereign 
bonds Lane, (2012: 56, emphasis added). 
 
Indeed, as we shall see below, even for those countries whose fiscal dimensions were not 
as much of an explanatory variable for the crisis as Greece’s, spread movements as a 
reflection of sovereign default fears remained a central analytical lens to understand the 
unfolding of their crises. Furthermore, it is worth pointing out that acknowledging fear of 
default contagion in countries that did not have such negative fiscal positions as Greece 
hints at a type of market behaviour that is detached from fundamentals. Rather, it is a type 
of market behaviour that is driven by psychological motivations under uncertainty, which 
recalls the analyses by Keynes of financial behaviour and Minsky’s financial instability 
hypothesis (see Dow, 2009). The issue of spread movement during the euro crisis as 
disconnected from fundamentals will be explored in more detail in Section 1.3. 
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The analysis will now continue to examine how domestic-level explanations of the crisis, 
focused on the deterioration of macroeconomic fundamentals, were also prominent in the 
study of the Irish, Portuguese, Spanish and Italian crises. 
 
1.2.1.2 Spain 
 
Royo (2010) argues that differences in fiscal consolidation and trade competitiveness 
helps explaining the growing economic divergence between Portugal and Spain between 
2000 and 2007, which contributed to the onset of the crisis in Spain.  Whereas Spain had 
been growing much faster than Portugal during the 2000s, the economic reforms 
implemented by the Sócrates government, such as the extensive privatisations and fiscal 
consolidation undertaken between 2006 and 2009, placed Portugal in a better position (at 
least initially) to tackle the international credit crunch that followed the 2007-2008 
subprime mortgage crisis in the US (see Reis, 2013). To an important extent, Spain’s slide 
into crisis has been ascribed to the loss of a significant amount of competitiveness. By 
having channelled large amounts of foreign investment into the non-tradable sector, 
particularly construction, this type of growth model allowed a real-estate bubble to make 
the Spanish economy more prone to external shocks (e.g. Gabrisch and Staehr, 2015).  
 
It should be noted, however, that loss of competitiveness was not unique to Spain, as it 
was also a factor, as discussed above, in Greece, as well as in Ireland, Italy and Portugal. 
Although relatively lower competitiveness has often been attributed to differences in 
export performances in the euro area between the surplus core and deficit peripheral 
countries2, economists have argued that it is was actually the faster increase in unit labour 
                                                        
2 In the euro crisis literature, the core/periphery dichotomy emerged to differentiate between counties of 
the euro area that had accumulated, on the one hand, large trade surpluses (Germany, France and, initially, 
the Netherlands) and, on the other hand, large trade deficits (Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain). 
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costs in the non-tradable sector of the deficit countries that eroded competitiveness, rather 
than poor export performance (e.g. Gaulier and Vicard, 2013; c.f. Gabrisch and Staehr, 
2015).  
 
This argument has been supported by comparative political scientists, as well as post-
Keynesian and Marxist economists (e.g. Johnston et al., 2014; Lapavitsas et al., 2012; 
Lucarelli, 2011) who claim that the different wage-setting mechanism in the euro area is 
a key contributor that eroded competitiveness in the deficit countries3. Indeed, Johnston 
et al. (2014) argue that the corporatist institutional settings in the core of the euro area 
have developed sectoral collective bargaining agreements that have restrained wage 
growth, limiting demand-driven inflationary pressures and thus improving trade 
competitiveness, a mechanism that is also known as internal devaluation (see also 
Stockhammer and Sotiropoulos, 2014)4.  
 
Lacking equivalent (or at least not as effective) wage-restraining mechanisms, the authors 
conclude that the European periphery was more exposed to the credit crunch that hit the 
euro area after the GFC. This is because weak competitiveness negatively impacted the 
European periphery’s economic growth the most when credit halted, raising concerns 
among market participants about sovereign debt servicing sustainability, as reflected in 
the widening of their spreads (Johnston et al., 2014: 1772). In short, the difference in 
                                                        
3 It should be noted that the difficulty for peripheral countries to introduce stricter wage-setting mechanisms 
has also to do with the periphery having generally worse real wages and welfare states compared to the 
core (see Lapavitsas et al., 2012: 4). 
4 Internal devaluation is an economic policy option that seeks to improve international competitiveness, 
primarily by reducing labour costs through wage suppression or by reducing other indirect costs on the part 
of the employer. In the euro area, as will be explained in Section 1.2.2, internal devaluation was achieved 
largely by means of wage suppression in the periphery (see Lucarelli, 2011; Lapavitsas et al., 2012; 
Stockhammer and Sotiropoulos, 2014). 
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wage-growth rates in the euro area between the deficit peripheral and surplus core 
countries is a key element for understanding the dynamics of the crisis. Furthermore, 
differences in wage-setting mechanisms as a key contributor to macroeconomic 
imbalances is an important point because it has also been retained by the European-level 
explanations discussed in the next section, although through a different lens.  
 
Returning to Spain, when the construction sector collapsed in the aftermath of the 2008 
credit crunch, by 2011 Spanish banks had accumulated around €405bn in bad loans, 
which were connected to real estate (see Quaglia and Royo, 2015: 492). Crucially, the 
Spanish housing bubble was closely linked to foreign capital, in the sense that domestic 
banks were channelling large amounts of lending from other European banks into 
speculative investments in real estate by providing cheap lending to the mortgage market 
(Royo, 2010). 
 
Although the initiatives developed by the Bank of Spain during the crisis initially 
prevented a collapse of the banking system5, the lack of interbank funding, brought about 
by the credit crunch, eventually made the housing bubble burst, triggering a banking crisis 
that forced the Spanish economy through a period of dramatic downturn. Indeed, as will 
be discussed in more detail in Chapter 5, the ways in which the real estate sector had 
underpinned the growth of the Spanish economy as a whole meant that its collapse also 
spelled a period of recession. Thus, the economic downturn and the extensive programs 
of bank recapitalisations between the end of 2011 and throughout 2012 reduced tax 
revenue and simultaneously increased the budget deficit. According to the literature, this 
made investors question the public-debt servicing sustainability of the Spanish 
government, as reflected in the widening of the country’s spreads (see Arghyrou and 
                                                        
5 The Bank of Spain introduced regulatory provisions for Spanish banks to have higher capital requirements 
dedicated to absorbing losses incurring from the GFC at the time (see Royo, 2013). 
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Kontonikas, 2012; Pepino, 2015; see also IMF, 2012: 15). Indeed, as shown in figure 3, 
the height of the Spanish crisis (end of 2011 throughout 2012) was matched by a widening 
of the Spanish spreads. 
 
(Fig. 3) Spain’s 10-year sovereign bond yield spread against Germany (in %) 
 
Source: Eurostat, own calculations. 
 
To sum up, the strong rate of economic growth experienced by Spain developed at the 
expense of the country’s declining competitiveness, the weakness of which manifested in 
the bursting of the housing bubble and banking crisis that followed the GFC. Thus, even 
though the Spanish crisis did not initially contain a fiscal dimension, the bursting of the 
housing bubble and the banking crisis still had repercussions on the public debt servicing 
sustainability of the Spanish government, leading investors to ask for higher interest rates 
when trading the country’s sovereign bonds, and so widening the spread. 
 
While the ways in which the banking dimension of the Spanish crisis has impacted the 
economy as a whole have certainly been examined in detail, the ways in which spread 
hikes during that time were linked to funding needs has not received sufficient attention. 
Chapter 5 will expand upon this dynamic, to demonstrate that some of the large spread 
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spikes in 2012 were also closely linked to the interaction between sovereign debt, bank 
funding and CCPs. 
 
1.2.1.3 Portugal 
 
Deteriorating competitiveness was also recognised as an issue in Portugal by new 
Keynesian economists and rational choice political economists (e.g. Reis, 2013; Lagoa et 
al., 2014). Although Portugal did not experience a speculative bubble and has generally 
witnessed relatively lower levels of economic growth compared to the rest of the euro 
area, foreign investments were nevertheless channelled to non-tradables. Much like for 
Greece and Spain, this investment strategy took resources away from the tradable sector, 
compromising the competitiveness of the Portuguese economy throughout the 2000s (see 
Reis, 2013).  
 
The economic performance of Portugal after joining the EMU is an interesting case with 
respect to the unfolding dynamics of the euro crisis, especially when compared to Greece, 
Ireland and Spain. Paraphrasing a Deutsche Bank report (2010), the Portuguese economy 
overheated without accelerating. This expression seeks to describe that, despite showing 
all the signs of strong economic development, such as increased private and commercial 
lending, consumption and investment, Portugal failed to translate these into concrete GDP 
growth (see Dooley, 2015: 106). Indeed, differently from Greece, Spain and, as we shall 
see below, Ireland, all of which experienced strong booms after the adoption of the euro, 
Portugal went through a period of economic recession.  
 
Despite enjoying strong GDP growth between the late 1980s and 2000, experiencing the 
EU’s fastest growth rate after Ireland and Luxembourg during that time (see IMF, 2002), 
the Portuguese economy underwent a slump after joining the EMU. In order to implement 
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the policy prescription of the Single European Act (SEA)6, a European initiative aimed 
at liberalising financial markets and removing barriers to trade, Portugal proactively 
liberalised its regulatory frameworks around banking activities to improve capital 
mobility (see Leao and Palacio-Vera, 2011). Indeed, until the 1980s, the Portuguese 
banking sector was built upon extensive state intervention, featuring fixed interest rates 
and providing financing to specific industries (see Dooley, 2015: 121).  
 
Following the reforms, Portugal experienced a dramatic expansion in credit-based 
consumer spending, which greatly accounted for the country’s economic growth during 
the 1990s. According to Lagoa et al. (2014: 15), private consumption accounted for 
66.6% of the GDP growth in Portugal between 1995-2000 (out of 3.6% GDP growth, 
2.4% was ascribable to private consumption), whereas net exports accounted for a 
staggering -0.9%. In short, much more similar to Greece than Spain in this respect, 
Portuguese banks channelled large amounts of foreign capital primarily into private 
consumption and infrastructure, which compromised the country’s competitiveness vis-
à-vis its European counterparts. Often described as debt-led domestic demand growth 
(e.g. Rodrigues and Reis, 2012), the Portuguese model was essentially built around 
stimulating domestic consumption through the expansion of credit.  
 
Differently from Spain and Greece, however, the Portuguese economy went through a 
slump throughout the 2000s. As investments ended up funding unproductive companies 
in the non-tradable sector, including construction but primarily retail and privatised 
utilities companies, funds were taken away from the tradable sector, which did not lead 
to a significant acceleration in economic performance. Upon joining the EMU, net 
                                                        
6 The Single European Act came into force in 1987 and is highly significant insofar as it was the first 
concrete attempt at establishing a European single market. Most notably, it required signatories of the treaty 
to undertake steps to reduce trade barriers and liberalise capital movement (Single European Act, 1987). 
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borrowing began to rise even more, as Portugal became increasingly financially 
integrated with other European economies, while productivity and growth slowed down 
(see Reis, 2013). Hence, when the GFC hit, Portugal was particularly exposed to the halt 
in international capital flows. Because of its overly credit-dependant, domestic-demand 
driven and stagnant performance, the Portuguese economy became severely hit by the 
credit crunch, which exerted significant pressure on the country’s domestic banks.  
 
An interesting aspect of studies on the Portuguese crisis is how they are framed around 
markets’ suddenly increased fears of sovereign default (e.g. Pereira and Wemans, 2012: 
18; Lagoa et al., 2014: 61; see also Reis, 2013). This is one of the instances in which the 
Greek blueprint for understanding the euro crisis as essentially a confidence crisis in 
public debt servicing sustainability is evidenced more clearly. As shown in figure 4, 
whereas the downturn generated by Portuguese banks’ exposure to international credit 
lines led to a recession in 2009, which greatly reduced tax revenues, it was not until 
Greece and Ireland had to resort to external financial assistance in 2010 and 2011 that 
Portuguese’s spreads took a decisively upwards trend. 
 
The orthodox economics literature on the Portuguese crisis explains this dynamic as 
follows. Following the unfolding of the Greek debacle and, particularly, the Irish crisis, 
investors started questioning the public debt servicing sustainability of the Portuguese 
sovereign amid declining GDP growth and tax revenues (e.g. Pereira and Wemans, 2012; 
Kalbaska and Gątkowski, 2012; Arghyrou and Kontonikas, 2012). As a matter of fact, 
Portugal had been considered the ‘most vulnerable’ country in the euro area to sovereign 
debt markets contagion dynamics during the euro crisis, where contagion is understood 
as cross-country shock transmission channel during times of financial distress (Kalbaska 
and Gątkowski, 2012). As the eroding confidence in the sovereign debt servicing 
sustainability of the Portuguese government extended from Greece and Ireland, investors 
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began large-scale sell-offs of Portuguese government securities in 2010, which widened 
the Portuguese spread. 
 
(Fig. 4) Portugal’s 10-year sovereign bond yield spread against Germany (in %) 
 
Source: Eurostat, own compilation. 
 
Thus, the widening spread in the case of Portugal in 2011 has been described as an 
indication of the heightened credit risk (i.e. default risk) posed by Portuguese government 
securities in a struggling economy (Pereira and Wemans, 2012: 18; Lagoa et al., 2014: 
61; see also Reis, 2013). However, as I will demonstrate in Chapter 5, the sudden hikes 
in the Portuguese spread in 2011 and the rising trends in the following months were 
caused, to an important degree, by LCH.Clearnet’s collateral management practices in 
the European interbank repo market. 
 
1.2.1.4 Ireland 
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Much like Greece, Spain and Portugal, orthodox economics and rational choice political 
economy research on Ireland ascribes the deterioration of fundamentals to investments in 
the non-tradable sector, which led the country into crisis (e.g Lane, 2011: 60; Lane, 2012: 
56; De Santis, 2012; Pepino, 2015). Similar to Greece, Ireland experienced remarkable 
growth rates following its entrance to the EMU, among one of the highest in the euro 
area. However, much of the Irish economic boom of the 2000s marked a significant break 
from the growth model of the 1990s, known as the Celtic Tiger (see Kirby, 2010). During 
the 1990s, Ireland had experienced a massive influx of foreign direct investment from US 
multinationals, particularly pharmaceutical and tech companies, which greatly 
contributed to improve Ireland’s competitiveness, boosting its exports. Ireland’s reliance 
on US multinationals was so significant that their sales alone contributed to over 40% of 
the country’s GDP growth between 1990 and 1995 (see O’Hearn, 1998).  
 
However, before joining the euro, Ireland had implemented a number of economic 
policies that aimed at ‘injecting untapped capital into the economy’, which contributed to 
a radical change in the direction of Ireland’s economic growth trajectory (Dooley, 2015: 
147). Indeed, by 1998, the Fianna Fáil-Progressive Democrat coalition government had 
halved capital gains tax and helped to channel these large amounts of foreign capital into 
the property, construction and mortgage markets (ibid). To a significant extent, the reason 
why financing was channelled to real estate has to do with the close personal ties between 
Fianna Fáil government figures and bankers, property developers and construction 
companies (see Dellepiane et al., 2013). A large number of Fianna Fáil’s political donors 
were, in fact, also among some of the biggest names in Irish property development (see 
Byrne, 2012).  
 
Simultaneously, financial liberalisation in Ireland happened alongside as the EMU’s low 
interest rate regime, which allowed for cheap borrowing to massively expand the Irish 
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mortgage market and, consequently, household indebtedness. The extensive lending by 
Irish banks during those years generated a property bubble between 2003 and 2009 (see 
Lane, 2012). Equally important, the housing bubble became so central that it underpinned 
other sectors of the Irish economy (Norris and Byrne, 2015). Thus, for much of the 2000s, 
‘domestic demand replaced export as the main driver of Ireland’s economic growth’ 
(Dooley, 2015: 166). However, as the economy began to shift from export towards the 
property market and construction throughout the 2000s, Ireland went from having an 
almost balanced current account to accumulating large trade deficits almost continuously 
between 2001 and 2009. These deficits were financed by the increased exposure of Irish 
banks to international credit lines, which essentially underpinned Irish growth during the 
first decade of the euro. 
 
Given Ireland’s dependence on external financing to support its domestic demand and 
construction growth, the 2008 credit crunch that followed the GFC severely hurt its 
economy, experiencing a decline of roughly 21% of its GDP between 2008 and 2010 (see 
Lane, 2011: 59). The collapse in property prices and the decline in construction activities 
caused huge losses to the Irish banking system, which had financed the boom in the first 
place. As the economy fell into recession, Ireland also underwent a period of fiscal 
deterioration. Following several years of budget surpluses, the Irish budget developed a 
deficit of 30% of GDP in 2010. In part, this was also caused by successive banking 
recapitalisation efforts (see Hendrikse, 2013).  
 
As shown in figure 5, by the end of 2010 the Irish spread began to widen, which the 
domestic-level literature has interpreted as the financial markets’ declining confidence in 
Ireland’s fiscal sustainability, health of its banking sector and the overall status of the 
country’s economy (e.g. Lane, 2011: 60; Lane, 2012: 56; De Santis, 2012; Pepino, 2015).  
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(Fig. 5) Ireland’s 10-year sovereign bond yield spread against Germany (in %) 
 
Source: Eurostat, own calculations. 
 
Thus, the abovementioned studies argue that it is within the shift from an export-oriented 
to a debt-led domestic demand model that the Irish crisis was rooted. The shift led to a 
speculative bubble that eroded Ireland’s competitiveness, which eventually impacted the 
Irish government’s finances and the rest of the economy, failing to keep spreads under 
control. 
 
Yet, and very similar to Portugal in this respect, as I will show in Chapter 5 the spread 
hikes and trends that affected Ireland in 2011 were largely due to LCH.Clearnet’s 
increases in collateral requirements, which led to bond-sell offs of Irish securities amid 
funding concerns. 
 
1.2.1.5 Italy 
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A domestic lens has also been used extensively in the case of Italy, in order to examine 
the sovereign debt market turmoil that hit the country in 2011. However, it should be 
noted that Italy is distinctive from the other countries discussed. First, unlike Greece, 
Ireland, Portugal and Spain, Italy did not have to resort to any form of external financial 
assistance. Second, and also contrary to those countries, Italy did not receive such a large 
amount of capital inflow after joining the single currency and did not develop any sort of 
speculative bubble in the years leading up to the crisis. That was largely due to Italy’s 
conservative banking structure, whereby domestic banks did not finance construction to 
the same extent of Ireland and Spain and were not lending primarily to small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs) (see Quaglia and Royo, 2015). 
 
However, between the end of 2011 and the summer of 2012, Italy underwent a period of 
serious sovereign debt market distress, as well as an important political transition. Given 
the size of its economy and, most importantly, of its sovereign debt market (totalling 
almost €2tr in 2011, or 116% of GDP), Italy has also been examined in the euro crisis 
literature because its sovereign default could have spelled the end of the euro area. Indeed, 
the size of the country’s yearly public debt servicing meant that the Italian government 
was (and remains) simultaneously ‘too big to fail’ as well as ‘too big to bail’ (Hopkin, 
2012: 36). The Italian experience of the euro crisis has been examined primarily by 
political scientists working on comparative politics, political economy and public policy 
as well as institutional economists. These ascribe the onset of the crisis to years of 
anaemic growth and a large stock-pile of public debt and lack of reform capacity, in turn 
the result of Italy’s dysfunctional capitalism (see Hopkin, 2012; Culpepper, 2014; 
Quaglia and Royo 2015; Rangone and Solari, 2012). 
 
Until the 1980s, the Italian economy was more akin to the Southern European model of 
capitalism, which entailed a significant involvement of the state in production activities 
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and market control (Rangone and Solari, 2012; see also Amable, 2003). For example, up 
until the 1970s, large banks in Italy were in public ownership through the state holding 
company Institute for Industrial Reconstruction (IRI), whereas smaller local savings 
banks were controlled by local and regional governments (see Lagna, 2013). In addition, 
Italy’s corporate governance was largely concentrated in the hands of few families, such 
as in the case of Fiat with the Agnellis (see Deeg, 2005). Further, the power structure of 
the Italian economy, fragmented between divided private interests, party politics and the 
collusion between politicians and organised crime, has been argued to have impaired 
Italy’s reform capacity, which prevented the fostering of the country’s growth and for the 
creation of a systematic plan for public debt reduction (Hopkin, 2012; see also Pasquino 
and Valbruzzi, 2012). Rather, despite going through several periods of downsizing, 
particularly through the 1980s, the expansion of state enterprises since the mid-1950s 
significantly added to the general government debt (Segreto, 1998). 
 
A number of reforms aimed at liberalising the economy did not succeed in fully 
transforming the structure of Italian capitalism. For example, the labour market reforms 
and the liberalisation of capital movement of the 1980s did not alter the conservative, 
family-based corporate governance at the root of the Italian economy, (Lagna, 2015; see 
also Culpepper, 2007). Thus, Italian capitalism has been defined as having only partially 
shifted towards the more liberal market model, leaving the country with an inefficient 
model that has crystallised an uneven distribution of economic resources, in turn putting 
a strain on growth (see Rangone and Solari; 2012; see also Bull and Rhodes, 2007). For 
this reason, Italy has also been labelled as a ‘dysfunctional political economy’, making 
direct reference to how its governmental and economic institutions made the country’s 
institutions unable to deal with declining productivity and a diminishing share of the 
world’s exports (see De Cecco, 2007).  
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At the height of the euro crisis in 2011, political tensions in Italy intensified, particularly 
with respect to Berlusconi’s declining support at home as well as in Europe. The literature 
suggests that the fiscal consolidation measures introduced by Berlusconi from the onset 
of the GFC were unsuccessful in staving off markets concerns about the sustainability of 
Italy’s public debt servicing, particularly due to the country’s lack of reform capacity to 
improve its stagnant growth and large stock-pile of public debt, which inevitably led to a 
widening of the Italian spread (see figure 6) (e.g. Hopkin, 2012; Culpepper, 2014; Quaglia 
and Royo 2015).  
 
(Fig. 6) Italy’s 10-year sovereign bond yield spread against Germany (in %) 
 
Source: Eurostat, own calculations. 
 
As argued by European studies scholar Jones, the fiscal consolidation and growth 
stimulation measures introduced by Berlusconi did not succeed in restoring market 
confidence and keeping the country’ spread under control, because the markets 
considered these actions ‘too little, too late’ (Jones, 2012: 7). Indeed, the appointment of 
the technocratic government led by Monti, following the resignation of Berlusconi in 
November 2011, is understood to have been made with sole objective of reducing Italy’s 
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spread and reforming the country’s economy (see Pasquino and Valbruzzi 2012; 
Culpepper, 2014).  
 
In a nutshell, the markets’ deteriorating confidence in the public debt sustainability of the 
Italian government during the euro crisis, reflected in the widening of the spread in 2011, 
has been largely ascribed to the country’s lack of reform capacity with respect to boosting 
growth and lowering public debt. However, as will be discussed in Chapter 5, the 
involvement of LCH.Clearnet in the Italian repo market from 2011 to 2012 caused a 
number of significant spread hikes, largely due to the importance of Italian sovereign debt 
in underpinning the European repo-based interbank lending market, and not just because 
of the country’s perceived heightened default risk. 
 
1.2.2 European-level explanations 
 
Whereas domestic-level explanations attribute the 2010-2012 decline of market 
confidence in the public debt servicing sustainability (and spread of default fears) to 
domestic political and economic developments of the affected countries in the euro area, 
the European-level explanations take a more macro-structural approach to the study of 
the euro crisis. By shedding light on European-level weaknesses, this body of literature 
tends to be more forgiving about the domestic economic and governance issues affecting 
the periphery. This is precisely where the European-level explanations depart from their 
domestic counterparts: whereas the latter mostly condemn domestic economic policy 
making, the former blame how the architecture of the monetary union was designed (or, 
at least, how it integrates incompatible economic systems). However, an important point 
of similarity, highly relevant with respect to the objectives set out in this project, is that 
the EMU design flaws are argued to have led to the same set of macroeconomic 
imbalances as described by the domestic-level explanations above.  
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Another important observation to be made before we delve into the European-level 
explanations has to do with its disciplinary composition and analytical homogeneity. As 
opposed to the domestic-level explanations, which feature a large number of 
contributions from orthodox economists and political scientists, the European-level 
explanations are comprised primarily of research in heterodox economics (post-
Keynesian and Marxist) (e.g. Lapavitsas et al., 2012; Cesaratto, 2014; Stockhammer, 
2016) and institutional economists as well as political scientists conducting research on 
varieties of capitalism (e.g. Hall, 2014; Gambarotto and Solari, 2015). Further, the 
European-level studies are a much more compact and homogenous body of literature than 
the domestic-level explanations, in that they make similar arguments and arrive at 
comparable analytical conclusions.  
 
Nevertheless, the more homogeneity of this body of work does not mean that it should be 
taken as less relevant in the overall debate. The domestic-level explanations received a 
lengthier discussion only because their studies examine in greater detail the distinctive 
history of each individual affected country in the euro area. These were worth reviewing 
in detail in order to show that, despite these explicit differences, fear of default remains a 
central explanatory variable for understanding spread movements during the crisis.  
 
1.2.2.1 The asymmetric design of the EMU 
 
The most widely adopted view within this body of literature is that the asymmetric nature 
of the EMU crystallised in trade imbalances within the euro area. For instance, Lapavitsas 
et al. (2012) argue that the exchange rate at which higher inflation economies joined the 
euro (such as Greece, Italy and Spain) created an outright reduction in the competitiveness 
of these countries against their lower-inflation counterparts (e.g. Germany and the 
Netherlands). However, as monetary sovereignty had been shifted to the ECB and the 
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Stability and Growth Path (SGP) effectively constrained fiscal policy latitude in countries 
participating in the EMU7, competitiveness could therefore largely be achieved through 
internal devaluation, applying downward pressures on wages (see Stockhammer and 
Sotiropoulos, 2014; see also Lucarelli, 2011).  
 
As discussed above, the difference in wage setting mechanisms between the euro area’s 
core and the periphery, whereby the former was more successful at restraining wages than 
the latter, implied that the periphery was unable to regain the competitiveness lost to the 
core, which had managed to significantly reduce nominal labour costs (e.g. Johnston et 
al., 2014; Lapavitsas et al., 2012; Stockammer, 2016). As a matter of fact, Germany had 
the lowest nominal unit labour costs in the euro area throughout the 2000, which greatly 
increased the country’s current account surplus vis-à-vis the periphery (Krugman, 2017). 
Indeed, since the end of 2001, Germany has consistently run current account surpluses, 
as opposed to the large deficits experienced by the periphery, which we discussed in the 
previous section.  
 
More importantly, these surpluses were accumulated within the euro area itself (see 
Bellofiore and Halevi, 2010: 16). As argued by post-Keynesian economist Lucarelli, 
Germany’s continuous accumulation of trade surpluses is ‘increasingly based on its 
ability to depress wage growth’ within the limitations imposed by EMU rules (Lucarelli, 
2011: 219). As also put by Marxist economist Bellofiore (2013: 504), the euro ‘was born 
with an original sin’, pointing to how the EMU was established with strong differences 
in relative competitiveness from its very inception. The structural division of the euro 
                                                        
7 The SGP ‘is a set of rules designed to ensure that countries in the European Union pursue sound public 
finances and coordinate their fiscal policies’, which imposes a limit for government debt and deficit (see 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/economic-and-fiscal-policy-coordination/eu-economic-
governance-monitoring-prevention-correction/stability-and-growth-pact_en). 
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area into a surplus core and a deficit periphery has therefore led to the argument, mainly 
portrayed by post-Keynesian and Marxist economists, that a short-term fix for the euro 
area is for surplus countries (mainly Germany) to expand their domestic demand by 
letting domestic wages and inflation rates increase (e.g. Moro, 2014; Pettis, 2013; 
Lapavitas et al., 2012).  
 
Authors contributing to this body of literature also argue that, unable to compete with 
Germany, peripheral countries faced no choice but to pursue different growth strategies, 
which were largely based upon different forms of debt-led growth models and 
unproductive investments, such as housing bubbles (Ireland and Spain) and domestic 
consumption (Greece and Portugal) (see Hein, 2013; Stockhammer, 2016). 
 
1.2.2.2 The incomplete nature of the EMU 
 
In this respect, the EMU’s lack of an effective system for the supervision and regulation 
of the financial sector, and automatic stabilisers to overcome said macroeconomic 
imbalances, have also been identified as some of the main factors that led the euro area 
into crisis (see Eichengreen 2012: 134; Jabko 2015: 71; Jones, 2015: 44; see also Jones 
et al., 2016). Indeed, the EU financial markets’ lack of sufficient integration and shared 
risk mechanisms also meant that the governments’ bank bailouts inevitably worsened 
their fiscal positions, increasing their insolvency risk (Jones et al., 2016: 1011). In other 
words, had financial markets in the euro area been more integrated, the euro crisis may 
have not affected sovereign public debt sustainability as much as it did. As also claimed 
by ECB President Mario Draghi, ‘one important factor [for the euro crisis] was the 
incomplete nature of financial integration in the euro area’ (Draghi, 2014; emphasis 
added).  
 
 74 
According to Draghi, the incomplete nature of financial integration in the euro area led 
to an allocation of banks’ assets that was not sufficiently diversified geographically, 
which made national banks more vulnerable to domestic shocks, and whose cost to 
overcome their failures was largely borne by domestic authorities. Ultimately, a point that 
he has also reformulated at a recent speech (Draghi, 2018), Draghi argues that this is the 
process underpinning the so-called bank-sovereign nexus, which indicates the ‘infamous’ 
link between bank assets and sovereign debt (Draghi, 2014). This is a particularly 
interesting remark, because the design that underpinned European financial market 
integration is actually strongly based on the close link between bank funding and 
sovereign debt. Indeed, as I will show in Chapter 4, this arrangement owes much to the 
ECB’s political imperative to strengthen European financial market integration via 
increasing cross-border lending operations.  
 
One of the crucial contributions of the European-level explanation is to show how the 
two regimes (export-led and debt-led) interacted in the euro area. Indeed, it has been 
argued that the periphery was able to develop a debt-led model because of the credit flows 
that were generated by the core’s surpluses, which financed housing bubbles and rising 
household debt (Stockhammer, 2016: 70; Pettis, 2013; 120; Baldwin et al., 2015: 20). 
Seen from another angle, according to this view the core would have been unable to 
accumulate such large trade surpluses had it not been for the deficit and debt-led model 
of the periphery (see also Young and Semmler, 2011; Lapavitsas et al., 2012). Arriving 
at similar conclusions, but from very different disciplinary and analytical starting points, 
political economists and political scientists belonging to the varieties of capitalism school 
examine the incompatibilities between norther European and southern European 
capitalisms (e.g. Hall, 2012; Hall, 2014; Gambarotto and Solari, 2015).  
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According to Hall (2012), it is essentially the inherent incompatibility between the export-
oriented economic model of northern European countries and the demand-led growth 
model of the southern European economies which has generated the structural trade 
imbalances described above. Indeed, according to authors in this category, as the EMU 
prevents currency devaluation, the debt-led growth models of southern European 
countries struggled to remain competitive (see also Hall, 2014).  
 
Similarly, Gambarotto and Solari (2015) claim that the institutional configuration of the 
EMU, strongly based upon deflationary policies, impaired the coordination mechanisms 
of southern European countries, which relied extensively on state intervention, 
competitive monetary depreciation strategies (and thus higher real inflation rates) and 
lower absolute labour costs, in order to retain competitiveness. Gambarotto and Solari 
also argue that the EMU introduced a process of ‘peripheralization’ of the southern 
European economies, like Spain, Greece and Portugal, which positioned them onto a path 
of non-sustainable growth patterns. In a nutshell, the EMU’s asymmetric design allowed 
core countries to accumulate large trade surpluses, which were then recycled as cheap 
credit in the periphery in activities that did not contribute to productivity growth, which 
led to large trade deficits. 
 
The role of the EMU in fostering macroeconomic imbalances was later also recognised 
by a group of renowned economists (Baldwin et al., 2015). Hence, the key contribution 
by the European-level explanations eventually made its way into a disciplinary territory 
that, as discussed above, had initially been largely focusing on examining (and blaming) 
domestic-based weaknesses. Indeed, the low-interest rate regime introduced by the 
Maastricht convergence criteria favoured this type of core-periphery, speculative credit 
flow, because it provided cheap cross-border funding to euro area economies (see 
Baldwin et al., 2015). As these imbalances generated structural trade deficits in the 
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periphery and surplus in the core, the sudden stop of credit in the wake of the GFC, when 
liquidity dried up, put this asymmetric regime in crisis, hitting the deficit countries the 
hardest by halting economic activities.  
 
Thus, as discussed by Baldwin et al. (2015), the sudden stop in cross-border lending made 
investors less keen to invest in the private and public sectors of the deficit countries, 
which resulted in rising sovereign bond yields, widening their spreads. This is because, 
according to the authors, as the deficit countries mainly relied on foreign investment for 
economic growth, the halt of credit flows impaired those countries’ GDP growth, which 
worsened their public debt-to-GDP ratios to ‘unsustainable’ levels in a self-fulfilling 
fashion, whereby investors’ fear of sovereign default made defaults more likely (ibid: 7; 
see also Chang and Leblond, 2015). This self-fulfilling dynamic is particularly important 
because it is an argument that is also retained by some authors belonging to the financial 
economics literature, explored later on in this chapter. 
 
1.2.2.3 The euro crisis as a balance of payment crisis 
 
Given the significant trade imbalances that were generated in the euro area during the 
2000s, the euro crisis has also been described by post-Keynesians as a balance of 
payments crisis (see Dejuán et al., 2013 for an overview). For example, post-Keynesian 
economist Cesaratto argues that the euro area is a hybrid between a fixed exchange rate 
regime and a full currency union (Cesaratto, 2013). Whereas in the former banks’ capital 
flows can be balanced out by the national central bank, in the euro area these are financed 
 77 
by TARGET2, a centralised real-time payment and settlement system managed by the 
central banks of the euro area, and the ECB’s refinancing operations8.  
 
Crucially, as each country’s TARGET2 balances can go negative, a country can run 
sustained deficits, which are financed in the interbank lending market, as if the banks in 
the euro area had access to unlimited overborrowing (see also Sinn, 2012 for a collection 
of similar arguments). The impossibility of governments in the euro area to convert the 
value of their public debt (currency devaluation is not an option in a currency union) at a 
given exchange rate (fixed, with the euro) is precisely what has allowed for periphery 
countries to access cheap funding that financed their current account deficits, because 
investors had the guarantee of non-devaluation at debt repayment (ibid.). When interbank 
lending dries up, the ECB fills in the funding gap through its different refinancing 
operations. Hence, the periphery’s trade deficits were financed through negative 
TARGET2 balances, in turn financed in the interbank lending market and, in the last 
instance, by the ECB. In other words, the way in which the EMU is designed allows the 
ECB to simultaneously finance current account deficits as well as capital outflows. 
 
According to Cesaratto, when the 2008 credit crunch hit the euro area, the unwillingness 
of banks to continuing lending to each other created a liquidity shortage that put into crisis 
the debt-led and trade deficit-based regime of the periphery. Thus, as the economies of 
the periphery went through a severe downturn, investors (particularly foreign) pulled their 
resources from private and public debt markets. However, as the domestic economies of 
the periphery had accumulated significant deficits, they lacked the resources needed to 
keep financing both private activities and, more importantly for the scope of this project, 
                                                        
8 TARGET2 is the Eurosystem’s proprietary payment system. It is the mechanism in the euro area ‘for 
processing large-value payments and is used by both central banks and commercial banks to process 
payments in euro in real time’ (see https://www.ecb.europa.eu/explainers/tell-me/html/target2.en.html). 
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their countries’ sovereign debt markets, which led to the widening of the periphery’s 
spreads. Further, according to this view, spreads largely widened because the ECB lacked 
the competence necessary to act as a lender of last resort for sovereigns. As in the words 
of Cesaratto (2013: 123), a ‘prompt intervention of the ECB as a lender of last resort of 
peripheral states would have possibly avoided the capital outflow reducing the sovereign 
spread’. 
 
1.2.2.4 Beyond the domestic/European-level dichotomy 
 
To sum up, the European-level explanations highlight competitiveness gaps and structural 
trade imbalances as one of the main drivers for economic divergences in the euro area at 
the root of the crisis, much like the domestic-level explanations. However, scholars in 
this group place more emphasis on how the introduction of the euro itself has contributed 
to fostering these imbalances, rather than blaming developments in the domestic 
economies. 
 
Before moving on to assess the last group of scholars, it is worth mentioning the few 
notable exceptions that break with my categorisation between domestic-level and 
European-level explanations. For instance, authors like Featherstone (2011) and Katsimi 
and Moutos (2010) specifically address the question of the Greek crisis. The authors 
recognise both the domestic weaknesses of the Greek economy, such as fiscal 
unsustainability and endemic corruption and clientelism, as well as the EMU’s 
institutional flaws, such as the lack of a timely and unified policy response to the 
sovereign debt market turmoil and how the introduction of the euro has led to a decline 
in the savings rate of the euro area’s peripheral countries, like Greece.  
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Furthermore, Dooley (2015) provides the most balanced analysis with respect to 
domestic-level vs European-level factors. Dooley explains the onset of the crisis in 
Greece, Ireland and Portugal as stemming from how the specific trajectories of these 
economies interacted with the process of European integration. Dooley argues that the 
different crises of the abovementioned countries emerged from how their domestic 
economies adapted to the processes and regulatory requirements of financial 
liberalisation and monetary union as per the EU treaties. 
 
1.3 The financial economics literature 
 
Through significantly different approaches compared to the studies discussed above, the 
financial economics literature on the euro crisis explores more directly the question of 
sovereign spreads during the crisis. This body of literature employs different econometric 
analyses to isolate the variables that determined spreads before and during the crisis. 
While most of them also rely on the deterioration of macroeconomic fundamentals as an 
explanatory variable, such as government budget, debt and balance of payments, the 
studies below remain anchored, ultimately, to an understanding of spread movements as 
being closely linked to sovereign default risk perceptions. 
 
For instance, Maltritz (2012) employs a Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA)9 model to 
determine what variables influenced the 10-year sovereign yields spreads during the first 
decade of the euro for Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
                                                        
9 BMA is employed in studies incurring high model uncertainty, in the sense that the exact values are 
unknown, whereby uncertainty itself is transformed into probability. BMA takes into account the high 
uncertainty by acknowledging the entire model space, utilising any possible combination of regressors 
depending on a given set of potential determinants, instead of making a particular model to fit the existing 
set of data (see Hoeting et al., 1999). 
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Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. Maltritz’s use of a BMA model emerged to overcome 
the difficulties faced by previous studies on the subject, which delivered inconsistent 
results (e.g. Eichengreen and Mody, 1998; Kamin and von Kleist, 1999; Min, 1998; Arora 
and Cerisola, 2001; Cantor and Packer, 1996; Bernoth et al., 2006; Codogno et al., 2003; 
Manganelli and Wolwsijk, 2007).  
 
Maltritz looks at 10 EMU countries during the timeframe 1999-2009 and finds that the 
key variables influencing sovereign spreads in the euro area are budget balance-to-GDP, 
terms of trade, balance of trade and trade openness10. Ultimately, he argues that the 
deterioration of said fundamentals affects spreads by increasing the ‘perception of default 
risk’ (Maltritz, 2012: 662). This is particularly the case with respect to worse fiscal 
positions and poor trading performance, because he argues that they reduce funds 
available for public debt servicing. Hence, the finding of Maltritz, corroborating those of 
Hilscher and Nosbusch (2010), are largely in line with what has been discussed by the 
rest of the literature in previous sections, in that investors are primarily concerned with 
macroeconomic fundamentals when buying and selling euro area sovereign bonds, thus 
directly impacting spreads.  
 
It should be noted that the data used in the abovementioned studies rely on annual spread 
data, as these authors are primarily interested in uncovering ‘long-term determinants of 
spreads and the market perception of default risk, whereas more frequent data is supposed 
to be more influenced by short-term influences’ (Maltritz, 2012: 664, emphasis added). 
Thus, whereas this type of data allows us to understand the extent to which sovereign 
spreads are influenced by fundamentals in the long-term, they will not be able to assess 
short-term economic shocks. Hence, this approach is unable to spot any sign of sudden 
                                                        
10 Terms of trade refers to the ratio of export prices to import prices, whereas trade openness refers to the 
total value of exports and imports as a share of GDP. 
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shift in market behaviour as a result of these shocks. This is an important observation, 
because the data I rely on differs from those employed by these studies. Whereas the data 
used in the explanatory figures 1-6 employ monthly averages for spread, I rely on daily 
spread data in Chapter 5, which allows us to detect the extent to which LCH.Clearnet’s 
collateral management strategies during the euro crisis influenced spreads in the short-
term. 
 
1.3.1 Beyond fundamentals: investors’ changing perception of sovereign default 
risk 
 
This leads us to the next category of authors in financial economics that attempts to break 
with such a strong correlation between spread and fundamentals. Indeed, the following 
authors seek to overcome a fairly significant gap left unaddressed by most of the euro 
crisis scholarship discussed until now, which can be summarised through the following 
research puzzle: if we are to assume that investors look at fundamentals when buying and 
selling sovereign bonds, but macroeconomic fundamentals of certain countries in the euro 
area had been deteriorating already since the 2000s, how and why did spreads started to 
widen significantly only from 2009? 
 
To answer this question, Olveira, et al. (2012) examine the determinants of spreads in the 
euro area for different maturities (5-, 10- and 15-year) and, more importantly, by dividing 
the examinations between a pre-crisis and during-crisis period. By accounting for 
different maturities, the authors seek to obtain a broader view of market behaviour with 
respect to a wider segment of the governments’ sovereign debt market compositions, 
rather than just focusing on the 10-year maturity as the literature usually does. Further, 
by accounting for different time-frames Oliveira et al. are interested in examining 
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potential changes in market behaviour, in order to understand the trigger of sovereign 
debt market turmoil during the euro crisis.  
 
Their examination identifies the determinants of sovereign spreads for Austria, Belgium, 
France, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. Greece and Ireland were excluded on 
the basis that there were an insufficient number of liquid government bonds for those 
countries during the crisis, which could have skewed the results This is an interesting 
observation, because it points towards the importance of sovereign bond market liquidity 
as a factor which may influence sovereign spreads, which is exactly what I seek to 
emphasise in this thesis. 
 
The authors find that before the GFC (from 2000 to 2007), spreads were largely driven 
by returns on stocks and the German sovereign bond yield curve, whereas the domestic 
countries’ macroeconomic fundamentals did not play a big role11. In other words, it was 
primarily the return on investments for equities and German government debt that 
influenced other euro area sovereign bonds yields spreads before the crisis, whereas 
domestic variables such as public debt- and budget-to-GDP rations, balance of payments, 
and inflation rates did not play much of a role. However, from the onset of the GFC, the 
authors find that country-specific macroeconomic fundamentals, particularly high public 
debt levels and large current account deficits, began playing a prominent role in widening 
the sovereign spreads of the countries examined (see also Beirne and Fratzscher, 2013).  
 
With respect to default fears, the authors essentially refer to sovereign bond yield spreads 
as directly reflecting markets’ perception of sovereign default risk, in line with most of 
the literature discussed so far. However, the novelty brought by the authors is with respect 
                                                        
11 The yield curve shows all the interest rates (yields) spanning across the different contract lengths, rather 
than just focusing on an individual maturity (on which spread is usually calculated, i.e. 10-year). 
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to how they interpret the changing attitude towards sovereign default risk. They argue 
that the sudden change in market behaviour towards sovereign default was determined by 
the fact that, as discussed above, investors had assumed the existence of an implicit 
guarantee on sovereign debt in the euro area, leading to much smaller spreads despite the 
deterioration of macroeconomic fundamentals of certain economies since the introduction 
of the euro. The authors argue that the reason why spreads were not wider, despite 
differences in fundamentals, has to do with a presumed guarantee in the euro area that no 
sovereign would have been allowed to actually default. Hence, as far as this view go, 
spreads were smaller in the EMU before the crisis because markets did not perceive any 
significant risk of default. 
 
However, this implicit guarantee (especially by German authorities) disappeared in the 
wake of the crisis, particularly since the onset of the Greek crisis (see also Arghyrou and 
Tsoukalas, 2011; Chang and Leblond, 2015). Thus, Oliveira et al. argue that, lacking such 
a public debt servicing guarantee, investors began perceiving a higher default risk 
associated with deteriorating fundamentals, leading to a widening of the spreads.  
 
Along those lines, Bernoth and Erdogan (2012) contribute to the debate by accounting 
more explicitly for how market behaviour can change over time for the same set of 
variables. The authors employ a semiparametric time-varying coefficient model in order 
to determine the extent to which spread movements in the euro area are primarily driven 
by either macroeconomic fundamentals or the changing perception of default risk12. The 
                                                        
12 In contrast to both parametric statistical inferences (requiring strict assumptions such as model linearity, 
in that assumptions are derived from a specific probability distribution) and nonparametric modelling 
(making no model assumptions whatsoever) a semiparametric time-varying coefficient model accounts for 
the dynamism that may exist in the available data sets, where coefficients are not linear, but change over 
time (see Fan and Zhang, 2008). 
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authors examine the changing attitude of investors towards euro area sovereign bonds 
between 1999 and 2010 for Belgium, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Austria, Portugal and Spain. Their finding is that investor attitude changed 
at various points throughout the period examined.  
 
This is one of the first studies of its kind arguing that sovereign spreads ‘may not only be 
affected by changes in macroeconomic fundamentals but also by shifts in the pricing of 
sovereign risks’, where sovereign risk refers to sovereign default risk (ibid: 651, see also 
De Grauwe and Ji, 2012; 2013). Indeed, the authors argue that in the first few years of 
the euro financial markets mostly looked at public debt-to-GDP ratios. For the next few 
years until 2006, it looks as if investors were not paying much attention to the government 
debt or budget deficit positions of countries in the euro area, having had no influence on 
spreads. From 2006 onwards, spreads began to widen slightly, suggesting that the 
investors’ risk aversion right before the collapse of the subprime mortgage bubble in the 
US induced them to invest more in German government bonds (i.e. they started 
considering the German government debt market as a safe asset).  
 
From the onset of the GFC the authors find that spreads in the euro area were widening 
as a consequence of worsening fundamentals, especially with respect to budget deficits. 
Similar to the finding of Oliveira et al. (2012), Bernoth and Erdogan’s study is distinctive 
in that it shows how market behaviour towards euro area sovereign bond changed over 
time. More importantly, however, they make an explicit argument about investors 
‘pricing’ (i.e. charging different interest rates on) sovereign debt in the euro area 
differently depending on the investors’ perception of sovereign default likelihood 
regardless of the changes in macroeconomic fundamentals. This is an important 
argument insofar as it one of the first attempts to frame market behaviour as not being 
necessarily connected to changing fundamentals in the euro area. 
 85 
This brings us to De Grauwe and Ji (2012), who take Bernoth and Erdogan’s idea further 
by showing that part of the movements in spreads from 2010 to 2012 (the height of the 
euro crisis) cannot be explained by fundamentals alone, in the sense that part of the spread 
movements during that period ‘appeared to be dissociated from fundamentals’ (ibid: 18, 
emphasis added). De Grauwe and Ji provide a different type of analysis from the rest of 
the literature. Their study compares the spreads between the German bunds and other 
EMU members (Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Belgium, France and the Netherlands) 
with the so-called ‘stand-alone’ countries issuing public debt in their own national 
currencies (Australia, Canada, Denmark, Japan, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United 
States and United Kingdom).  
 
First of all, the authors find that the sovereign debt market distress in the euro area after 
the GFC, as reflected by the widening spreads, did not manifest in the stand-alone group, 
despite most of the EMU countries (with the exception of Greece) not having a worse 
fiscal position than countries like the US or the UK. Indeed, after 2007, bond market 
operators became suddenly concerned with country-specific fundamentals in the euro 
area, such as public debt-to-GDP, budget and current account balances, which resulted in 
widening spreads of the peripheral countries (see also Beirne and Fratzscher, 2013). 
However, increasingly high debt-to-GDP ratios in stand-alone countries did not play an 
important role in influencing spreads.  
 
Crucially, and more importantly for the scope of this project, De Grauwe and Ji found 
that from 2010 to 2012 a substantial amount of the variation in spread is not at all 
correlated with changes in the underlying fundamentals. In other words, even though 
investors did become generally more susceptible to the periphery’s deteriorating 
fundamentals in the wake of the GFC when buying and selling their sovereign bonds, 
there were other factors that influenced spreads during that period, which they initially 
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refer to simply as a time-dependent variable. This time-dependant variation in spread 
accounted for about half of the total variation in spread in Portugal and Ireland from 2010 
to 2012, and for almost the totality of the surge in the Spanish spread.  
 
Hence, for these countries, changes in fundamentals alone are insufficient to explain 
spread movements during the euro crisis13. The authors then move on to argue that such 
time-dependant changes in spreads reflected a negative market sentiment on the expected 
future public debt servicing capabilities of the peripheral countries (see also Aizenman et 
al., 2013). In short, fear of default.  
 
De Grauwe and Ji argue that countries within a monetary union are more susceptible to 
such negative sentiment because of their inability to implement currency devaluation and 
their lack of a public debt servicing guarantee by a national central bank. Hence, investors 
slowly realised that EMU countries could not provide to sovereign bondholders the same 
guarantee of stand-alone countries that cash would always be available at maturity (see 
also Arghyrou and Tsoukalas, 2011).  
 
This is, in essence, what the authors deem had increased investors’ fear of sovereign 
default, which led to a widening of the spreads. There is a self-fulling element to this 
story. As put by De Grauwe and Ji (2013: 17) ‘[w]hen investors fear default, they act in 
such a way that default becomes more likely. A country can become insolvent because 
                                                        
13 As a matter of fact, a number of studies in financial economics and political economy have pointed to 
factors other than fundamentals that contributed to pushing the sovereign spreads of the periphery during 
the crisis. These have highlighted particularly the news (e.g. Büchel, 2013; Beetsma et al., 2013), fiscal 
policy announcements (e.g. Zoli, 2013; Falagiarda and Gregori, 2015; Falagiarda and Reitz, 2015), and the 
lack of intra-European solidarity (Chang and Leblond, 2015), because of the ways in which communication 
and solidarity shape investors’ perception of the future public debt servicing sustainability of financially 
distressed economies. 
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investors fear default’. This is a plausible argument, because as investors sell sovereign 
bonds they can lead to an increase in the cost of public debt servicing, which increases 
the cost of public debt servicing and, thus, potentially compromising the sustainability of 
public debt-servicing. The emphasis put by De Grauwe and Ji on the changing of market 
behaviour from 2010 to 2012 is particularly important for the scope of this project, 
because Chapter 5 will show that it is precisely from 2010 to 2012 that the actions of the 
world’s largest CCP, LCH.Clearnet, impacted the usability of these countries’ sovereign 
bonds as collateral in repo transactions. However, contrary to what is argued by De 
Grauwe and Ji, I seek to argue that it was also concerns surrounding the use of these 
sovereign bonds to access short-term funding that widened the spread, rather than just 
self-fulfilling expectations of sovereign default. 
 
1.4 Liquidity, the functioning of the European repo market and the role of CCPs 
 
Undeniably, the literature has provided us with more than enough evidence to identify 
the different factors that have compromised market confidence in public debt 
sustainability during the crisis, and how these led to a widening of the spreads. Among 
these, the deterioration of macroeconomic fundamentals (caused by either domestic-level 
or European-level weaknesses), and how they have led to imbalances and unsustainable 
growth models in the periphery of the euro area, have dominated the debate. Given the 
functioning of the euro area, which lacks automatic stabilisers and unconditional 
sovereign default guarantees, investors’ confidence in the public debt sustainability of the 
periphery collapsed in the aftermath of the GFC. 
 
However, some authors, particularly economists and financial economists, have moved 
beyond fundamentals in order to explain the sudden widening of the spreads during the 
height of the crisis, identifying the self-fulfilling expectations of sovereign default as 
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another explanatory variable. Their contribution is key because it shows that market 
sentiment in the euro area is much more heterogenous and less consistent than what has 
been discussed in the vast majority of the literature. Yet, even in that case, spread remains 
understood as primarily reflecting the markets’ default fears. 
 
I argue that the reason the literature has remained fixed on fear of default rests on another 
important aspect that has not been sufficiently examined when understanding spread: its 
relationship with liquidity. The dimension surrounding liquidity is crucial, because the 
lack thereof also contributed to the widening of the spreads in the euro area during the 
euro crisis. Indeed, a number of authors have shown that the declining liquidity (as 
reflected by falling trading volumes) of specific sovereign bonds has led to sell-offs that 
widened the spreads. For instance, De Grauwe and Ji (2012; 2013), De Santis (2012), 
Bernoth and Erdogan (2012), Pepino (2015) all agree that the declining liquidity of a 
sovereign bond could affect its yield differential (i.e. spread), because the fear that such 
security could not be traded quick enough without impacting its market price would also 
lead to massive sell-offs. Nonetheless, these views remain anchored to perceptions of 
sovereign solvency as the main driver for liquidity crises in the euro area in the first place, 
as in the words of De Grauwe and Ji (2013: 16): 
 
When investors fear some payment difficulty, e.g. triggered by a recession, they 
sell the government bonds. This has two effects. It raises the interest rate and leads 
to a liquidity outflow as the investors who have sold the government bonds look 
for safer places to invest (for a similar view, see also De Santis, 2012; Moro, 
2014). 
 
Other authors have likewise pointed out the liquidity issues faced by banks in the euro 
area in the wake of the 2008 credit crunch, which compromised the debt-led growth 
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models of the periphery, contributing to eroding market confidence on sovereign debt 
servicing sustainability (e.g. Quaglia and Royo, 2015; Gambarotto and Solari, 2015; 
Lane, 2011). Further, it has been shown that downgrades by CRAs also decreased the 
liquidity of specific sovereign bonds for banks, because credit rating downgrades 
impacted the ability to use specific sovereign bonds to access the refinancing operations 
of the ECB, which only accepts highly rated assets within its collateral risk policy (e.g. 
Eijffinger, 2012: 915; Gärtner et al., 2011; De Santis, 2012: 3).  
 
Nevertheless, the mechanisms underpinning the interbank funding market in the euro 
area, which is the main market segment where banks access short-term funding, have 
been almost entirely ignored by the literature. This is crucial, because the sovereign debt 
market tensions experienced in the euro area curtailed access to wholesale short-term 
funding of banks in the euro area. As put by Rixtel and Gasperini (2013: 25), the euro 
crisis demonstrates ‘the strong interconnection between financial crises and bank 
funding’, because the declining value of euro area sovereign bonds in financial markets 
during the crisis rendered those assets less valuable in repo operations, which are key 
short-term funding tools for banks. 
 
To study these mechanisms and the potential impact they may have had in shaping market 
sentiment, this project examines the role of CCPs in the European repo market, and how 
these contributed to sovereign debt market instabilities during the euro crisis. Chapter 4 
will show that the politics surrounding the integration of European financial markets, 
between the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s, has made sovereign bonds 
the key collateral for the creation of a Europeanised interbank repo market, which brought 
sovereign debt and bank funding ever closer together. As argued by Gabor and Ban 
(2016), the creation of a single European repo market has exposed sovereign bonds in the 
euro area to the procyclical fragilities underpinning collateral-based finance. Yet, the euro 
 90 
crisis literature overlooks the dynamics underpinning repo trading as a source of systemic 
instability. Therefore, in Chapter 3 I discuss how collateral-based lending practices have 
proven to be extremely fragile in modern financial history, exacerbating liquidity 
shortages during financial crises. In this context, the collateral practices of CCPs during 
the euro crisis have likewise received insufficient attention. The absence of CCPs from 
the euro crisis literature is puzzling, considering their historical and contemporary 
relevance in financial markets. Chapter 2 will in fact argue that CCPs were already 
important institutions in the 18th century and have become increasingly important in OTC 
derivatives trading in modern times.  
 
Furthermore, in Chapter 4 I will argue that the politics underpinning the consolidation of 
the European exchange and clearing business after the introduction of the euro has led to 
the creation of one of the world’s largest CCPs, LCH.Clearnet. By clearing almost the 
entire euro-denominated repo market, LCH.Clearnet has become the most powerful CCP 
in that market segment. As CCPs interpose themselves between buyers and sellers in a 
given transaction, LCH.Clearnet thus retains a huge destabilising potential, thanks to the 
ways in which they can suddenly demand more collateral from traders. Indeed, Chapter 
2 will show that CCPs have exacerbated liquidity shortages during several financial crises 
in the 20th century, precisely due to how they can demand extra collateral from traders.  
 
Without a doubt, a few authors have in fact pointed out that the sudden increase in 
collateral requirements by LCH.Clearnet was followed by a widening in the spread of 
certain euro area economies during the crisis (e.g. Jones, 2012; Pepino, 2015; Gabor and 
Ban, 2016). However, these discussions are merely speculative in nature, lacking both a 
detailed examination of the core technologies at the heart of central clearing as well as a 
systematic assessment of how CCPs have actually destabilised sovereign debt markets 
during the crisis. Therefore, Chapter 5 will assess the involvement of LCH.Clearnet 
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during the euro crisis, focusing on four case studies: Ireland, Portugal, Italy and Spain. 
The chapter will show that LCH.Clearnet’s sudden increases in collateral requirements to 
use Irish, Portuguese, Italian and Spanish sovereign bonds in repo trading raised concerns 
among investors about the use of those securities to access short-term funding, leading to 
sell-offs that widened the spreads from 2010 to 2012.  
 
1.5 Conclusions 
 
This chapter examined how the euro crisis literature employs spread to understand the 
origins and unfolding of the euro crisis. I argued that the vast majority of the literature is 
anchored on an understanding of spread as an indicator of investors’ concerns with 
sovereign default risk. As a matter of fact, spread has become an actual proxy for market 
sentiment towards sovereign default perception during the crisis. The deterioration of 
macroeconomic fundamentals has been interpreted by many scholars as the leading cause 
of the financial markets’ loss of confidence towards the public debt servicing 
sustainability of the euro area’s periphery, leading to the bond sell-offs that widened the 
spreads. The fundamentals/spread link as a way to understand the markets’ declining 
confidence in sovereign solvency is largely due to the developments of the Greek crisis. 
Indeed, Greece was the first country in the euro area to have undergone sovereign debt 
market turmoil during the euro crisis. More importantly, it was the only country to 
experience a severe, initially hidden, mismanagement of its public finances during the 
first decade of the euro, which, once revealed, triggered panic on sovereign debt markets 
that forced the country to ask for a bailout.  
 
The Greek crisis provided the blueprint for understanding the euro crisis as essentially a 
crisis of confidence in public debt servicing sustainability. For all the other countries 
discussed in the literature, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy, fiscal mismanagement was 
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not as much of an important a factor as in the case of Greece. Yet, even in those cases, 
macroeconomic imbalances, as caused by either domestic-level or European-level 
factors, have been accounted for as the key drivers for sovereign spread, which continue 
to be understood as investors’ deteriorating confidence in public debt servicing 
sustainability. However, a number of economists and financial economists have argued 
that market sentiment during the crisis was also driven by self-fulfilling expectations of 
sovereign default, which contributed to the sell-offs that widened the spreads. The main 
contribution of this scholarship, and of De Grauwe and Ji (2013) in particular, is to 
demonstrate the existence of a certain degree of separation between fundamentals and 
investor attitude towards sovereign bonds during the euro crisis. Nevertheless, even those 
authors continue to rely on fear of default as the key explanatory variable for the sudden 
widening of the spreads from 2010 to 2012. 
 
I argue that the fixation with sovereign default is, to a large extent, linked to the 
literature’s neglect in sufficiently accounting for the mechanisms underpinning liquidity 
provision in the euro area. That is not to say that the literature ignored issues surrounding 
the banking and liquidity dimension of the euro crisis. Especially from reviewing the 
Irish, Spanish and, to a lesser extent, the Portuguese crises, it is clear that unsustainable 
lending practices, as well as the sudden lack of access to credit, are at the heart of each of 
these countries’ crises. Further, credit downgrades have also played a role in reducing the 
liquidity of euro area sovereign bonds, as it impaired their use at the ECB’s refinancing 
operations. However, the precise mechanisms underpinning the functioning of the 
European repo-based interbank lending market, and their implications for sovereign debt 
market stability, have been largely ignored. 
 
To bridge this gap, I seek to answer the following research question: what factors 
contributed to destabilising sovereign debt markets during the height of the euro crisis 
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from 2010 to 2012? In order to answer this question, the rest of this thesis examines the 
functioning of the European repo market, within which CCPs play a key and, I argue, 
destabilising role in the provision of short-term funding. Ultimately, this project seeks to 
demonstrate that spread movements from 2010 to 2012 were not only due to markets’ 
fear of sovereign default, as discussed by much of the euro crisis literature, but also 
largely influenced by the banks’ concerns with funding liquidity risk. The next chapter 
will examine the development and functioning of CCPs in global finance. This 
assessment will be carried out to demonstrate that, to a significant extent, the destabilising 
impact that CCPs can have on systemic liquidity stems from the unique way in which 
they operate. 
  
 94 
2 Understanding Central Counterparty Clearing Houses 
in Global Finance 
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter seeks to explain the role played by CCPs in financial markets. CCPs are 
financial institutions that interpose themselves between the buyer and the seller of a given 
transaction, effectively guaranteeing each trader’s contractual obligations. CCPs have 
become increasingly important in the aftermath of the GFC. However, outside of financial 
news and central banks’ reports, very little is known about the CCPs’ broader significance 
in global finance. The analysis below is thus conducted against the backdrop of a very 
limited literature about the nature of those financial companies in the euro crisis literature. 
There are a few exceptions, however. On the one hand, political scientists and political 
economists do recognise, to different degrees, the role and impact played by 
LCH.Clearnet on sovereign debt markets during the height of the euro crisis (e.g. Jones, 
2012; Pepino, 2015; Gabor and Ban, 2016). On the other hand, research in the political 
economy of global finance highlights several regulatory dimensions surrounding the 
renewed role of CCPs in the OTC derivatives market in the aftermath of the GFC (e.g. 
Helleiner, 2014; Lockwood, 2018).  
 
However, these studies lack a detailed examination of the core mechanisms at the heart 
of central clearing and are unable to appreciate the extent to which CCPs have historically 
been embedded in financial markets. Therefore, this chapter provides a historically-
grounded analysis of the development of CCPs. Such a historical examination will shed 
light on the ways in which some of the most distinctive aspects of central clearing are still 
relevant today, particularly when it comes to liquidity and systemic stability. The main 
argument portrayed in this chapter is that the mechanisms at the origins of central 
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clearing, rooted in the provision of contract performance guarantee, have been retained 
by the present day CCPs and can reduce the liquidity available to investors during times 
of financial distress. More broadly, this chapter also seeks to show that, since their 
inception, the development of CCPs is closely linked to the political contingencies 
underpinning the functioning of financial markets, such as monetary arrangements, 
colonial expansions and financial reforms. 
 
For example, the analysis conducted below shows that contract performance guarantee, 
one of the most defining aspects of central clearing, was already present in the futures 
market of 18th century Japan, in the Dojima Rice Exchange of Osaka, in order to shield 
traders against the price fluctuation of rice. The necessity to control the price fluctuation 
of rice had to do with how Japanese society was organised during the Tokugawa period, 
whereby the military dictatorship allowed for multiple currencies to exist simultaneously, 
and who often paid the army in rice. These arrangements in Japanese monetary policy led 
to development of money exchange brokers, who would be trading rice for other 
currencies. The rapid expansion in rice markets exposed traders to the price fluctuation 
of the grain, which laid the foundation for the development of futures markets. Brokers 
thus developed into actual clearing houses, offering contractual performance guarantee 
precisely with the aim to protect traders against the price fluctuation of rice. 
 
The first institution to provide contract performance guarantee in the West was the 
French-based Caisse de Liquidation des Affaires en Marchandises, which was mainly 
involved in the coffee and cotton exchange markets. Similar to what had happened to the 
rice markets of Dojima, the emergence of the Caisse was dependent upon the politics 
underpinning the development of coffee and cotton exchange markets in France. On the 
one hand, France’s second colonial expansion in the beginning of the 19th century greatly 
increased the import of coffee. On the other hand, the country’s support of American 
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independence from British rule led to a massive expansion in the French import of 
American cotton. As the trade of those two commodities increased, so did the traders’ 
exposures to price volatility risk, which led to the creation of the Caisse in 1882 to provide 
contract performance guarantee to coffee and cotton futures contracts. 
 
CCPs developed in such a way throughout the 19th century to legally replace the buyer 
and the seller in a given trade, a mechanism called counterparty substitution. Differently 
from traditional intermediation, contract performance guarantee through counterparty 
substitution entails that the CCP becomes the legal counterparty in each trade, responsible 
for fulfilling all the contracts’ obligations, even in the case of a counterparty defaulting. 
CCPs have therefore implemented several default management tools, which mainly take 
the form of collateral demanded from the traders themselves. Among these, the most 
important are the use margin requirements, which is collateral equal to a portion of the 
contract’s value that is calculated, imposed and held by CCPs throughout the duration of 
the trade. The imposition of non-negotiable margin requirements by CCPs, while taking 
the position of both the buyer and the seller in a given transaction, is expression of the 
power of CCPs in financial markets, because they can constrain the freedom of investors 
to allocate their assets.  
 
The chapter continues by showing how the embeddedness of CCPs in financial markets 
extends to modern times, specifically with reference to the politics underpinning financial 
regulatory reforms that were implemented by G20 leaders after the GFC. This chapter 
finds that the self-regulatory, opaque and unaccountable nature of OTC derivatives 
exerted significant pressures on regulators to reform that market, which paved the way to 
expanding the use of CCPs in global finance. This was particularly the case with respect 
to how defaults on OTC derivative contracts contributed to the failure of large financial 
institutions, which had to be bailed out with taxpayers’ money. At the same time, the 
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ways in which LCH.Clearnet relied on its margin requirements to successfully handle 
Lehman Brothers’ default, without causing financial losses to any of its clients, brought 
CCPs under the spotlight of regulators. Thus, I argue that the calls to improve the 
accountability and transparency of the financial sector, combined with the excellent 
performance of CCPs during the GFC, pushed G20 leaders to introduce regulatory 
provisions that made the central clearing of OTC derivatives mandatory. The new key 
central role of CCPs in OTC markets around the world was designed to change who 
would bear the risk deriving from the OTC derivatives trading, in the sense that it would 
no longer be up to the taxpayers to pay for the failures of the financial sector, but the 
CCPs themselves. 
 
However, as the CCPs’ presence in global finance increases in the aftermath of the crisis, 
this chapter focuses another key aspect surrounding the importance of central clearing in 
financial markets: its relationship to systemic stability. As will be discussed in more detail 
below, this chapter argues that, during times of financial distress, CCPs can suddenly 
demand more collateral by increasing margin requirements, which can lead to a sudden 
shrink in the liquidity available to investors. This claim is backed by surveying various 
failures of CCPs during the 20th century.  
 
The three documented failures of CCPs all show that the collection of margin 
requirements during times of financial instability caused liquidity shocks, which led to 
traders’ default and, in turn, the failure of CCPs themselves. This is a crucial point with 
respect to answering the research question posed by this study, which aims at identifying 
the factors that contributed to destabilising sovereign debt markets during the euro crisis. 
Indeed, Chapter 5 demonstrates that the use of margin requirements by LCH.Clearnet 
during the euro crisis contributed to destabilising sovereign debt markets in the euro area 
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from 2010 to 2012, because they caused large-scale bond sell-offs that widened the Irish, 
Portuguese, Italian and Spanish sovereign spreads. 
 
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 discusses the limited attention 
paid to CCPs by the euro crisis literature. Section 2.3 examines the development of central 
clearing between the 18th and 19th centuries. Section 2.4 discusses the functioning of 
CCPs in modern times. Section 2.5 explores the renewed importance of CCPs in the 
aftermath of the GFC. Section 2.6 showcases the relevance of CCPs for systemic stability. 
Section 2.7 is dedicated to the concluding remarks, namely, that the way CCPs operate 
can exert a significant amount of influence over how investors employ their assets, which 
may contribute to exacerbate liquidity shortages during times of financial distress. 
 
2.2 The limited presence of CCPs in the euro crisis literature 
 
CCPs have played a near-to-inexistent role in the euro crisis literature, in the sense that 
they have largely been ignored in relation to the events that unfolded from 2010 to 2012. 
Even when they have been acknowledged, the impact of the CCPs’ actions on sovereign 
debt markets lacks a more systematic examination. For instance, Jones (2012) should be 
credited to be among one of the first authors to have discussed LCH.Clearnet’s 
involvement during the euro crisis. Specifically, Jones mentions the involvement of 
LCH.Clearnet in the middle of Italy’s crisis in 2011. The author firstly discusses how, in 
the middle of a domestic political crisis, the declining price of Italian government bonds 
made the use of those securities less valuable as collateral, and thus more expensive for 
investors to hold. Jones further talks about LCH.Clearnet’s actions in responses to the 
declining value of Italian government debt. The author points towards the introduction of 
a numerical threshold for spread by LCH.Clearnet that, if crossed, would have increased 
‘the cost for using Italian sovereign debt as collateral’ (Jones, 2012: 187). As Italian debt 
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crossed that threshold, Jones notes, LCH.Clearnet actions caused an immediate spike in 
the Italian long-term sovereign bond yields, widening the spreads.  
 
Without acknowledging LCH.Clearnet itself, Pepino has also made reference to spread 
thresholds in how they ‘generated significant worries and accelerated sell-offs in 
government bond markets’ during the euro crisis (2015: 12). Noting the existence of that 
spread threshold is particularly important for the scope of this project. As Chapter 5 will 
show, the introduction of a numerical threshold for spread was a central aspect of 
LCH.Clearnet’s Risk Management Policy during the euro crisis. However, the specific 
mechanisms that have allowed for LCH.Clearnet’s actions to destabilise sovereign debt 
markets during the crisis remain entirely unexplored in these accounts. More recently, in 
their study about the creation of a Europeanised repo market, Gabor and Ban (2016) have 
provided more information about the ways in which CCPs can contribute to sovereign 
debt market instabilities. By conducting an examination of the historical roots of the 
European repo market, Gabor and Bank observe that key repo market actors, like the ECB 
and LCH.Clearnet, increased collateral requirements in a procyclical manner during the 
euro crisis, exacerbating tensions in the sovereign debt markets of the periphery that 
further widened their spreads (see also Gabor, 2016).  
 
The authors argue that the sudden increase in collateral requirements by LCH.Clearnet 
during the crisis led to large-scale sell-offs of the affected government securities, which 
‘helped creating the perfect storm for periphery governments’ (Gabor and Ban, 2016: 
631). The study by Gabor and Ban represents an important milestone for our 
understanding of the relationship between CCPs, bank funding and systemic stability 
during the euro crisis, as it is the first work of its kind to suggest that CCPs can be a 
source of sovereign debt market instability. However, their detailed work on the European 
repo market lacks a more exhaustive account of the CCPs-unique features that can 
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contribute to instability in financial markets, and their claims about LCH.Clearnet’s 
impact on sovereign debt markets remain speculative in nature.  
 
Differently from the abovementioned studies, which take the destabilising impact of 
LCH.Clearnet’s margin policies on sovereign debt markets for granted, this chapter 
contributes to our understanding of these dynamics by examining how the specific 
mechanisms at the heart of central clearing can impact systemic stability. Indeed, these 
studies are unable to capture that the destabilising impact of LCH.Clearnet during the 
euro crisis stems from the distinctive way in which CCPs operate, whereby counterparty 
substitution and the unilateral imposition of margin requirement can have a highly 
destabilising impact during times of financial distress.  
 
It should be noted, however, that although the presence of CCPs in the euro crisis 
literature is fairly limited, financial news, as well as national and supranational 
governmental authorities, paid more attention to CCPs (LCH.Clearnet in particular) 
during the crisis. For example, the Financial Times and Reuters were following the 
sovereign debt and repo markets developments very closely during those years. While 
reporting the LCH.Clearnet’s introduction of a spread threshold in the European repo 
market, they were among the first ones to warn (and eventually recognise) that a sudden 
increase in collateral requirements could have exerted downwards pressures on the euro 
area sovereign bonds (i.e. sell-offs), further widening the affected government bonds’ 
spreads against Germany (e.g. Oakley and Jones, 2010; Reuters, 2012a; Cotterill, 2011; 
Oakley, 2011).  
 
Researchers at the Italian Central Bank have also explored the destabilising impact of 
CCPs on sovereign debt markets. A report by the Bank of Italy suggests that the increases 
in collateral requirements by leading CCPs LCH.Clearnet and CC&G in 2011 affected 
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virtually the entire Italian repo market, leading to sell-offs that widened the spreads (Bank 
of Italy, 2012: 38). In that respect, the procyclical potential of margin requirement 
increases has also been picked up by the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), a body 
set up in 2010 for macro-prudential oversight of the European financial system within the 
jurisdiction of the EU (ESRB, 2017). The ESRB argues that the CCPs’ margin 
requirements pose procyclical threats, which requires their systemic risk to be addressed 
through macro-prudential regulation. Even in this case, however, the procyclicality of 
CCPs is taken for granted, and the core mechanisms underpinning CCPs remain obscure 
in these reports and studies14. 
 
2.3 The development of central clearing during the 18th and 19th centuries  
 
This section provides a historically-grounded examination of the development of CCPs 
in financial markets. My historical analysis of CCPs will underscore the long-term 
importance of CCPs in global finance, which makes their neglect in the literature even 
more striking. Furthermore, a historical outlook will also allow us to understand how the 
CCPs’ specific mechanisms came into being and why this is still relevant today. CCPs 
clear transactions by interposing themselves between trading parties and have 
traditionally been dealing with commodity contracts. For instance, the London Produce 
Clearing House, renamed International Commodity Clearing House (ICCH) in 1973, 
played a central role in the establishment and development of many British future markets 
since 1883 (see Rees, 1981). It is only since the 2010s that CCPs have been used more 
                                                        
14 It should be noted that many other reports by central bank and international institutions do in fact explore 
the CCPs’ mechanisms and the risks they pose in more detail. However, these studies to not address the 
euro crisis or sovereign debt market instabilities specifically, but are rather concerned with regulatory 
discussions or with OTC derivatives (e.g. ECB and Federal Reserve, 2007; Rehlon and Nixon, 2013; 
Rahman, 2015; Wendt, 2015). 
 102 
prominently in securities, repurchase and OTC derivatives markets, primarily in 
advanced economies (Wendt, 2015: 3). 
 
2.3.1 Early clearing in 18th century Japan 
 
Some of the oldest clearing organizations can be traced back to 18th century Japan, in the 
Dojima Rice Exchange Market of Osaka. During the Tokugawa period in Japan (1603-
1867), Osaka was the country’s largest rice trading centre, which had even been dubbed 
as the ‘kitchen for the country’ (see Wakita, 2001: 535) 15. As a matter of fact, scholars 
in the history of future markets consider Dojima to be the world’s first established futures 
market (see Duffie, 1989; Blank et al., 1991) 16. One of the key characteristics of the 
Dojima Exchange is that brokers changed rice into cash. That is because, during the 
Tokugawa period, Japan lacked a single unified currency (see Cargill et al., 2003: 12). 
Thus, since the military was often paid in rice, the grain became a currency in its own 
right, whereby trading it for other currencies became common practice. However, as 
changing rice into cash became more complex and transactions had increased in volume, 
brokers developed into ‘full-fledged clearinghouses’ to improve their role as 
intermediaries between trading parties and guarantee the fulfilment of all contracts (West, 
                                                        
15 The Tokugawa shogunate was the last feudal military government of Japan (see Yonemoto, 2003 for a 
full history). 
16 Futures contracts are legal agreements between different parties to buy or sell a specific commodity or 
financial instruments at an agreed price for a specific time in the future (see Malliaris, and Ziemba, 2015). 
Usually, this is conducted via an investor, who guarantees the price changes of the underlying commodity. 
The investor would be making or receiving financial transfers with the affected party depending on the 
price change of the commodity. Therefore, in its very essence, futures contracts are used to protect the 
buyers and sellers of a commodity against price volatility, transferring risk between parties. Today, future 
contracts are often standardized and agreed at the trading floor of a futures exchange. 
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2000: 2587). These brokers essentially laid down the foundation of what will in the future 
be known as a CCP, underpinning the creation of more standardised futures markets. 
 
According to West (2000), there were at least four reasons as to why market participants 
in Dojima succeeded in developing these sophisticated market institutions before Europe. 
First, the shogunate (the de facto military dictatorship of Japan during that time), allowed 
the existence and competition of different currencies simultaneously, which fostered the 
development of a huge number of money exchange brokers. Indeed, there were more than 
a thousand money changers in the Dojima Exchange in 1700, all of which were 
intermediating rice trade. Second, the feudal political system existing at the time in Japan 
did not restrict the lords’ power in the market places, which would be exerted through 
brokerage. Third, and related to the previous point, since rice was simultaneously an 
informal currency and a seasonal, weather-sensitive good, it encouraged these lords to 
hedge themselves against price fluctuation through brokerage activities.  
 
Last, West argues that even socioeconomic and religious factors may have played a role. 
Japanese merchants, as opposed to their European counterparts, retained both the ability 
and the incentive to establish a central marketplace in Osaka. Indeed, Japanese merchants 
did not have the same market restrictions imposed by Christian or Muslim codes of 
conduct that punished or, at least, discouraged debt and usury (see Weatherford, 1997: 
73). In short, the ‘ancestors’ of the modern CCPs have their roots in the contingencies 
underpinning the development of rice futures markets in 18th century Japan, whereby the 
shogunate’s monetary policy deeply shaped how rice would be traded simultaneously as 
a de facto currency and a consumer good. 
 
Crucially, clearing houses in the Dojima rice market were not just intermediaries. They 
were the first organizations to have some recognisable elements of one of the most 
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distinctive features of central clearing: counterparty substitution. Counterparty 
substitution offers a legal guarantee provided by the CCP to fulfil all contractual 
obligations, thereby eliminating what is known as counterparty risk, or the risk that a 
trading party may fail at honouring her/his obligations. According to Schaede17, 
rudimentary counterparty substitution was one of the features that distinguished the 
Dojima Exchange from its European siblings (see Schaede, 1989; 1991). Schaede found 
that the ways in which rice trading was conducted in the Dojima exchange was not 
bilateral. Instead, clearing houses entered each trade as a third party specifically to 
guarantee the fulfilment of every contract. This means that contract performance 
guarantee was already offered by brokers in the Dojima Exchange in early 18th century, 
which is the feature retained by modern-time CCPs.  
 
This is highly relevant for the scope of my project, because it is in its virtue of contract 
performance guarantor that LCH.Clearnet’s actions during the euro crisis need to be 
understood. As discussed in Chapter 5, the CCP’s perception of increasing financial risks 
during the euro crisis prompted its risk committee to formalise a new collateral policy in 
2010. This initiative, which was introduced through the name of Risk Management 
Policy, was designed to ensure that LCH.Clearnet would have enough collateral to 
continue guaranteeing the performance of every contract during turbulent times (see 
Burke, 2011), paving the way for the increases in margin requirements that led to a 
widening in the spreads of the periphery. 
 
However, as we shall see in the next subsection, the process of counterparty substitution 
in modern times is much more complex and nuanced than Dojima’s, both with respect to 
its legal and its trading implications. 
                                                        
17 The work by Ulrich Schaede is remarkable in that it is one of the first that examines the exchange and 
clearing system of Dojima in English. 
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2.3.2 CCPs in the West 
 
According to Norman, the first CCP-like organisation to have provided contract 
performance guarantee in the West was the Caisse de Liquidation des Affaires en 
Marchandises, established in 1882 in Le Havre, France (Norman, 2011: 69). Le Havre 
hosted one of France’s fastest growing and busy ports, which had become Europe’s 
leading importers of coffee and cotton. The expansion of the Le Havre port and the 
creation of the Caisse was closely linked to the politics that shaped the trading of coffee 
and cotton trading during the 19th century. First of all, France’s second colonial expansion 
in Africa during the first half of the 19th century greatly increased the country’s extraction 
and consumption of coffee (see Topik, 2004).  
 
As a matter of fact, due to its colonial expansion in Africa, France became the world’s 
third largest consumer of coffee until World War I. Equally important, the port of Le 
Havre had also become a major importer of American cotton. Le Havre’s involvement in 
the American cotton market was the direct consequence of France helping American 
exporters to avoid the British embargo during the American War of Independence (see 
Lacombe, 1939). France’s support of American independence provided American cotton 
producers new trading avenues into Europe. However, the immediate consequence of 
France’s move was that Le Havre had also become continental Europe’s largest importer 
of US cotton. Indeed, during the 1830s, the port of Le Havre was importing around 15% 
of all American cotton annually. Thus, the volume of coffee and cotton imports in Le 
Havre’s port became rampant throughout the 19th century, which also exposed coffee and 
cotton traders to greater price volatility. Brokers and merchants in Le Havre therefore 
started to look for ways to improve the city’s futures market to shield themselves against 
price fluctuations in cotton and coffee (Norman, 2011: 68).  
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On 6 November 1882, the Caisse de Liquidation was developed precisely with the 
intention of guaranteeing the fulfilment of all the cotton and futures contracts in Le Havre. 
The Caisse of Le Havre managed to establish its lead against all the other European 
competitors by providing a guarantee on all the contracts that it registered and became 
widely employed by local traders and brokers. It is not completely clear why Le Havre 
took the lead over, for instance, London or Amsterdam, given these cities’ roles in 
financial innovation and commodity trade. However, according to Lacombe (1939), an 
official from the Banque de France based in Le Havre, the establishment of the Caisse 
came after one of Le Havre’s leading traders visited the New York Coffee Exchange in 
1882, which hosted a clearing house not offering contract performance guarantee. Still, 
the fact remains that France’s colonial expansion in Africa and support of American 
independence (in what was an essentially an anti-British move) shaped the coffee and 
cotton markets in Le Havre and led to the development of contractual performance 
guarantee through the Caisse. 
 
It goes without saying that contract performance guarantee was attainable even prior to 
the innovation brought about by the Caisse, through a third-party guarantor for example. 
However, the difference with the Caisse in Le Havre was that it successfully combined 
performance guarantee, other risk management and transaction cost reduction techniques, 
such as collateralisation, as well as registration and monitoring of all the open risk 
positions (see also Steigerwald, 2015: 193). The innovation brought about by the Caisse 
was essentially one of centralising the clearing, settlement, and collateral management in 
one institution. Within five years since its inception, the Caisse of Le Havre’s clearing 
method started to become replicated in other large European trading cities, such as Paris, 
Marseilles, Antwerpen, Hamburg and London. It is fair to say that the Caisse of Le Havre 
has established itself as the blueprint of modern central clearing in Europe, since modern 
CCPs, like LCH.Clearnet, have retained the same centralisation functions described 
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above. Although the pay-out guarantee offered by the Caisse is very similar to what is 
provided by today’s CCPs, it had not yet exactly involve counterparty substitution 
intended as the legal replacement of the CCPs with each counterparty in a trade (see 
Steigerwald, 2015: 194).  
 
This specific form of contract performance guarantee only made its first appearance in 
19th century United States at the Minneapolis Chamber of Commerce, later renamed 
Minneapolis Grain Exchange. Counterparty substitution was introduced by the 
Minneapolis Exchange in 1891, requesting that ‘[a]ll transactions…shall be cleared 
through the clearing association…Upon acceptance by the manager of such transactions, 
the clearing association assumes the position of buyer to the seller and seller to the buyer 
in respect to such transactions… (in Moser, 1998: 38, emphasis added). The Minneapolis 
Grain Exchange requested that clearing houses interposing themselves in a trade must act 
as the legal counterparty in each side of exchange-traded contracts. The ways in which 
counterparty substitution replaces the original trading parties in a given trade is a 
particularly important feature for the scope of this project. As discussed in section 2.4, 
the position as both the buyer and seller in a given transaction provides CCPs with the 
ability to unilaterally impose margin requirements onto traders, which is key for 
understanding both the power of CCPs in global finance and the implication of central 
clearing for financial stability. 
 
In a nutshell, the development of modern central clearing is closely linked to the political 
contingencies underpinning the development of futures markets as a means to control the 
price volatility of expanding commodity trade in different sectors. In order protect traders 
against the price fluctuation of commodities, brokers first, and institutionalised 
companies after, provided the guarantee to perform the contracts they traded, culminating 
in its most contemporary iteration: counterparty substitution. 
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2.4 The functioning of contemporary CCPs 
2.4.1 Counterparty risk reduction through matched books and multilateral 
netting 
 
CCPs are widely employed today for their perceived ability to reduce counterparty risk, 
or the risk that one of the traders involved may fail to honour her/his obligations. The 
presumed ability of CCPs to reduce such risks owes a lot to how CCPs conduct their 
contract performance guarantee operations. Counterparty substitution is performed 
through a process called novation, which brings to an end the contracts held by the 
original trading parties and replaces them with two new contracts that legally bind each 
of the initial trading parties to the CCP (see Gregory, 2014: 28). CCPs settle their clearing 
members' open positions through automatic offsets. Settlement by automatic offset 
effectively extinguishes a position by entering into an equal but opposite trade with 
another market participant (Steigerwald, 2015: 184; see also Manning and Schanz, 2009). 
This is also called a matched book, entailing that 'any position taken on with one 
counterparty is always offset by an opposite position taken on with a second counterparty' 
(Rehlon and Nixon, 2013: 2).  
 
Counterparty substitution is one of the main features that makes central clearing 
distinctive from traditional intermediation. An intermediator is a middle man between 
two trading parties, and ‘incurs liabilities on its own account for the purpose of acquiring 
financial assets by engaging in financial transactions on the market’ (OECD, 2003). 
Hence, intermediators are exposed to a change in the market value of the assets they are 
trading, also called market risk. CCPs, however, are not. Through a matched book, CCPs 
will never take on an exposure from a trader that is not matched with an equal exposure 
from another trader. As a consequence, a CCPs is never exposed to market risk. Seen 
through a more systemic lens, the central counterparty clearing system is a: 
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sui generis financial risk management institution that operates by interposing 
itself between a group of merchants…who have contractually entered into the 
CCP scheme in order to clear transactions they have entered into, which gives rise 
to rights and obligations between the clearing members and the CCP (Chamorro-
Courtland, 2010: 520).  
 
Hence, differently from traditional intermediation, with central clearing traders are not 
simply outsourcing the clearing and settlement of a transaction to a third party, they are 
now directly engaging with the CCP on a bilateral basis. The mechanism of central 
clearing through counterparty substitution is graphically explained in figure 7. 
 
(Fig. 7) CCPs and counterparty substitution 
      Bilateral trade       Central clearing 
 
 
Figure 7 shows how central counterparty clearing works in practice. In bilateral trading, 
on the left, individual investors are not only exposed to each other’s default risk directly 
(A with B, B with C, C with D, D with E, E with F, F with A), but also indirectly through 
cross-exposures (A with C, D and E; B with D, E and F; C with A, E and F; D with A, B 
and F; etc.). With central clearing, on the right, investors are only exposed to the CCP on 
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an individual basis. Operations are dealt through multilateral netting, an arrangement 
whereby the parties’ multiple transactions are summed with one another through the CCP, 
rather than being settled individually (see Chamorro-Courtland, 2010). Multilateral 
netting with a CCP allows not only for operational efficiencies, but also to reduce credit 
risk for traders (due to the smaller number of transactions that need settling). In short, 
central clearing involves the replacement of multiple risk exposures between traders with 
a ‘centralised network of exposures between clearing participants and the CCP’ 
(Domanski et al., 2012: 60). What this also means, however, is that although CCPs are 
immune to market risk, they remain exposed to counterparty risk. While CCPs can offset, 
for example, losses against the buyer with gains from the seller, they remain vulnerable 
to counterparty default. Indeed, the default of one trading party would ‘prevent a CCP 
from collecting the full amount of any valuation gains with that counterparty’, while still 
owing valuation gains to the non-defaulting counterparty (Heller and Vause, 2012: 2).  
 
Hence, over the years CCPs developed several tools to shield themselves and their clients 
from the financial losses caused by a defaulting counterparty. Today, it is normally 
required to first register as a member before utilising a CCP’s services. As part of their 
membership, traders have to deposit cash into a default fund, a form of guarantee that can 
range in the order of several millions of US dollars for each member. For instance, the 
Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) Group, the world’s largest option and future 
exchange, asks for its OTC clearing members to contribute between $15,000,000 and 
$50,000,000 to the default fund18. Capital requirements and other criteria for financial 
soundness are also a condition for membership. More important for the scope of this 
project, CCPs also collect collateral for each transaction they clear, the so-called margin 
requirements.  
                                                        
18 These costs are available at the following link: 
http://www.cmegroup.com/company/membership/clearing/otc.html. 
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The selected moments in financial history discussed both below and in Chapter 3 
demonstrate that the use of margin requirements can be detrimental to systemic stability 
in times of financial distress, because they can reduce the liquidity available in the 
financial system. The destabilising potential of margin requirements is in line with the 
finding provided in Chapter 5, which show how LCH.Clearnet’s sudden increase in 
margin requirements from 2010 to 2012 reduced the liquidity of Irish, Portuguese, Italian 
and Spanish sovereign bonds as collateral in repo transactions, which led to large-scale 
bond sell-offs that widened the spreads. 
 
2.4.2 Margin requirements 
 
Margin requirements, or simply margins, is collateral that needs to be deposited by the 
holder of a financial instrument as a way to hedge against the credit risk that he/she may 
pose to the counterparty handling that contract, usually a broker, a CCP or an exchange. 
CCPs demand margin requirements in the form of highly liquid collateral, like cash or 
sovereign bonds. Given the legal obligation of CCPs to fulfil the performance of every 
contract, margin requirements must be liquid, so that the collateral held can be quickly 
sold in order to close out open positions of a defaulting counterparty (see Norman, 2011; 
Gregory, 2014; Rehlon and Nixon, 2013). 
 
Margin requirements can further be divided into three other categories: initial, 
maintenance and variation margins. Initial margins refer to the amount of collateral that 
is required to open a position, and, as mentioned above, is usually equal to a percentage 
of the contract’s value. The maintenance margin requirement is the minimum amount of 
collateral that is required to keep the position with a counterparty open. This means that, 
normally, the maintenance margin is lower than the initial margin. When the value of the 
collateral deposited drops below the maintenance requirement threshold, the position 
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holder needs to deposit more collateral in order to bring the margins back to at least the 
initial margin. This is also called a margin call. Finally, the variation margins are not 
collateral as such, but daily payments reflecting the profits and losses of the position and 
is calculated on mark-to-market basis. Mark-to-market is a way of valuing assets based 
on how much they could be selling for at current market prices. The use of mark-to-
market pricing is highly relevant for the scope of this thesis. As I will argue in Chapter 4, 
the EC and ECB’s political imperative for financial market integration has fostered the 
use of market-based practices, including mark-to-market pricing and margin calls, for 
sovereign collateral in repo markets. In turn, this arrangement exposed the sovereign debt 
markets of the euro area to destabilising price volatilities in financial markets. 
 
Margin requirements work as follows (see Choudhry, 2002 for a full explanation). Let’s 
imagine that an investor purchases a wheat future contract for 5000 bushes at a Chicago-
based exchange through its CCP, where the price for a bush of wheat at current prices is 
set for $10, so the contract is worth $50.000. On day one, the CCP will demand $4000 
dollars in collateral as the initial margin to open the position, whereas the maintenance 
margin is set to $1200. As the price of wheat drops to $9.5 per bush on day two, the 
contract’s value declines to $47.500, which means that the investor’s margin balance 
drops to $1500 ($4000-$2500), which is still above the maintenance margin, but it 
incurred a $2500 variation margin payment to the CCP. On day three, the price of a bush 
of wheat declines further to $9.4, which brings another $500 losses to the investors, with 
an equivalent variation margin payment to the CCP and brings the margin balance to 
$1000. As the margin balance dropped below the $1200 threshold introduced with the 
maintenance margin, the CCP issues a $3000 margin call to the investor in order to bring 
the balance back to $4000. Seen through another lens, margining is an accounting 
technique that allows for the entity managing the financial contract to maintain the 
investor’s collateral account in check.  
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The use margin requirements are particularly important for the scope of this thesis. As 
we shall below, as well as in Chapter 3, the implementation of margin calls tends to have 
procyclical effects in times of financial distress; where procyclical is intended as an 
amplification of prices fluctuation in financial markets (see Borio et al., 2001). This is 
precisely the same dynamic that will be examined in Chapter 5, which assesses the 
destabilising impact of LCH.Clearnet’s margin calls during the euro crisis. 
 
Margin requirements are central to the CCPs’ risk-management strategies. The financial 
losses incurring from a clearing member’s default are dealt with through a series of 
financial buffers, usually referred to as a ‘default waterfall’: 1) the defaulting member’s 
initial margin requirements and default fund contribution; 2) a portion of the CCP’s 
equity; 3) other members’ contribution to the default fund; 4) other forms of members’ 
contributions; 5) the CCP’s own capital (see Eurex Clearing, 2017; LCH.Clearnet, 2016). 
It is important to note that margin requirements, which are effectively liabilities owed by 
the CCP to its clearing members, make up almost the entire CCP’s balance sheet. In the 
case of LCH.Clearnet, the world’s largest CCPs by clearing volume, this figure was over 
99% in 2015, whereas the equity share was only about 0.21% (Cont, 2017: 7).  
 
Simply put, the instruments used by CCPs against the risk of default are mostly made up 
of clearing members’ contributions, particularly margin requirements, which again is 
important to reiterate are composed by highly liquid assets. Crucially, the prices of the 
margin requirements are determined solely by the CCP and cannot be contested by the 
clearing members (see Kenyon and Green, 2013). This is particularly important insofar 
as it helps highlighting the powerful role of CCPs in financial markets. By occupying 
both the positions of buyer and the seller of a trading relationship, together with their 
power to unilaterally increase or decrease margin requirements, CCPs can exert 
significant influence on how investors can employ the assets at their disposal.  
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2.5 CCPs in the aftermath of the 2007-08 financial crisis 
2.5.1 The regulation of OTC derivatives after the crisis 
 
CCPs have become even more relevant and powerful today. The increased regulation of 
the OTC derivatives market after the GFC is key to understand the changing role CCPs 
in global finance. Prior to the financial crisis, OTC derivatives mainly revolved around 
the decision-making power of large banks, the main dealers within the industry, whose 
self-regulatory initiatives allowed for both the growth of OTC trading and for the market 
to be kept outside of public regulatory initiatives (see Pagliari, 2012; Pagliari, 2013: 29).  
 
Derivatives labelled as OTC generally imply that their prices and contractual 
requirements are not publicly disclosed and are negotiated bilaterally by banks without 
going through exchanges. It is important to point out that OTC derivatives outnumber 
their counterparts traded on exchanges before the financial crisis. Indeed, in 2014, around 
90% of the entire derivatives market resided in OTC contracts (Rahman, 2015: 284). The 
OTC market had grown increasingly opaque in the years prior to the onset of the financial 
crisis, to the point where at the time of the collapse of Lehman Brothers ‘no one knew the 
precise size of the [credit default swaps] on its bonds or who held these contracts’ 
(Helleiner, 2011: 71). OTC derivatives became discredited for how their lack of 
transparency ‘contributed to significant market disruption’, which culminated in 
Lehman’s default (Rahman, 2015: 284). 
 
Thus, the waves of bank nationalizations and bailouts that followed had soured the 
electorate, putting politicians across the Atlantic under pressure to make sure taxpayers 
would no longer have to pay for the reckless investment practices of the financial sector 
(see OECD, 2011: 14). As in the words of Timothy Geithner, Secretary of the US 
Treasury during the first Obama administration: ‘[t]he politics would be awful. People 
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hated the idea of government bailouts for mismanaged financial behemoths’ (Geithner, 
2014: 4). President Obama thus made financial reform one of the flagships of his 
administration, stressing that taxpayers should no longer pay to rescue banks that are too 
big to fail (Obama, 2010). Indeed, the issue salience of derivatives following the crisis 
was the engine that helped to push for OTC derivatives regulation in the US Congress, 
which also set the tone for the international reform agenda (Pagliari, 2013: 149).  
 
On the other side of the Atlantic, European leaders also committed to no longer having 
to step in with public money to bail-out bankrupt financial institutions. In the EU, bail-
outs became so unpopular that it pushed European legislators to develop bail-in rules, 
which set regulatory frameworks to make shareholders and creditors pay for the cost of 
bank failures (Schäfer et al., 2016: 2).  
 
2.5.2 The mandatory clearing commitment 
 
When the G20 leaders met on 15 November 2008, just over two months after the collapse 
of Lehman Brothers, reform of the OTC derivatives market was on top of the agenda. 
Credit derivatives, and OTC derivatives more generally, became acknowledged as one of 
the financial products at the root of the crisis, requiring their systemic risk to be promptly 
reduced (G20 Leaders Statement, 2008: 7). Soon after that mission statement, CCPs 
began to acquire an explicit role in those reforms for G20 leaders. In March 2009, the 
G20 Working Group urged regulators to increase incentives to shift predominantly 
bilateral OTC derivatives transactions onto CCPs, as well as to increase their oversight 
(Pagliari, 2013: 32). At the following G20 Summit in Pittsburgh the coming September, 
the role of CCPs in the OTC market was strengthened further. Indeed, the summit was 
concluded with a joint statement that sought to make the central clearing of standardised 
OTC derivatives mandatory in order to improve the OTC market and thus contributing to 
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strengthen the international financial regulatory system (see G20 Leaders Statement, 
2009)19. In short, between March and September 2009 consensus crystallised among 
world leaders that shifting OTC derivatives onto CCP would help to improve financial 
stability. 
 
With regard to the two largest OTC derivatives markets, the clearing mandate was 
introduced in the US with the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act, and in the EU with the 2012 
European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR). Globally, implementation is still a 
work-in-progress, even though the majority of the Financial Stability Board (FSB)’s 
members have implemented, or are in the process of implementing, legal requirements to 
enforce mandatory clearing for standardised OTC derivatives (FSB, 2015: 8). In terms of 
regulatory oversight, G20 leaders also mandated the Committee on Payments and 
Settlements Systems (CPSS) and the International Organization for Securities 
Commission (IOSCO) to establish international standards to supervise and regulate CCPs 
(see Helleiner, 2014: 80).  
 
There was a specific event that helped to build momentum to expand the use of CCPs. 
When Lehman Brothers went bankrupt in 2008, the defaulting positions cleared by 
LCH.Clearnet, who clears most of the global interest rates swap (IRS) market, were 
resolved without even exhausting the investment bank’s margin requirements held by the 
CCP, only a third of which were used (see Gregory, 2014: 43). LCH.Clearnet’s successful 
management of the default helped consolidate consensus for mandatory clearing among 
                                                        
19 What the process of standardisation entails is a complex issue, which falls outside the scope of this 
chapter and will not be discussed in detail. Broadly speaking, it refers to the process of making specific 
classes of OTC derivatives uniform on legal, processing, and product levels, in order to facilitate central 
clearing. See CESR (2010) and ESMA (2017) for OTC derivatives standardization in the EU; and CFTC 
and SEC (2012) for the US counterpart. 
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G20 leaders, which began to see CCPs as the solution to improve both the transparency 
of the OTC derivatives market and the overall stability of the financial system (see Lee, 
2010). Politically, the clearing mandate helped to solve the more salient problem of state 
bailouts and the regulation of OTC derivatives. Indeed, mandatory clearing was 
implemented with the intention of transferring an increasing share of derivative risk to 
CCPs, so that it would no longer be taxpayers paying for failures of the financial sector, 
but the CCPs themselves (see Singh, 2011: 4).  
 
Further, the clearing mandate simultaneously transformed and sustained the OTC market. 
Even though the implementation of both the Dodd-Frank act and EMIR is still a work-in-
progress (see FCA, 2016), according to a report by the Bank for International Settlements 
(BIS) central clearing has been literally ‘reshaping the OTC derivatives market’ (BIS, 
2016: 5). As of the second quarter of 2017, the percentage of IRS cleared via CCPs was 
over 88.5% of all outstanding positions, up from approximately 21.3% at the end of 
December 2007 (see ISDA, 2017; ISDA, 2013). This is a remarkable figure, considering 
that the IRS derivatives segment accounts for around 80% of the entire OTC market.  
 
However, the new role given by G20 leaders to CCPs in the OTC market did not go 
unchallenged. Big banks, who had long dominated OTC derivatives trading, were among 
those who most clearly contested such deep reforms. The main concern banks had with 
the clearing mandate had to do with the reduced profit margins within the new mandatory 
clearing regime. Indeed, default funds contributions, margin requirements and all the 
other forms of financial guarantees demanded by CCPs increase the costs for trading OTC 
derivatives (see Deloitte, 2014). In addition, the transparency requirement included 
alongside mandatory clearing also reduces revenues of large banks. That is because 
higher price transparency reduces the amount of money that a trader can earn by 
exploiting differentials in buyer’s and seller’s prices, the so-called bid-ask spread, 
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squeezing revenues from OTC trading. It comes as no surprise, then, that the vast majority 
of derivatives dealers openly opposed mandatory clearing for standardized OTC 
derivatives in US Congressional hearings in 2008 and 2009 (Pagliari, 2013: 152).  
 
In Europe, The International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA), the Securities 
Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA) and the London Investment 
Banking Association (LIBA) also raised concerns with regard to the European 
Commission’s proposal to introduce mandatory clearing for all standardised OTC 
derivatives in the EMIR legislation. Although the associations welcomed the EC’s 
intention to strengthen the stability of OTC market, they also argued that ‘valid reasons 
exist for why certain trades are not cleared’, reflecting their scepticism towards improving 
the transparency of a profitable, but opaque market (Metcalfe, Serocold, Huet, 2009: 5).  
 
On the other hand, exchanges are among the main beneficiaries of the mandatory clearing 
reforms. Exchanges had been trying for a long time to break into the OTC market without 
annoying the banks, the exchanges’ largest customers (Van Duyn and Gangahar, 2009). 
As in the words of an analyst at Sanford Bernstein, an investment manager: ‘[e]xpanding 
the scope of mandatory clearing through central clearing counterparty…is a material step 
up in the shift from OTC to on-exchange’ (Hoffmann-Becking in Van Duyn and 
Gangahar, 2009). Indeed, most exchanges became in favour of mandatory clearing during 
the US Congressional debates, though to different degrees (Pagliari, 2013: 153). In this 
respect, it is important to note that some of the world’s largest CCPs are currently 
majority-owned by exchanges, like LCH.Clearnet (London Stock Exchange), CME 
Clearing (CME Group) and Eurex Clearing (Deutsche Börse). Given that exchanges 
usually prefer a for-profit business model for their central clearing business, expanding 
the use of CCPs increases revenues for their clearing activities.  
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To sum up, the enhanced role of CCPs in global finance is closely linked to the politics 
surrounding the regulation of the OTC derivatives market in the aftermath of the GFC, 
whereby the opaque and unstable nature of OTC derivatives increased pressure regulators 
to change how they had to be governed and traded. More importantly, for the scope of 
this project, mandatory clearing contributed to dramatically expand the use of CCPs in 
global finance, which, as we shall see in Chapter 4, has had implications into market 
segments beyond OTC derivatives. Following the G20 mandatory clearing commitment, 
the presence of CCPs has also greatly increased in the European repo market, which helps 
to explain why LCH.Clearnet’s actions during the euro crisis have been able to destabilise 
the sovereign debt markets of the periphery and widen these countries’ sovereign spreads 
to such an important extent. The last subsection will discuss a final, crucial aspect of 
central clearing: its relationship with systemic stability. 
 
2.6 Central clearing and systemic stability 
2.6.1 CCPs and risk concentration 
 
The increasingly key role of CCPs in financial markets has raised concerns among central 
banks and international institutions about their systemic importance, particularly with 
regard to how they can become a single failure point. A number of studies have shown 
that CCPs do in fact suffer from risk concentration, indicating exposures large enough 
whereby the failure of a single CCP could deal a serious blow to the financial system (see 
ECB and Federal Reserve, 2007: 44, Gracie, 2015: 2; Domanski et al., 2015; Wendt, 
2015). Through counterparty substitution, CCPs transfer default risk from traders to 
themselves, which means that their exposure to counterparty default has significantly 
increased (see Banque de France, 2010: 34). Furthermore, a recent survey by the FSB 
shows that many CCPs have relationships with the same clearing members, many of 
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which are systemically important financial institutions on a global scale and are also the 
greatest contributors to the CCPs’ financial resources (FSB, 2017).  
 
The study finds that, on the basis of this interconnectedness, a default of a CCP’s two 
largest clearing members could result in defaults of the same entity in 23 other CCPs (out 
of the 26 surveyed). In other words, the default of a large clearing member could 
simultaneously affect multiple CCPs, with potentially dramatic consequences for the 
stability of global finance. Issues arising with the CCPs’ interconnectedness have also 
been highlighted with respect to the so-called interoperability agreements (i.e. links 
between different CCPs), whereby CCPs are exposed to one another and to each other’s 
clearing members (see ESMA, 2016). Relatedly, an important study by Duffie and Zhu 
found that clearing different OTC derivatives classes among separate CCPs always 
increases counterparty risk, relative to clearing an entire portfolio with the same CCP, 
suggesting that the existence of a fragmented CCP market may increase, rather than 
reduce, counterparty risk (Duffie and Zhu, 2011).  
 
2.6.2 CCPs and liquidity 
 
There is, however, another aspect that has received relatively less attention, and I consider 
to be of equal systemic importance: the impact of central clearing on liquidity. An 
improvement in general liquidity conditions and trading activities has been detected since 
the introduction of the clearing mandate, also thanks to the price transparency 
requirements that came with it (Loon and Zhong, 2014). Indeed, the CCPs’ automatic 
offsets provide market participants with ‘[t]he ability to easily enter into positions…and 
the ability to exit positions…[which] greatly increase the liquidity of the market’ (Bliss 
and Steigerwald, 2006: 26, in Steigerwald, 2015: 184, emphasis in the original). 
Nevertheless, these conclusions often refer to conditions of financial stability. The world 
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economy has not yet experienced a large-scale financial crisis since the use of CCPs has 
expanded, which makes it extremely difficult to make any conclusion on the relationship 
between CCPs and global liquidity in times of financial distress.  
 
That being said, an important study conducted at the Central Bank of Norway (Norges 
Bank) warns that although central clearing is effective in reducing counterparty exposure 
among clearing members, margin requirements transform counterparty risk into liquidity 
risk (see Cont, 2017). The reasoning is the following. As discussed above, margin 
requirements are demanded in the form of very liquid assets, usually cash and sovereign 
bonds, and CCPs hold a lot of margin requirements, effectively acting as their strongest 
resource against counterparty risk. According to the same study, in 2016 some of the 
world’s major CCPs held an average of around $400 billions of liquid assets in the form 
of collateral gathered from their clearing members (ibid: 6). For comparison, the four 
largest broker dealers in the US only held around $25 billion in cash reserve in 2015. 
Given that margin requirements are the largest reserve of collateral to protect the CCP 
against the risk of counterparty default, and that margin requirements are by definition 
liquid assets, CCPs do not run as much into problems of solvency (due to the use of a 
matched book) as they would with liquidity. At the same time, because the actual amount 
of the collateral is the result of risk-based calculations, margin requirements can greatly 
increase in times of economic turbulence, where the CCPs’ default risk perception 
strengthens.  
 
If this analysis is correct, the study at the Central Bank of Norway effectively suggests 
that an increase in margin requirements could shrink the liquidity available in financial 
markets during times of financial distress. As the perception of counterparty default risk 
increases, CCPs would likewise demand more liquid collateral, which would shrink the 
liquidity available to investors. CCPs have thus been deemed as ‘too interconnected’ in 
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financial markets and therefore ‘too important to fail’ (Wendt, 2015: 1), alluding to the 
potentially catastrophic consequences that could stem from a CCP collapse. Although, as 
discussed above, CCPs do have a number of mechanisms in place to shield themselves 
against heightened counterparty risk, CCPs did go bust in the past, and liquidity (or the 
lack thereof) was a central aspect of these failures. 
 
2.6.3 When (and how) CCPs fail 
 
There have only been three documented failures of CCPs: 1) the Paris-based Caisse de 
Liquidation des Aiffaires en Merchandise – 1974; 2) the Kuala Lumpur Commodity 
Clearing House (KLCCH) – 1983; 3) the Hong Kong Futures Exchange Clearing 
Corporation (HKFECC) – 1987 (see Alloway, 2011). The failures shared a number of 
crucial aspects: clearing members were unable to meet their margin requirement 
obligations in times of financial distress, and the default funds were insufficient to absorb 
all financial losses.  
 
The failure of the Paris Caisse is closely linked to the excessive degree of speculation that 
was taking place in the white sugar market in 1974. Between November 1973 and 
November 1974, the prices for white sugar increased by a factor of six (see Bignon and 
Vuillemey, 2017, see also Chalmin, 1990). In Paris, white sugar prices further doubled 
between September and November of 1974, before experiencing a fall on 21 November. 
The sudden crash of sugar prices hit several speculators, particularly brokers, many of 
which were clearing members of the Paris Caisse and had been trading at those 
speculative prices on behalf of their clients without authorisation by the CCP (Norman, 
2011: 131). As the sugar prices were plunging, the Caisse issued several margin calls for 
its sugar futures contracts. Due to the massive decline in profits, many clearing members 
were unable to meet the increase in margin requirements, which added to their liquidity 
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shortage. There was one particularly large sugar broker-firm, Maurice Nataf, which 
underwent massive losses and was a member of the Caisse. In addition to the existing 
problems in collecting margin requirements, the crisis took a turn for the worst when 
Maurice Nataf announced to the Caisse that it would not be able to meet a margin call on 
2 December (see Bignon and Vuillemey, 2017). The Caisse decided to close the market 
and cease its activities on 3 December, which did not re-opened until January 1976 when 
the Caisse was, in effect, liquidated, leading to the creation of a new CCP, the Banque 
Centrale de Compensation.  
 
When it comes to the Malaysian KLCCH, the CCP had only been operating for about 
three years prior to its failure, and its troubles derive from a crash in the futures market 
for palm oil in 1983. Similar to what had previously happened with the Caisse in Paris, 
the sudden decline in the price of palm oil led six clearing members to default on around 
$70 million of palm oil futures contracts amid declining profits, which made them unable 
to meet the margin calls issued by KLCCH (see Gregory, 2014: 268). Just like in the 
previous case, the Malaysian CCP shut down its market operations before failing 
altogether thereafter. According to a Bank of England report, the Malaysian government 
heavily criticised the ways in which the KLCCH handled the crash, as there had been a 
12-day gap between the squeeze in the market and the brokers’ default, suggesting that 
the CCP could have attempted issuing margin requirements beforehand (Hills et al., 
1999). Thus, as opposed to the Caisse, in the case of KLCCH a big responsibility lay in 
the inexperience of the CCPs’ managers, as well as the lack of coordination between the 
CCP and the exchange in handling the crash (see Norman, 2011: 33). Still, the fact 
remains that the inability to meet the KLCCH’s increases in margin requirements led to 
a liquidity shortage that contributed to the default of clearing members and the CCP itself. 
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Lastly, the failure of the HKFECC in 1987 brought a near-financial disaster in the global 
economy. The clearing system in Hong Kong at the time was slightly more complex than 
the other cases. Whereas the HKFECC was the institution managing the actual clearing 
of the contracts traded on the Hong Kong Futures Exchange, the guarantor of these 
contracts was a different institution, the Hong Kong Futures Guarantee Corporation 
(HKFGC). The fragmented structure of the clearing system in Hong Kong created a 
regime of moral hazard (see Gregory, 2014: 269). First, whereas HKFECC (the CCP) 
was responsible for monitoring the positions traded on the exchange, it was not exposed 
to losses in case of default, which would have been borne by the HKFGC instead. 
Secondly, while the HKFGC was exposed to the losses stemming from default risk, it had 
no say in risk monitoring and standards, which were set by the HKFECC instead. Thus, 
when the Hang Seng Index (the Hong Kong Stock Market index) experienced close to a 
50% drop on 19 October 1987 – the so-called Black Monday – the Hong Kong clearing 
system suffered from the lack of properly coordinated risk management practices, which 
had been reflected by the sustained price growth on futures prices during the previous 
years (see Hills et al., 1999).  
 
In a similar fashion to what happened to the previous two instances, traders were not able 
to meet the sudden increase in margin requirements by the HKFGC following the price 
drop. In that respect, the margin calls added a squeeze to their already limited available 
liquidity. However, differently from Paris and Kuala Lumpur, the HKFGC actually had 
to be bailed out. After contributions from shareholders, members and large brokers, the 
bailout still cost taxpayers around HK$1bn. Equally important, the crash in Hong Kong 
could have compromised global financial transactions, as the local division of the 
London-based CCP ICCH was heavily invested in the Hong Kong commodity market. 
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In light of the failure of CCPs discussed above, what can be said about the relationship 
between the new key role CCPs in the OTC market and systemic stability? Firstly, 
mandatory clearing does not reduce OTC derivatives risk per se, it transfers it from banks 
to CCPs, which are perceived as more adept at managing counterparty risk. At the same 
time, the increased exposure to the default risk of OTC derivatives traders means that the 
‘systemic consequences of a CCP default could be unprecedented’ (Cœuré, 2014: 5). As 
put by Financial Times editor Philip Stafford, CCPs have become ‘the new too-big-too-
fail institutions’, an expression previously used to describe over exposed and thus 
systemically important banks during the GFC (Stafford, 2017). Mandatory clearing 
commitment has created new single failure points in the financial system, which may 
actually be detrimental to financial stability. Therefore, I argue that mandatory clearing 
may undermine the original intent of the G20 financial reform agenda, aimed at 
improving systemic stability and preventing future tax payers’ bailout. The scope of the 
changes brought about by the clearing mandate in the OTC derivatives market could 
prove to be dysfunctional, insofar as they simultaneously promote OTC derivatives risk 
concentration and make the global financial system more prone to liquidity crises.  
 
Back to liquidity, the three CCP crashes described above show that the sudden increase 
in collateral requirements by CCPs can add pressure to the traders’ already weakening 
funding availability during times of financial turmoil, effectively compromising their 
ability to meet payments, including the margin calls themselves. This is a key finding 
when it comes to answering this project’s research question, which seeks to examine the 
factors that contributed to destabilising sovereign debt markets during the euro crisis. 
While LCH.Clearnet’s actions during the euro crisis did not lead to a full-blown liquidity 
crisis, the CCP’s sudden increase in margin requirements did reduce the liquidity of 
specific sovereign collateral markets, which added pressures on the funding liquidity 
needs of the banks in the euro area. In other words, the transmission channel through 
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which LCH.Clearnet contributed to destabilising sovereign debt markets is funding 
liquidity. The link connecting CCPs to liquidity will be explored in further detail in the 
next chapter, which explores the functioning of repo market, the market segment where 
most interbank lending operations are conducted and where LCH.Clearnet triggered its 
large margin calls in the euro area from 2010 to 2012.  
 
2.7 Conclusions 
 
The analysis conducted in this chapter sought to bridge a pretty significant gap about the 
role and functioning of CCPs existing in euro crisis literature, and in the political 
economy of global finance scholarship more broadly. This gap is particularly staggering, 
considering that I have shown that central clearing technologies already exited in the 
18thth century, albeit in rudimentary form. As a matter of fact, this chapter has shown that 
CCPs have historically been embedded in the political contingencies underpinning the 
development of financial markets: monetary policy during the Tokugawa period in the 
18th century, France’s second colonial expansion in the 19th century and the post-GFC 
financial reforms.  
 
The key finding of this chapter is that the main features of CCPs, margin requirements 
and counterparty substitution, were developed over the centuries within the context of 
their historic role in financial markets: guaranteeing the performance of every contract. 
In this respect, the peculiar position of CCPs as both the buyers and the sellers in a given 
transaction, together with their ability to unilaterally impose margin requirements, makes 
CCPs powerful actors in financial markets. Following the mandatory clearing reforms in 
the OTC derivatives market, CCPs have become even more significant in global finance.  
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As the use of central clearing witnessed a dramatic expansion, CCPs have also become 
more relevant with respect to financial stability, as also shown by the many studies 
(carried out primarily by central banks) that are particularly concerned with risk 
concentration. Undoubtedly, contract performance guarantee through counterparty 
substitution and multilateral netting is highly effective in reducing the risk that one of the 
counterparties may fail to honour its contractual obligations – which is one of the reasons 
that underpinned the CCPs’ expanded use in the OTC market in the first place. However, 
the ways in which CCPs can unilaterally impose margin requirements, which is key to 
the CCPs’ role to fulfil contractual obligations, can also compromise the liquidity 
available in the financial system.  
 
Because of the highly liquid nature of margins, when a CCP hikes collateral requirement 
in times of financial distress it puts pressures on the liquidity of investors who are already 
struggling to meet their funding needs. The three cases of CCP collapse throughout the 
course of the 20th century provide evidence of this dynamic. Speculation and the 
subsequent crash of white sugar prices in France in the 1970s, the sudden decline of palm 
oil in Malaysia, and the crash of the Hong Kong futures market in the 1980s, all share a 
similar dynamic when it comes to the involvement of CCPs. As prices in commodity and 
futures markets dropped, CCPs began demanding more collateral through margin calls. 
Amid declining profitability form the price drop, the increase in margin payments put a 
strain on the funding liquidity of investors. Unable to meet margin calls, the investors 
defaulted, leading the respective CCPs to fail as well. 
 
The findings of this chapter are highly relevant to answer the research question posed by 
this project, namely: what factors contributed to destabilising sovereign debt markets 
during the height of the euro crisis from 2010 to 2012? First, the embeddedness of CCPs 
in the development of markets will help to highlight the pivotal role that CCPs play in 
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European finance. Indeed, Chapter 4 shows how the contrasting interests in the process 
of European economic integration on the one hand, and within the European exchange 
business on the other, shaped the European interbank funding market in such a way to be 
highly dependent on CCPs, particularly on LCH.Clearnet. In turn, this helps to explain 
why it was LCH.Clearnet in particular that destabilised different sovereign debt markets 
over the course of the euro crisis.  
 
Second, the evidence of the destabilising impact of the CCPs’ margin requirements 
provides the historical backbone against which to examine the role of LCH.Clearnet 
during the euro crisis, particularly with respect to the dimension of liquidity. Chapter 5 
demonstrates that the increases in margin requirements for using Irish, Portuguese, Italian 
and Spanish sovereign bonds reduced their liquidity as collateral in repo transactions, 
which led to large-scale sell-offs that contributed to destabilising their respective 
sovereign debt markets, widening the spreads. 
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3 The Repo Market 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
One of the main arguments made in the previous chapter was that the destabilising 
potential of CCPs stems from the specific ways in which they function. The position that 
CCPs retain as buyers and sellers in a clearing agreement, which allows them to 
unilaterally impose margin requirements, can be destabilising in times of financial 
distress. In that respect, the impact that margin calls can have in shrinking the liquidity 
available to investors was central to the analysis, because it provided a framework to 
understand how LCH.Clearnet contributed to destabilising sovereign debt markets during 
the euro crisis. This chapter focuses on a second important pillar that allows us to further 
explore the relationship between central clearing, margin calls and financial stability 
during the euro crisis: the repo market. Repos are short-term collateralised loans, which 
have historically been used by central banks and investors. Much like CCPs, repo trading 
did not feature much in the euro crisis literature, which does not allow us to understand 
the role played by the provision of short-term funding in the sovereign debt markets of 
the euro area (see Katsimi and Moutos, 2010; Bibow, 2013; Pepino, 2015 as notable 
exceptions). 
 
The scope of this chapter is thus to examine the different aspects surrounding the 
functioning and development of modern repo markets, which is an essential prerequisite 
before assessing the ways in which its European variant is structured (Chapter 4), and the 
role that CCPs play therein (Chapter 5). Like in the previous chapter, the dimension of 
liquidity remains central to the analysis. This chapter traces the origins of the modern 
repo market to the 20th century US, when the New York Fed used repos as a way to 
provide short-term liquidity to underfunded banks (see Garbade, 2006). This is an 
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important point that shows how the repo market has always been closely linked to banks’ 
liquidity since its inception. However, because repo lending is collateralised, the 
availability of collateral is a key aspect surrounding the stable functioning of these 
markets. As will be examined in more detail below, the declining quality of repo collateral 
during the GFC shrank the liquidity available to investors, contributing to making the US 
banking system insolvent (Gorton and Metrick, 2012). The ways in which the declining 
liquidity of repo collateral can lead to systemic instabilities is a central point when it 
comes to answering this project’s research question.  
 
As I will argue in Chapter 4, the European repo market’s reliance on sovereign bonds and 
central clearing on the one hand, and market-based practices on the other, makes the 
sovereign debt markets of the euro area extremely prone to what I call CCP-induced 
collateral crises. In the euro area, government bonds act as the main form of collateral in 
the European repo market, and the vast majority of repo-lending is centrally cleared. 
Therefore, the liquidity and stability of specific sovereign bond markets can be 
compromised should CCPs ask for additional margins when clearing a given government 
security in repo transactions. This is precisely the dynamic explored in Chapter 5, which 
examines the ways in which LCH.Clearnet increased margin requirements to use Irish, 
Portuguese, Italian and Spanish sovereign bonds in repo transaction from 2010 to 2012. 
 
The analysis conducted below will proceed in several steps. In Section 3.3, I introduce 
what a repo contract is and what repos are used for, focusing on how repos are undertaken 
through the sale and repurchase of collateral used to guarantee an exchange of cash. I 
therefore explain how repos are used both as monetary policy tools by central banks and 
as short-term funding instruments by banks. Section 3.4 moves on to discuss how the 
expansion of repo markets have largely been determined by the politics surrounding the 
transformation of monetary policy in US and Europe in the aftermath of World War II. 
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This section stresses the separation between monetary and fiscal policy and the shift to 
market-based finance between the 1950 and 1980s in the US as one of the main drivers 
that contributed to the expansion of repos. The analysis then examines how the expansion 
of the repo market in Europe between the 1980s and 1990s largely built on previous 
developments in the US, which inevitably intertwined with the politics of European 
integration.  
 
The chapter moves on to a crucial event that would significantly change the development 
of repos: the 1998 Russian currency crisis. The crisis demonstrated that the lack of 
collateral can generate liquidity shortages in market-based financial systems; thus, central 
banks and international institutions found in sovereign debt the anchor collateral that 
would preserve repo-funding in times of financial distress. This brings us to the last topic 
discussed in this chapter: the ways in which repo markets connect to financial 
(in)stability. In Section 3.5, I therefore evaluate the empirical evidence on the 
performance of repo markets during the GFC, which points towards a procyclical effect 
in how margin calls triggered sell-offs in the run up to Lehman’s collapse in 2008. The 
procyclical effect of margin requirements on the declining availability of repo collateral 
is highly relevant for the scope of this project. Indeed, in Chapter 5 I will show that 
LCH.Clearnet’s margin calls had a procyclical impact on the sovereign spreads of Ireland 
and Portugal during the euro crisis. 
 
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 examines the gap existing in 
the euro crisis literature on the functioning and importance of repos. Section 3.3 explains 
what repos are, the different type of repos contracts and what repos are used for. Section 
3.4 examines the development of the modern repo market as embedded in the politics of 
post-war monetary policy restructuring and of the process of European economic 
integration. Section 3.5 discusses the implications of repo markets for systemic stability, 
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while Section 3.6 is dedicated to the concluding remarks, which are that the collateralised 
nature of repo lending makes this type of financing susceptible to sudden funding shocks. 
 
3.2 Repos and the euro crisis 
 
Almost as staggering as the case of CCPs, repo contracts have not been discussed in much 
detail in the euro crisis literature. This is surprising given that, as will be examined below 
and in Chapter 4, repos represent the point of intersection between government debt and 
bank funding, particularly in the euro area. The lack of a detailed examination of repo 
markets is remarkable insofar as both rising sovereign bond yields and deteriorating bank 
liquidity were central to the unfolding of the euro crisis. 
 
A number of studies in rational choice political economy and heterodox economics do, 
however, mention the role played by declining liquidity of repo markets in the distressed 
economies of the euro area. For instance, Katsimi and Moutos note that, by mid-2010, 
Irish, Portuguese and Spanish repo markets ‘were becoming less liquid’, which prompted 
investors to become more aware of the sovereign debt market exposure of European 
banks (Katsimi and Moutos, 2010: 569). Furthermore, Moro argues that the ECB played 
a key role in improving markets’ perception of sovereign default risk in the euro area 
prior to the crisis (2014: S12). By reducing the haircuts demanded when accepting 
sovereign bonds as collateral in its own repo-based monetary policy refinancing 
operations, the ECB’s collateral policy contributed to lower bond yields (and thus lower 
spreads) across the euro area (see also Bibow, 2013).  
 
In other words, according to Moro, the low haircuts on sovereign bonds placed by the 
ECB in its repo operations contributed to reduce the investors’ perception of sovereign 
default in the euro area, leading to lower spreads across the board.  
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From a different angle, but equally relevant for the scope of this study, Pepino notes how 
the Irish banks’ reliance on repo funding had reached over €136bn by November 2010 
(which she considers to be disproportionately large when compared to the country’s 
GDP); however, these operations were largely collateralised through Irish government 
debt, and the liquidity of Irish securities had been deteriorating during that time, which 
made it increasingly difficult for Irish banks to fund themselves appropriately (2015: 
113). Although she does not address the specific question of why repo liquidity for Irish 
government securities had been deteriorating during that time, which is treated as an 
existing condition affecting the global economy since 2008, she does point to the fact that 
the increasing reliance of Irish banks to repo funding took place precisely when the 
liquidity of the collateral used (Irish government bonds) was in decline.  
 
Pepino makes an important point when it comes to answering the research question posed 
by this project, which seeks to uncover the factors that contributed to destabilising 
sovereign debt markets from 2010 to 2012. Chapter 4 will show that the ways in which 
the European repo market is structured around the market-based handling of sovereign 
collateral allowed for LCH.Clearnet’s actions to put an additional strain on the liquidity 
of Irish banks through the increases in collateral requirements. In turn, Chapter 5 will 
argue that that these actions contributed to making Irish government securities less liquid, 
which led to sell-offs that widened the Irish sovereign spread.  
 
However, the studies mentioned above do not make the declining liquidity of repo 
collateral the central focus of their analyses, calling for more work to be conducted on 
repos in the euro crisis debate. Conversely, the works by Gabor (2016) and Gabor and 
Ban (2016) are among the few studies in political economy examining the 
interconnections between sovereign debt, collateral availability and bank liquidity in repo 
markets. While the authors discuss how the development of repos within the context of 
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market-driven financial integration has made European financial markets extremely 
prone to the instabilities related to procyclical collateral crises, they do not engage with 
the euro crisis debate as such. 
 
In other words, whereas, on the one hand, the euro crisis literature has largely neglected 
repos as a central feature of their analyses, on the other hand, the few studies that do 
examine the systemic relevance of repos are not concerned with the unfolding of the euro 
crisis as such. Thus, one of the contributions of this chapter, and of this project more 
broadly, is to draw on existing studies and extending the repo market as a central 
analytical focus to understand the unfolding of the euro crisis.  
 
3.3 Introducing repos 
3.3.1 The repo contract 
 
In a repo contract, a borrower sells an asset in the form of collateral to a lender in 
exchange for cash, with the promise to repurchase the asset on a given date at a given 
price. In short, this kind of transaction allows the seller of the collateral (the borrower) to 
lend money from the buyer (the creditor). The security being traded is held as collateral, 
which serves as protection for the buyer against the possibility that the seller may fail to 
repurchase that security. In a sense, ‘a repo transaction may be thought of as a 
collateralized loan to the seller of the repo’ (Wells Fargo, 2017). From a legal perspective, 
the formal ownership transfer of the security for the duration of the agreement provides 
protection against credit risk, because, should any of the traders fail to complete the 
transaction, the collateral can simply be liquidated by the other party (see CGFS, 1999a: 
5). 
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When purchasing the security, the buyer demands a payment for holding the security (i.e. 
for lending the money). The difference between the price paid by the buyer and the 
amount of money received by the seller at the end of the contract is called the repo rate, 
which is quoted as an annualised percentage. Depending on the volatility of the security’s 
market price and inflation, a positive repo rate indicates that the lender is making a profit, 
whereas a negative rate means that the lender is making a loss. Further, when lenders 
purchase the asset, they seek financial buffers in order to shield themselves against the 
potential loss of value of that asset, either due to price volatility or for covering the 
estimated cost of liquidating the collateral following a default. The financial buffers either 
take the form of a percentage deduction from the market price of the collateral (e.g. 4%), 
called a haircut, or is expressed as a percentage of the collateral purchase price (e.g. 
104%), referred to as an initial margin (see ICMA, 2012).  
 
Figure 8 shows bank A, a lender, and bank B, a borrower, undertaking a 1-week repo. 
Bank A purchases a security from bank B (in the example, an asset-backed security), with 
a nominal value of €2000, for €1880, where the €120 deduction from the market price 
represents a haircut of 6%. Thus, bank A temporarily holds a €2000-worth security, for 
which €1880 was paid to bank B.  
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(Fig. 8) How repos work – 1 
 
 
After 1 week, figure 9 shows that bank B re-purchases the security by paying the 
discounted price of €1880 plus €94, the latter used to cover for the lender’s repo rate of 
5%, which also represents the net profit made by the lender.  
 
(Fig. 9) How repos work – 2 
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3.3.2 What repos are used for 
3.3.2.1 Central banking 
 
Broadly speaking, repos are money market instruments, meaning that they are mostly 
used for highly liquid assets and with short-term maturities (usually overnight, but up to 
a one year) (see Gorton and Metrick, 2012). Repos are routinely used by central banks 
for monetary policy purposes, and that is largely due to two reasons (see CGFS, 1999a: 
11; see also Spörndli, 1998). First, repos are an effective tool for liquidity management. 
By conducting repo transactions with the banks within their regulatory remit, a central 
bank can inject liquidity on a short-term basis. At the same time, the liquidity injections 
can be reversed once the contract ends. Indeed, central banks can absorb liquidity by not 
rolling over the repos reaching maturity. Similarly, central banks can also reduce liquidity 
by conducting reverse repo operations, whereby it is the central bank that sells the 
security, thus withdrawing liquidity from the financial system. In short, repos provide 
central banks with precise control over liquidity provision.  
 
Repo operations can also function as monetary policy signalling. For instance, the ECB 
utilises repo contracts for its main refinancing operations, which is where the bulk of 
short-term funding for banks comes from. Thus, the repo rate on the main refinancing 
operations is the short-term interest rate of the ECB’s monetary policy (i.e. the key policy 
rate), which can be set in a way to signal the monetary policy stance and therefore 
influence investors’ inflation expectations20.  
 
                                                        
20 In countries where the main policy rate is not the repo rate, but the discount rate (like the Fed), repos can 
still be used to provide an indication of the monetary policy stance, or the general direction of the key 
official rate (see CGFS, 1999a: 12). 
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3.3.2.2 The different types of repos in the interbank funding market 
 
Aside from monetary policy, repos are one of the main sources of short-term funding in 
the interbank lending market (see Mancini et al., 2015; FSB, 2012). The interbank lending 
market is a market segment where banks lend to each other at a short maturity, usually 
overnight. Interbank lending plays a central role in the financial system because short-
term funding is ‘vital for banks’ liquidity management’ and is divided between the 
secured and unsecured segment (Heider and Hoerova, 2009: 5). The secured market 
segment is composed to a large extent by repos, which, as mentioned above, are a form 
of collateralised (secured) financing transaction. The unsecured market segment makes 
no use of collateral, like federal funds in the US or bank deposits. Without a doubt, repos 
(and, by extension, secured loans) have almost entirely replaced unsecured loans for the 
short-term funding needs of the vast majority of large banks (see FSB, 2012).  
 
Generally, repo trading in the euro area can be divided in three segments: bi-lateral, 
triparty and CCP (see Copeland et al., 2014; Mancini el al., 2015: 1751). Bi-lateral repos 
are conducted directly by the two trading parties, whereby the margin requirements are 
the result of negotiations and both parties are exposed to counterparty risk in case of 
default. In a triparty repo, there is a third actor that is responsible for the settlement and 
the handling of the collaterals. However, the triparty agent is not involved in the 
calculation of margin requirements and counterparty risk is still borne by the two trading 
partners (see Comotto, 2017).  
 
Besides the involvement of a third party, what distinguishes triparty from bi-lateral repos 
is the selection of collateral that is usually employed. Whereas triparty repos are used to 
finance general collateral, which means that cash providers are usually keen to accept any 
security within a specific asset class, in bi-lateral repos traders often impose a narrower 
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restriction on the type of securities accepted as collateral (see Copeland et al., 2014). 
Thus, one of the reasons for choosing either triparty or bi-lateral repos has to do with the 
general higher cost efficiency in the case of triparty (due to the wider selection of 
collateral accepted), or the need for trading a particular security, thanks to the more 
specialised collateral nature of bi-lateral contracts (ibid).  
 
Finally, CCP repos extend the technology of central clearing to the repo market. As will 
be discussed in Chapter 4, the vast majority of repo trading in the euro area is conducted 
by CCPs, which makes central clearing extremely relevant with respect to systemic 
stability. As explained in the previous chapter, through the mechanism of counterparty 
substitution CCPs become the legal counterparty to each trader, they calculate margin 
requirements and bear financial losses in case of a counterparty defaulting. Thus, the wide 
adoption of CCPs in the European repo market links the potentially destabilising 
technology of central clearing to the interbank lending market in Europe. This is a key 
point in answering the research question posed by this project because, as we shall see in 
Chapter 5, it is precisely the ways in which LCH.Clearnet applied margin requirements 
on the use of particular securities as collateral in repo transactions that contributed to 
destabilising sovereign debt markets during the euro crisis.  
 
More generally, investors decide to carry on their repo trades through a CCP because of 
the perceived extra guarantees that central clearing provides (see Mancini et al., 2015). 
First, trading through a CCP is anonymous and counterparty exposure is eliminated de 
facto by counterparty substitution, meaning that investors will no longer be exposed to 
each other’s failure to meet contractual obligations (c.f. Duffie and Zhu, 2011). A CCP 
liquidates the collateral and distributes the losses among its clearing members should one 
of them default, which provides an added layer of counterparty protection. Finally, as 
CCPs only rely on safe and highly liquid collateral, the use of central clearing in theory 
 140 
reduces all the risks associated with potential individual or systemic runs (see Norman, 
2011; Gregory, 2014; Mancini et al., 2015).  
 
However, this thesis will disprove the assumption that CCP-based repos prevent potential 
systemic runs. First, as I will examine in Chapter 4, the ways in which the European repo 
market is built around the use of sovereign bonds as collateral and is dependent on the 
concentration of clearing activities makes European financial markets prone to collateral 
shocks by individual CCPs. Second, Chapter 5 will demonstrate that LCH.Clearnet’s 
actions, while not having caused a systemic run on repos per se, did cause a run on specific 
repo collateral, with detrimental consequences for sovereign debt market stability.  
 
Given the repo’s fragmentation in different markets, quantifying a precise figure of the 
overall size of the repo market as a whole becomes a particularly difficult exercise. 
However, some estimates have been made. Copeland et al. (2012) estimate the repo size 
in the US – intended as the amount of collateral used in repo transactions – at around $3tr. 
The International Capital Market Association (ICMA)’s estimate for outstanding repo 
contracts in the EU in December 2014 was €5.5tr, while the Fed’s counterpart for the 
same period was around $4.6tr – or €4tr at the time (ICMA, 2018a). Though this may 
seem like a large amount, it is comparable to the foreign exchange market turnover, 
which, in April 2016, was just above $5tr (BIS, 2016).  
 
At first glance, the repo market may seem even less impressive in comparison to the OTC 
derivatives market. For the second half of 2015, the total notional amount outstanding for 
OTC derivatives contracts globally was over $492tr, more than $384tr of which taken up 
by interest rate swap contracts alone (BIS, 2017). However, these figures should not let 
us downplay the importance of the repo market in global finance, quite the contrary. 
Chapter 4 and 5 will show that the ways in which the repo market in Europe brought 
 141 
together sovereign debt, bank funding and central clearing led for even such a 
comparatively smaller market to contribute to significant financial market turbulence 
during the euro crisis. Indeed, the importance of the repo market should be understood in 
spite of its trading volume. 
 
3.4 The politics at the root of repos 
3.4.1 The birth of the modern repo market in the 20th century 
 
Repos are not just important financial instruments with respect to their key presence in 
financial markets, but also by their political relevance. Historically speaking, loans 
secured with some form of collateral can be traced back to ancient China, some 3000 
years ago (Acharya and Öcü, 2010: 323). However, modern repo contracts were 
introduced by the New York Fed in US financial markets at the beginning of the 20th 
century. Repos were used by the New York Fed in 1917 as a tool to extend credit to its 
member banks when a wartime tax on interest payments on commercial papers made it 
increasingly expensive for them to look for affordable funding (see Garbade, 2006).  
 
Thus, since its very inception, the modern repo market has been closely linked to 
supporting the financial sector’s funding liquidity needs. The use of repos to support the 
funding liquidity of banks is an important point to retain for the development of this 
project’s analysis. As I will examine in Chapter 4, during the 2000s the ECB pushed for 
an integrated repo market in the euro area precisely with the objective of fostering the 
liquidity of European financial markets through enhanced cross-border lending. The use 
of repos experienced a decline in the aftermath of the Great Depression, which, however, 
was followed by a rapid revival during the transformation of the world economic order 
after World War II, particularly in the 1980s. The use of repos became central to the split 
between monetary and fiscal policy, whereby central banks were released from their 
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obligation to monetise government debt, and the rise of financial stability through market-
based finance after World War II. Market-based finance denotes that the cost and 
availability of lending has become increasingly determined in financial markets (see 
Hardie et al., 2013)21. Gabor (2016) provides a detailed account of how the sovereign 
bonds and the repo markets have developed a symbiotic relationship since the 
restructuring of monetary policies between the 1950s and the 1980s; in the US first, but 
then quickly spreading to Europe.  
 
3.4.2 Monetary policy transformations in post-war US 
 
A central part of this story are the changes that took place in US monetary policy 
following the Treasury-Federal Reserve Accord of 1951, which re-introduced the Fed’s 
independence from discretionary monetary policy (see Meltzer, 2003 for a full history). 
During World War II, the Fed kept interest rates at less than 0.5% in order to provide 
cheap funding for military expenses, despite skyrocketing inflation. The 1951 accord 
                                                        
21 The conventional wisdom is that, whereas in bank-based financial systems (traditionally, like in Japan 
and Germany) it is mostly banks that are central in mobilising savings, allocating capitals and investments 
to firms and beyond, in market-based financial systems (traditionally, like in the US and the UK) banks 
share that role closely with securities markets (see World Bank, 2018). Thus, according to this dichotomy, 
banks in bank-based financial systems have more financial power to influence the market prices of their 
loans because these are not traded financial instruments (see Zysman, 1983). However, it should be noted 
that this dichotomy has been contested insofar as it does not sufficiently acknowledge the changing role of 
bank lending in supposedly bank-based systems, which is increasingly constrained by the banks’ own 
ability to borrow from financial markets due to deposits no longer funding the majority of the banks’ 
liquidity needs (see Hardie et al., 2013). Thus, I employ the expression of market-based finance as a 
synonym of Hardie et al. (2013)’s notion of ‘market-based banking’, which denotes the transformation of 
bank lending that is increasingly market determined. 
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brought new emphasis on inflation control while simultaneously diminishing the 
emphasis on keeping low interest rates. 
 
Thus, during the period of high inflation experienced in the US between the 1970s and 
the early 1980s, there were three conditions that allowed for the use of repos to flourish. 
First, rising short-term interest rates between the end of the 1960 and throughout the 
1970s; second, an increase in the issuing of marketable Treasury bills after 1974; third 
the increased volatility of intermediate- and short-term interest rates since the end of 
October 1979 (see Garbade, 2006: 30). The ever-rising level of short-term interest rates 
led an increasing number of corporations and local authorities to begin using repo 
contracts with the help of brokers and other small security dealers. That is because repos 
allowed them to access cheaper funding than what had been available through banks, 
whose lending had become more expensive due to rising rates.  
 
Because their demand increased among debtors, repos became increasingly more 
attractive to creditors as well. Simultaneously, the fast growth of tradable Treasury bills 
after 1974 fostered the expansion in the dealers’ government securities’ position and 
financing (see Fed, 1981; 1982). That was particularly the case for nonbank dealers in 
Treasury securities, which were looking for cheaper funding than what had been available 
from New York banks, which had traditionally been funding the vast majority of the 
dealers’ loans. In this respect, repo transactions by the New York Fed represented 
precisely that alternative source of funding.  
 
Because of higher short-term interest rates, repos were cheaper than bank loans, entailed 
minimal risk (the collateral can be liquidated should the borrower fail to repurchase it) 
and the maturities could be negotiated, thus becoming ideal both for securities dealers 
and institutional cash managers. As repos were treated in effect as the sale and repurchase 
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of collateral, repo lenders could re-use the collateral they purchased through a repo 
contract for other kinds of investments and hedging, such as short-selling. The expansion 
of the repo market therefore marked an important transformation in how lending would 
be provided from that moment onwards. As repos are essentially built on securities 
markets (for collateral), the use of repo lending in place of bank loans marked a deep 
structural shift towards market-based finance, whereby the availability and cost of 
funding would be increasingly reliant on, and constrained by, financial market actors (see 
Hardie et al., 2013). 
 
Indeed, while the use of repos became increasingly more common, in their 1992 Joint 
Report, the Treasury, the Fed and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) began 
praising repos as cheaper, more flexible and administratively easier to manage funding 
instruments than commercial bank loans (see Treasury, SEC, Fed, 1992: A-11). By 
pushing the use of repos and via increasing the availability of sovereign collateral, the 
Treasury and the Fed assumed a ‘market-building’ approach built on a narrative about the 
positive role of repos in fostering financial market liquidity (Gabor, 2016: 976). On the 
one hand, in its role of sovereign debt issuer, the US Treasury began playing a central 
role within the context of an expanding repo market that needed liquid collateral. On the 
other hand, from a financial stability perspective, having a centralised repo market would 
provide a much clearer picture of the size and trend of the government security market. 
The commitments to repos lending of the Treasury, SEC and the Fed can also be 
witnessed by how they were actively pushing the Government Securities Clearing 
Corporation (GSCC) to develop new automated technologies for the processing of repo 
contracts, such as an automated system that would register and display the different stages 
of a repo transactions (opening, closing, setting up a reverse repo or closing a reverse 
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repo) (Treasury, SEC, Fed, 1992: 31) 22. As the use of repos began to greatly expand in 
the US, Europe would soon after build on that momentum.  
 
3.4.3 Repos and the politics of European economic integration 
 
In a bid to obtain a stronger position in global finance, in the 1980s France was the first 
European country to emulate what the US did in terms of repo market liberalisation, 
which entailed monetary policy restructuring through the use of interest rate management 
for inflation control, abandoning credit controls and embracing financial liberalisation 
(see Jabko, 2006). Under the direction of the Banque de France, France liberalised 
domestic repo markets by providing a regulatory framework that allowed for collateral 
management and ownership-transfer of collateral. As noted by Gabor (2016), France’s 
move was based upon two interlinked objectives. First, France sought to imitate the US 
by recognising the increasingly important role played by the repo market in global 
finance. As both US and European banks with a global outlook became more involved in 
securities trading throughout the 1980s (mostly thanks to the repo developments in the 
US described above), French politicians aimed at competing with the US to attract 
international investors, thus encouraging the use of French sovereign collateral. The 
benefit of this strategy would have also led to the benefit of reducing the French 
government’s funding costs thanks to decreasing sovereign yields. Indeed, the more 
French sovereign bonds were in demand, the higher their prices would become, matching 
a reduction in long-term yields (with a long-term reduction in the cost in public debt 
servicing).  
 
                                                        
22 The GSCC was founded in the US in 1986 to provide clearing and settlement of government securities. 
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Second, France’s move had also to do with the power struggles underpinning the process 
of European economic integration. As the Deutsche mark had dominated currency 
markets during the European Monetary System (EMS), by effectively locking European 
currencies into a Deutsche mark zone (see De Grauwe, 1991), France aimed at competing 
with Germany with the issuing of sovereign bonds in euro by deregulating its repo market 
to attract international investors. In other words, if Germany was the anchor for Europe’s 
currency markets in the EMS, France aimed at becoming the benchmark issuer for 
sovereign debt in the euro area. 
 
Interestingly, the Bundesbank initially opposed the liberalisation of the bund repo market 
until the second half of the 1990s, amid concerns that investors would prefer cheaper repo 
funding and thus shift away from the uncollateralised money market, where the Bank 
implemented its monetary policy operations. Indeed, despite pressure from the financial 
sector, the Bundesbank was against more short-term, market-based sovereign debt 
management approaches, as it would have impaired the effectiveness of its monetary 
policy and compromised macroeconomic stability more generally (see Trampusch, 2015: 
122). Therefore, the Bundesbank kept strict minimum reserve requirements on the repo 
liabilities of banks, in order to maintain systemic stability and preserve its monetary 
policy transmission channel on the unsecured market (see Krauskopf, 1999: 12). Thus, as 
conducting repo contracts in Germany had become fairly expensive, by 1996 German 
banks relocated more than half of the deutsche mark repo business to London (see Prati 
and Schinasi, 1997: 286). This move would contribute to the Bundesbank’s change of 
mind later on. 
 
It was a similar story in the case of Britain. The Bank of England initially opposed the 
liberalisation of its repo market, as it was concerned about the systemic stability 
implications of market-based financing. Indeed, although the Bank of England officials 
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‘… recognised the possible benefits [of repos] ...’, they were concerned about the impact 
of a liberalised repo market on other market segments, for instance the failure to account 
for accrued interest rates when valuing collateral (see Bank of England, 1997: 187). As a 
matter of fact, the Bank of England’s concerns were grounded upon a general scepticism 
towards the repo market that stems from the aftermath of what had previously happened 
to the US security dealer Drysdale Securities in 1982.  
 
Drysdale Securities was a dealer in secondary markets of government securities and was 
utilising reverse repos to provide broker-dealer firms with Treasury bills. However, while 
the government securities were being traded, Dysdale Securities did not have sufficient 
funds to provide the buyers the interest rates accrued when the US government began 
paying out interest rates on its bonds on 15 May 1982. Unable to meet its interest rate 
transfers, Drysdale Securities closed down and began liquidating its business on June 15 
(see Vartan, 1982; Garbade, 2006). Thus, on financial stability grounds, the Bank of 
England maintained strong control over repo traders in the gilt markets until 1996.  
 
The Bundesbank’s and the Bank of England’s concerns regarding a liberalised repo 
market and market-based finance, with respect to the threat that it posed on systemic 
stability, is particularly relevant in order to understand the events that I will describe in 
Chapter 5. Indeed, the ways in which LCH.Clearnet destabilised the collateral market for 
repos in the euro area provides support to exactly the same set of concerns that these 
central banks had at the time. 
 
The politics surrounding the introduction of the euro inevitably impacted upon the 
European central banks’ attitude against market-based finance. On the one hand, the 
German government’s demand to make the country’s financial markets more competitive 
internationally, in order retain Germany’s economic dominance in post-EMU Europe (see 
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Dyson, et al., 1995), contributed to soften the Bundesbank’s strict position against short-
term finance. In this respect, the position of the German government should be 
contextualised in relation to France’s aggressive financial liberalisation efforts in its repo 
market, which Germany had to emulate in order to assert its economic prowess in the 
upcoming euro area. On the other hand, pressure from the financial sector also played an 
important role. Due to an increasing share of bund-denominated repo business being 
relocated to London, on 5 December 1996 the Bundesbank lifted the restrictions on the 
minimum reserve requirements for repo liabilities up to one-year maturity, in order to win 
back that market share lost to the City (see Bundesbank, 1996: 57).  
 
In short, the Bundesbank agreed to make it easier to conduct repo trading in Germany. 
To obtain a unified and, most importantly, internationally competitive euro money 
market, Germany had to be active in repo markets in order to attract foreign investors, 
which ultimately meant joining together the European money and government debt 
markets through repos (McCauley, 1999: 4). By 1997, having Germany to compete as the 
leading European sovereign debt issuer began to matter even more to the Bundesbank. 
The German macroeconomic authorities realised that foreign investors would no longer 
only look at fiscal policies when investing in the countries of the upcoming euro area, but 
also to their sovereign debt-management strategies, favouring those with a wider 
selection of maturities and enough liquidity for each sovereign issue (e.g. 3-year, 5-year, 
7-year, 10-year, etc.) (see Euromoney, 1997; see also Galati and Tsatsaronis, 2003). The 
reasons that led the Bundesbank liberalising its repo market are particularly important 
points with respect to the objectives set out in this project, because they highlight the 
importance of sovereign debt to investors in relation to their liquidity and beyond 
considerations regarding debt-servicing sustainability.  
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The UK also followed the example of France and Germany. Before liberalising Britain’s 
repo market, the Bank of England only allowed for a few selected institutions to borrow 
and short its gilts. Opposition to a liberalised repo market stems from considerations 
regarding financial stability. The Bank of England’s concerns need to be contextualised 
within the dramatic impact that speculative short-selling had on its monetary policy and 
the declining value of the pound in 1992, which forced the UK out of the European 
Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) (see Eichengreen, 2007: 364)23.  
 
However, the UK Treasury, heavily influenced by the Conservative Party at the time, 
argued instead that liberalising Britain’s gilt market would have reduced the 
government’s funding cost, while simultaneously increasing the market’s liquidity and 
improving the City’s attractiveness to foreign investors vis-à-vis the other European 
capitals (see Gabor, 2016: 979; see also Baker, 1999). Thus, in its July 1995 debt 
management review, the UK Treasury encouraged the Bank of England to adopt a more 
modern sovereign debt management approach, citing the examples of the US and France 
and thus pushing for repo market liberalisation (see UK Parliament, 1999). Following the 
pressure from the Treasury, the Bank of England eventually agreed to liberalise the UK’s 
repo market for its gilts in January 1996 (see Bank of England, 1997).  
 
Three considerations are worth noting with respect to the repo market’s development in 
Europe discussed above. On the one hand, repo liberalisation in Europe should be 
contextualised in relation to the growing power of finance in shaping domestic politics 
since the end of the fixed exchange regime under the Bretton Woods System (see 
Helleiner, 1994; Seabrooke, 2001, Konings, 2007). This is evidenced on two accounts. 
First, the growing importance given by domestic politicians to compete against the US in 
                                                        
23 The ERM was introduced in 1979 as a tool to reduce exchange rate volatility among countries belonging 
to the EMS (see Eichengreen, 2007 for an overview). 
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attracting foreign capital, beginning with France, played an important role in repo market 
liberalisation. Second, the pressure exercised by the financial sector also contributed to 
repo market liberalisation; the relocation of repo activities from Germany to Britain is an 
example of this dynamic.  
 
On the other hand, repo market liberalisation was also an outcome of institutional 
struggles at domestic level. With the exception of the Banque de France, Europe’s most 
important central banks were initially opposed to repo market liberalisation because of 
concerns regarding financial stability. Indeed, it was not until the British and German 
government started pressuring their respective central banks that repo markets were 
liberalised. In this respect, the German and British governments’ willingness to 
modernise their repo markets to catch-up with the US and France played a key role 
towards liberalisation. Lastly, as will be discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, the ways in which 
the European repo market is prone to CCP-induced collateral crises lends support to the 
initial scepticism towards liberalised repo markets by the Bundesbank and the Bank of 
England, on systemic stability grounds. 
 
3.4.4 The transformation of repos in the aftermath of the 1998 Russian currency 
crisis 
 
Whereas the politics underpinning the liberalisation of European finance was an 
important dimension that allowed the fostering of the use of repos, there was another 
particularly important event that significantly shaped the course of the repo market’s 
development: the 1998 Russian financial crisis. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
the Russian economy had gone through significant modernising efforts (see Chiodo and 
Owyang, 2002). By the end of 1997, Russia had, to a large extent, privatised its 
manufacturing and natural resources sector. In February of the following year, inflation 
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had dropped to single digits, largely thanks to a fixed exchange rate regime. However, 
the government’s continued subsidies to what it considered as a ‘vulnerable 
manufacturing sector’ greatly added to its fiscal deficit, which led to a steep increase in 
government debt (see Pinto and Ulatov, 2010: 34). I 
 
In turn, government debt expansion was fuelled by Russian banks keen on lending easily 
due to low interest rates, which increased the sovereign debt exposure of domestic 
Russian banks. The money lent to the government was collateralised with the shares of 
oil, metal and telecoms companies with the agreement that, were the loans not to be 
repaid, the bank would acquire the shares, thus representing a clear shift towards market-
based finance in Russia (see Popov, 1999). More importantly, due to the financial 
liberalisation efforts undertaken in 1997, Russia had effectively removed restrictions for 
foreign participation in its sovereign debt and stock markets, which made the country 
extremely vulnerable to external shocks (see Pinto and Ulatov, 2010). Indeed, by mid-
1998, non-resident foreign creditors held an estimated 30% of Russian short-term 
Treasury bills. 
 
When the 1997 Asian crisis spread to Russia in August 1998, productivity slowed down, 
and the country’s current account slipped from the surplus it held the year before to 
deficit. Thus, the rouble came under speculative attacks. In order to maintain the fixed 
exchange rate, monetary policy was tightened, and a large amount of foreign reserve was 
used, which led to a massive increase in the real interest rates of short-term sovereign 
bonds. As the value of Russian government security plunged, foreign creditors started to 
demand additional collateral for their repo loans with Russian banks, who had been 
dealing Russian government bonds (see UNCTAD, 1998). The timing of the margin 
requirement increases severely hit the Russian interbank funding market. Indeed, margin 
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calls were implemented exactly when a large number of syndicated loans were due in 
August that year (see Pinto and Ulatov, 2010).  
 
In addition, Russian banks had to raise more funds just when the central bank had been 
draining up liquidity to protect the fixed exchange rate regime. Russian banks thus had 
no alternative but to close their repo positions by repaying their borrowing in US dollars. 
This move put further downward pressure on the rouble and the fixed exchange rate 
regime, leading to further restrictive monetary policy measures that exacerbated the 
decline in the price of Russian government securities, which led to a continuing rise in 
their interest rates. Amid unsustainable government funding costs, due to the rising 
interest rates of Russian sovereign bonds, the Russian government, together with its 
central bank, devalued the rouble and defaulted on its debt.  
 
Given the far-reaching consequences that the Russian crisis had in the rest of the world 
in shaking up lending markets (see Van Rijckeghem and Weder, 2001), the global 
community of central bankers began to explore how to improve the stability funding 
markets. As noted by Gabor (2006), the Russian crisis made it clear that it is the lack of 
sufficient collateral that dries up liquidity in market-based financial systems, which set 
the Russian economy towards a downward spiral. Thus, in search of a safe market that 
could provide continuous liquidity, consensus built among central bankers and 
international institutions about making sovereign bonds the cornerstone of financial 
stability in repo-based interbank funding markets (see CGFS, 1999b; IMF, 2001). Indeed, 
sovereign bonds could provide precisely that type of liquid asset, which is creditworthy 
enough to be subjected to minimal price fluctuation, thus guaranteeing repo funding-
liquidity during times of turmoil. In other words, sovereign bonds would act as the safe 
collateral in repo markets during periods of financial instabilities, which would allow the 
preservation of funding liquidity in the financial system. 
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As a consequence, the use of sovereign bonds in repo contracts began to expand thanks 
to the consensus among central bankers that the stability of collateral-based finance 
necessitates liquid government bond markets and deregulated repo markets, something 
that Gabor (2016: 969) dubs as ‘the repo trinity’. This is key. As I will explain in more 
detail in Chapter 4, the use of market-based practices to handle sovereign collateral in the 
European repo market is one of the factors that underpins its fragility, because it allowed 
for LCH.Clearnet’s margin calls to destabilising sovereign debt markets during the euro 
crisis.  
 
The consensus built around the use of free repo markets for obtaining financial stability 
and market liquidity was embraced in both the US and Europe, a process that developed 
alongside the liberalisation of repo markets in Europe’s most important financial capitals, 
as discussed above. However, following the fallout from Lehman’s default in 2008, the 
liquidity assumptions of the repo trinity collapsed, which brings my analysis to a 
discussion of the extent to which repo markets relate to systemic instabilities and other 
financial crises. 
 
3.5 Repo markets, margin calls and systemic instabilities 
3.5.1 Margin calls in the US repo market during the 2007-08 global financial 
crisis 
 
Repos were central to the GFC. An influential study by Gorton and Metrick (2012) has 
argued that the GFC was similar to a systemic bank run; however, this time it differed in 
that the run did not unfold through the withdrawal of bank deposits, but of repo contracts. 
This has led the authors to coin the term ‘run on repo’. By using a large data-set, which 
included hundreds of securities bonds (asset-backed securities, collateralised debt 
obligations, and credit default swaps), Gorton and Metrick found that changes in the 
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LIBOR-OIS spreads are strongly correlated with credit spread rates and repo rates for the 
abovementioned bonds24.  
 
The LIBOR-OIS spread is considered a key indicator of credit risk in the banking sector. 
It is the differential between the average interest rate that banks charge to one another 
when lending to each other in the unsecured market (the LIBOR) and the index in the 
overnight swap market, where financial institutions swap their interest rates (the OIS). 
Usually, it is the fixed interest rate (the central bank’s overnight rate) that’s swapped with 
the variable interest rate. The difference between LIBOR and OIS is employed as a 
measure of the health of the banking sector ‘because it reflects what banks believe is the 
risk of default associated with lending to other banks’ (Thornton, 2009: 1).  
 
In other words, the correlation between the LIBOR-OIS spread and the repo rates for 
securitised bonds found by Gorton and Metrick indicated that fears about shrinking 
banking liquidity was induced by decreasing returns on repo lending. That is because, the 
authors argue, as the size of subprime exposures in the repo market were unknown, 
investors worried that liquidity for collateral would quickly decline, particularly for non-
subprime collateral, which would have been more in demand due to them being the safest 
securities at that point. As concerns about the liquidity of those securities intensified in 
early 2007, particularly since the collapse of Lehman in 2008, their price declined, which 
effectively reduced their value as collateral in repo transactions. In fear that banks would 
begin large-scale sell-offs of those bonds, lenders started to demand more collateral by 
increasing margin requirements on repo contracts. In a procyclical way, the increase in 
                                                        
24 Whereas LIBOR refers to the London interbank offer rate (the rate at which banks indicate their 
willingness to lend to other banks), the OIS is the overnight indexed swap (the rate on a derivative contract 
on the central bank’s overnight rate).  
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collateral requirements further reduced the collateral-value of those bonds, leading to 
more sell-offs that triggered more margin calls.  
 
Crucially, instead of acting as the collateral of last resort in repo markets, US government 
bonds generated capital flight from bilateral repo markets to the US sovereign debt 
market, drying up liquidity from the interbank funding market. In essence, the 
combination of declining asset values and increasing margin requirements is what 
reduced funding liquidity and made US banks insolvent. Although these findings have 
been criticised for not having accounted for triparty repo operations (see ICMA, 2018b), 
the work by Gorton and Metrick remains a landmark study because it shows that the ways 
in which lenders apply haircuts to repo collateral in times of financial distress can be a 
procyclical transmission mechanism that exacerbates liquidity shortages. The findings of 
Gorton and Metrick’s study also laid the foundations for similar works conducted in the 
same area in following years.  
 
An important paper by Martin et al. (2014) corroborates Gorton and Metrick’s study, in 
that it also finds short-term collateralised borrowing via repos to be a particularly unstable 
source of funding in times of financial distress. More importantly, however, their work 
also finds that such funding fragilities, or repo runs, are highly dependent upon the 
specific ‘microstructure’ of a particular funding market, highlighting the different ways 
in which the runs unfolded in bilateral and triparty repo market segments (ibid: 980).  
 
Relatedly, Copeland et al. (2014) argue that what characterised the 2007-08 repo 
instabilities were not systemic runs in every segment of the US repo market. The authors 
found that whereas margin requirements were indeed increased across the board in 
bilateral repo contracts (which was the market segment examined by Gorton and 
Metrick), margins remained relatively stable in the triparty markets, and investors mostly 
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maintained repo funding in that segment, with the exception of a sharp decline when 
Lehman defaulted, when investors withdrew funds rather than increasing margins. The 
authors conclude that the dynamic experienced in triparty repo markets resembled more 
of a traditional bank run, as it had more to do with sudden fund withdrawal rather than 
being related to the specific mechanisms underpinning the functioning of repo markets 
and changes in margin requirements. In short, the authors argue that the run on repos in 
the US was not systemic but limited to the bilateral segment. 
 
Still, there is by now unequivocal evidence to suggest that the use of margin calls in repo 
markets during the GFC had a procyclical effect, shrinking the liquidity available in the 
financial system. This argument has been corroborated by a theoretical model elaborated 
by Brumm et al. (2012), which also concludes that the increase in margin requirements 
on collateralised borrowing can contribute to market volatility, especially during times of 
financial distress. This is a key finding in relation to the objectives set out in this project. 
As Chapter 5 will show, LCH.Clearnet’s margin calls in the European repo market during 
the euro crisis both increased pressures on domestic banks to access short-term funding 
in the euro area and retained a distinctive procyclical impact on the Irish and Portuguese 
sovereign debt markets. That is because the ways in which LCH.Clearnet introduced 
margin requirement increases in rapid succession for both Ireland and Portugal exerted a 
continuously increasing pressure on their sovereign debt markets. Higher margin 
requirements led to sell-offs that widened their sovereign spreads, which, in a procyclical 
way, caused more margin calls that further widened the spreads. 
 
To sum up, the ‘Lehman crisis was the result of a situation whereby financial institutions 
drastically and suddenly curtailed access to funding that had been collateralised with 
asset- and mortgage-backed securities’ (Ban and Gabor, 2016: 903). As noted by Gorton 
and Metrick, when the sub-prime mortgage market in the US collapsed, investors began 
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increasing margin requirements on bilateral repos for mortgage-backed securities, 
triggering massive scale sell-offs of the affected securities. In a search for safer assets, 
investors relocated their funds onto the US Treasury bill market, which, rather than 
sustaining interbank lending, drained liquidity away from the financial system. 
 
Central bankers realised that funding shocks of highly leveraged shadow banks, in effect, 
stopped collateral trading, which eroded market liquidity irrespective of the 
creditworthiness of the collateral issuer (Gabor, 2016: 985). Indeed, central bankers were 
faced by the crude reality that free repo and liquid sovereign bond markets do not 
necessarily guarantee stability in times of financial distress. Whereas the strain put on 
liquidity by margin calls has only been recently documented in the repo market, it is not 
unique to the GFC. More importantly, the triggering of a collateral crisis irrespective of 
the creditworthiness of the collateral issuer lends support to the argument that I am trying 
to develop in this thesis. Namely, that the sovereign collateral sell-offs that widened the 
spreads in the euro area from 2010 to 2012 were not only due to default fears, but also 
because of concerns regarding those securities’ reduced liquidity to access short-term 
funding. 
 
3.5.2 The procyclicality of margin calls in modern financial history 
 
In 1929, the US faced one of the most devastating stock market crash of its history, whose 
impact contributed to the longest economic decline experienced by the global economy 
in the 20th century. The origins of the crash lie in a stock market bubble that developed in 
the 1920s, where the US stock markets witnessed very strong quarterly gains almost 
constantly between 1924 and 1929 (see Santoni, 1987: 18). The bubble was driven by the 
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growth of securities markets and the expansion of investments trusts, which allowed firms 
to substitute bonds and stocks for commercial loans (see White, 1990) 25.  
 
This development led to a reduction of the traditional roles of banks as financial 
intermediaries. Indeed, the banks’ commercial loans as a percentage of their total earning 
assets declined from 58% in 1920 to 39% in 1929 (see Currie, 1931). As a consequence, 
banks began both offering new financial services, such as insurances and trusts, and, more 
importantly, they became more involved in the brokerage between the public savers and 
the industrial sector, which in the meantime had experienced a massive expansion (see 
White, 1984). A growing industrial sector and an increasing channelling of household 
savings into the stock market created the perfect condition for the developing of a 
financial bubble. 
 
However, after reaching a historic peak in September 1929, the stock market began to 
suddenly plummet on Thursday October 23. Amid increasing panic, massive sell-offs 
took place once the stock market opened again on Monday 28 September counting 
through ‘Black Tuesday’, respectively leading to a fall of the Dow Jones Industrial 
Average index by a staggering 12.8% and 11.7%. It has been recorded that 16 million 
shares were traded during those days, as investors were getting rid of their stocks in the 
fear that their value would decline even further.  
 
An often-under-appreciated element of this story is the role played by margin calls during 
the crash. A study by Smiley and Keehn (1988) found that, while an ever-increasing 
number of borrowers began investing in the stock market, lenders began increasing 
margin requirements in October 1928 to historic levels, suggesting that they did not share 
                                                        
25 Investments trusts were financial institutions selling securities to the public and re-investing their gains 
in stocks and bonds (see Carosso, 1970).  
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the same optimism of borrowers when it comes to rising stock prices. The increase in 
collateral requirements did not have much of an impact on stock prices, as during that 
time the market was still growing at unprecedented levels. However, the effect of margin 
calls on sell-offs quickly changed as the crash began to occur. It has been documented 
that, starting from 28 October 1929, the margin calls introduced following the severe 
decline in stock prices caused another significant plunge, as investors kept selling their 
holdings amid rising collateral requirements (White, 1990: 68).  
 
Hence, though not directly attributable as a direct cause of the crash, the sudden increase 
in margin requirements contributed to exacerbate the size of the sell-offs (see Brumm et 
al., 2012). In this sense, the effect of margin calls during the 1929 stock market crash is 
similar to what has been previously discussed in the case of the repo market during the 
GFC, whereby the increase in collateral requirements exacerbated a liquidity shortage. 
Even more significant for the scope of this study is the role played by the margin calls 
implemented by CCPs during another stock market crash more than 50 years after Black 
Tuesday: Black Monday of 1987.  
 
To an important extent, the stock market crashes experienced around the world on 
Monday 19 October 1987 are an effect of contagion, in the sense that a price shock in one 
particular market spread to another (see Yang and Bessler, 2008). Like in the previous 
case, the crash began in the US. Starting from October 14, the Dow Jones Industrial 
Average index declined by 31% during that week; the derivative markets of Chicago also 
plummeted during the same time. The decline in stock prices quickly spread around the 
world, hitting stock markets in Hong Kong, London and Sydney on the same day. The 
Hang Seng index in Hong Kong (a stock market index) dropped 11.3% on October 19, 
before stock markets even opened in the US and Europe. The London Stock Exchange 
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(LSE) fell by a comparable amount, whereas prices on the Sydney exchange collapsed by 
almost 25%.  
 
The 1987 stock market crash is unique in that it exposed the vulnerabilities of electronic 
trading, which is closely linked to the onset of the crash. Indeed, electronic trading 
systems interacted in such a way with price declines that they exacerbated the crisis 
creating liquidity shortages. In this respect, the role of central clearing was crucial. In a 
report presented to US Congressional Committees in 1990, the General Accounting 
Office (GAO) found that during the events of 1987 some clearing members did not have 
sufficient funding to meet their collateral obligations to CCPs; hence they had to increase 
their borrowing from other banks (GAO, 1990: 3). This was due to the complexity of the 
clearing system in the US, which generated ‘delay and confusions over payments of 
margin calls triggered by stock price falls, raising concerns over the solvency of securities 
brokers and the ability of exchange clearing houses to make payments’ (IMF, 2003: 82).  
 
As trading systems were unable to process large volumes of transactions at once, investors 
became uncertain about the price information they were getting, which led them to pull 
out of the markets. On the morning of the crash, the clearing services offered by CME 
requested over $1.2bn intra-day variation margin requirements from its clearing 
members. By the end of business, CME asked for another $1.3 billion (Norman, 2011: 
137). However, clearing members received a report showing that they were being asked 
for an extra $2.5 billion on top of the initial $1.2bn, because the CME’s trading system 
had not accounted for the $1.2 billion that had already been requested earlier (see CME, 
1988: 48). The difficulty for clearing members to provide the extra collateral put a strain 
on their available liquidity, which forced them to seek additional credit from other banks 
(see IMF, 2003: 64). Similar issues were faced by another Chicago-based CCP, the 
Option Clearing Corporation. The CCPs of the future markets in Chicago asked for over 
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$4bn in intra-day variation margins between Monday and Tuesday and were thereafter 
criticised for having drained liquidity from the financial system in a time of economic 
turmoil (see Bernanke, 1990: 147).  
 
In a short, clearing systems did not allow for market participants to easily meet large 
margin requirement increases during the crash, causing illiquidity and payment 
difficulties to spread across the financial markets (see IMF, 2003: 64). Crucially, this led 
to deep scrutiny of the clearing system as a whole. One of the most significant impacts 
was the 1988 Brady Report, which was compiled by the Presidential Task Force on 
Market Mechanisms on behalf of President Ronald Reagan. The report acknowledged 
how the clearing systems had exacerbated the crash (see Brady, 1988: 51), pointing 
towards the need to an overall improvement of their trading system and how margin 
requirements were implemented.  
 
Whereas the context in which LCH.Clearnet implemented its margin calls during the euro 
crisis are different from those discussed above (particularly with respect to the absence 
of a flaw in electronic trading systems), the role of the CCPs’ margin calls during the 
1987 stock market crash are still important with respect to answering this project’s 
research question, which seeks to examine the factors that contributed to destabilising 
sovereign debt markets during the euro crisis. Much like as discussed in Chapter 2, the 
evidence provided in this chapter suggests that the CCPs’ margin calls can add further 
pressure on the already weakening funding liquidity of investors, because it forces them 
to post more collateral when credit lines are tight. This is precisely the dynamic that will 
be examined in Chapter 5, whereby banks in the euro area were forced to sell sovereign 
bonds to find the cash needed to meet the margin requirement increases by LCH.Clearnet 
from 2010 to 2012. At the same time, meeting the margin calls contributed to destabilising 
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sovereign debt markets, as the bond sell-offs led to higher sovereign bond yields and 
therefore wider spreads.  
 
We can thus draw contours of continuity and change with respect to the repo market and 
systemic instability. To an important degree, the negative relationship between margin 
calls and liquidity in times of financial distress shows that there is a much more generic 
dynamic at play in how financial crises unfold, which is not unique to a specific crisis. 
Indeed, margin calls during a crisis tends to have procyclical effects, because the sudden 
increases in collateral requirements further reduces the value of assets, securities or 
contracts already undergoing large-scale sell-offs.  
 
The 1929 stock market crash demonstrates this dynamic pretty clearly, since margin calls 
only really exacerbated sell-offs while stock prices were already declining, having had 
virtually no effect in slowing down the unsustainable stock market growth in previous 
years. Margin calls were even more central to the developments surrounding the 1987 
debacle. The ways in which CCPs applied margin calls during the 1987 stock and 
derivative markets crash also caused strong liquidity strains, as banks were unable to meet 
the payments following the hike in margin requirements, exacerbating distress in times 
of financial instability. Arguably, the 1987 crash was largely related to the dynamics and 
flaws surrounding the functioning of the then-emerging electronic trading systems, which 
worsened the procyclical impact of the CCPs’ margin calls.  
 
At the same time, however, because CCPs calculate and impose non-negotiable margin 
requirements (as opposed to bi-lateral and triparty arrangements), individual CCPs had a 
relatively higher impact on systemic stability than single traders, as was recognised by 
the US. This point contributes in highlighting the potentially self-defeating objective of 
the G20’s mandatory clearing commitment for OTC derivatives, which I discussed in the 
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previous chapter. Indeed, the ways in which the CCPs’ risk concentration negatively 
impacted systemic stability during the 1987 stock market crash continues to affect global 
finance today, although now on a larger scale, given the unprecedented exposure of CCPs 
to an enormous amount of OTC derivatives risk. 
 
Thus, while the GFC does share the more general procyclical element with regard to how 
margin requirements reduce financial market liquidity during a crisis, repos do retain a 
distinctive element. Differently from both the 1929 and the 1987 crashes, margin calls 
during the GFC directly impacted bank funding. As the repo market is a major source of 
interbank short-term funding, the increases in collateral requirements directly affect 
banks’ liquidity, which adds a much stricter banking dimension to the crisis, centred on 
repos. 
 
3.6 Conclusions 
 
This chapter has set up a framework that allows us to understand the importance of the 
repo market with respect to systemic stability within the context of the objectives set out 
in this project. Starting from how the New York Fed used repo transactions to provide 
financing to underfunded banks in the early 20th century, repos have always been involved 
in the provision of the banks’ short-term funding liquidity needs. Indeed, over the years 
repos have become the main tools through which banks lend to each other in the 
wholesale funding market. 
 
The chapter showed that the development of modern repo markets is closely linked to the 
politics underpinning the transformations of the world economic order in the aftermath 
of World War II. Thanks to the detailed works of Garbade (2006) and Gabor (2016), this 
chapter has shown that the shift to market-based finance in the US has largely determined 
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the development of repos between the 1950s and the 1980s. In the context of higher 
interest rates to combat high inflation, repos became widely employed in the US as a 
cheaper and more reliable funding alternative to the more expensive bank loans. 
Crucially, these transformations took place against the backdrop of a Treasury that had in 
effect become an active repo market participant, supporting market liquidity through the 
issuance of sovereign bonds. These trends were adopted in Europe as well during the 
1980s and 1990s, starting from France.  
 
The analysis then moved on to show how the 1998 Russian currency crisis further shaped 
the development of repos. The sudden lack of repo collateral during that crisis contributed 
to build consensus among central bankers and international institutions to expand the use 
of sovereign bonds in repo markets as a way to provide a highly liquid collateral that 
would guarantee repo-funding in times of financial distress. Expanding the use of 
sovereign bonds as collateral has been a highly significant change in the functioning of 
repo markets, which brings us one step closer to answering this project’s research 
question: what factors contributed to destabilising sovereign debt markets during the 
height of the euro crisis from 2010 to 2012? Indeed, as will be discussed in Chapter 4, the 
centrality of sovereign bonds as the main source of collateral in the European repo market 
is one of the factors that makes European financial markets prone to CCP-induced 
collateral crises and sovereign debt market instabilities. Furthermore, Chapter 4 shows 
that, just as described in this chapter, the development of a single European repo market 
around market-based practices is also closely linked to the politics of underpinning the 
creation of a single European financial space following the introduction of the euro. 
 
This chapter has also expanded upon another crucial aspect that allows us to answer the 
research question posed by this project: namely, the relationship between repos and 
financial crises. The collateralised nature of repo lending makes this type of financing 
 165 
susceptible to sudden funding shocks. As shown by discussing the available scientific 
evidence on repo markets, the sudden withdrawal of repo collateral, as a consequence to 
procyclical margin policies, contributed to make the US banking system insolvent during 
the GFC, because it shrank the funding liquidity available in the interbank lending market. 
While there does seem to be a broader procyclical dynamic in place, in that the use of 
margin requirements during crises is generally associated with declining stock prices and 
liquidity, margin calls during the GFC led to a withdrawal of repo collateral that caused 
insolvencies. 
 
This is highly relevant for the scope of this project, insofar as it helps understanding the 
dynamics to be explored in Chapter 5. The ways in which LCH.Clearnet implemented 
margin calls on sovereign repo collateral during the euro crisis led to large-scale bond 
sell-offs that destabilised sovereign debt markets, contributing to widening the spreads of 
Ireland, Portugal, Italy and Spain. Equally important, the examination of the repo market 
conducted in this chapter also provides an empirical backing to one of the main arguments 
put forward by this project. Given the importance of repo collateral to access short-term 
funding, the increase in margin requirements by LCH.Clearnet to use Irish, Portuguese, 
Italian and Spanish sovereign bonds in repo transactions reduced the usability of those 
securities to access short-term funding. Thus, the large-scale bond sell-offs that took place 
following LCH.Clearnet’s margin calls in repo markets, widening the spreads, were the 
result of investors being concerned with the usability of the affected government 
securities to access short-term funding, and not just driven by fears of sovereign default. 
 
We now turn to Chapter 4, which examines how the European repo market was created 
and developed systemic vulnerabilities. 
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4. European Financial Integration and Repo Market 
Vulnerabilities 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter has identified repos as a potential source of credit shocks in the 
interbank lending market, which crystallises this project’s focus on liquidity (or the lack 
thereof) as a key explanatory variable for financial market instabilities. The purpose of 
this chapter is to examine the functioning of the European repo market, thus bringing the 
analytical focus back to Europe. More specifically, this chapter contributes to the euro 
crisis debate by examining how the integration of European financial markets through 
repo trading has exposed sovereign debt markets to systemic vulnerabilities. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the European-level explanations have been primarily 
concerned with examining the impact that European monetary integration had in 
generating macroeconomic imbalances, which laid down the foundations for the onset of 
the crisis. However, whereas the imbalances affecting the monetary union have been 
extensively examined, the potential imbalances arising from the integration of European 
financial markets have been ignored by this scholarship. Understanding the difference 
between monetary and financial integration is key. The process of European economic 
integration tends to be examined only through the lens of monetary integration, that is, 
how countries in the euro area have given up monetary sovereignty by adopting a 
common currency, the euro, thus shifting monetary authority at European level.  
 
I seek to make a key contribution to the European-level explanations by showing that, 
after the introduction of the euro, European financial markets also began an integration 
process, which has had important repercussions for sovereign debt market stability. 
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Differently from monetary integration, European financial integration refers to processes 
that sought to increase the level of cross-border financing among the economies of the 
euro area, which was relatively low at the onset of the single currency. I argue that the 
creation of a single European repo market for cross-border interbank lending has made 
sovereign debt markets of the euro area extremely prone to systemic instabilities.  
 
The main finding of this chapter is that the European repo market is distinctive in that its 
trading activities are almost entirely dependent on sovereign bonds as collateral and that 
they are cleared largely by CCPs, particularly on one of the world’s largest, 
LCH.Clearnet. In monetary terms, this equates to roughly €6.2tn worth of sovereign 
bonds as collateral being cleared in December 2017, and where LCH.Clearnet is 
responsible for clearing around €6tn of European repos and €125tn of OTC derivatives 
worldwide during the same month. The analysis developed in this chapter contributes to 
answering the research question posed by this project, which aims at identifying the 
factors that facilitated the sovereign debt markets distress during the height of the euro 
crisis. Indeed, I argue that the specific ways in which the European repo market is 
structured established extremely close links between sovereign debt, bank funding, and 
CCPs, which has made European financial markets highly vulnerable to what I define 
CCP-induced collateral crises. This is a novel notion I devised, which recognises the 
concentration of repo exposures in one CCPs as a potential trigger for collateral crises. A 
collateral crisis is a situation whereby a market shock creates a hierarchy between good 
and bad collateral, restricting the use of the latter (see Gorton and Ordoñez, 2014). 
 
The impact of these arrangements on financial stability manifested during the euro crisis 
and are examined in Chapter 5, where I demonstrate that the margin calls by 
LCH.Clearnet likely led to large-scale sovereign bond sell-offs from 2010 to 2012, which 
destabilised sovereign debt markets, widening the spreads. Thus, this chapter takes us one 
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step closer to show that spread movements during those years were also highly influenced 
by the usability of these securities to access short-term funding via repo contracts, and 
not just by sovereign default risk perceptions. These dynamics are key to the objectives 
set out by this project, which seek to put into question the use of spread as an indicator of 
markets concerns with sovereign default risk.  
 
The analysis developed in this chapter owes a lot to the work of Gabor and Ban (2016), 
which shows that the development of a European repo market established new, fragile 
links between sovereign debt and bank funding. My analysis provides two novelties in 
this regard. First, I evaluate the process of European financial integration with a sharper 
focus on issues regarding systemic stability. Second, I contribute to our understanding of 
European financial market integration by exploring the importance played by 
consolidation of the European exchange industry in this process, which has led to the 
creation of one of the world’s largest CCP. Ultimately, I show that central clearing retains 
a key destabilising potential in the relationship between sovereign debt and bank funding 
in European finance. 
 
Crucially, this chapter examines a specific process that has shaped the European repo 
market to be so reliant on sovereign bonds, namely, the EC and ECB’s political 
imperative of financial market integration. While research in comparative political 
science and political economy has examined at great length the politics in the run up to 
the euro, particularly with respect to the different interests between the French and 
German negotiators in the process of European monetary integration, these have 
neglected repo market integration (e.g. Feldstein, 1997; McNamara, 1998). Further, 
according to the European-level explanations of the euro crisis literature, it is the result 
of these compromises that shaped monetary integration in such a way which, as discussed 
in Chapter 1, led to the development of macroeconomic imbalances at the root of the euro 
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crisis (e.g. Hall, 2014; Lapavitsas et al., 2012; Bellofiore, 2013). I seek to contribute to 
this debate by showcasing the interests of public and private market actors in fostering 
the creation of a single European financial space. Differently from previous chapters, I 
should note that I will focus extensively on the ECB here, because it has had a key role 
in shaping the functioning of the European repo market. In particular, I will examine the 
role played by the ECB in the consolidation of market-based practices for the handling of 
sovereign collateral, which I conclude make sovereign debt markets prone to price 
volatilities in financial markets. 
 
The analysis will be conducted in two stages. Section 4.2 examines how repos and 
sovereign bonds became among the main drivers for European financial integration. 
During the end of the 1990s, the EC put together a group of financial market experts, 
called the Giovannini Group, to provide advice on how to strengthen the integration of 
European financial markets. It is important to note that, besides the EC and the ECB, the 
Giovannini Group was in essence made of representatives coming from the international 
financial industry (Giovannini, 1999: 61), meaning that their ideas and actions were 
essentially based upon their de facto status as an interest group for the financial sector. 
The Giovannini Group promoted the harmonisation of collateral and repo trading rules, 
in order to foster liquidity in European finance through integrated repo markets. 
Welcoming the Giovannini Group’s advice, the EC instituted repos as the main 
instruments through which integrating European financial markets. However, I argue that 
by rooting the provision of short-term funding in repo loans the involvement of the 
Giovannini Group has exposed European financial markets to collateral crises.  
 
It should be noted that the role of the Giovannini Group in shaping the integration of 
European financial markets has been completely ignored in the euro crisis literature, 
while it has only received some attention in EU studies on European economic policy 
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after the introduction of the euro (e.g. Hartmann et al., 2003). Further, the impact of the 
Giovannini Group in shaping the functioning of the European repo market has never been 
examined in relation to systemic stability, with the exception of Gabor and Ban (2016), 
who wrote a few years after the euro crisis. The increasing attention given to the 
functioning of the European repo market is evidence of just how much the link between 
repos and systemic stability are becoming evident in scholarly debates in recent years. 
 
The ECB’s actions during those years would provide the next, crucial building block that 
took the integration of European financial markets even further: the introduction of 
general collateral (GC) baskets for euro area sovereign bonds. With the objective to 
further integrate European financial markets, the ECB provided banks with the possibility 
of utilising the sovereign bond interchangeably of any area when conducting repo 
operations with the central bank. The ECB sought to improve the liquidity of European 
financial markets by allowing investors to use any euro area sovereign bond in repo 
transactions.  
 
To shield itself against discretionary monetary policy criticism, the ECB began 
employing market-based practices to handle sovereign bonds for collateral purposes, such 
as daily mark-to-market and margin calls. This is crucial, because the ECB established 
the blueprint for the use of sovereign collateral use in the euro area through these practices 
which, as discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, retain a highly destabilising potential. Thus, I 
argue that, on the one hand, the ECB’s actions have dramatically expanded the use of 
sovereign bonds in the European repo market, but, on the other hand, the promotion of 
market-based practices has also exposed the sovereign debt markets of the euro area to 
collateral crises. 
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Section 4.3 assesses another process that characterised the integration of European 
financial markets: the consolidation of the European exchange industry, centred around 
the creation of a single European trading platform. This process has also received virtually 
no attention in the euro crisis literature, or in EU studies more generally, while it has been 
documented in financial history (e.g. Norman, 2011; Gregory, 2014). I found that the 
contrasting interests between the German, French and London stock exchanges, to create 
a pan-European trading platform between the 1990s and 2000s, were based upon their 
rivalry in the cross-border exchange and clearing industry within the (then) developing 
European financial space. In this respect, the insistence of the Paris stock exchange to 
preserve central clearing as a key technology laid the foundations for the dominance of 
CCPs in European financial markets. Furthermore, the compromises on the type of 
clearing model to adopt, which took place during the early 2000s between British users 
and European exchanges, paved the way for the creation of LCH.Clearnet, one of the 
world’s largest CCPs by clearing volume. While the European repo market has become 
increasingly reliant on central clearing, I argue that the concentration of the repo business 
in one CCP made the sovereign debt markets of the euro area highly susceptible to CCP-
induced collateral shocks.  
 
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 examines the role played by 
repos and sovereign bonds in the integration of European financial markets. Section 4.3 
analyses the consolidation of European exchange industry and the creation of a single 
European CCP. Section 4.4 is dedicated to the concluding remarks, which are that the 
politics underpinning the integration of European financial markets has made the 
sovereign debt markets of the euro area vulnerable to collateral instabilities. 
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4.2 The integration of European financial markets through repos and sovereign 
bonds 
4.2.1 The Giovannini Group and the making of a single European financial space  
 
After coming into force in 1999, the euro represented the most important milestone in the 
convergence efforts of European economies since the establishment of the European 
Economic Community (EEC) in 1957. Most importantly, European monetary integration 
had finally succeeded in putting an end to over two decades of failed attempts to prevent 
exchange rate volatility between European currencies after the demise of the Bretton 
Woods international monetary arrangement in 1971 (see Eichengreen, 2007). However, 
whereas the process of European integration had finally reached a monetary union, the 
integration of European financial markets still lagged behind. The reason for the poor 
integration of European financial markets had to do with the low degree of cross-border 
financing among European banks, which was to a significant extent reflected in the 
fragmented nature of the repo markets in Europe. 
 
As noted by Galati and Tsatsaronis, there were structural constraints that prevented the 
development of a Europeanised repo market (Galati and Tsatsaronis, 2003: 171). 
Differences in regulatory, legal and tax regimes, as well as market practices, included: 
short-selling restrictions, restrictions in the type of securities that could be held, and 
general lack of tradition in securities lending; these all contributed to a fragmented 
securities markets in Europe. These limitations were recognised by the Giovannini Group, 
an ensemble of financial experts who came from the private sector and EU institutions, 
appointed by the EC to provide advice on financial market integration.  
 
Before going any further, is important to note that financial market integration needs to 
be understood as part of a key political strategy by the EC to achieve the single currency, 
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which required reconciling the different interests at stake regarding the future of European 
integration. In order to satisfy, on the one hand, the France and Italy’s desire to regain 
what they perceived as lost monetary sovereignty to the EMS and, on the other, to 
reassure Germany about avoiding the risk of high inflation within the monetary union, in 
the late 1980s the EC simultaneously promoted the liberalisation of capital markets as 
well as further monetary integration (see Jabko, 1999).  
 
While capital market liberalisation provided German authorities with assurances that 
future euro countries would submit their economic policy to market discipline – because 
free movement of capital would limit fiscal policy latitude – introducing a single currency 
also put to rest France’s disapproval of the EMS as being too German-centric26. In short, 
the integration of European capital markets needs to be understood as a key political 
priority by the EC and, as we shall see later, the ECB, which was instrumental in 
promoting further financial market integration. Hence, it is within the EC’s political 
strategy of financial market integration that the appointment of the Giovannini Group 
needs to be contextualised.  
 
The Giovannini Group is named after Alberto Giovannini, an US-educated Italian 
Professor in finance and economics. After obtaining his PhD from the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology (MIT), Giovannini was hired by the Columbia Business School 
in New York and worked at several prominent think tanks, like the Centre for Economic 
                                                        
26 Since the end of the Bretton Woods system, the market discipline hypothesis suggests that international 
financial markets discipline governments by forcing them to adopt more conservative, sound and non-
inflationary fiscal policies (see Helleiner, 1995). According to the market discipline hypothesis, financial 
market actors react to governments, on what they deem unsound fiscal policy, punishing them by taking 
investments out of the country’s sovereign debt market or by asking higher interest rates when lending 
money, which both tend to increase the government’s borrowing costs in the long-term (Rommerskirchen, 
2015). 
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Policy Research. He also worked for the Italian Treasury, as well as serving in numerous 
company boards, such as for the Italian electric utility provider ENEL. Widely respected 
across the continent, in the mid-1990s Giovannini was tasked by the European 
Commission to recruit financial market experts in order to assess and advise on the impact 
of the single currency on European capital markets (see Hartmann et al., 2003).  
 
It should be noted that the Giovannini Group was largely composed of key representatives 
of the financial industry, both European and international, such as Deutsche Bank, ING 
Group, Morgan Stanley, the Paris Bourse, JP Morgan, ISMA, and more (Giovannini 
Group, 1999: 61). These were among the same figures who had been lobbying to 
liberalise capital movements in Europe since the end of the 1980s (see Underhill, 1997: 
110). Therefore, I argue that the Giovannini Group can be thought of as essentially a 
lobbying organisation for the financial sector, whose interests aimed at liberalising and 
enhancing capital movements in the EU, which aligned with the EC’s political ambition 
to integrate the European financial markets. Indeed, an integrated repo market would ‘fit 
this political strategy that invoked the appealing vision of a single financial space, further 
cementing the alliance between the Commission, European banks and technocracies’ 
(Gabor and Ban, 2016: 623). 
 
While, in the past, the Giovannini Group did not reach agreements on issues such as the 
creation of a single debt instrument in the euro area backed by mutual guarantees, repo 
market integration gathered broad consensus among its members (Hartmann et al., 2003: 
208). The Giovannini Group claimed that European financial markets lacked the 
sufficient degree of integration and efficiency necessary to foster the development of the 
European economy (Giovannini Group, 1999: 2). Integrating repo and collateral markets 
in Europe was thus identified as the solution to this problem, on the assumption that it 
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would have improved the liquidity of securities markets and thus laid the foundations for 
a truly integrated, pan-European capital market.  
 
The Giovannini Group recognised the fragmentation of European finance into (back then) 
15 separate repo markets as one of the main problems that prevented the proliferation of 
cross-border security trading, which negatively impacted the overall liquidity of 
European financial markets. Although the introduction of the euro had provided ‘a firm 
base’ upon which to build capital market integration, it fell short in fully harmonising 
market practices and legislative frameworks across the continent (ibid: 10). Thus, the 
Giovannini Group provided market participants as well as national and EU authorities 
with a series of recommendations in order to improve the integration of repo markets 
across Europe, which would have a long-lasting impact in shaping the functioning of 
European financial markets.  
 
The alternative to this vision, the Giovannini Group argued, was for European repo 
markets to remain largely divided along national lines, which would have impaired cross-
border liquidity provision. This is an important point to retain for the scope of this project, 
because repo market integration in effect implied liberalisation, providing access to 
domestic repo markets by foreign investors. As discussed in Chapter 3, Europe’s most 
important central banks, notably the Bundesbank and the Bank of England, initially 
opposed repo market liberalisation because of concerns regarding the systemic stability 
of liberalised short-term collateralised finance.  
 
Hence, whereas the Giovannini Group, representing the interests of the financial sector, 
condemned repo market fragmentation, in the view of central banks the fragmented 
approach helped to maintain systemic stability. This is key, because the argument I am 
developing in this chapter shows that the specific ways in which European repo markets 
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were integrated along the lines suggested by the Giovannini Group made European 
financial markets prone to systemic instabilities. More broadly, my thesis lends support 
to the arguments against this type of repo liberalisation made by the Bundesbank and the 
Bank of England at the time. 
 
To market participants, the Giovannini Group suggested to remove any restriction on repo 
activities by institutional investors, based on the idea that larger repo trading volume 
conducted by those actors would greatly improve the liquidity of securities trading. It also 
suggested that market players employ market-based practices with respect to collateral 
management, such as daily mark-to-market, haircuts and margins. To regulators, the 
Giovannini Group advised, firstly, to remove any existing tax disincentive to repo 
activities. Second, to conduct a detailed survey of market rules and netting in each 
Member State, in order to provide the widest possible mutual legal recognition of netting 
practices across the continent. Third, to provide a pan-European legal framework for the 
recognition of collateralisation techniques and practices across the continent, to facilitate 
the use of collateral cross-border. Finally, the mutual recognition of both bilateral repo 
activity as well as the clearing and settlement systems underpinning the functioning of 
the repo market as a whole.  
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, until the mid-1990s a consensus existed between 
governments and central banks (pushed by the latter) to restrict and control repo activities, 
particularly to prevent short-selling in government bond markets and to maintain an 
effective transmission channel of monetary policy operations. However, following 
pressure from financial market operators, and to compete with France’s aggressive repo 
liberalisation strategies, that consensus began to crumble, which helps to explain why the 
Giovannini Group’s proposals were endorsed by domestic authorities as well as by the 
EU. 
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Indeed, the EC ‘warmly welcomed the report’, supporting the Giovannini Group’s 
objective to integrate European financial markets via enhancing cross-border repo trading 
in the euro area (EC, 1999). Almost quoting the report itself, the EC argued that a ‘unified 
EU repo market will ensure efficient liquidity management in the euro-area’, thus 
committing to the Giovannini Group’s recommendations to implement the necessary 
legislative initiatives at EU level (ibid, emphasis added). The Giovannini Group’s 
guidelines were translated into the Directive 2002/47 on Financial Collateral 
Arrangements, which provided the legal foundations for cross-border use (and re-use) of 
collateral. (see Council Directive, 2002).  
 
Directive 2002/47 aimed at tackling the issues raised by the Giovannini Group and 
enacting its suggestions, including: 1) the removal of the major legal barriers for the 
cross-border use of collateral; 2) creating effective and simple regulatory and market 
regimes for financial collateral arrangements; 3) the recognition of specific risk 
mitigation techniques (indirectly making reference to the market-based collateral-
management practices described above), all of this in order to: 4) improving the 
integration and cost efficiency of European financial markets; 5) strengthening the 
stability of the financial system as a whole and reducing of risks and losses (as discussed 
in Chapter 3, repos had been considered instrumental for financial stability in both the 
US and Europe); 6) enhancing overall cross-border transactions and competitiveness.  
In a nutshell, by adopting the Giovannini Group’s guidelines through Directive 2002/47, 
the EC ‘effectively institutionalized pure market-based governance’ in the provision of 
short-term funding in the euro area, meaning that lending practices and prices would 
increasingly be determined in financial markets through repo trading (see Gabor and Ban, 
2016: 623). Ultimately, repo, and, more generally, financial integration according to 
market-based practices was a political success for the EC, because it managed to reconcile 
Italy and France’s demands for a less German-centric monetary arrangement and 
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Germany’s objective for a low inflationary regime thanks to enhanced market discipline 
(see Jabko, 1999). As I will discuss in more detail in the following subsection, national 
governments did not oppose those proposals because the ECB engineered a way to 
manage collateral that, in theory, would have prevented a Europeanised repo market to 
create asymmetries by causing capital flights from less to more liquid government bond 
markets (see Gabor and Ban, 2016). However, as demonstrated in Chapter 5, I argue that 
these measures would not be effective in preventing CCPs from causing exactly these 
types of asymmetries in sovereign debt markets. 
 
Before moving forward, I draw a parallel between the role played by the Giovannini 
Group and the much more documented involvement of the European Roundtable of 
Industrialists (ERT) in the process of European integration. The ERT is a forum of 
Europe’s largest and most internationalised industrial corporations, which deeply shaped 
European monetary integration in the 1980s by proposing the creation of a European 
single market in 1983 (see Van Apeldoorn, 2002; Holman, 2006). Similarly to the 
Giovannini Group, the ERT blamed the fragmentation of European markets for goods as 
the cause of Europe’s declining competitiveness, which could have been overcome 
through the creation of a single European market (ERT, 1983). Just as in the case of how 
the Giovannini Group’s guidelines were implemented in the Directive on Financial 
Collateral Arrangements, the ERT’s proposals were incorporated into the European 
Commission’s White Paper on Completing the Internal Market. Hence, I argue that the 
interests of private sector groups, like the ERT and the Giovannini Group, have played 
an important role in shaping the integration of Europe’s markets for goods as well as 
financial services. 
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In any case, I found that cross-border repo lending in the euro area dramatically increased 
following the introduction of the Directive on Financial Collateral27. Figure 10, which 
measures the daily percentage change in cross-border lending activities in the euro area, 
shows that the total borrowing activity on the secured money markets (like repos) has 
dramatically increased, at the expense of the unsecured segments (such as bank 
deposits)28. In short, this piece of legislation greatly contributed to the creation of a single 
European financial space. 
 
(Fig. 10) Borrowing activity in the secured and unsecured markets of the euro area 
 
 
Source: ECB (2017). 
 
                                                        
27 Reporting only started in 2005. 
28 As explained in Chapter 3, secured money markets are mainly repos. 
 180 
It should be noted, however, that by the time the report was published in 1999 the supply 
in sovereign bonds issuing had taken a downwards trend in Europe, which was matched 
by an equal increase in private debt issues (e.g. corporate and financial institutions bonds). 
Indeed, the Giovannini Group’s initiative aimed at promoting a unified European repo 
market by strengthening the appeal of private paper, and not government bonds. This 
means that, although the Giovannini Group’s report should certainly be credited for 
having pushed financial market integration through the creation of a pan-European repo 
market, it did not specifically address sovereign bonds as the catalyst for achieving this 
goal. As will be shown in the next section, sovereign bonds only became more central in 
repo trading in the euro area at a later stage.  
 
4.2.2 Integrating European financial markets through the ECB’s general 
collateral baskets 
 
Politicians across Europe broadly supported the EC’s efforts for currency union and 
financial market integration, in the hope that the EMU would prove more stable than the 
currency crisis-prone EMS (see Eichengreen, 2007: 357). The EMS, which preceded the 
EMU, was established in 1979 as a monetary arrangement between European currencies. 
The main objective of the EMS was to link the currencies of the EEC’s members together 
as a means to limit exchange rate fluctuations. The exchange rate arrangement allowed 
for fluctuations at different percentage bands over its years of operation (1979-1998). 
Albeit no currency was formally employed as the benchmark of the system, the German 
mark quickly became the currency anchor of the arrangement, due to its relative stability 
with other currencies and low inflation. However, as most other countries could not keep 
up with the low-inflationary interest rate regime of Germany, the EMS became target of 
significant currency speculation in 1992 that, ultimately, led to several currency crises 
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that put the regime in crisis and paved the way for the euro (see Eichengreen, 2007 for a 
full history). 
 
Thus, regulators were worried that a Europeanised sovereign bond market could also lead 
to speculation and capital flights, as investors could decide to opt for more liquid and 
stable securities, like German government debt. Therefore, the ECB became instrumental 
in achieving a liquid, presumably stable and Europeanised repo market, because it argued 
that an integrated securities market for the euro area would have facilitated the 
transmission mechanism of its interest rate-based monetary policy (see ECB, 2017). More 
broadly, the ECB’s position on European financial market integration was largely in line 
with those of the Giovannini Group, in the sense that it also regarded repo market 
fragmentation as the largest obstacle to further integration. Furthermore, as the ECB’s 
‘political legitimacy in concentrating monetary powers at European level rested on its 
ability to deliver price stability’ (particularly in the eyes of German authorities), the ECB 
saw in European financial integration an effective monetary policy transmission tool for 
the whole euro area (Gabor and Ban, 2016: 625). Hence, the ECB’s saw the overcoming 
of financial market fragmentation central to its political legitimacy. 
 
As in the words of the ECB, ‘[t]he remaining obstacles to [financial market] integration 
lie in the diversity of the types of securities in the euro area’ (ECB, 2002a: 66). While the 
ECB shared the Giovannini Group’s view of financial integration, the ECB also had the 
additional burden of having to develop and implement concrete strategies to make a 
Europeanised repo market work in practice. As we shall see below, these strategies 
resulted in the ECB establishing the blueprint for collateral management of European 
repo trade, which significantly transformed the market and made it increasingly reliant 
on sovereign bonds. In order to foster a single European repo market and prevent capital 
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flights across the euro area, the ECB promoted the use of GC baskets that integrated all 
of the euro area sovereign bonds for its own repo transactions (see ECB, 2002a). 
 
GC are built upon an agreement that explicitly recognises which securities are to be 
treated equally for collateral use. GC baskets were introduced by the ECB so that 
different euro area sovereign bonds could be used interchangeably as high-quality 
collateral. For example, through the use of GC baskets, a buyer in a repo contract could 
be purchasing €500 worth of Greek sovereign bonds and returning an equivalent amount 
in German government securities. 
 
The ECB explicitly praised the use of GC as a means to strengthen the integration of 
European financial markets. In the ECB’s own words:  
 
[Financial] [m]arket integration would benefit from the extension of a euro GC 
approach, enabling participants to put securities with similar, although not the 
same, characteristics in the same basket (ECB, 2002a: 66). 
 
Thus, the introduction of GC baskets by the ECB helped to engineer a single market for 
euro area sovereign bonds, despite that each participating government issued its own debt 
– albeit in a common currency – and despite that those bonds did not share the same 
liquidity or credit rating. 
 
Treating all euro area sovereign bonds equally for collateral purposes was considered a 
highly politically move, as it could lead to moral hazard by less creditworthy sovereigns 
in terms of fiscal policy, an unacceptable move for an independent central bank (see 
Buiter and Sibert, 2005). An influential paper by former international advisor to Goldman 
Sachs and current chief economist of Citigroup, Willem H. Buiter, (co-authored by 
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economics Professor Anne Sibert) argued that the ECB’s collateral policy would have 
weakened the fiscal discipline of low-rated government bonds in the euro area, because 
GC baskets allowed for any sovereign bond to be treated equally for collateralised repo 
operations (Buiter and Sibert, 2005). In other words, the authors argued that such a policy 
incentivised weak fiscal discipline by low-rated sovereigns, because their debt issuing 
would always be liquid in the eyes of the ECB, even if they had received comparatively 
lower ratings.  
 
This issue became highly political because of Germany’s long-held monetary policy 
priority to have a politically independent central bank. According to German authorities, 
the independence status would guarantee price stability and not directly financing 
government spending, contributing to maintain fiscal discipline (see Jabko, 1999: 481). 
Indeed, Germany was co-opted by the EC into the monetary union precisely thanks to 
having guaranteed that the ECB had to remain independent and be unable to directly 
finance sovereign debt, a principle that was enshrined in the Eurosystem’s statute 
(Protocol 4, 1998).  
 
Thus, to shield itself against the German criticism of implementing discretionary 
monetary policy decisions, the ECB decided to handle sovereign collateral according to 
market-based practices, such as margin calls, haircuts, and daily mark-to-market pricing 
like any other private repo market participant (see Issing, 2005). To this date, the ECB 
considers it essential for risk management purposes to ‘accurately’ value collateral, in 
order to ensure that the money the central bank provides to a counterparty does not exceed 
the ‘actual’ collateral value (Bindseil et al., 2017: 15, see also ECB, 2002a: 58). By actual 
value, the ECB refers to a security value on financial markets. Indeed, according to the 
ECB, when the value of an asset fluctuates over time in open markets, it is key for its own 
collateral value to be re-assessed and for new collateral to be demanded, should prices 
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drop below a certain threshold (i.e. triggering a margin call). As in the words of the ECB’s 
former Executive Board member and Chief Economist Otmar Issing ‘[i]n its collateral 
policy, the ECB therefore relies on the judgement of the market to distinguish among 
government bonds and, implicitly, the fiscal behaviour of member states’ (Issing, 2005). 
In other words, in its understanding of collateral management, the ECB’s accurate value 
of a security is essentially its market price at a given moment. 
 
This is important, because it indicates that the ECB implements its collateral management 
practices – within the remit of its monetary policy operations – acting like private market 
actors, hence demanding more collateral in order not to be exposed to the changing value 
of an asset. As I discussed in Chapter 3, the ECB implements repo and reverse repo 
operations as a monetary policy tool not only to control liquidity, but also to manage 
inflation expectation among market participants. Thus, this explicit market-based 
collateral management approach is central to how the ECB runs its monetary policy 
within the euro area.  
 
The ECB’s market-based approach, implying that the price of sovereign debt would be 
increasingly determined by financial markets, was in stark contrast to the approach of the 
other large European central banks before the introduction of the euro, which were not 
adopting mark-to-market pricing or margin calls on sovereign collateral. With the 
exception of the Dutch central bank, which was applying weekly, and not daily, mark-to-
market pricing and rarely used margin calls, the Belgian, French, German and Italian 
central banks did not make use of either of the two (Gabor and Ban, 2016: 628). More 
practically, the ECB’s market stance on collateral management means that, should private 
investors judge, for example, German sovereign bonds less creditworthy, then the ECB 
would also implement margin calls on the same security accordingly. Similarly, utilising 
a daily mark-to-market approach meant that the ECB would be valuing a particular 
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government bond according to the daily price of that asset on financial markets. In short, 
the ECB has been acting like a private investor with respect to the use of sovereign 
collateral for its refinancing operations, marking a significant break from how other 
European central bank handled government debt until then. This is a particularly 
interesting point that I make with respect to the ECB/Bundesbank comparison, as the 
former is seen as being largely a replication of the latter in terms of institutional design 
(e.g. Kaltenthaler, 2005). As in the words of economics professor and candidate-
Governor to the Fed Kathryn Dominguez: 
 
The ECB was modeled on the Bundesbank, both because Germany had a large 
influence on its design, and because of the perception that the Bundesbank 
represented “best practice” among the European central banks (Dominguez, 2006: 
73) 
 
In what is an original observation made in this thesis, I argue that whereas this similarity 
may well be the case with respect to monetary policy stance, in that the ECB adopted the 
Bundesbank’s definition of price stability and monetary targeting strategy, the same 
cannot be said when it comes to collateral management. This is line with what I discussed 
in Chapter 3, whereby the Bundesbank was, at least initially, largely opposed to market-
based and short-term finance, because of the potential negative effect it may have on 
monetary policy transmission and macroeconomic stability.  
 
Interestingly, the ECB seemed aware that the use of GC baskets could have influenced 
the investors’ pricing of sovereign bonds in the euro area, resulting in lower yields even 
for those sovereign bonds that received lower credit ratings (ECB, 2002b: 67). At the 
same time, however, it is precisely this diversification in sovereign bond pricing that was 
recognised as a main obstacle for the pursue of European financial integration by the 
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ECB. As discussed above, and along the lines of what ought to be pursued by the 
Giovannini Group and the EC, European financial market integration had become a key 
objective for the ECB. Hence, the ECB’s move aimed to strike a balance between its 
political independence and the objective to achieve financial market integration, which 
resulted in the use of both GC baskets and market-based practices (Gabor and Ban, 2016: 
627). 
 
More generally, the introduction of GC baskets by the ECB could be seen as a tool to 
promote bond yield convergence as prescribed by the so-called Maastricht criteria, an 
essential condition (and a priori requirement) for the smooth functioning of the monetary 
union29. The convergence of long-term interest rates required for the convergence 
sovereign bonds yields in the euro area. GC baskets facilitated such convergence because 
it provided securities within the basket with the same value for collateral purposes. 
However, it is unclear whether this was the ECB’s actual intention. Indeed, the ECB has 
never been explicit about the use of GC baskets to promote interest rate convergence, 
which, as discussed above, could have been perceived as a highly political move that 
would have weaken fiscal discipline in the euro area. 
 
Regardless of the political contentions surrounding its monetary policy architecture, the 
ECB’s implementation of GC baskets for sovereign bonds became extremely successful. 
Indeed, the ECB’s decision to create GC baskets for its own repo operations paved the 
                                                        
29 Agreed by member states as part of the Treaty of Maastricht in 1991, the Maastricht convergence criteria, 
also known as the Maastricht criteria, are a number of conditions that EU member states need to meet in 
order to adopt the euro. Such criteria require for the candidate country to convergence on a set of common 
targets with respect to inflation, government budget deficit, government debt-to-GDP ratio, exchange rate 
stability and long-term interest rates. For a more detailed explanation, see 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/euro-area/enlargement-euro-area/convergence-criteria-
joining_en.  
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way for dramatically expanding the use of GC baskets across the euro area. By 2008, 
Europe’s largest private repo market actors, such as the CCPs LCH.Clearnet and Eurex 
Clearing, had also begun adopting GC baskets. Eurex Clearing is a division of Eurex 
Exchange, Europe’s largest futures and options market, which is in turn owned by the 
Deutsche Börse Group. In 2005, Eurex was one of the first large CCPs in Europe to 
introduce GC baskets for its repo services (see Eurex, 2018). Around two years later, 
LCH.Clearnet, the world’s largest CCP by clearing volume, also announced that it would 
launch its own GC basket for repo operations in the euro area, which came into force in 
2008 (see LCH.Clearnet, 2007). LCH.Clearnet described the introduction of its GC 
clearing service as a ‘step-change improvement in collateral management and efficiency’ 
(ibid).  
 
Indeed, in the announcement note of the GC basket service, John Burke, LCH.Clearnet’s 
former director for fixed income products, claimed that participants of the new GC euro 
programme would benefit from ‘increased liquidity’ due to standardized baskets, and, 
consequently, enhanced trading efficiency (ibid). In short, the ECB established the 
blueprint for the use of GC repo in Europe. More importantly, the ECB’s move had far 
reaching consequences on the structure of the European repo market, placing sovereign 
bonds as one of its pillars.  
 
However, the ways in which the ECB simultaneously fuelled the use of euro area 
sovereign bonds as collateral in repo transactions through market-based practices also 
exposed government debt markets to collateral crises. As discussed by Gorton and 
Ordoñez (2014), a collateral crisis emerges whenever a financial shock creates a 
previously non-existent hierarchy between good and bad collateral, which restricts the 
usability of the latter. A collateral crisis could affect sovereign debt markets in the euro 
area in the same ways as during the GFC, which I examined in Chapter 3. The use of 
 188 
margin calls and haircuts underpinning the collateral practices of repo market participants 
(that the ECB contributed to institutionalising) could suddenly reduce the liquidity of 
certain government bonds as collateral in repo transactions, reducing the value of these 
securities to access short-term funding.  
 
Nevertheless, my understanding of collateral crises goes beyond that of Gorton and 
Ordoñez, because I claim that the specific position of CCPs in the European financial 
markets can be a distinctive trigger of collateral crises. I define this dynamic with the 
novel notion of CCP-induced collateral crisis. As will be discussed in Chapter 5, this is 
precisely what affected the Irish, Portuguese, Italian and Spanish sovereign debt markets 
from 2010 to 2012, whereby LCH.Clearnet’s margin calls reduced the usability of those 
countries’ sovereign bonds to access short-term funding via repo. More generally, margin 
calls on selected securities would establish a hierarchy between more and less liquid 
sovereign collateral, leading to a widening in the spreads between those countries’ 
sovereign bonds (whose liquidity was reduced) against more liquid securities, like 
German government debt. Therefore, and in light of the findings to be provided in the 
next chapter, I argue that the ECB’s collateral management approach is dysfunctional, 
because it promotes precisely the dynamic that its GC baskets aimed at preventing in the 
first place: capital flights from one government debt market to another. This observation 
is a key contribution that I make to our understanding of the ECB’s collateral policy. 
While Gabor and Ban (2016) do acknowledge the potentially destabilising impact of the 
ECB’s collateral policies, their claims are speculative in nature, as it does not provide any 
empirical backing to their claims. Thus, in this thesis I contribute to our understanding 
between repo collateral practices and systemic instabilities by empirically showing that 
the adoption of repo GC baskets by CCPs has destabilised, and led to capital flights from, 
the Irish, Portuguese, Italian and Spanish sovereign debt markets, which is precisely what 
the ECB aimed at preventing. 
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In this respect, it is interesting to point out that the ECB also acknowledged that, despite 
its merit in liquidity provision and overall systemic risk reduction, collateralised loans 
through repos could ‘also alter the market dynamics in certain circumstances, in particular 
through abrupt adjustments of collateral standards (e.g. haircuts) in times of stress’ (ECB, 
2002b: 64). In other words, the ECB was aware of the potentially destabilising impact of 
repos. Yet, the ECB also argued that the fragmented structure of repo trading at the time 
had not reached ‘the level of integration and efficiency that is needed to reap the full 
benefits of the financial area which has flourished with the advent of the single currency’ 
(ibid.).  
 
Thus, I argue that the political imperative of European financial integration (through the 
creation of a Europeanised repo market) outweighed considerations regarding financial 
stability. This is a plausible argument to make, especially when considering that the ECB 
was aware that its collateral management policy would have led to sovereign bond price 
convergence despite the heterogeneity in the original credit ratings, liquidity profiles and 
prices of government securities in the euro area. 
 
4.2.3 Sovereign bonds in the European repo market today 
 
I found that the use of government bonds as collateral in the euro area greatly expanded 
since the introduction of GC baskets by the ECB, at over €6tn in the first quarter of 2016 
(Fig. 11)30. As a matter of fact, figure 11 shows that government bonds have become the 
fastest growing collateral in the euro area since 2004. The ways in which the introduction 
of GC baskets by the ECB played a key role in bringing about this significant shift goes 
as follows.  
                                                        
30 Reporting only started in 2004. 
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Whereas the ECB’s move was indeed largely successful at preventing capital flight from 
one sovereign debt market of the euro area to another during the first decade of the euro, 
it also greatly improved the overall cross-border liquidity of government debt securities 
in European financial markets. Through the use of GC, the ECB incentivised assets that 
belonged to that basket when compared to those outside of it. This is due to two factors. 
First, banks in the euro area are heavily affected by the so-called domestic bias, whereby 
banks hold large quantities of the sovereign bonds they are headquartered in (Manna, 
2011; Moro; 2014: S12). This means that banks in the euro area holding large quantities 
of domestic sovereign debt found themselves with even more valuable assets, because 
their domestic debt holding could be employed in repo trading in exchange for any other 
euro area government bonds. 
 
(Fig. 11) Use of collateral in the euro area (in EUR bn) 
     
Source: Bindseil, et al. (2017: 24). 
 
Secondly, buying and selling sovereign bonds belonging to GC baskets also created 
profitable earnings for banks by exploiting the price differentials among euro area 
sovereign bonds, which were much wider when compared to what was available through 
non-sovereign assets, such as mortgage-backed securities (see ECB, 2002a: 62). 
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The most immediate consequence of the ECB’s move was the transformation of the 
European repo trading. The unification of collateral and repo markets in the euro area 
caused for repo trading to become increasingly dependent on sovereign bonds. As shown 
in figure 12, the share of all government bonds within the pool of EU-originated collateral 
utilised in repo contracts stood at almost 85.7% in December 2017, roughly €6.2tn.31 It is 
interesting to note that traders also rely on non-EU government securities, particularity 
Japanese and American, which helps to highlight just how much the European repo 
market participants have become reliant on sovereign bonds as collateral.  
 
(Fig. 12) Fixed-income collateral composition of the European repo market (as a 
% of total) 
         Source: ICMA’s 2018 European Repo Market Survey (Comotto, 2018: 14). 
 
                                                        
31 This figure is derived from the 65 institutions who participated in ICMA’s 2018 European Repo Market 
Survey. 
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In the US (together with the EU, the world’s largest repo markets) the collateral used is 
much more heterogeneous, which means that the use of sovereign bonds in the euro area 
is distinctive insofar as they underpin the vast majority of interbank funding operations. 
Except for bilateral contracts, most of the US repo market does not rely as much on 
Treasury bills, but employs a combination of corporate bonds, mortgage-backed 
securities, asset-backed securities, etc. (Martin, 2015). Indeed, according to a recent 
report by the SIFMA, the American trade group acting on behalf of securities firms, 
banks, and asset management companies, the use of US Treasury bills as collateral in 
repo operations stood at around 54% in 2017 (SIFMA, 2017).  
 
As pointed out by the same report, the second largest component of the US repo market 
collateral base is made of asset- and mortgage-backed securities, at around 26%. Even 
when compared to other large repo markets, the European one remains unique in how 
much it relies on sovereign bonds as collateral. For instance, in the Chinese inter-bank 
repo market, which, worth around $720bn, is roughly one third of its American 
counterpart, Chinese government bonds make up around 40% of the collateral used, 
which is equal in size to bonds from financial corporations (see Kendall and Lees, 2017: 
76; J.P. Morgan, 2015). In short, although sovereign bonds represent an important 
collateral base in repo markets across the world, nowhere is their use so prominent as in 
the European repo market. This means that the European repo-based interbank funding 
market is closely intertwined with the sovereign debt issuing of the governments in the 
euro area. This is a particularly relevant finding for the scope of this thesis, because it 
highlights the importance of sovereign bonds in the provision of short-funding in the euro 
area. 
 
4.3 The CCP-centred nature of the European repo market 
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To summarise what has been discussed so far, the European repo markets presented the 
following characteristics following the introduction of the euro. Thanks to the suggestions 
contained in the report by the Giovannini Group first, and their implementation in the 
Directive 2002/47 later, the integration of European financial markets was driven 
primarily by repo trading and through market-based practices. This means that, aside from 
the regulatory efforts to harmonise trading rules, it has been up to financial markets to 
guarantee funding liquidity through repo lending. Therefore, the involvement of the 
Giovannini Group played a crucial role in the creation of a single European financial 
space. 
 
Furthermore, sovereign bonds have in effect become the cornerstone of European finance, 
in their role as the most important collateral in the provision of liquidity. This was mainly 
due to the efforts by the ECB to improve the integration and liquidity of European 
financial markets, achieved through the introduction of GC baskets for its own repo 
transactions. The ECB’s handling of sovereign collateral through the use of GC baskets 
and market-based practices, such as daily mark-to-market and margin calls, has shaped 
the ways in which sovereign bonds would be treated by large repo market actors in 
European financial markets.  
 
However, whereas these initiatives aimed at improving the liquidity of European finance 
through increased cross-border transactions and a unified financial space, they have also 
exposed sovereign debt markets to CCP-induced collateral crises. This is a key point with 
respect to answering the research question posed by this project, which seeks to examine 
the factors that contributed to destabilising sovereign debt markets during the euro crisis. 
Indeed, I argue that sovereign debt markets in the euro area can be severely destabilised 
by collateral asymmetries, and not just by the macroeconomic imbalances as claimed by 
many in the euro crisis literature (see Chapter 1). 
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The centrality of sovereign bonds in the European repo market helps to highlight the 
connection between sovereign debt and bank funding as a central aspect that characterised 
the euro crisis (see Genito, 2013). Indeed, the existence of close links between sovereign 
debt and the repo-based interbank funding is a central element of the analysis conducted 
in the next chapter. Chapter 5 shows that spreads from 2010 to 2012 also winded due to 
investors’ concern with funding liquidity risk, and not just by fears of sovereign default, 
because LCH.Clearnet’s margin calls reduced the liquidity of Irish, Portuguese, Italian 
and Spanish sovereign bonds as collateral to access short-term funding via repos.  
 
This section discusses another aspect that characterises the European repo market: its 
reliance on CCPs. As shown in figure 13, in 2015 around 70% of the repo market in the 
euro area was centrally cleared, whereas triparty arrangements and bilateral non-CCP 
contracts only contributed to a relatively smaller proportion of the total trade. The figure 
also shows that the increase in the share of CCP-repos began in 2009, precisely after the 
introduction of the G20 clearing mandate for OTC derivatives (see Chapter 2). Thus, to 
an important extent, the expansion of the use of CCPs in the euro repo market is a direct 
consequence of the new role that CCPs now hold in the OTC derivatives market (see 
Wendt, 2015)32. 
 
However, there is more to it. A closer look at how CCPs are differently employed in repo 
markets in the US and Europe helps highlight differences in how repo trading is 
conducted across the Atlantic. In the US, more than 50% of repos are managed by triparty 
agents, while CCPs are largely unused in repo markets (see Copeland et al. 2012). 
Conversely, as shown in figure 13, even before the clearing mandate was implemented, 
CCPs were already important actors in the euro area, clearing around 40% of the repo 
                                                        
32 Until 2009, the ECB reporting on the market structure of repo lending in the euro area did not differentiate 
between non-CCPs bilateral and CCPs bilateral transactions, treating them both simply as ‘bilateral’. 
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market. The main reason for such a significant divergence has to do with how repo 
markets are structured in the US and Europe, which makes the features of central clearing 
differently employable between these two markets. In the US, repos are mainly used by 
securities dealers (non-banks), where market participants are much more heterogeneous, 
meaning that the collateral they trade is highly diversified (e.g. a mix of corporate bonds, 
asset-backed securities, mortgage-backed securities, equities, US Treasury bills, etc.) (see 
Martin, 2015). 
 
(Fig. 13) Breakdown of total secured market (percentages of total) 
    
Source: ECB Money Market Survey (2015: 16). 
 
Indeed, ‘in most segments of the U.S. repo market, at least one of the counterparties is a 
securities dealer’, and the collateral is often traded to hedge or speculate on the changes 
in the market value of those securities (Copeland et al., 2012: 2). This is different in the 
euro area, where repos are primarily utilised in the much more homogenous interbank 
funding market, which, as previously mentioned, mainly relies on sovereign bonds as 
collateral. The more homogenous collateral composition of the European repo market is 
one of the factors that helps to explain why CCPs have become more widely employed 
in the EU than the US.  
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In more technical terms, this has to do with multilateral netting which, as explained in 
Chapter 2, is one of the core functions of CCPs. Multilateral netting is more effective in 
markets that trade the same asset class (in Europe, government bonds), because it allows 
CCPs to sum transactions among different market participants to then see who owes what 
to whom, instead of settling trades individually. Netting multiple transactions undertaken 
with the single asset-class, like sovereign bonds in Europe, decreases the number and 
volume of trades that need settling (see Lee, 2011: 61; Duffie and Zhu, 2011; Gregory, 
2014: 72). This is an important point to keep in mind, because it provides a structural 
determinant as to why CCPs have been more prominent in the European repo market than 
the US counterpart. The ways in which the European repo market is structured around the 
same asset class (sovereign bonds) creates an incentive for banks in the euro area to use 
CCPs in order to reduce both costs and counterparty risk when seeking short-term 
funding.  
 
This makes central clearing more suitable for the Europe than the US, whose repo market, 
as discussed before, relies on a more heterogenous collateral composition. However, 
given what I have discussed in the previous sections, to an important extent the difference 
in collateral composition between the US and the EU can be ascribed to the ways in which 
European financial integration was carried out, which has resulted into a massive 
expansion in the use of sovereign bonds as collateral in repos. This, in turn, has made the 
collateral market for repos in the euro area much more homogenous. Hence, I argue that 
the European repo market’s higher suitability for the use of CCPs, compared to its US 
counterpart, can be located to the EC and ECB’s political objective of financial market 
integration. 
 
Nevertheless, the European repo market is not simply reliant on CCPs in general, but on 
one CCP in particular. Indeed, I found that LCH.Clearnet is the largest CCP in the 
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European repo market by clearing volume, which alone cleared 75% of CCP-based repo 
contracts in 2015 (see LCH.Clearnet, 2015). The dominance of LCH.Clearnet in the 
European repo market is also exemplified by looking at figure 14, which compares the 
notional amount of repo contracts cleared by LCH.Clearnet vis-à-vis the other four largest 
European CCPs. The LCH.Clearnet Group (comprising the London-based LCH.Clearnet 
Ltd and the French subsidiary LCH.Clearnet SA) together cleared more than twice the 
value of euro-denominated repo contracts than all the other large CCPs combined. By 
recalling what has been discussed in Chapter 2, the concentration of OTC derivatives risk 
in CCPs has recently been highlighted as a systemically relevant issue by regulators, in 
relation to the objectives set out in the G20 clearing mandate for the reduction of OTC 
derivatives risk. 
 
(Fig. 14) Value of repo contracts using debt securities cleared in 2015  
(in EUR tn) 
 
 
Source: ECB’s Statistical Data Warehouse, own calculations. 
 
Although, as discussed in Chapter 3, the repo market is significantly smaller than OTC 
derivatives trading, the way in which CCPs accumulate risk exposure remains relevant 
with respect to the objectives set out in this project. Because repo trading is highly 
concentrated, large CCPs like LCH.Clearnet are able to exert a particular amount of 
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influence on traders and sovereign bond prices in the euro area. This is largely due to how 
CCPs interpose between traders through counterparty substitution and their unilateral 
imposition of margin requirements (see Chapter 2). 
 
First, it makes sense, from a collateral management perspective, to concentrate your 
portfolio into a single CCP, especially if you already clear large amounts of assets or 
contracts with that CCP. Indeed, ‘the more assets that are cleared through a single 
CCP…the lower the total amount of collateral that is likely to be required of each 
individual participant’ (Lee, 2011: 61). That is because a CCP offsets margin 
requirements in one category of assets against the positions in other categories of assets 
that are correlated with one another. Hence, investors will need to provide less collateral 
to clear a diversified portfolio through a single CCP than among multiple CCPs.  
 
However, whereas this point may help to understand the existence of concentration of the 
clearing business in general, it does not explain the extent of this concentration in the 
European repo business, and within LCH.Clearnet in particular rather than other CCPs. 
More importantly, it does not explain why Europe’s other leading CCPs lag so far behind 
LCH.Clearnet in terms of overall clearing volume. In order to understand how and why 
LCH.Clearnet has come to dominate the European repo market, we need to examine the 
different interests surrounding the consolidation of the exchange and clearing business in 
Europe following the introduction of the euro. 
 
4.3.1 Consolidating Europe’s exchanges through the creation of a single CCP 
 
This subsection examines the different interests at play in the consolidation of the 
exchange and clearing business in Europe between the 1990s and the mid-2000s. This 
analysis is particularly relevant with respect to objectives set out in this project, because 
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it shows how the specific negotiations and compromises among European exchanges and 
users gave life to the largest CCP in the world, whose impact on sovereign debt markets 
from 2010 to 2012 I argue has been highly destabilising. Had these negotiations not led 
to a final agreement, the clearing and exchange business in Europe may have remained 
much more fragmented than it is now. As we shall see below, whereas a fragmented 
clearing industry could have impaired cross-border trades, it may also have prevented 
LCH.Clearnet from becoming such a systemically important giant in the European repo 
market. 
 
Until the late 1990s, European exchanges did not have many cross-border relationships 
outside of their close neighbourhood. Indeed, before euro came into use in 1999, 
consolidation efforts were mainly regional in nature (see G10, 2001: 61). For example, 
one of the first significant cross-border mergers was between the stock exchanges of 
Copenhagen and Stockholm, which, by the end of the 1998, gave life to NOREX. 
Although the initiative attracted interest from all the other exchanges of the Nordic-Baltic 
Eight group, with the exception of Finland, NOREX never really managed to expand to 
include them. The Nordic-Baltic Eight is a regional co-operation organisation made of 5 
Nordic countries (Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Iceland, Finland) and 3 Baltic states 
(Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania). Furthermore, the German Deutsche Börse was created in 
1993 after the merger of various regional stock exchanges in Germany; and a similar 
process took place in the Netherlands and Belgium. In other words, pre-euro mergers had 
a pronounced regional nuance. 
 
The ongoing integration of European financial markets brought by the introduction of the 
euro would, however, change these regional efforts. Whereas, on the one hand, more 
integrated financial markets increased competition among Europe’s leading exchanges 
(ibid.), on the other hand the increasingly interconnected nature of European finance also 
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led to a wide range of possibilities among users and exchanges with respect to enhanced 
cross-border cooperation, mergers and links. Quite distinctively, these more pan-
European cooperation efforts were centred around a series of competitive struggles for 
the creation of a single European CCP. Indeed, the plan for creating a single European 
CCP was first proposed respectively by the French and German CCPs Clearnet (owned 
by the Bourse de Paris) and Deutsche Börse Clearing (owned by the Deutsche Börse), as 
well as by the Luxembourgish Central Security Depository (CSD) Cedel to merge and 
create a pan-European clearing and settlement platform, called the European Clearing 
House (ECH) in May 1999. A CSD is a financial organisation that holds securities (such 
as shares or bonds) and allows for ownership transfer to take place through a book entry, 
rather than transfer of actual certificates. Differently from a CCP, a CSD does not assume 
counterparty risk. Whereas CCPs intervene during the trading phase, by replacing both 
sides of a trading relationship and thus assuming the responsibility to fulfil contractual 
obligations, CSDs only take care of the settlement for a given transaction.  
 
Broadly speaking, the ECH was launched hoping that the initiative would have thereafter 
attracted many other exchanges, CCPs and CSDs from around the continent (see Garfield, 
1999). This move began creating tensions among banks and exchanges, however, as 
Cedel, which was owned by several European banks at time, was also in merger talks 
with Euroclear, a Belgium-based CSD that was owned by JPMorgan. However, Cedel 
worried that it would have been completely overshadowed by Euroclear as a consequence 
of the merger, by virtue of its Belgian counterpart being a substantially larger CSD (see 
Milner, 1999). Thus, Cedel decided to drop its discussions with Euroclear and joined the 
French and the Germans in the ECH project. The talks would not last long, as a 
disagreement between the German and French negotiators broke down the discussions. 
The disagreement revolved around the different stances of Deutsche Börse and the Bourse 
de Paris about the future role of central clearing technologies in European finance. 
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Whereas the German stock exchange envisaged real-time processing becoming the most 
efficient alternative to central clearing – which instead nets down positions at the end of 
the day – the Paris stock exchange insisted upon maintaining its CCP Clearnet as a central 
block within the ECH project in the years to come (see Norman, 2011: 228).  
 
I argue that the Paris stock exchange’s insistence on maintaining central clearing (and 
Clearnet in particular) as one of the cornerstones of the ECH project is key, because it 
contributed to fostering the development and expansion of CCPs in Europe. Had the ECH 
been created according to the Deutsche Börse’s vision, central clearing may have become 
much less significant in Europe than it is now, as it would have likely been replaced by 
real-time processing. Hence, the destabilising potential of CCPs, which we explored in 
Chapters 2 and 3, may not have been retained in the European repo market had exchange 
consolidation happened according to the Deutsche Börse’s stance.  
 
Furthermore, the disagreement on central clearing between the French Bourse and the 
German Börse also marked an important departure by the latter in the creation of a single 
trading platform in the euro area. Since the end of the ECH project, Deutsche Börse 
became in fact less engaged in merger deals within the euro area, turning its eye on the 
LSE instead (see Watson, 2007: 189). The Deutsche Börse’s change of direction did not 
spell the end of Europe’s exchange consolidation efforts, however. Quite the opposite in 
fact. 
 
Despite the internal frictions among the ECH participants, the initiative created the 
precedent for a rival project. Just a few months after the announcement of the ECH, the 
Brussels and Amsterdam stock exchanges began discussing creating links with, and 
incorporating the technologies of, the British CCP London Clearing House (LCH) and 
the Belgian CSD Euroclear. Although this venture did not materialise either, the renewed 
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relationship between the Brussels and Amsterdam exchanges on the one hand, and 
Euroclear on the other, turned out particularity useful when the ECH project fell apart. 
As the Paris Bourse turned its back onto the ECH project, it began looking elsewhere to 
expand its cross-border business (see Galati and Tsatsaronis, 2003).  
 
Following several rounds of talks among exchanges, CSDs and CCPs, in March 2000 the 
Brussels, Amsterdam and Paris stock exchanges announced their merger and the creation 
of Euronext, a new multinational exchange (New York Time, 2000). Without the 
opposition of Deutsche Börse with regard to central clearing, the Paris-based CCP 
Clearnet was incorporated as a subsidiary of Euronext and linked to Euroclear, in turn 
dedicated to settlement services (see Stevens, 2010: 172). Back to the point I made above, 
the importance of Clearnet in this first trans-European exchange needs to be 
contextualised in relation to the Paris Bourse’s insistence on pushing central clearing as 
a key technology in European financial markets. As Clearnet became integrated as 
Euronext’s clearing arm, the Paris Bourse succeeded in establishing central clearing as 
the core technology at the heart of Europe’s newly instituted international exchange. This 
is important for the scope of this research, insofar as it helps to highlight the contingent 
nature of central clearing in European finance, and therefore of the relevance of CCPs 
with respect to systemic stability. 
 
It should also be noted that the integration of Cleaarnet was not an automatic consequence 
of the Bourse’s involvement in Euronext, in the sense that there were also specific reasons 
as to why the French CCP was chosen as the new exchange’s clearing platform. Clearnet 
originates from the Banque Central de Compensation, which was founded in 1888 as a 
French CCP and had traditionally been clearing commodity contracts in Paris (see 
Hasenpusch, 2009: 349). It started trading as Clearnet upon being acquired by the Bourse 
de Paris in 1998, after which it merged with several other French CCPs, becoming one 
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of the largest in Europe. Most importantly, in 1990 the Marché à Terme International de 
France (MATIF), a former French-based futures exchange, acquired the Banque Central 
de Compensation as part of its bid to increase its cross-border activities (see Norman, 
2011: 156)33.  
 
Thus, the Banque Central de Compensation first, and Clearnet after, became one of the 
first European CCPs to have had significant and successful involvement in cross-border 
clearing outside of its own country. Clearnet’s expertise in cross-border clearing quickly 
became appealing to Euronext’s owners, who had created the international exchange 
precisely with the intention of increasing their cross-border business, thus deciding to 
integrate Clearnet as a subsidiary. Clearnet’s expertise in cross-border clearing has been 
retained in LCH.Clearnet, which in turn played a key role in making the CCP the central 
node of the European repo market. This is important, because it helps to understand that 
Clearnet’s expertise in cross-border lending allowed LCH.Clearnet to simultaneously 
affect different sovereign debt markets, a central aspect of the analysis to be conducted 
in Chapter 5. 
 
Before moving forward with the analysis, it is important to understand that the creation 
of Euronext and the integration of Clearnet (as well as of Euroclear) is highly significant 
insofar as it was based upon a broad consensus and shared interests among some of 
Europe’s largest stock exchanges. In effect, Euronext became the first successful attempt 
at creating a large cross-border trading and clearing platform in Europe. This 
                                                        
33 Established in 1986 by the French Treasury, the MATIF first acquired the commodity exchanges of Paris, 
Lille and Le Havre in 1988, and then in 1993 made an agreement with the Deutsche Terminbörse, a German 
derivatives exchange belonging to Deutsche Börse group, to expand each other’s cross-border activities 
(see Norman, 2011: 156). In 1998, the MATIF became part of the Bourse de Paris. 
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consolidation paved the way for the creation of a truly pan-European CCP. Indeed, in 
2003 Clearnet and LCH announced a strategic initiative to merge (see OFT, 2003).  
 
However, LCH, formally known as the ICCH, has had a different development from 
Clearnet (see Rees, 1981), which would create a number of issues to be resolved before 
the merger could materialise. The London-based CCP became a user-owned, user-
governed clearing house in 1996, when its majority ownership was sold from a 
consortium of six British banks34 to clearing members (other large banks), while four 
exchanges35 became minority shareholders. Thus, whereas Clearnet was owned by 
European exchanges, LCH has traditionally been in the hands of British banks. These 
different models, which are usually referred to respectively as vertical- and horizontal-
structured CCPs, reflect Europe’s main competing approaches to central clearing. The 
nuances underpinning this divide are particularly important for the scope of this study, 
because it is precisely the compromise between these models that allowed for the merger 
to finalise, and thus for LCH.Clearnet to become one of the world’s largest and most 
influential CCPs. 
 
4.3.2 Horizontal and vertical approaches to central clearing and the creation of 
LCH.Clearnet 
 
Generally speaking, horizontal and vertical models refer to different ownership structures 
for a CCP. A vertically-structured CCP means that it is incorporated within a trading 
platform, a model that was born in 1970s US in the futures exchanges of Chicago (see 
Norman, 2011: 18). In Europe, this is best exemplified by looking at Clearnet, which was 
                                                        
34 Barclays, Lloyds, Midland, National Westminister, Standard Chartered, Williams and Glyn. 
35 International Petroleum Exchange, London Commodity Exchange, London International Financial 
Future Exchange, London Metal Exchange). 
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‘vertically’ integrated when it became legally incorporated within Euronext. One of the 
consequences of vertical integration is that the CCP becomes specialised in clearing only 
the asset classes traded on that platform. This creates a relatively close clearing 
environment, in the sense that the exchanges often provide preferential clearing 
treatments to traders on their platforms, making it inconvenient for a trader not utilising 
a given exchange to use the latter’s vertically integrated CCP (see Gregory, 2014). 
Another characteristic of vertical integration is that CCPs owned by a trading platform, 
like exchanges, usually opt for a business model that prioritises revenues rather than 
reducing clearing costs for members (see BIS, 2010: 30). This is key, because the 
prioritisation of a for-profit business model by the vertical approaches was one of the 
central contentions that had to be resolved before the LCH.Clearnet merger finalised. 
 
A horizontally-structured CCP refers to when a CCP is majority owned by clearing 
members themselves and does not belong to the corporate structure of any specific 
exchange. Therefore, one of the main differences from vertically integrated CCPs is that 
they are institutionally separate from exchanges and clear across multiple markets and 
asset classes (see Gregory, 2014). This was the model employed by ICCH first, and LCH 
later, which were primarily owned by banks and where exchanges were minority 
shareholders. The horizontal model provided LCH clearing members with the ability to 
utilise the CCPs’ services across multiple exchanges, without being restricted to one in 
particular as is the case with Eurex’s Clearnet. Historically, horizontally-structured CCPs 
have retained an at-cost business model, whereby the clearing house operates by 
providing the lowest possible costs for its clearing members, and where increasing 
clearing-driven revenues is not necessarily a priority (see Norman, 2011: 18)36. 
                                                        
36 There is also an important dimension surrounding the different risks posed by each of these two models, 
which, however, fall outside the scope of this thesis. See BIS (2010) for a general understanding of this 
subject. 
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Since the end of the 20th century, most European exchanges employed the vertical model 
for the clearing of their futures trading, thus following their US counterparts (see Levy-
Garboua, 2016). Besides Euronext and Clearnet, this was case with Deutsche Börse’s and 
Eurex’s clearing houses. The Intercontinental Exchange employed the same strategy after 
it acquired the London International Financial Futures and Option Exchange, where the 
products were cleared by ICE Clear Europe. One important exception to this trend was 
the London Stock Exchange Group (LSEG). The LSEG preferred the horizontal 
integration approach for their clearing activities because it did not have its own 
derivatives trading platform, meaning that it had to rely on other exchanges and CCPs in 
order to engage in futures contracts37. LSEG’s preference for horizontally-structured 
CCPs also allowed for the members-owned LCH to flourish independently of the 
exchange, while simultaneously becoming one of its biggest clients (e.g. Gregory, 2014; 
Norman, 2011).  
 
4.3.3 The compromises at the heart of LCH.Clearnet 
 
Clearnet’s and LCH’s different vertical and horizontal approaches to central clearing 
inevitably created frictions to be resolved before the merger could be finalised, 
specifically with respect to what business model the future CCP had to adopt (see Pagano 
and Hoare, 2003). On the one hand, LCH’s horizontal structure meant that, being owned 
largely by clearing members themselves, the latter wanted the widest possible access to 
different exchanges and for the future merger to be operating an at-cost business model, 
prioritising lower fees and costs over larger profits (Lee, 2011). On the other hand, 
Clearnet inherited Euronext’s approach to central clearing, as it had been vertically 
                                                        
37 This was until 2015, when the LSEG launched its own interest rate derivatives exchange venture called 
CurveGlobal (see Fintech Futures, 2015). 
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integrated within the multinational exchange. Euronext saw central clearing as part of its 
exchange business, prioritising high profit rather than low fees (ibid).  
 
In short, whereas continental Europe’s exchanges wanted to ensure high profit margins, 
British clearing members sought to reduce the exchanges’ influence over the future CCP’s 
governance and to lower its membership costs. Ultimately, a deal was struck, however 
compromises were made from both sides. As the merger between LCH and Clearnet gave 
life to LCH.Clearnet in 2003, its final design would be a middle ground between LCH’s 
horizontal and Clearnet’s vertical approaches to central clearing. As discussed in detail 
by Lee, the corporate and business model of the new CCP upon the completion of the 
merger was complex (Lee, 2011: 232).  
 
First, LCH.Clearnet was going to operate as a horizontally-structured CCP, without 
giving preferential access to Euronext’s platforms. Second, it would maintain a for-profit 
business model to guarantee Euronext a steady income stream. Third, LCH.Clearnet’s 
ownership would be equally divided between users and exchanges. In 2003, 
LCH.Clearnet was owned 45.1% by exchanges (41.5% of which was held by Euronext, 
2.7% by the London Metal Exchange and 0.9% by the International Petroleum 
Exchange); another 45.1% was divided among user-members; and the remaining 9.8% 
was held by Euroclear. This was to be expected, in the sense that the ownership was 
evenly distributed among the main actors at play (continental Europe’s Euronext, UK 
banks owning LCH, and the Belgian-based CSD Euroclear). Fourth, despite having 
formally agreed for LCH.Clearnet to generate profits, the business model adopted was 
unique. Negotiators decided to opt for a limited for-profit basis, whereby 70% of any 
yearly profit exceeding €150m would have been re-distributed to the clearing members 
(see Hasenpusch, 2009: 356). Seen through another lens, the partial re-distribution of 
LCH.Clearnet’s profit can be thought as a form of clearing fee subsidy for LCH’s 
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members, which again preferred an at-cost business model to reduce the cost of their 
clearing activities.  
 
In a nutshell, the final corporate structure and design of LCH.Clearnet satisfied both 
Euronext’s for-profit aspiration and LCH’s preference for both a less restrictive clearing 
model that allows users to clear across multiple trading platforms, as well as for a 
relatively more affordable fee structure than what was available through vertically-
structured organisations. I argue that it is precisely the compromise between the interests 
of clearing members and exchanges interests in European financial markets that allowed 
for the creation of one of the largest CCPs in the world, clearing a wide range of products 
across the British, European and American financial markets. In other words, the 
compromise between the vertical and horizontal approaches contributed to the 
concentration of almost the entire European repo market in one single CCP, which makes 
LCH.Clearnet highly relevant for considerations of systemic stability in the euro area. 
 
This is particularly the case with regard to how the CCPs’ margin requirements can 
impact upon liquidity in times of financial distress. As I argued in Chapter 2, the sudden 
increase in margin requirements can exacerbate liquidity shortages during a financial 
crisis, because CCPs demand margin collateral in the form of highly liquid assets. In the 
case of the European repo market, a highly concentrated repo market within a single CCP 
means that LCH.Clearnet alone could significantly reduce the liquidity of particular 
government securities as collateral to access short-term funding. Thus, I argue that the 
reliance of European repo markets on CCPs, and on a single CCP in particular, does not 
make European financial markets just prone to collateral crises, but to CCP-induced 
collateral crises.  
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Margin calls implemented by LCH.Clearnet in times of financial distress can therefore 
impact upon the liquidity of a variety of euro area government bonds, potentially at the 
same time, which retains highly destabilising potential to sovereign debt markets. This is 
precisely the dynamic that I will examine in the next and chapter of this project. Before 
moving on to my concluding remarks, I will briefly discuss the importance of 
LCH.Clearnet beyond Europe, in order to provide a sense of just how important this CCP 
is for global systemic stability. 
 
4.3.4 The importance of LCH.Clearnet in global finance 
 
Besides its absolute dominance in the European repo market, in 2017 and 2018 
LCH.Clearnet alone cleared over 50% of the global IRS market (or €136tn), as well as 
providing clearing services for some of the world’s most important exchanges. In terms 
of raw numbers, table 1 compares the nominal value of repo and OTC derivative contracts 
cleared by LCH.Clearnet, Eurex Clearing, and CME Clearing for December 2017. Eurex 
Clearing is Europe’s second largest CCP, vertically integrated with the Eurex Exchange, 
which is in turn owned by Deutsche Börse. CME Clearing is an American-based, 
vertically-structured CCP belonging to the CME Group. By accounting for the amount 
cleared by LCH.Clearnet Ltd and LCH.Clearnet SA together, the LCH.Clearnet trumps 
Eurex Clearing and CME Clearing with respect to both repos and OTC derivatives. 
Hence, as more of the global OTC derivatives trade is being channelled through CCPs, 
the systemic importance of large CCPs like LCH.Clearnet is more relevant than ever 
before. 
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Table 1 
 
Sources: Own elaboration based on data available at lch.com; eurexclearing.com; cmegroup.com. 
*For repos, these numbers refer to the sum of the contracts' bond nominal value cleared. For OTC, it refers 
to volume of the cleared transactions. However, it should be noted that transactions cleared by CCPs suffer 
from double counting, because novation splits the original contract in two. Hence, the actual value of the 
collateral being cleared in repo by CCPs is half of the face value (same applies for OTC contracts). 
 
These findings indicate that LCH.Clearnet clears a substantially larger amount of trade 
than other big CCPs. In turn, LCH.Clearnet’s size and market share lends support to the 
discussions about the systemic relevance of CCPs for financial stability, which I 
discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. CCPs have become increasingly more exposed to OTC 
derivatives risk than ever before, and thus more interconnected and pivotal for global 
financial stability. This is also an important point with respect to the objectives set out by 
this project, which seek to bridge the significant gap in in the euro crisis literature about 
the systemic importance of CCPs in European financial markets, and of LCH.Clearnet in 
particular.  
 
4.4 Conclusions 
 
Before the onset of the euro crisis, the European repo market presented the following 
characteristics: 1) it had one Europeanised collateral market for repos; 2) it was operating 
largely through the use of sovereign bonds as collateral; 3) it was mainly cleared by one 
single CCP, LCH.Clearnet. This chapter has shown that this distinctive arrangement is 
dependent on the politics underpinning the process of European financial integration. 
Most significantly, the political imperative of financial market integration played a key 
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role that pushed the EC and the ECB to follow the Giovannini Group’s advice and move 
forward with the creation of a single European financial space through repo trading. In 
that respect, the ECB’s introduction of GC baskets played a key role in expanding the use 
of sovereign bonds as collateral.  
 
Covering around 85% of the repo collateral base in 2017, sovereign bonds underpin the 
majority of the short-term funding liquidity needs of banks in the euro area. In no other 
large repo market jurisdiction do sovereign bonds occupy such a large proportion of the 
collateral base, which means that government debt has essentially become the life-blood 
of European finance. In short, European financial integration was developed in such a 
way as to strengthen the links between sovereign debt and bank funding in the euro area.  
However, despite the original intent to foster cross-border liquidity, I argued that the 
integration of European financial markets through market-based practices also made 
European sovereign debt and repo markets particularly prone to collateral crises. That is 
because, as envisaged by the Giovannini Group and put into practice by the ECB, repo 
sovereign collateral would be valued and handled according to the fluctuating prices in 
financial markets and subjected to daily collateralisation practices such as margin calls. 
Thus, as the ECB’s GC baskets created a single collateral market for repos, the use of 
margin calls during a crisis could trigger a collateral crisis, meaning creating a hierarchy 
between good and bad collateral, which would significantly reduce the liquidity of 
specific securities in favour of others. I claimed that the wide adoption of market-based 
practices for collateral policies undermines the main objective for the introduction of GC 
baskets in the first place: preventing capital flights from one sovereign debt market to 
another. 
 
Furthermore, this chapter has examined the different interests among European 
exchanges and users that sought to establish a single European trading platform after the 
 212 
introduction of the euro. In this respect, the insistence by the Paris Bourse to retain central 
clearing as a key technology in European financial markets is a crucial factor that 
contributed to the expansion of CCPs in Europe. The creation of Euronext in the year 
2000, and the acquisition of the French-CCP Clearnet as the new exchange’s clearing 
arm, paved the way for the creation of one of the world’s largest CCPs by clearing 
volume. Following negotiations with LCH’s owners on the type of business model to 
adopt, Euronext and British users finally agreed on the creation of LCH.Clearnet, which 
would become a leader in different market segments across both the American and 
European financial markets.  
 
However, the consolidation of Europe’s trading platforms did likewise lead to the 
concentration of the euro-denominated repo market in LCH.Clearnet. This arrangement, 
I argued, made the already crisis-prone nature of the European repo market also 
vulnerable to what I call CCP-induced collateral crises. That is because LCH.Clearnet is 
the largest CCP operating in the euro area, which means that its collateral practices could 
have negative repercussions on both the provision of short-term funding for banks and 
the liquidity of sovereign debt markets in the euro area. 
 
These are particularly relevant points with respect to answering the research question 
posed by this project, namely: what factors contributed to destabilising sovereign debt 
markets during the height of the euro crisis from 2010 to 2012? First, I have established 
that, before the onset of the crisis, the euro area was not just exposed to the 
macroeconomic imbalances and trade asymmetries that stem from the politics of 
European monetary integration, as discussed by the European-level explanations (see 
Chapter 1). The analysis conducted in this chapter has also highlighted how the politics 
of European financial market integration has shaped the European repo market in such a 
way to expose sovereign debt markets to systemic instabilities. In short, before the crisis 
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the European sovereign debt markets were not just vulnerable to macroeconomic 
imbalances, but also to collateral weaknesses. 
 
The next chapter of this project will assess the implication of this arrangement on 
European sovereign debt markets by examining the involvement of LCH.Clearnet during 
the height of the euro crisis. 
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5. LCH.Clearnet and the Euro Crisis 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter assesses the role played by LCH.Clearnet during the euro crisis. The analysis 
relies strongly upon the insights developed throughout the course of this thesis. Central 
to the assessment conducted below is how CCPs, collateralised lending via repos and the 
architecture of the European repo market all retain highly destabilising potentials in their 
own distinctive ways.  
 
Chapter 2 has shown that the ways in which CCPs interpose themselves between traders 
through counterparty substitution allow them to unilaterally impose margin requirements. 
The highly liquid nature of the collateral required by CCPs implies that a sudden increase 
in margin requirements can greatly reduce the liquidity available to investors during a 
crisis. As demonstrated by reviewing several CCP failures during the 20th century, I show 
that margin calls reduced the liquidity of assets available to investors, which led to 
payment difficulties that contributed to the default of traders and the CCPs themselves. 
In short, the CCPs’ use of margin calls during times of financial distress can exacerbate 
existing liquidity shortages. 
 
Chapter 3 has examined the role played by repo trading in the provision of short-term 
funding in financial markets. Repo transactions have historically allowed central and 
commercial banks to foster short-term liquidity in the financial system. However, because 
repos are essentially collateralised loans, I showed that the sudden lack of repo collateral 
can generate liquidity shortages in market-based financial systems. Furthermore, the 
chapter has also shown that margin calls implemented by repo traders can also have a 
procyclical effect on the value of repo collateral. The increase in margin requirements on 
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particular assets makes the latter less valuable as collateral to access short-term funding 
via repos, leading to sell-offs that can trigger further margin calls. Hence, while repos can 
be an effective source of short-term funding, these instruments can also reduce the value 
and liquidity of specific securities. In other words, a collateral crisis. 
 
Chapter 4 has examined the distinctive way in which the European repo market is 
structured. I argued that, on the one hand, the EC and ECB’s political imperative for 
financial market integration and, on the other, the different interests at play in the 
consolidation of the exchange industry in Europe, have made the European repo market 
particularly prone to what I call CCP-induced collateral crises. That is because the 
European repo market is dependent on different euro area sovereign bonds as collateral 
and is highly concentrated in one particular CCP: LCH.Clearnet. 
 
All of the above brings us to the fifth chapter of this thesis, which will examine the 
involvement of LCH.Clearnet in the European repo market from 2010 to 2012. It does so 
by evaluating the impact of LCH.Clearnet’s collateral management strategies on repo 
markets during the Irish, Portuguese, Italian and Spanish crises. Collateral management 
is a fundamental part of the CCPs’ risk strategies. At the same time, as mentioned in 
Chapter 2, increasing or decreasing the margins required for using specific securities as 
collateral can have important consequences on financial stability, due to the impact these 
actions have on the liquidity of these securities. 
 
Studies that assess the involvement of CCPs during the euro crisis generally praise how 
they have been able to preserve the repo market as a whole (e.g. Mancini et al., 2015). 
However, the tendency of the literature to assess the provision of repo funding in 
aggregate overlooks the potentially destabilising consequences of the CCPs’ risk 
management strategies on specific collateral markets, such as those of individual 
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sovereign bond issuers. Therefore, assessing how LCH.Clearnet implemented its 
collateral management strategies in each different collateral (i.e. sovereign debt) market 
provides the last building block to answer the research question posed by this project, 
which seeks to identify the factors that contributed to the destabilisation of sovereign debt 
markets during the euro crisis.  
 
The main finding of this chapter is that the margin calls implemented by LCH.Clearnet 
on Irish, Portuguese, Italian and Spanish sovereign bonds have led to large-scale sell-offs, 
which led to a widening of their respective spreads. In light of what has been discussed 
in previous chapters, and by examining the specific contexts in which margins and sell-
offs took place, I argue that LCH.Clearnet’s increase in collateral requirements 
contributed to a widening of the spreads because they reduced the value of those securities 
to access short-term funding in repo operations. Therefore, it is the ways in which 
LCH.Clearnet implemented its collateral policy within the crisis-prone structure of the 
European repo market that contributed to the destabilisation of sovereign debt markets 
during the height of the euro crisis. These findings are crucial for the objectives set out in 
this thesis, because they demonstrate that spread movements during the euro crisis were 
not only reflecting investors’ concerns with sovereign default risk, as discussed by the 
many studies we examined in Chapter 1.  
 
A note of caution is necessary, however. This chapter does not seek to ascribe to 
LCH.Clearnet a deterministic power in conditioning market behaviour, because the CCP 
was not acting in a vacuum. As we shall see below, LCH.Clearnet took many of its 
collateral policy decisions based on existing spread values, which in effect means that the 
CCP was being influenced by how investors were trading sovereign bonds before the 
margin calls were triggered. At the same time, this chapter shows that the collateral 
management practices of LCH.Clearnet in turn influenced how investors were trading 
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those sovereign bonds, because the increases in collateral requirements made the cost for 
using those securities in repo transactions increasingly expensive. 
 
The case study selection has to do with how LCH.Clearnet adopted its collateral 
management strategies during the euro crisis, which only targeted the sovereign debt 
markets of Ireland, Portugal, Italy and Spain. Methodologically, the evaluation of 
LCH.Clearnet’s involvement during the sovereign debt crises of the abovementioned 
cases combines quantitative as well as qualitative analytical techniques. In order to 
explore the effect of LCH.Clearnet’s collateral requirement increases on bond sell-offs, I 
have collected daily data on the Irish, Portuguese, Italian and Spanish 10-year sovereign 
bond yield spread against the German bund from the Thomson Reuters’ Eikon platform, 
from 2010 to 2012, which is the timeframe when LCH.Clearnet implemented its margin 
calls on sovereign collateral (Eikon, n.d.). The spread’s daily movements are examined 
in relation to the timing of the margin calls in each country, the latter collected from 
LCH.Clearnet’s online database (LCH.Clearnet, n.d.). 
 
To assess the impact of margin calls on spread I look at whether an increase in margin 
requirements matches a widening in the spread on the days the margin calls were 
announced, as well as the following day. As the spread data refer to the markets’ closing 
price, yield variation from the previous day as a result of margin-induced sell-offs is 
reflected in the final price at the end of business, as well as on the following day, a 
technique that is widely employed by financial analysts to assess the impact of day-to-
day shocks on bond prices (e.g. Reuters, 2011, 2012a; Cotterill, 2011). Secondly, I 
examine the long-term impact of margin calls on spread by placing spread and margins 
data together onto line charts. This allows me to identify long-term trend changes in 
spread movements since margin calls were introduced, regardless of the short-term, day-
to-day effects of the margin increases on the bond sell-offs. Further, as a means to 
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compare margin calls to other factors that may have influenced spread movements during 
the period examined, the analysis below also considers credit rating downgrades, 
monetary policy intervention by the ECB and domestic political upheavals, such as 
changes in governments, bank failures and bailout requests. These have all been deemed 
as some of the most important factors that influenced government bond prices and thus 
their spreads during the euro crisis (see Falagiarda and Reitz, 2015; Falagiarda and 
Gregori, 2015; Zoli, 2013; Gärtner et al., 2011).  
 
There are a few further points to make with respect to the ways in which I conduct the 
assessment below. First of all, the limited number of the margin calls for each individual 
country – 10 for Ireland; 6 for Portugal; 4 for Italy; 3 for Spain – do not allow for 
generalisable findings outside of the case studies examined, or to quantify the effect of 
margin calls on spread. At the same time, that is also the reason why a regression analysis 
was not feasible, as larger sample sizes are required in order to correctly estimating 
relationships between variables (see Bryman, 2012; Agresti and Finlay, 2013). Indeed, 
the financial economics studies examining the determinants of spread in the euro area all 
rely on much larger sample sizes (e.g. Büchel, 2013; Beetsma, et al., 2013; Oliveira, et 
al., 2012; Bernoth and Erdogan, 2012; Falagiarda and Gregory, 2015; De Grauwe and Ji, 
2013). However, as I discussed in Chapter 1, these studies are often based on monthly 
spread data to identify long-term predictors of spread. While their approach allows for a 
generalisation of the long-term variables which can have an impact on spreads, they are 
unable to assess the impact of short-term shocks on spread movements, as they 
themselves acknowledge (e.g. Maltritz, 2012: 664). 
 
In order to assess the short-term impact of LCH.Clearnet’s margin calls on spread, I 
conduct the quantitative analysis alongside a qualitative component, which will allow me 
to triangulate my findings. The data on margin requirements and spread are examined 
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throughout a commentary of the specific political and economic contingencies that I have 
taken into account for each country, such as the roots of their respective sovereign debt 
crises, the status of their banking sectors, as well as the crisis-specific developments 
during the period examined. In addition, this chapter also considers other studies, reports 
and market analyses examining the implication of margin calls on spread during the euro 
crisis. In short, this chapter employs a contextual understanding of causality. That is to 
say, the combination of quantitative and qualitative evidence will help me to identify the 
main contextual factors that are likely to have driven spread movements in relation to the 
actions undertaken by LCH.Clearnet. 
 
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows: Section 5.2 discusses existing research 
that assesses the role of CCPs in the European repo market. Section 5.3 explains the 
introduction and functioning of LCH.Clearnet’s new collateral management policy 
during the euro crisis. Section 5.4 examines the involvement of LCH.Clearnet during the 
Irish, Portuguese, Italian and Spanish crises. Section 5.5 is dedicated to the concluding 
remarks, which are that LCH.Clearnet’s collateral policies from 2010 to 2012 contributed 
to reduce the liquidity of Irish, Portuguese, Italian and Spanish sovereign bonds as 
collateral in repo operations, which led to large-scale sell-offs that widened their spreads. 
 
5.2 Assessing the role of CCPs in the European repo market 
 
As a result of the lack of research looking specifically at the European repo market, 
studies examining the role of CCPs in the euro area are relatively recent. Indeed, as Hardie 
et al. (2013: 715) already argued a few years back, despite repos are an essential segment 
of the European short-term funding market, most research on repos has primarily focused 
on the US (e.g. Gorton and Metrick, 2012; Martin et al., 2014; Copeland et al., 2014). 
Things have started to change over the past few years, however. The euro crisis debacle 
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has sparked more attention, particularly in financial economics, to the role played by 
CCPs on the liquidity provision in the European repo market.  
 
Overall, these studies praise the performance of this market during the euro crisis, arguing 
that short-term funding via repos in aggregate was not compromised by the turmoil on 
sovereign debt markets (e.g. Mancini et al., 2015). Although repo rates widened during 
the height of the crisis (see Chapter 3), which means that the cost of short-term funding 
actually increased (e.g. Miglietta et al., 2015; Boissel et al., 2017), the repo market as a 
whole has been resilient. Indeed, Mancini et al. (2015) found that repo lending volume 
did not shrink during the euro crisis, as in the case following the collapse of Lehman in 
2008 (see Chapter 3). That is because, these authors argue, CCPs acted as a ‘shock 
absorber’, in the sense that repo lending via CCP increased while fear of default was 
strengthening, something that did not happen in other non-CCP euro repo interbank 
markets segments or repo markets in the US. Mancini et al. argue that it was precisely 
the mechanisms underpinning central clearing (anonymous trading, counterparty 
substitution, CCP-imposed margin requirements and the overall reduction of counterparty 
risk) that provided clearing members with strong financial guarantees, ultimately 
allowing them to continue accessing short-term funding.  
 
However, the potentially destabilising role of the CCPs’ actions during the euro crisis has 
been entirely overlooked (see Armakola et al., 2017; Bottazzi et al., 2017 as notable 
exceptions). This is somewhat of a surprising finding, considering what has been 
discussed in Chapters 2 and 3 about the destabilising potentials of both the CCPs’ margins 
and repo-based financial systems. Therefore, this chapter seeks to further examine the 
relationship between CCPs, repo margins and financial stability in the euro area. Indeed, 
whereas the involvement of CCPs during the euro crisis has certainly preserved repo 
funding in the euro area as a whole, the negative impact of CCP-imposed margin 
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requirements on collateral markets has been largely overlooked. I argue that the reason 
for this neglect stems from the tendency to focus on only one criterion when assessing 
the involvement of CCPs during the euro crisis: whether it was successful in guaranteeing 
repo liquidity.  
 
These deficiencies manifest on several grounds. First, the central clearing segment of the 
European repo market is examined in aggregate, without paying sufficient attention to the 
actions undertaken by systemically important CCPs (see Miglietta et al., 2015 as a notable 
exception). Second, the literature portrays certain assumptions about the functioning of 
European repo market, whereby the interests of CCPs are understood to be aligned to, 
and in fact indiscernible from, those of every actor involved in the repo market. CCPs are 
examined with respect to whether they are successful in guaranteeing the aggregate 
provision of short-term liquidity via repos, implicitly regarded as the sole functional 
necessity of the European repo market. As put by Steigerwald, ‘CCP’s interests, however, 
may not be exactly aligned with its members’ interests or the objectives of public policy’, 
suggesting the decision taken by CCPs may not necessarily be in line with the regulators’ 
requirements to maintain systemic stability (Steigerwald, 2015: 188). The Fed’s former 
Governor Ben Bernanke has in fact argued in 2011 that effective regulation and oversight 
of CCPs is necessary, in light of the potential risk these institutions pose to systemic 
stability (see Bernanke, 2011). 
 
With respect to the involvement of CCPs in the euro area, there has also been insufficient 
attention paid to the systemic impact of their actions with reference to domestic banking 
systems, as well as when it comes to exacerbating the cost of public debt servicing of 
governments in the euro area. Indeed, as suggested by Gabor and Ban, the haircut and 
margining policies of key repo market actors, like the ECB and LCH.Clearnet, has 
‘helped create a perfect storm for “periphery” governments between 2010 and 2012’, 
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which exacerbated pressures on sovereign debt markets (Gabor and Ban, 2016: 631). 
Nevertheless, these claims remain speculative in nature, and the precise mechanisms 
underpinning the CCPs’ pressures on the sovereign debt markets of the euro area during 
the crisis remain almost entirely ignored. This gap calls for a more thorough and 
systematic empirical observation of said dynamics. Thus, I seek to uncover the 
significance of the CCPs’ relevance for systemic stability in the euro area, providing an 
assessment of the actions undertaken by LCH.Clearnet during the Irish, Portuguese, 
Italian, and Spanish sovereign debt crises. 
 
5.3 LCH.Clearnet’s Sovereign Risk Framework  
 
LCH.Clearnet implemented its Sovereign Risk Framework (SRF) as a reaction to the 
perceived changes in market conditions during the Greek crisis in 2009. The SRF was a 
revised collateral policy in light of the increased sovereign default risk perception that the 
CCP was facing in the European repo market. As discussed in Chapter 1, the unfolding 
of the Greek crisis around its fiscal dimension was crucial in shaping an understanding of 
the euro crisis as essentially a confidence crisis in public debt servicing sustainability. 
This is mostly clearly evidenced in LCH.Clearnet’s SRF, because it was implemented 
precisely to protect the CCP against increasing default risk while also guaranteeing access 
to funding for its repo market members (see Burke 2011: 4). That is because, it is 
important to reiterate, the main task of a CCP is to guarantee the performance of every 
contract, even in case of default: when it comes to interbank repos, that performance 
guarantee is directly linked to the continued provision of short-term funding. Thus, while 
the dimension surrounding sovereign default risk perception remains key to understand 
the introduction of the SRF, this chapter shows that the margin calls implemented by 
LCH.Clearent led to a widening of the spreads because they reduced the liquidity of the 
affected securities as collateral in repo contracts. Hence, I shed light to the role played by 
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fears regarding the lack of access to short-term funding as a central concern for investors 
when trading sovereign bonds during the euro crisis. 
 
The SRF introduced three indicators that LCH.Clearnet judged would signal a significant 
increase of default risk for a given security: 1) sovereign bonds reaching 450bp yield 
spread at the 10-year maturity against a highly-rated benchmark; or 2) 500bp CDS spread 
for 5-year positions; or 3) a credit rating drop to B1. If a security, like a sovereign bond, 
were to meet any of these three criteria, LCH.Clearnet would increase the margin 
requirements to use that security as collateral. It should be noted that, despite the 
availability of these criteria, LCH.Clearnet only ever cited sovereign bond yield spreads 
as the trigger to its margin requirement increases. This can also be evidenced by margin 
calls having always preceded credit rating downgrades to B1 or CDS widening to 500bp. 
 
In more technical terms, through the introduction of the SRF, LCH.Clearnet sought to 
ensure that the CCP would have sufficient collateral to close out open positions in case 
of a clearing member defaulting, in order to conclude the repo agreement. Such an 
approach to margin requirements and collateral management fits with the contract 
performance guarantee mission of CCPs, which, as discussed in Chapter 2, has 
distinguished the development of central clearing since its early stages in 18th century 
Japan. Equally important, the SRF was approved by LCH.Clearnet’s own Risk 
Committees and board but was developed together with the Fixed Income Risk Working 
Group, which is made up of major participants in the affected markets, mainly 
international members (see ibid: 4). In other words, the SRF resulted from a decision 
taken by LCH.Clearnet in consultation with repo markets’ largest international 
participants. This is important, because, as clarified below, while the actions undertaken 
by LCH.Clearnet preserved the functioning of the European repo market as a whole (in 
practice guaranteeing funding liquidity for international investors), it compromised the 
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liquidity of certain domestic banks and the sovereign debt markets of the affected 
governments. 
 
As sovereign debt markets were the main channel through which the euro crisis unfolded, 
the analysis below utilises daily spread data in order to assess the role of LCH.Clearnet 
therein, which remains a key under-reported factor. Before moving on to the actual 
assessment, it should be noted that LCH.Clearnet was not acting in a vacuum, meaning 
that its actions need to be contextualised in relation to other key market actors and 
processes that took place during the period examined. Firstly, the ECB: a surge in the 
spread of lower-rated government bonds was noticeable when the ECB announced that 
its haircut policy would include sovereign bonds in August 201038. Further, the ECB’s 
actions to ease sovereign debt market turmoil in 2011 and 2012 caused declines in 
sovereign bond yields spread (Dewachter et al., 2016). Secondly, margin calls were often 
implemented in rapid succession with credit downgrades by CRAs, which have also 
influenced sovereign yields during the crisis (see Gärtner et al. 2011). As mentioned in 
Chapter 1, sovereign yields are evidenced to have been influenced by a number of 
different factors during the euro crisis, including country-specific macroeconomic 
fundamentals and rising sensitivity to deteriorating fundamentals (see Beirne and 
Fratzscher 2013; De Grauwe and Ji 2013), the news (Beetsma et al. 2013), statements by 
politicians, governmental officials and fiscal policy announcements (Büchel 2013; 
Falagiarda and Gregori 2015).  
 
Hence, while it can certainly be said that credit rating downgrades and the ECB’s 
intervention during the crisis have influenced sovereign yields, these were just some 
                                                        
38 A haircut is intended as a reduction of the value of a security used as collateral. In April 2010, the ECB 
announced the introduction of gradual haircuts on the assets it accepted as collateral, should their credit 
rating fall in the BBB+ BBB- range (see ECB, 2010). 
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among many other factors. The same goes for LCH.Clearnet’s actions during the crisis, 
meaning that its margin calls were only one among many other factors that may influence 
sovereign spreads. Thus, the analysis below assesses LCH.Clearnet’s likely impact in 
influencing sovereign spreads by taking into account the interaction of the CCPs’ actions 
with other key events for each of the individual countries examined, including credit 
downgrades, political crises, bailout requests and the ECB’s interventions. 
 
Further, it is important to point out that LCH.Clearnet did not undertake its decisions in 
a political void. Although the SRF was developed in-house, it was actually forwarded to 
stakeholders, like regulators, central banks, and national treasuries already in September 
2010, before the framework’s public announcement in October 2010 (Burke, 2011). This 
means that macroeconomic authorities had an opportunity to examine the SRF 
beforehand. More importantly, when the SRF was triggered for Irish sovereign bonds in 
November 2010, it was only invoked ‘after discussions with the ECB, the Irish Treasury 
and Central Bank’ (ibid: 9). Similarily, LCH.Clearnet’s decisions on Portuguese 
collateral were only undertaken after similar discussions with the Portuguese authorities. 
In short, regulatory bodies around Europe were aware of what LCH.Clearnet had planned 
in order to preserve the euro-denominated repo market. However, regulators were 
informed that LCH.Clearnet’s SRF would have only protected the CCP (and its clients) 
from increasing collateral risk while guaranteeing its members’ funding needs, without 
any mention of the potential destabilising effects the framework may have had on the 
stability of sovereign debt markets (see ibid: 4). Interestingly, there is no evidence of any 
of them being concerned about the systemic implications of LCH.Clearnet’s actions when 
the SRF was released, and attention was limited in the subsequent years (e.g. Bank of 
Italy, 2012). 
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It should also be noted that although international and EU institutions had become 
increasingly aware of the potential systemic risk posed by repo markets after the 
introduction of the euro (see CGFS, 1999a; ECB, 2002b), studies that empirically 
assessed these instabilities, such as the landmark paper by Gorton and Metrick (2012), 
had not come out yet, and CCPs themselves were not considered destabilising actors in 
repo markets. Moreover, up until very recently, there was a general absence of Europe-
focused repo market studies, which adds to the overall lack of understanding of the 
functioning of these instruments in the euro area (see Hardie et al., 2013).  
 
In sum, it is fair to conclude that regulators were not fully aware of the systemic impact 
that the SRF would have on the structural integrity of the euro area and its sovereign debt 
markets.  
 
The analysis conducted below seeks to provide a distinctive contribution to the literature 
on the involvement of CCPs in the euro area by showing that the LCH.Clearnet’s margin 
requirement increases compromised the usability of the affected government securities to 
access short-term funding via repos, which destabilised sovereign debt markets and the 
liquidity of primarily domestic banks, leading to a widening of the affected countries’ 
spreads. 
 
5.4 LCH.Clearnet’s involvement during the Irish, Portuguese, Italian and Spanish 
crises  
 
The SRF was published in October 2010 and was first implemented for repo market 
participants by LCH.Clearnet’s London-based subsidiary, LCH.Clearnet Ltd, under the 
name of Risk Management Policy (RMP).  The RMP included the following provisions: 
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We would generally consider a spread of 450 basis points over the 10-year AAA 
benchmark to be indicative of additional sovereign risk and LCH.Clearnet Ltd 
may materially increase the margin required for positions in that issue. As a guide, 
materially would likely mean an increase in the order of 15% of position size, 
with further material increases in margin charged as the spread deteriorates 
further. We will also consider whether additional margin is required from 
indicators in CDS prices or Market Implied Rating data.  
 
Where a sovereign issuer is downgraded to sub-investment grade by a major rating 
agency we would generally expect market liquidity to be significantly impacted 
and may seek to apply additional margin for positions in that issuer.   
If a Clearing Member and sovereign issuer subject to increased ‘jump-to-default’ 
risk are highly correlated (‘wrong-way’ risk) we would also seek additional 
margin. (LCH.Clearnet, 2010a). 
 
In effect, the RMP transposed the SRF’s general provisions into concrete collateral 
management policies, which included several, better defined criteria that would trigger a 
margin call. First, the sovereign yield spread differential. The RMP established a 
numerical threshold (450bp) of yield spreads as an indicator of increasing default risk for 
sovereign bonds used as collateral in repo transactions. If crossed, LCH.Clearnet would 
likely increase the margins required to use those bonds as collateral by 15%, making the 
use of those bonds less appealing (i.e. more expensive) vis-à-vis other bonds. Margin 
requirements would increase further, should the spread against the benchmark deteriorate. 
Second, LCH.Clearnet would judge the credit downgrade of a major CRA to sub-
investment grade and CDS spread data as another indicator for increasing margin 
requirements, due to the impact the downgrade would have on the liquidity of the security. 
Third, additional margins could have been demanded by LCH.Clearnet if a clearing 
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member and a sovereign debt issuer – whose bond prices have been subjected to high 
price fluctuations – are highly correlated with one another39. However, as we shall see 
below, I found that only spread movements would be cited by LCH.Clearnet as the reason 
underpinning the margin calls, never referring to the other criteria cited above. 
 
The following figures were developed through an original compilation of: i) daily 
sovereign bond yields spreads information, gathered from the Thomson Reuters’ Eikon 
platform; ii)  credit rating downgrades; iii) LCH.Clearnet’s margin requirement increases, 
collected from the LCH.Clearnet Group’s online database; iv) internal and external 
market shocks that are deemed to have exerted significant sovereign debt market pressure 
during the euro crisis (e.g. Falagiarda and Reitz, 2015; Falagiarda and Gregori, 2015; 
                                                        
39 The last criterion utilises the expressions jump-to-default risk and wrong-way risk. Jump-to-default risk, 
also termed price dislocation, or market dislocation, indicates ‘large and widespread asset mispricings’, 
whereby there is a sudden change in the market price of an asset (see Pasquariello, 2014: 1868). It should 
be noted that the concept of mispricing is based upon an assumption in financial and behavioural economics 
whereby an asset’s correct price is inferred by investors acting rationally (e.g. Baker and Wurgler, 2007). 
Therefore, according to this view, in times of severe financial distress investors may start acting 
sentimentally, or irrationally, leading to a sudden change in the pricing of an asset that deviates from its 
price as rationally inferred in normal times (e.g. Shu and Chang, 2015; Siegel, 1992; Shiller, 2000; Brown 
and Cliff, 2004). Discussions about the presumed rational and irrational foundation of asset prices go 
beyond the scope of this study. Thus, this analysis understands jump-to-default risk only with respect to the 
sudden change in an asset price, without prejudice to the rational/irrational dichotomy of asset pricing. On 
the other hand, wrong-way risk refers to ‘when exposure to a counterparty is adversely correlated with the 
credit quality of that counterparty’ (NASDAQ, 2011). In other words, it is a type of risk where an investor’s 
exposure to a particular asset increases while the default risk of that particular asset rises too. In more 
concrete terms, LCH.Clearnet probably took into account this type of risk because of the relatively strong 
‘home bias’ in the euro area, whereby banks are highly exposed to the sovereign debt of the country they 
are headquartered in (see Moro, 2014; see also Manna, 2011). 
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Zoli, 2013; Gärtner et al., 2011). All the examinations, calculations and figures made 
below are my own, and resulted from an assessment of the abovementioned data. 
 
5.4.1 Ireland 
 
The first country to have experienced the RMP was Ireland, which was undergoing a 
severe banking crisis at the time. Ireland’s financial troubles were rooted in a period of 
speculative developments in the property market since the end of the 1990s. However, 
before the speculative boom, Ireland had experienced a decade of strong of export-led 
economic expansion. Throughout the 1990s, Ireland’s economy grew at a considerably 
higher rate than the rest of its European neighbours, while witnessing a dramatic decline 
in unemployment. To a large extent, this growth was due to the increasing number of 
high-value companies (mostly from the US), such as computer and pharmaceutics, who 
took advantage of Ireland’s favourable business environment to access the newly unified 
European single market (Lane, 2011: 59). Thus, as those multinationals channelled large 
amounts of foreign direct investments into the country, Ireland accumulated large trade 
surpluses, while also maintaining budget surpluses between 1996 and 2000.  
 
The 2001 international recession that followed the burst of the doc.com bubble did not, 
as many expected, slow down the previous 10 years of strong export-led economic growth 
in Ireland, which had in the meantime been dubbed as the ‘Celtic Tiger’ by Dublin-based 
economist and Morgan Stanley employee Kevin Gardiner (see Donovan and Murphy, 
2013: 16). Although export-led growth began to slow down in the aftermath of the 
bursting of the dot.com bubble, economic growth started accelerating very fast by 2003. 
However, this time around Ireland’s economic successes were not driven by the export-
led model that had characterised the 2000s.  
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Rather, from the turn of the century until the GFC, the Irish economy experienced 
staggering levels of economic growth driven by a boom in investment in housing and 
commercial property, which was funded by reckless lending practices from local Irish 
banks, like Anglo Irish Bank, Bank of Ireland, and Allied Irish Bank (see Lane, 2011: 
64). On the one hand, property investment was fuelled by international short-term 
interbank funds, which had become cheap and widely available thanks to the process of 
European economic integration (Dooley, 2015: 174). On the other hand, the increasing 
presence of foreign banks in Ireland, like the Royal Bank of Scotland, increased 
competitive pressures on Irish banks who began to offer mortgages at much cheaper rates, 
which also increased household debt (see Kelly, 2014).  
 
Unquestionably, the GFC triggered Ireland’s crisis. As the availability of cheap and 
reliable funding suddenly stopped, Irish banks suddenly pulled back from the property 
market as they kept accumulating massive losses (Lane, 2011: 65). The Irish government 
thus introduced the Government Guarantee Scheme, a blanket guarantee for bank 
liabilities and deposits for over €400 billion to protect its sinking banking sector (see 
Hendrikse, 2013: 192). Although the Irish government did not expect to have to pay out 
on this guarantee, the financial positions of the country’s banks turned out to be much 
worse than initially thought. In addition, the government’s funding costs were soaring 
due to widening sovereign spreads, which ultimately forced the Irish government to make 
a formal request for international financial assistance. The package totalled €85bn; €35bn 
of which were dedicated to recapitalising the country’s banking system, while €50bn 
would be used to finance government spending.  
 
LCH.Clearnet’s had a key role in exacerbating sovereign debt market turmoil during that 
period. LCH.Clearnet’s actions can be traced back to when the Irish government 
submitted to the EC on 26 October 2010 the third restructuring plan for its struggling 
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Anglo-Irish Bank (specialised in commercial property lending) (see EC, 2012b: 19). 
Amid panic of an imminent banking collapse, investors in Irish government securities 
began to sell-off Irish government bonds. As Ireland’s spreads hovered around 450bp 
threshold for several days, LCH.Clearnet issued a 15% margin call for using Irish bonds 
as collateral in repo operations on 10 November (see figure 15). The margin call increased 
the cost for using Irish government bonds as collateral in repo contracts, which reduced 
their liquidity. The reaction on Irish sovereign debt markets was immediate. The margin 
call was followed by large bond-sell offs, as evidenced by the steep widening of Irish 
spreads on the day of the margin call itself, as well as the following day. Indeed, one of 
the key findings of this analysis is that the premium that investors were demanding to 
hold Irish government bonds hit a record high on the day LCH.Clearnet announced the 
increase in margin requirements for clearing Irish collateral (see appendix I).  
 
The extent of influence that the RMP had on the Irish crisis was deep; as in the words of 
a broker: ‘[t]he move by LCH should not be underestimated. It was the increase of margin 
payments by LCH last November that put Ireland under so much pressure’ (in Oakley 
2011). Indeed, domestic banks held 15%-20% of all Irish sovereign bonds in circulation 
in 2010 (see Merler and Pisany-Ferry, 2012). Thus, market analysts estimate that a 
staggering €8 billion worth of Irish government debt held by local banks was being 
cleared through LCH.Clearnet, which forced ‘Irish banks to sell government bonds as 
they scrambled to raise the cash needed to meet the new margin requirements’ (Oakley 
and Jones 2010). On the one hand, the cash was needed because Irish banks suddenly 
found themselves with around €1 billion cash-call by LCH.Clearnet in order to cover the 
extra margins (see also Jones et al. 2010). On the other hand, Irish banks were getting rid 
of Irish collateral due to its lowered value as collateral in repo transactions, which they 
badly needed to keep accessing short-term funding.  
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The margin calls compromised the funding liquidity of Irish banks, which effectively 
contributed to destabilising the country’s banking system and sovereign debt market. On 
17 November, LCH.Clearnet issued another margin call, this time to 30%. As it became 
explicit in the notices to its members, the decision to implement margin calls with respect 
to Ireland was ‘… based solely on publicly available yield spread data and in no way 
represents a forward looking market view’ (LCH.Clearnet, 2010b). This means that 
LCH.Clearnet was sticking to one of the key criteria set out in its RMP, whereby further 
margin calls could be issued should the spread deteriorate. As we shall see below, the fact 
that further margin calls were implemented as a reaction to widening spread is extremely 
important, because that is precisely what caused the RMP to retain a procyclical element.  
 
The increase in spread following the margin calls also compromised the funding cost of 
the Irish government, which found financing government spending increasingly 
expensive due to the higher yields. With a struggling banking sector and rising 
government funding costs, on 21 November the Irish government had no choice but to 
formally request a banking and government bailout. The bailout request caused more sell-
offs of Irish securities, which triggered another margin call by LCH.Clearnet on 25 
November. The margin call increased the collateral required to clear Irish securities in 
repo transactions to 45%, causing more sell-offs that were matched with a further 
widening of the Irish spread. Pressure on Irish spread eased after the bailout was 
eventually agreed on 28 November. As the RMP follows spread trends, Ireland’s securing 
of €35bn to recapitalise its banks, which guaranteed the funding needs of the Irish banking 
system, led to a decline in yield differentials that led to a reduction in the Irish margin 
requirements to 30% on 6 December. 
 
However, another moment that created further stress on Irish sovereign debt markets is 
linked to Fitch’s downgrading of Irish sovereign bonds to sub-investment grade on 9 
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December, which prompted LCH.Clearnet to exclude Irish sovereign debt from delivery 
in any euro denominated GC basket (LCH.Clearnet, 2010c). The exclusion meant that a 
repo contract using Irish sovereign bonds as collateral could have only been concluded 
with Irish public debt, and no longer with any sovereign bond in the euro area as part of 
the GC basket. In short, LCH.Clearnet had effectively shut out Ireland from the European 
repo market.  
 
Spread levels remained relatively stable until the end of March 2011, when LCH.Clearnet 
made a margin call to 35% on the 24 of that month, which widened the spread, thus 
triggering another margin increase to 45% on 1 April. Pressure on the Irish sovereign debt 
market eased after that last increase, particularly in early April 2011, when the EC, the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the ECB announced that Ireland was making 
good progresses in overcoming the crisis (EC, ECB, IMF, 2011). This update was 
followed by a decline in spread and a subsequent reduction in margins back to 35% on 
12 April. However, on 18 April the CRA Moody’s downgraded the long-term deposit 
creditworthiness of Irish banks to junk status (Ba1 and Ba2), which followed a downgrade 
on Irish sovereign debt a few days earlier, due to fears that Ireland would be unable to 
properly implement fiscal reforms and restructure its banking sector (Moody’s, 2011). 
 
Another wave of bond-sell offs followed, widening the spread. LCH.Clearnet reacted by 
implementing severe margin calls for the next two months, increasing the collateral 
requirements to 45%, 55%, 65%, 75% and culminating to 80% on June 28 (see appendix 
I). This study finds that the Irish spreads greatly increased after each margin call, 
widening to over 900bp after the last increase (a 300bp jump between April to June), 
which indicated a further wave of concerted selling of Irish government securities. 
Overall, out of the 10 margin calls that LCH.Clearnet implemented on Irish sovereign 
bonds, 9 of them were matched by an increase in spread (see appendix I). 
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To put this into perspective, when Irish bonds were trading with 80% margins it meant 
that to borrow, for example, €100 with Irish securities, LCH.Clearnet demanded at least 
€500 worth of collateral. Hence, the finding above suggests that LCH.Clearnet’s 
increases in collateral requirements had a procyclical impact on the Irish spread, in the 
sense that the consecutive reductions in the value of Irish sovereign bonds as collateral 
led to sell-offs that further reduced the value of those bonds. The procyclicality of 
LCH.Clearnet’s margin calls on the Irish spread is evidenced by looking at figure 15. 
Indeed, given the Irish banks’ large exposure to Irish sovereign debt, the procyclical 
impact of margin requirements turned out to be particularly impactful for Irish banks, 
which were already heavily distressed. Crucially, the sell-offs were taking place despite 
Ireland having secured state aid in its bailout negotiations. This is key, because it implies 
that spread kept widening not so much because of investors’ concern with the debt-
repayment ability of the Irish state, which had been secured through the bailout 
programme, but primarily due to the reduced liquidity of Irish debt as collateral in short-
term repo funding operations as a consequence to the margin calls. 
 
The impact of LCH.Clearnet’s margin requirements on the Irish sovereign debt market is 
particularly evident when compared to the different credit rating downgrades 
implemented by CRAs during the period examined. Quite remarkably, as shown in figure 
15, Irish spreads perfectly match the margins’ trend of LCH.Clearnet, both rising and 
declining, and certain margin calls were followed by pronounced hikes (on 10 November 
2010, 25 November 2010, 1 April 2011, 5 May 2011, 25 May 2011, 28 June 2011), 
something that did not happen with all the credit downgrades. More importantly, 
LCH.Clearnet did not announce its margin requirement increases due to credit 
downgrades, as the CCPs’ decisions were only based upon spread movements.  
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That is not to downplay the importance of sovereign credit downgrades in the context of 
the Irish crisis, however. Indeed, sovereign credit downgrades were matched by a visible 
(yet comparatively much smaller) widening of Irish spreads, particularly discernible on 
Fitch’s and Moody’s downgrades on 17 December 2010 and 15 April 2010 respectively. 
In this sense, credit downgrades did have an indirect impact on the margin calls through 
the sell-offs and the widening in spread they caused. Further, LCH.Clearnet’s margin 
calls from April 2011 onwards were implemented only following Moody’s sovereign 
credit and long-term deposit bank rates downgrades, and the exclusion of Irish bonds 
from delivery in any euro-denominated GC repo was also caused by credit downgrades, 
which adds to the importance of credit downgrades in the context of the Irish crisis. 
However, in certain cases there does not seem to be any visible impact of the downgrades 
of the Irish spreads, or their impact was relatively minimal (Fitch in October 2010, S&P 
in February 2011, and S&P and Fitch in April 2011).  
 
In short, LCH.Clearnet’s 9 out 10 different increases in collateral requirements were 
followed by immediate reactions on sovereign debt markets, as matched by the large scale 
bond-sell-offs that widened the Irish 10-year sovereign spread. Thus, what is to be learned 
from LCH.Clearnet’s involvement in the Irish crisis? The Irish banking system was 
already undergoing a severe banking crisis, which was closely linked to speculative 
investments in the property sector since the end of the 1990s, which made Irish banks 
particularly susceptible to external shocks in funding markets. Thus, when LCH.Clearnet 
publicly announced its SRF in October 2010, its actions contributed to exacerbate 
pressures on the Irish banking sector via a sovereign debt market shock. Troubled Irish 
banks were highly exposed to Irish sovereign debt, meaning that margin calls reduced the 
liquidity of Irish government securities in repo transactions, which made it even more 
expensive for Irish banks to finance themselves on the repo-based interbank funding 
market.  
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It is important to reiterate that I am not trying to argue the that dimension surrounding 
sovereign default risk perception did not matter – after all, LCH.Clearnet’s actions were 
themselves based upon an increased perception of sovereign default risk. However, the 
widening in the spread following LCH.Clearnet’s margin calls were also driven by the 
reduced liquidity of Irish government bonds in repo transactions, and not only by the 
increased fear of sovereign default as argued by most of the euro crisis literature (see 
Chapter 1). Indeed, given the Irish banks’ high exposure to Irish sovereign debt, the 
increase in collateral requirements directly compromised the use of Irish government 
securities to access short-term funding via repos, which led to the large-scale sell-offs 
showed above. 
 
This point can be corroborated if we look at how margin calls are associated with the sell-
offs even after Ireland had secured bank and state bailouts. Upon agreeing a state bailout, 
Ireland had effectively guaranteed public debt servicing sustainability for the next three 
years, meaning that the possibility of sovereign default had, in effect, disappeared. Yet, 
spread kept widening as margin calls were increased, suggesting that banks were not 
concerned with sovereign solvency during that time, but with the declining value of Irish 
government securities as collateral in repo transactions. In short, the evidence provided 
in this analysis indicates that sell-off activities around the time of the margin calls were 
influenced by the strain on liquidity that LCH.Clearnet had put on Irish government 
securities to be used as collateral in repo contracts.  
 
Two considerations can finally be made with respect to Ireland. First, as LCH.Clearnet 
based its collateral requirement decisions purely on bond yield spread data, the sell-offs 
caused by the margin calls further widened the spread, leading to more margin calls and 
sell-offs. This dynamic indicates the presence of margin procyclicality on the Irish spread, 
because the increase in collateral requirements led to bond price declines that triggered 
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more margin calls, leading to further price declines. Second, the political implication of 
LCH.Clearnet’s margin calls. The destabilising role of LCH.Clearnet between November 
and December 2010, which made the cost of bank and sovereign debt funding 
increasingly expensive, can be ascribed as one of the factors that pushed the Irish 
government to request external financial assistance. Seen through another lens, as the 
bailout negotiations were essentially a political process (see Hancock, 2015), the political 
implication of LCH.Clearnet’s actions lies precisely in that the RMP represented one of 
the sovereign debt market destabilising factors that pushed the Irish government to 
negotiate that bailout program. 
 
5.4.2 Portugal 
 
The next country to become target of the RMP was Portugal. Differently from Ireland 
and Spain, Portugal did not experience a property bubble, did not have as much of a 
dramatic increase in public debt and deficit as Greece, but had one of the lowest growth 
rates of the entire euro area since the introduction of the euro (Lagoa et al., 2014: 6). Two 
of the main reasons for the Portuguese slump have been ascribed in the channelling of 
capital inflow in the unproductive, non-tradable sector and the generous pension 
arrangements (see Reis, 2013). This is far from being only a domestic story, however, as, 
much like Ireland, reliance on external capital is closely linked to Portugal’s joining the 
processes of European financial liberalisation from the end of the 1980s onwards (see 
Dooley, 2015: 132). Instead of causing a boom, private unproductive capital inflows led 
to a slump from the 2000s onwards, which caused both a decline in the productivity of 
the whole economy and real exchange to rise, compromising the competitiveness of the 
tradable sector (see Blanchard, 2007). Further, taxes were increased during the slump to 
meet past promises on old-age pensions, which also contributed to almost a decade of 
dismal economic performance. Portugal’s high dependence on foreign capital meant that, 
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as capital inflow suddenly stopped, economic activity and domestic consumption also 
came to a halt. This brought such a significant drop in tax revenues that budget deficit 
almost tripled in 2009. 
 
Most distinctively, the Portuguese crisis is closely linked to what had previously 
happened to Ireland. In part, this has to do with the fact that its high private external 
indebtedness and long-standing productivity difficulties made Portugal the country in the 
euro area most susceptible to external shocks (see Kalbaska and Gątkowski, 2012). 
Indeed, the Portuguese crisis was to an important extent the consequence of contagion 
dynamics, which is when a shock in one given country or region affects others. With 
respect to Portugal, contagion took place on sovereign bond markets. This dynamic can 
be evidenced by looking at figure 16 showing that, besides following a very similar trend 
throughout the crisis, Portuguese sovereign spreads underwent the same hikes 
experienced by Ireland between October and December 2010, which matches the exact 
timeframe when LCH.Clearnet first introduced the RMP and triggered margin calls for 
Irish sovereign bonds. In short, the sovereign debt market shocks inflicted by 
LCH.Cleranet in Ireland were also felt in Portugal.  
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(Fig. 16) Ireland’s and Portugal’s 10-year sovereign bond yield spreads (in percentage points) 
 
Source: Thom
son Reuters’ Eikon, ow
n calculations. 
0.0
200.0
400.0
600.0
800.0
1,000.0
1,200.0
05-O
ct-2010 
05-N
ov-2010 
05-D
ec-2010 
05-Jan-2011
05-Feb-2011
05-M
ar-2011 
05-Apr-2011 
05-M
ay-2011
05-Jun-2011 
Portuguese	spread
Irish	spread
 241 
Interestingly, Portuguese authorities at the time denied the existence of contagion 
dynamics. This view is best exemplified by the position of the Portuguese Central Bank, 
blaming the country’s sovereign debt market distress on the declining confidence of 
international investors ‘on the sustainability of the public finances’ of the Portuguese 
government (Banco de Portugal, 2010). This position resonates with the analyses 
portrayed in the euro crisis literature I discussed in Chapter 1, particularly the domestic-
level explanations, that ascribe the declining sustainability of domestic finances as one of 
the factors that deteriorated market confidence towards sovereign solvency. 
 
As the Irish government announced its restructuring plans for the Anglo Irish bank on 26 
October 2010, investors reacted in Portugal in a similar fashion as they did with Ireland, 
which led to sell-offs of Portuguese bonds that widened the country’s spread (see 
appendix I). Moreover, figure 16 shows that LCH.Clearnet’s subsequent margin increases 
on Irish bonds on 10, 17 and 25 November 2010 were matched by similar spread hikes 
on Portuguese spreads as they did in Ireland. The susceptibility of Portuguese yields to 
the Irish crisis is also evident once the Irish bailout was agreed at the end of November 
2011, whereby Portuguese spreads followed a similar decline as the Irish ones, alongside 
the falling margins.  
 
Despite it being closely linked to the developments in Ireland, the Portuguese crisis took 
a decisive turn for the worse when José Sócrates, then Portugal’s prime minister, resigned 
on 23 March 2011 while failing to pass his fourth package of austerity measures that year. 
The political instability that followed triggered several credit rating downgrades by Fitch, 
S&P and Moody’s between 24 March and 5 April, which brought Portuguese government 
debt below investment grade, triggering a yield hike that widened the Portuguese spreads 
(see appendix I). Just as had happened in Ireland, due to the downgrade LCH.Clearnet 
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excluded Portuguese collateral from being eligible for delivery in any euro-denominated 
GC repo basked (LCH.Clearnet, 2011a).  
 
Hence, Portugal remained locked out of the European repo market. Differently from 
Ireland, however, the exclusion from euro-denominated GC baskets came during a time 
of serious distress on Portuguese sovereign debt markets, due to the country’s political 
instability. Amid rising spread, on 6 April the Portuguese government requested a bailout, 
which was immediately followed by a 15% LCH.Clearnet’s margin call on Portuguese 
debt the coming day. As LCH.Clearnet introduced its margin requirement increases only 
after the Portuguese government requested a bailout, the CCP cannot be said to have had 
any direct implication with respect to exacerbating sovereign debt market pressure in the 
lead up to the bailout request. At the same time, however, the actions of LCH.Clearnet 
contributed to destabilising Portugal’s sovereign debt market. 
 
LCH.Clearnet made it unambiguous that its decision to increase collateral requirements 
on Portuguese sovereign debt was based exclusively on publicly available yield spread 
data, which had been hovering around the 450bp threshold for several days 
(LCH.Clearnet, 2011b). In other words, the CCP considered neither the bailout request 
nor the credit rating downgrades below investment-grade when it implemented margin 
calls on Portuguese government debt. Indeed, this study finds that LCH.Clearnet 
increased margin requirements on Portuguese bonds five times from April until June, 
despite the Portuguese government eventually agreed the previously requested bailout on 
4 May (see figure 17). Each of these margin requirement increase (25%, 35%, 45%, 65%) 
was followed by sell-offs that widened the spread, which likely triggered subsequent 
increases (see appendix I).  
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(Fig. 17) Portuguese 10-year sovereign bond yield spread (left-hand scale), LC
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Then, on 28 June 2011, LCH.Clearnet increased Portuguese margins to 80%, around the 
time when the Portuguese spread witnessed a similar hike and levels experienced by its 
Celtic counterpart. Due to the steady increase in margins up to 80%, by the end of June 
2011 Portuguese government bonds were no longer usable collateral in repo transactions, 
since they were worth only 20% of their original value.  
 
In addition, just before the last margin call, Portuguese government securities had peaked 
to a record high of 1000bp. Thus, this study finds that margin calls are likely associated 
with a long-term decline in the price of Portuguese government debt, as evidenced by the 
steep widening of the spread between the first and the last margin call. Crucially, that 
steep increase in spread since the triggering of the first margin call also indicates the 
presence of procyclicality (figure 17). The reduction in the value of Portuguese 
government securities as collateral in repo transactions widened the spread, which led to 
further margin requirement increase that further widened the spreads. This affected 
domestic Portuguese banks the most.  
 
Although most major Portuguese banks were less exposed to toxic financial instruments 
than their European counterparts (see Pereria and Wemans, 2012: 11), they were also 
large holders of Portuguese government securities. Indeed, between April and June 2011 
domestic banks held close to 40% of all the Portuguese government debt in circulation 
(see Merler and Pisany-Ferry, 2012). It should also be noted that the bailout for Portugal, 
which was requested before the first margin call, included financial assistance for the 
banking sector, which is likely the reason why LCH.Clearnet’s actions did not 
compromise the Portuguese banking system to the same extent as in Ireland and, as we 
shall see below, Spain (see McCaffrey, 2011). 
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In addition, since the mid-2010s Portuguese banks had been relying a lot on the ECB for 
their funding needs (Cavalier, 2011: 7). However, the increase in margin requirements 
remained a troubling event for domestic banks. As they held a large stock-pile of 
Portuguese government bonds, the increases in collateral requirements compromised the 
ability by domestic banks to use Portuguese sovereign debt to finance short-term funding 
need through repos (see Caldas, 2017). Hence, as shown in figure 17, investors began a 
massive sell-off since LCH.Clearnet started increasing margin requirements from 7 April 
all the way through June, which is evidenced by an increase in spread trends.  
 
In conclusion, what can we learn from the Portuguese experience of LCH.Clearnet’s 
RMP, with respect to the importance of liquidity in relation to spread? It is important to 
recognise that the Portuguese crisis is linked to a large degree to contagion dynamics from 
Ireland, as evidenced by the Portuguese sovereign bond sell-offs that took place during 
key moments of the Irish crisis. Further, the involvement of LCH.Clearnet during the 
Portuguese crisis was less impactful than in the case of Ireland, primarily because the 
RMP was triggered after the Portuguese government requested a bailout. This means that, 
differently from Ireland, we cannot ascribe any direct role of LCH.Clearnet’s actions on 
the bailout request, as the margin calls took place after Portugal asked for financial 
assistance. For the same reason, the increase in collateral requirements, despite having 
increased funding pressure for Portuguese banks, did not destabilise the Portuguese 
banking system as a whole, as the bailout also provided funds to recapitalise the country’s 
banks. 
 
However, LCH.Clearnet’s margin calls did retain a destabilising impact on Portuguese 
sovereign debt market. Out of the 6 margin calls that LCH.Clearnet implemented on 
Portugal sovereign debt, 5 of those are matched by an increase in spread (see appendix 
I). A question arises, however, about the timings of the margin calls. If investors were 
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rather concerned with the public debt servicing sustainability of the Portuguese 
sovereigns, a view often employed in the euro crisis literature (see Chapter 1), then why 
would sell-offs take place after the Portuguese government had secured both a state and 
bank bailout, and after the Portuguese government introduced austerity measures? In light 
of what discussed above, I argue that the sell-offs took place in the aftermath of the margin 
calls because LCH.Clearnet’s actions reduced the liquidity of Portuguese government 
securities as collateral in short-term funding operations.  
 
This is a particularly important point with respect to the objectives set out in this project, 
because these finding suggest that the spread hikes in Portugal from April to June 2011 
reflected the concerns that investors had with the declining liquidity of Portuguese 
government securities to access short-term funding, and not with their heightened 
sovereign default risk. Therefore, the involvement of LCH.Clearnet during the 
Portuguese crisis provides us with similar insights as in the case of Ireland, with respect 
to the relationship between sovereign spread movements and market sentiment regarding 
funding liquidity. 
 
Equally important, like in Ireland, LCH.Clearnet based its collateral requirement 
decisions for Portuguese government securities explicitly on the RMP’s threshold and 
only on bond yield spread data. Thus, as the margin calls reduced the value of Portuguese 
government bonds, leading to large-scale sell-offs, LCH.Clearnet further increased 
margin requirements amid rising spread, which led to further sell-offs. Hence, the 
dynamic explained above shares the same element of margin procyclicality that I 
discussed in the case of Ireland, and that I have examined in relation to the US subprime 
mortgage crisis in 2008 (see Chapter 3). 
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Finally, a difference with Ireland is the role of credit downgrades. CRAs have exacerbated 
stress on Portuguese sovereign debt markets much more significantly than in the case of 
Ireland. Fitch’s and Moody’s downgrade of Portuguese government securities to sub-
investment grade triggered an increase in spread around and above the 450bp threshold 
that, a few days later, triggered a margin call by LCH.Clearnet. Indeed, credit rating 
downgrades did not directly trigger the RMP, as LCH.Clearnet based its collateral 
requirement decisions on Portugal solely on bond yield spreads data. However, given the 
more impactful effect they had in triggering sell-offs, credit downgrades can be argued to 
have indirectly underpinned the triggering of LCH.Clearnet’s first margin call due to the 
more visible role they had in influencing spread movements. 
 
Margin requirement increases also took place for Italian and Spanish sovereign bonds. 
These margin calls were issued by LCH.Clearnet SA, the Paris-based subsidiary of the 
LCH.Clearnet Group, which was more heavily involved in the Spanish and Italian 
domestic sovereign bond markets than LCH.Clearnet Ltd. Interestingly, LCH.Clearnet 
SA applied its margin requirement increases in a different way to LCH.Clearnet Ltd. 
 
5.4.3 Shift in attitude: LCH.Clearnet’s different collateral management 
approaches for Italy and Spain 
 
Differently from LCH.Clearnet Ltd, LCH.Clearnet SA was not formally employing the 
RMP, and did not disclose to market participants which criteria would thereafter trigger 
margin calls (see Keohane 2012; see also Cotterill, 2011). Further, as shown below, this 
study finds that the actual size of the margin increases for Italy and Spain was 
substantially lower than what was previously experienced by Ireland and Portugal. Before 
moving on to assess the last two cases, some commentary is required in order to make 
sense of LCH.Clearnet’s different approaches to Italy and Spain.  
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This is an interesting puzzle, because it seems plausible that LCH.Clearnet deliberately 
took a softer approach in how it treated Italian and Spanish government bonds. However, 
this story is not that straightforward. LCH.Clearnet received no formal criticism by 
European authorities with respect to how it implemented its margin calls within the 
context of the SRF/RMP. Quite the opposite in fact, as EU regulators generally praised 
CCPs for the ways they preserved repo funding in the euro area during the euro crisis 
(e.g. Constâncio, 2012). That is not to say that central clearing had been overlooked by 
regulators, because CCPs were most clearly under scrutiny during those years. At the 
time, however, EU policy makers were still mostly concerned with implementing the G20 
mandatory clearing provisions for OTC derivatives (see Chapter 2). EMIR, the relevant 
European legislation that introduced mandatory clearing for OTC derivatives, was 
proposed by the EC in September 2010, and had been undergoing legislative scrutiny by 
the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union between July 2011 and 
July 2012 (see Pagliari, 2013). However, EMIR was not directly concerned with repos, 
as it only aimed at transposing the mandatory clearing commitment for OTC derivatives 
into EU law, which means that the systemic relevance of CCPs was only being assessed 
in relation to OTC derivatives risk. 
 
LCH.Clearnet’s changing approach may have come from within the company itself, 
which is relatable to how LCH.Clearnet handles risk management in more general terms. 
Given the CCPs’ primary objective to guarantee the performance of every contract, 
LCH.Clearnet’s risk management strategies do not seek to terminate the operations of 
markets, like the euro-denominated repo market for instance, not even in times of severe 
turmoil. Indeed, while presenting the SRF at the ECB’s Money Market Contact Group in 
2011, LCH.Clearnet’s former executive director and head of fixed income John Burke 
stated that: 
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[The SRF] [a]llows for LCH.Clearnet to protect itself from increasing risks in a 
transparent way whilst providing certainty of funding for fixed income 
participants – (we will not cease clearing a market) (Burke, 2011: 4, emphasis 
added) 40.  
 
LCH.Clearnet’s increase in collateral requirements did not, in fact, close repo operations. 
It certainly caused liquidity strains for Irish, Portuguese (and, as we shall see below, 
Italian and Spanish) banks, excluded Irish and Portuguese collateral from the euro GC 
baskets, and made it more expensive to use those securities in repo transactions, but it 
never actually stopped accepting any of the affected security as collateral or offering repo 
services. At the same time, LCH.Clearnet’s risk management ‘philosophy’ for its 
RepoClear service is to cause ‘minimal disruption to the market’, which essentially means 
to keep its repo clearing services open even in times of financial distress (LCH.Clearnet, 
2018).  
 
If we are to assume, with the benefit of hindsight, that LCH.Clearnet became somewhat 
aware of the destabilising implication of its margin calls, it could be argued that 
LCH.Clearnet may have decided to revise its collateral management policy. Indeed, the 
disruption caused by LCH.Clearnet calls in Ireland and Portugal, by exacerbating 
pressures on their respective sovereign debt markets and banks, may have compelled 
LCH.Clearnet to adopt a softer approach with Italy and Spain, whose sovereign bond 
                                                        
40 Founded in 1999, the Money Market Contact Group is a forum for discussing issues related to the money 
market in the euro area, such as short-term market developments, changing regulatory trends, and the ways 
in which the euro money market works more generally. The Money Market Contact Group meets several 
times a year, is composed of representatives of the ECB and of the different commercial banks of the euro 
area. 
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markets represent respectively the third and fourth largest collateral-base of the European 
repo market as a whole. 
 
This means that the collapse of the Italian or Spanish sovereign debt markets could have 
spelled the end of the euro area, wiping out the entire European repo market and thus 
compromising the funding liquidity of all LCH.Clearnet’s clearing members, 
international or domestic alike. Though this was never made explicit by LCH.Clearnet 
(the internal discussions undertaken by LCH.Clearnet’s risk committees are highly 
confidential), it does remain a plausible interpretation, especially given the lower margin 
requirement increases overall in Italy and Spain, the absence of a formal numerical trigger 
or other criteria, and, perhaps most importantly, the fact that Italy and Spain are some of 
the largest sovereign debt (and repo collateral) markets in the euro area. The view that 
LCH.Clearnet SA’s softer approach for Italy and Spain came from within the company 
has also been portrayed by some financial news commentators (e.g. Kehoane, 2012; 
Cotterill, 2011). However, even they have admitted that they are not fully aware of the 
context in which LCH.Clearnet SA took a different margin policy when compared to 
LCH.Clearnet Ltd., precisely because of the relatively more opaque nature of the 
collateral decision-making of the former. Now, back to the case studies. 
 
5.4.4 Italy 
 
With regard to Italy, its conservative banking sector had proven fairly resilient to the 
credit crunch of 2008. Indeed, much like their Portuguese counterparts, Italian banks 
maintained a very low exposure to the complex financial instruments that underpinned 
the GFC (see Quaglia and Royo, 2015). Further, Italian banks were lending mostly 
between themselves. As a matter of fact, it has been estimated that the Italian banking 
system maintained the highest ‘home bias’ in the euro area between 2004 and 2009, 
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meaning that Italian banks were the least likely to undertake cross-border lending outside 
of Italy (see Manna, 2011: 25). Thus, whereas Italian banks were still reliant on 
wholesale, interbank funding, this was conducted mostly with other Italian banks.  
 
Very differently from Portugal, Ireland and, as we shall see below, Spain, Italian banks 
did not channel their funding onto property developers (Ireland and Spain), and did not 
foster a credit boom (Portugal). Indeed, Italian banks mostly lent to non-financial 
corporations, a third of which went to services and industry (see Bank of Italy, 2008). 
This all contributed to a banking system that was fairly resilient to the sub-prime 
mortgage crisis of the US, and the credit crunch that followed. However, the combination 
of a large stock-pile of public debt, over a decade of sluggish growth, and mounting 
domestic political instability, laid the foundations for market turbulence to extend to the 
country’s sovereign debt market.  
 
According to the Eurostat, in late 2011 Italy was the second largest sovereign debt issuer 
in the euro area, followed by Germany. Italy suffered from decades of low growth and 
labour productivity rates, contributing to a debt-to-GDP ratio above 100% since the 
1990s, as well as having sustained significant trade deficits since the introduction of the 
euro (see OECD, 2012: 7). However, these trends were long-term trajectories of the 
Italian economy, meaning that investors did not make unexpected discoveries about 
Italy’s fiscal stance (like they did in the case of Greece) or suddenly started worrying 
about the country’s bank solvency (like they did in Ireland, Portugal and Spain). To a 
degree, then, the turmoil on Italian sovereign debt markets between 2011 and 2012 has 
been ascribed to broader fears about the future of the euro, given the limited response of 
the ECB and the divisions among European leaders at the time (see Hopkin, 2012; 
Pagano, 2010). At the same time, it also became increasingly clear that, given the size of 
its public debt and funding needs, Italy was deemed too big to be bailed out, suggesting 
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that Italy’s sovereign default could have severely compromised the structural integrity of 
the euro area. 
 
Pressure on Italy’s sovereign debt markets began to exacerbate during the second half of 
2011, when Berlusconi’s parliamentary majority began to crumble, raising doubts about 
the government’s handling of the crisis. In addition, external pressures from European 
politicians and institutions (particularly the ECB, which, in a leaked letter41, asked 
Berlusconi’s government to implement much harsher spending cuts than its 
administration had already committed to) posed further uncertainty about Italy’s political 
stability and economic future. As Italy’s spread kept widening, on 9 November 2011, 
LCH.Clearnet SA raised the margin requirements for 10-year issues from 6.65% to 
11.65%. Before going any further, it is necessary to provide a short commentary about 
the difficulty of spotting any long-term trend of margin calls on the Italian spread, as 
opposed to what was witnessed in Ireland and Portugal.  
 
First, LCH.Clearnet only increased margin requirements on Italian sovereign bonds four 
times, which makes any long-term trend assessment unfeasible. Secondly, there were two 
important factors that made Italian sovereign debt extremely volatile. The reason why 
Italian spread kept hiking and declining so suddenly between the end of 2011 and early 
2012 is because, to a significant extent, Italian sovereign bonds were subject to severe 
speculative activities during those years (Jones, 2012). This can be witnessed by the much 
more intense and frequent hikes and declines of Italian spreads when compared to Ireland 
and Portugal. Indeed, the extent of speculation has been so dramatic that Italy even took 
Deutsche Bank to court in 2016, citing market distorting practices caused by the bank’s 
sudden massive sell-offs of Italian sovereign bonds in early 2011, despite having 
informed its clients that Italy presented no real risk (see Damiani, 2016). Similarly, in late 
                                                        
41 See Draghi and Trichet (2011). 
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2012, Italy banned short-selling and imposed restrictions on the use of CDSs with 
government bonds (Consob, 2012).  
 
In addition, the ECB exerted a strong downward pressure on Italian spreads. The ECB’s 
launch of its 3-year Long-Term Refinancing Operations (LTROs), on 21 December 2011 
and 29 February 2012, caused a downward trend of Italian sovereign spreads (see figure 
18). The two LTROs allowed banks in the euro area to borrow money from the ECB at a 
very low (1%) interest rate with a three-year maturity, funding which was made even 
more accessible thanks to the ECB’s increase in collateral availability by reducing the 
rating threshold for certain asset-backed securities. In other words, the LTROs gave banks 
(particularly sovereign bond-rich institutions) a much more convenient source of funding 
than what was available in the interbank market, particularly useful if we consider the 
LCH.Clearnet-led fragmentation of the European repo market and its increases in 
collateral requirements. In short, the LTROs ought to improve the access to financing for 
banks in the euro area. 
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It should be stressed that the stated objective of the 3-year LTROs was not to reduce 
sovereign bond yields, neither directly nor indirectly. Through its LTRO programme, the 
ECB only formally sought to ‘support bank lending and liquidity in the euro area’, and 
not government spending (ECB, 2011). As discussed in one of its own studies assessing 
the impact of the LTROs, the ECB only ever made reference to the positive impact of its 
actions on the funding conditions of banks in the euro area (see ECB, 2012). Yet, evidence 
suggests that the cheap funding provided with the 3-year LTORs encouraged banks in the 
euro area to buy higher yielding sovereign bonds (a practice that is also called carry-
trade), which materially contributed to a decline of Italian spread in the 3 months 
following the two programmes (see Casiraghi et al., 2016: 299). Given the above, it is 
plausible to assume that the LTROs overrode other shocks on Italian sovereign debt 
market during that time, such as the credit rating downgrades on 13, 27 January 2012 and 
13 February 2012. 
 
Therefore, the very small number of margin calls, speculation on Italian sovereign bonds 
during the crisis, and the ECB’s refinancing interventions make the identification of 
specific long-term patterns between margin calls and spread unworkable. However, 
Italy’s spread often widened in the aftermath of LCH.Clearnet’s collateral requirement 
increases, suggesting the existence of a short-term impact of individual margin calls on 
the sell-offs of Italian sovereign bonds, which are worth exploring in more detail. 
 
Indeed, after LCH.Clearnet triggered a margin call on 9 November 2011, Italy witnessed 
a severe spread hike (see figure 18). To an important degree, the extent of the increase is 
linked to the interoperability agreements with the Italian-based CCP Cassa 
Compensazione e Garanzia (CC&G). Among the different forms of interoperability 
agreements, which are essentially links between CCPs (see ESMA, 2016), the one 
characterising the relationship between LCH.Clearnet SA and CC&G allows investors 
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trading financial instruments on selected trading platforms to be clearing members of 
either of the two CCPs, as if they were a single entity. In short, two clearing members 
belonging to LCH.Clearnet SA and CC&G can conduct a repo transaction as if they were 
being cleared by the same CCP.  
 
Taken together, LCH.Clearnet SA and CC&G, which are used respectively by 
international and domestic financial institutions, clear over 90% of Italian repos traded 
on the MTS, the largest electronic trading platforms for Italian government securities 
(Miglietta, et al., 2015: 7). Crucially, for such an interoperability agreement to work, 
margin requirements from both CCPs need to coincide, so that if one CCP changes its 
margin requirements for a particular security, then the other needs to follow suit. In other 
words, any margin call by LCH.Clearnet SA also triggers the margin requirement 
increases by CC&G and vice versa.  
 
After LCH.Clearnet SA triggered its margin call on Italian debt on 9 November, CC&G 
also increased its margin requirements in order to maintain its interoperability links with 
the French-based CCP, affecting virtually the entire Italian repo market (see Bank of Italy, 
2012: 38). Following the margin calls by the two CCPs, this study finds that Italian 
spreads for long-term (10-year) issues peaked to over 520bp, reaching a historic high 
since the introduction of the euro (see appendix I). Quite significantly, the sovereign debt 
market distress caused by that margin call contributed to discrediting Berlusconi’s already 
weak positions with its European counterparts, and, most importantly, with its domestic 
coalition members. 
 
The rising funding costs for the Italian government increased domestic pressure on 
Berlusconi to resign, which he did after losing a key vote in Parliament but following a 
successful attempt to implement further austerity measures into law (see Culpepper, 
 257 
2014; Pasquino and Valbruzzi, 2012). The moment Berlusconi resigned, pressure on 
Italy’s sovereign yields eased slightly, which contributed to a decline in the Italian spread. 
Spread kept going down very rapidly once the technocratic government led by Mario 
Monti was appointed to form a new emergency government, putting an end to domestic 
political instability. As a consequence of the decline in spread, LCH.Clearnet SA and 
CC&G lowered the margin requirements for Italian 10-year issues to 8.15. In addition, as 
discussed above, the ECB’s LTRO was also one of the largest contributors to ease 
pressure on Italian sovereign debt markets until April 2012. 
 
However, the relative calm on Italian sovereign debt market was short-lived, as the 
stability of the Spanish banking system (analysed in more detail below) deteriorated very 
quickly in the spring of 2012. Following the nationalisation announcement of Bankia by 
the Spanish government on 9 May, Italian sovereign bonds became the target of new 
speculative attacks, which triggered an intense period of short-selling, as evidenced by 
the quick succession of hikes and declines of Italian spreads (figure 18). This led 
LCH.Clearnet to increase its margin requirements for Italian government debt to 9.5% on 
8 June, and then 11.65% on 23 July, which were followed by strong spread hikes in both 
occasions. In between the last two margin calls, Moody’s downgraded Italy’s sovereign 
bonds below investment grade, and, despite being followed by spread hike, it was 
relatively minor in comparison to the one caused by LCH.Clearnet’s margin call. Indeed, 
this study finds that the Italian spread widened significantly after each of the four increase 
in margin requirements by LCH.Clearnet during the Italian crisis (see appendix I). As a 
matter of fact, the two highest peaks in Italian spread took place precisely the day after 
LCH.Clearnet’s announcements of a 11.65% margin requirement increase on both 8 
November 2011 and 23 July 2012.  
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As also argued by the Bank of Italy in its 2012 Financial Stability Report, the ‘…very 
substantial increase in margins [by LCH.Clearnet and CC&G] impacted on the secondary 
market of Italian government securities, provoking a further widening of the BTP-Bund 
spread…and liquidity strains for participants in the guarantee system’ (Bank of Italy, 
2012: 38, emphasis added). Further, given the size of Italy’s sovereign debt market, 
accounting for around 10% of the collateral-base of the European repo market, even that 
relatively small increase in margin requirements (when compared to Ireland and Portugal) 
impacted upon the ability of both domestic and international investors to net their 
positions through LCH.Clearnet SA and CC&G, because they reduced the liquidity of 
Italian government securities as collateral to access short-term funding.  
 
In line with Ireland and Portugal, the increase in spreads caused by the margin calls did 
worsen the availability and cost of repo-based short-term funding to the domestic banks, 
not least because Italian banks had a large exposure on Italian sovereign bonds (see 
Albertazzi et al. 2014; see also Merler and Pisany-Ferry, 2012). However, differently 
from Ireland and Portugal, Italian banks were in good financial health (due to the reasons 
discussed above), and thus the rising spreads and margin requirements did not 
compromise the Italian banking system. Indeed, the Italian government did not need to 
intervene or seek financial assistance for any of its major banks, as in the case of Ireland, 
Portugal and, as shown below, Spain. 
 
However, just a few days after the last margin call, on 26 July the ECB President Mario 
Draghi made his famous speech at the Global Investment Conference in London, where 
he strongly stated that, within its mandate, ‘the ECB is ready to do whatever it takes to 
preserve the euro’ (Draghi, 2012). The reaction on sovereign debt markets was 
instantaneous, even before the ECB announced, a week later, its next government security 
purchase programme, the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMTs). The ECB’s pledge to  
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inject even more liquidity into national banking systems, should that necessity have 
arisen, sent a strong signal to investors and speculators, which led to a decline in 
sovereign bond spreads in Italy, Spain and across the euro area.  
 
Before moving on to our last case study, Spain, it is worth providing a short commentary 
about what we can learn about the role of LCH.Clearnet during the Italian crisis. The 
evidence discussed above suggests that the margin calls had a strong impact in causing 
short-term bond sell-offs, as evidenced by spread hikes in four out of four collateral 
requirement increases. The impacts of the margin calls were various, and retain important 
implications for our understanding of spread movements and the unfolding of the euro 
crisis. 
 
Even though the Italian government resorted to neither a bank nor a state bailout, the 
margin call on 8 November 2011 caused the highest spread hike during the Italian crisis. 
This timing of the spread hikes (which took place following the margin calls) suggests 
that the bond sell-offs took place precisely because LCH.Clearnet’s increases in collateral 
requirements reduced the liquidity of Italian government debt in repo-based short-term 
funding operations. To an important extent, even though the size of the margin increase 
was not as dramatic as in the case of Ireland and Portugal, the hikes occurred largely 
because Italian government debt provided around 10% of the collateral basis of the entire 
European repo market at the time, making those securities one of the most important 
sources of collateral for accessing short-term funding for banks in the euro area.  
 
Relatedly, Draghi’s ‘whatever it takes’ speech, and the launch of the ECB’s OMTs 
programme, need to be contextualised within the stress that Italian and Spanish sovereign 
debt markets were undergoing during that period of reduced liquidity.  
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Hence, as opposed to what is often argued by euro crisis literature, it was not just the 
sudden realisation of investors about the long-term weakness of the Italian economy to 
drive the spreads up during the height of Italy’s crisis (see Chapter 1). Rather, the reduced 
liquidity of Italian securities to access short-term funding via repos, in the aftermath of 
the LCH.Clearnet’s margin calls, also played a key role in the sell-offs that widened the 
spreads to the highest peaks experienced by Italy during the euro crisis. Furthermore, 
given the level of the sell-offs in November 2011, the spread peak caused by 
LCH.Clearnet’s margin call on 8 November contributed exacerbated existing domestic 
political pressure on Berlusconi, whose political position had already weakened both 
domestically and internationally.  
 
However, the relatively limited number of margin calls, the extent of speculation, and the 
open market operations of the ECB do not allow an examination of any potential long-
term impact of the margin calls on spread trends. The absence of any long-term trend 
assessment also excludes the possibility of ascribing a potential margin procyclicality on 
Italian government bonds, as in the case of Ireland and Portugal. In addition, differently 
from Ireland, and more similar to Portugal in this respect, the increases in collateral 
requirements did not destabilise the Italian domestic banking system. The soundness of 
Italian banks at the time prevented any significant banking crisis to develop as a result 
LCH.Clearnet’s and CC&G’s increase in collateral requirements, despite the evidenced 
strain that margin calls put on the liquidity of Italian banks. It is also worth noting that 
the much smaller size of the margin calls caused lower absolute increases in the Italian 
spread when compared to Ireland and Portugal, which received substantially larger 
collateral requirement increases by LCH.Clearnet. 
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Finally, with respect to CRAs, the credit downgrades caused little to no evincible increase 
in Italian spreads on 4 and 7 October 2011, as well as on 13 July 2012, when Moody’s 
downgraded Italy below investment grade.  
 
5.4.5 Spain 
 
The crisis in Spain is similar to the one in Ireland, in that it unfolded upon a housing and 
construction bubble, fuelled by large amount of foreign capital. Indeed, Spain attracted 
extensive European investments during the 2000s that, much like Ireland and Portugal, 
was to a large extent a consequence of the cheaper funding regime that emerged alongside 
the processes of European monetary and financial integration (see Quaglia and Royo, 
2015). Joining the EMU allowed Spain to borrow at very low interest rates, which was 
used to sustain massive construction and mortgage credit booms (see In't Veld et al., 
2014). Channelling the majority of that capital into construction compromised the 
competitiveness of the Spanish economy, as the tradable sector did not benefit from those 
foreign investments as much as the real estate sector. As a consequence, Spain’s current 
account deficit had reached 11% of GDP in 2008 (see Royo, 2010).  
 
It should be noted that the boom was not caused by capital inflows alone, however. 
Mortgages in Spain were usually based upon floating rates and short-term, where 100% 
loan-to-value ratios became relatively common (Gros, 2012: 10). This is quite the 
opposite in the case of Germany and Northern Europe, where mortgages were mostly 
longer-term, roughly 2-3% more expensive than in Spain, and where the loan-to-value 
ratio was limited to around 60% of house’s value (ibid). In short, the conditions for 
mortgages in Spain were more advantageous, and exposed the banks to much higher 
potential losses. 
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However, the peculiar way in which Spain’s banking system had been run adds a 
distinctive element to the Spanish story, which contributed to triggering a full-blown 
banking crisis that led to numerous bailouts and nationalisations. Until the onset of the 
euro crisis, the Spanish banking system was divided between private commercial banks 
and public savings banks, the latter called cajas. The cajas were different from the 
country’s private banks in that they were not listed on the stock market, accounted for 
more than half of the financial sector’s assets and had very close ties to regional and local 
authorities, whereby the Bank of Spain had minimal supervisory competence (Royo, 
2013). The political control of the local authorities on the cajas has been ascribed to as 
one of the key factors that laid the foundations for Spanish crisis (see Garicano, 2012). 
Due to their relative autonomy and regional ties, the cajas had become particularly 
involved in ‘turbocharged’ unsupervised lending to local property developers and 
consumer mortgages, which was fuelled by the cheap wholesale financing (Quaglia and 
Royo, 2015: 493). Once market financing suddenly stopped in the wake of the 2008 credit 
crunch, the real estate bubble burst, severely damaging the banking system’s funding 
liquidity needs.  
 
Crucially, in the case of Spain the importance of CCPs increased precisely in the 
aftermath of the credit crunch, when cajas needed to find new sources of funding. As the 
commercial paper which funded the activities of the cajas lost value, the public banks 
became increasingly reliant on repo funding via CCPs in order to get access to affordable 
and reliable financing (Alloway, 2010). As a part of this process, Spanish domestic banks 
also increased their share of Spanish sovereign bonds, on which they had grown 
increasingly dependent, collateral-wise, for CCP-based repos. Indeed, by the second 
quarter of 2012, a staggering 70% of Spanish sovereign bonds was held by domestic 
banks, up from 48% in 2007 (see Merler and Pisany-Ferry, 2012). In October 2010, 
LCH.Clearnet SA announced that it would begin to start clearing the Spanish government 
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bonds and repo markets, which was followed by membership application by some of the 
country’s largest cajas (LCH.Clearnet, 2010d). This means that Spanish public banks had 
the highest exposure to domestic sovereign debt than any other of the cases examined, 
and that sovereign debt had been extensively used for accessing short-term funding via 
CCP-based repos. 
 
Before moving forward, it is not possible to assess any long-term effect of 
LCH.Clearnet’s margin calls on the Spanish spread, because of similar reasons to what I 
mentioned in the case of Italy. Indeed, the number of margin calls implemented by 
LCH.Clearnet on Spanish sovereign debt were only three, lower than in Italy. That being 
said, even in the Spanish case, the impact of the margin calls retained an important short-
term effect in shaping the course of the Spanish crisis, even though most of margin 
increases are not matched with an immediate widening in the spread. 
 
As the recession brought about by the GFC hit the country, the cajas became exposed to 
the collapse of the construction sector and the payment difficulties of mortgage holders, 
impairing their ability to meet debt repayments. In order to consolidate their books, some 
of Spain’s largest and financially troubled cajas merged in December 2010 to form 
Bankia, which became the largest real estate lender in the country. Although the provision 
of liquidity by the ECB (via its two LTROs in December 2011 and February 2012) did 
ease the stress on Spanish sovereign debt markets between the end of 2011 and the 
beginning of 2012, it was not sufficient to fully recapitalise Spanish banks. That was 
particularly the case for Bankia, which had inherited the weaknesses from its founders 
cajas. In April 2012, an IMF report made warnings about the financial vulnerability of 
10 Spanish banks, the majority of which received state aid (IMF, 2012). Although the 
report did not name any bank in particular, it became clear that Bankia was among those 
10 banks, as it was the largest institution to have received state aid. As the profitability 
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and stock prices of Bankia began a massive decline from March 2012 onwards (ibid: 46), 
so did the price of Spanish sovereign bonds (because of the declining liquidity in the 
Spanish banking system) which led to a widening of the spread. 
 
Amid rising spreads, this study finds that on 25 April LCH.Clearnet raised its margin 
requirement for using Spanish sovereign bonds as collateral in its repo operations to 
11.20%, up from 8.35% (figure 19). Although the margin calls did cause a liquidity strain 
on the already struggling Spanish banking sector, there were no same-day reactions on 
sovereign bond markets in the aftermath of the increase (see appendix I), meaning that 
the margin call did not immediately lead to sell-offs. This raises an interesting question, 
particularly in light of the findings discussed in the previous three cases. 
 
How is it that the margin calls, which reduced the value of Spanish sovereign bonds in 
repo transaction – thus exacerbating the already limited liquidity available in the Spanish 
banking system – did not lead to immediate sell-offs? As mentioned above, Spanish banks 
had one of the highest exposures to domestic sovereign debt in the euro area, at around 
70% during the time of the first margin call.  
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Spanish banks largely relied on Spanish sovereign bonds to access short-term funding via 
LCH.Clearnet, as commercial paper was no longer a feasible option. As mentioned above, 
the uselessness of commercial paper as collateral in the aftermath of the GFC was the 
reason why the cajas increased their reliance on Spanish sovereign bonds and the use of 
CCPs in the first place.  
 
What that meant in practice was that, despite the margin requirement increases, Spanish 
banks did not have many other forms of collateral to sustain their funding liquidity needs, 
albeit it was becoming increasingly expensive for them to use Spanish government 
securities to access short-term funding. The strain on liquidity caused by the margin calls 
would also manifest on the country’s spread, however at a later stage. Spread did continue 
to widen after the margin call, suggesting that Spanish sovereign bond-rich domestic 
banks were eventually forced to sell-off Spanish government bonds in order to meet the 
increase in collateral requirements by LCH.Clearnet. My argument can be corroborated 
with the following forms of evidence.  
 
Financial analysts do suggest that the ‘increase in margin calls makes it even less 
attractive to hold Spanish bonds and piles more pressure on Spanish banks who have been 
using the debt as collateral to raise funds (e.g. Reuters, 2012a). Among these, Spanish 
sovereign bond-rich domestic banks, Bankia, which joined LCH.Clearnet SA on October 
2010 (see Bankia, 2011), was hit particularly badly by the margin call. Repos represented 
a very important source of short-term funding for Bankia, accounting for over 11% of the 
bank’s total liabilities between 2010 and 2011, one of the highest in Europe (Armakola 
et al., 2016: 15). Given Bankia’s reliance on repo funding, it does seem very plausible 
that the margin call exacerbated the bank’s liquidity difficulties.   
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Indeed, just over two weeks following LCH.Clearnet’s margin call, Bankia became partly 
nationalised by the Spanish government, which converted its previous €4.47bn state loan 
into a 45% stake in the institution. The Spanish government described the move as a 
‘necessary step to ensure its [Bankia’s] solvency, the tranquillity of depositors and dispel 
doubts about the about the entity’s capital needs…[and]...to guarantee the stability of the 
overall banking system’ (in Johnson et al., 2012). The announcement of the 
nationalisation was followed by massive sell-offs of Spanish sovereign bonds, amid the 
uncertainty of Bankia’s future. The sell-offs widened the Spanish spreads, which, on 18 
May 2012, triggered another margin call by LCH.Clearnet on Spanish sovereign debt to 
11.80% (see appendix I). The increase in collateral further reduced the liquidity of 
Spanish sovereign debt, which worsened the strain on the funding needs of Spanish banks. 
However, this study finds that, just as in the previous increase, the margin call only caused 
sell-offs in the next few days, reinforcing my argument that Spanish banks could not 
easily get rid of domestic sovereign debt, given how much they relied on Spanish 
sovereign debt to access short-term funding.  
 
This argument on the willingness by the cajas to maintain their sovereign debt holding 
can be corroborated by a recent study conducted at the ECB, which finds that during the 
euro crisis public domestic banks were much more likely than foreign banks to keep hold 
of sovereign debt (see Ongena et al., 2016). This was particularly evident in Spain, where 
70% of all domestic sovereign bonds were held by public banks.  
 
At that point, however, the prospect of external financial assistance became increasingly 
more likely, particularly after Bankia announced that it would need an additional €19bn 
in state aid on 25 May, bringing the total cost of its rescue to over €24bn (see Reuters, 
2012b). Despite months of denial that its banking sector needed a bailout, on 9 June the 
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Spanish government formally made request for up to €100bn bank bailout to its European 
partners, just a couple days after Fitch downgraded Spanish sovereign debt to junk status.  
 
The bailout request did not succeed in calming down turbulence on Spanish sovereign 
debt markets. The construction and mortgage credit boom developed in such a way 
whereby asset price growth in effect underpinned Spain’s rising demand and economic 
growth, a phenomenon known as house price Keynesianism (see Watson, 2010; see also 
Norris and Michael, 2015). However, the inherent real estate-driven dimension of the 
Spanish crisis was not addressed in the financial assistance package. Thus, as house prices 
kept falling, Spanish banks, particularly the remaining cajas and Bankia, kept 
accumulating losses on their loan portfolios, whilst the availability of short-term funding 
was becoming increasingly expensive. In the meantime, unemployment began to reach 
historic heights and the whole economy slipped into recession.  
 
Amid rising spreads, on 23 July LCH.Clearnet SA triggered a further margin call on 
Spanish sovereign debt to 12.20%. Although the increase in spread was not massive, this 
study finds that by the end of the trading day, when the margin call was issued, sovereign 
yield differentials reached a record high above 600bp (see appendix I). It should be noted 
that the announcement of the margin call that took place on 23 July also contained the 
increase in margins for Italian government securities to 11.65%. This means that two 
among the largest sovereign debt markets of the euro area were undergoing significant 
and comparable amounts of distress. This is important when it comes to understanding 
the events that followed. Indeed, Draghi’s ‘whatever it takes speech’, and the launch of 
the ECB’s OMTs programmes, need to be contextualised with respect to the risk that both 
Italy and Spain posed to the overall structural integrity of the euro area. The ECB acted 
in a moment whereby bank funding costs were becoming increasingly expensive for 
Italian and Spanish banks.  
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In conclusion, although the number of margin calls in the case of Spain were even more 
limited than those in the Italian case, the involvement of LCH.Clearnet during the Spanish 
crisis still underscores the crucial role of CCPs for our understanding of repos, funding 
liquidity and sovereign debt market instabilities during the euro crisis. Indeed, just like in 
Ireland, LCH.Clearnet’s margin calls contributed to destabilising the Spanish domestic 
banking system, due to the impact its collateral requirement increases had in reducing the 
liquidity of Spanish sovereign bonds, and thus compromising the funding liquidity of 
Spanish banks.  
 
This is also connected to a distinctive aspect of the Spanish story when compared to the 
other case examined: the unregulated, regional public savings banks, the cajas, had 
increased their reliance on Spanish sovereign debt as collateral to access CCP-based repo 
funding following the GFC. Once cheap credit (collateralised through commercial paper) 
suddenly stopped in 2008, the cajas became increasingly dependent on CCP-based repos 
for accessing affordable and reliable short-term funding, which was almost entirely built 
on the use of Spanish sovereign bonds as collateral. Thus, Spanish banks dramatically 
expanded their holdings of domestic sovereign debt. The huge prevalence of sovereign 
debt at home meant that, despite the increase in margins, the reduced liquidity of Spanish 
sovereign bonds did not compel Spanish banks to immediately get rid of government 
bonds, on which they heavily relied to access short-term funding after the GFC.  
 
Yet, as the Spanish banks’ liquidity deteriorated, sell-offs eventually took place in order 
to meet LCH.Clearnet’s increases in collateral requirements, contributing to destabilising 
sovereign debt markets and eventually resulting in a widening of the spread. In other 
words, the analysis conducted above suggests that the LCH.Clearnet’s margin calls 
contributed to the exacerbation of the funding pressures faced by of the Spanish domestic 
banking sector, even though they did not lead to an immediate sell-off. The absence of a 
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sustained short-term impact of margins on spread also excludes the presence of margin 
procyclicality in the case of Spain, as it was the case in Ireland and Portugal. Further, I 
should add that, as in the case of Italy, the much smaller increases in the collateral 
requirements for Spanish government securities (when compared to Ireland and Portugal) 
resulted in an absolute lower level of increase in the Spanish spreads when margin calls 
caused bond sell-offs.  
 
Lastly, with respect to the involvement of CRAs, credit downgrades were matched by 
visible hikes of the Spanish spreads, especially on 13 February and 7 June. However, 
again due to the limited number of collateral requirement increases experienced by Spain, 
and to the complex dynamics between high domestic sovereign debt ownership and bond 
sell-offs, the comparison between the short-term impact of credit downgrades and margin 
calls is unfeasible. 
 
Before moving on to the concluding remarks, I should also clarify that although this 
chapter emphasised the impact of LCH.Clearnet’s actions on domestic banking systems, 
the CCPs’ margin calls in some cases also worsened the position of those foreign banks 
who had increased their exposure to higher yielding government debt for carry-trade 
purposes, albeit in fewer cases than domestic banks. Carry-trade refers to the practice that 
involves borrowing at lower interest rates to purchase an asset with higher rates of returns, 
such as the euro area sovereign bonds with wider spreads during the euro crisis. The most 
striking case was the Belgium-based Dexia, who had increased their exposure to Greek, 
Portuguese, Italian and Spanish sovereign bonds, on the basis that they would profit from 
carry-trade with higher yielding sovereign bonds (see Acharya and Steffen, 2015). The 
increase in the margin requirements for clearing Portuguese and Italian and sovereign 
bonds, to which Dexia was highly exposed, greatly exacerbated its liquidity problems in 
2011, due to both covering the increasingly expensive collateral that it had to post, as well 
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as to the general decline in the value of those securities caused by the margins-induced 
sell-offs. Indeed, on 8 October 2011 Dexia had to pay out additional €16bn in margin 
requirements (see ibid: 12). Due to its inability to meet its margin requirement increases 
and debt repayments, Dexia went bankrupt and had to be bailed out a few days later by 
the governments of Belgium, France and Luxembourg. 
 
The concluding section will summarise the key findings, organise them into more concise 
tables, and discusses how we should be re-understanding the euro crisis in light of the 
analysis conducted above. 
 
5.5 Conclusions 
 
Despite the CCPs’ well documented role in preserving the repo market as a whole, this 
chapter has shown that the CCPs’ actions have nevertheless contributed to destabilising 
specific sovereign debt market in the euro area. This destabilising role has been fairly 
heterogeneous, both in relation to how LCH.Clearnet differently approached collateral 
management among the four case studies, as well as with respect to the impact that its 
actions had on the development of each country’s crisis. That being said, the analysis 
conducted in this chapter allows us to make important comparative assessments. 
 
First of all, the evidence gathered in this chapter suggests that most of LCH.Clearnet’s 
margin calls directly contributed to a widening of the spreads in 3 out of the 4 case studies 
examined in this chapter. Table 2 summarises the number of times a margin call was 
matched by a widening of the spread on the day of the margin call itself and the following 
day, for each case study. With the exception of Spain, margin calls were followed by an 
immediate widening of the spread in most margin calls in Ireland, Portugal and Italy.  
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(Table 2) LCH.Clearnet’s margin calls and spread hikes 
Country Number of occurrences % of total 
Ireland 9 (out of 10) 90% 
Portugal 5 (out of 6) 83.33% 
Italy 4 (out of 4) 100% 
Spain 1 (out of 3) 33.3% 
 
Thanks to the combination of the qualitative and quantitative evidence provided here, 
together to the analyses conducted in previous chapters, I argue that the widening spreads 
in the aftermath of the LCH.Clearnet’s margin calls were likely caused by the reduction 
in the value of the affected securities as collateral in repo-based interbank funding 
operations. LCH.Clearnet’s increases in margin requirements made it more expensive to 
employ Irish, Portuguese, Italian and Spanish sovereign bonds as collateral in repo 
operations. Hence, investors (particularly international sovereign bond holders) began 
large-scale sell-offs of the affected securities, which led to a decline in the prices of the 
affected securities, widening their spreads.  
 
In short, the euro area witnessed a full blown CCP-induced collateral crisis (a term that I 
coined and described in Chapter 4), as LCH.Clearnet’s margin calls established a 
hierarchy between good and bad collateral, compromising the liquidity of only a selected 
number of government bonds (i.e. Irish, Portuguese, Italian and Spanish), widening their 
spreads against the German bund. 
 
These findings provide key empirical insights with respect to answering the research 
question posed by this project, namely: what factors contributed to destabilising 
sovereign debt markets during the height of the euro crisis from 2010 to 2012? In light of 
the analysis conducted in this thesis, I argue that it is the ways in which LCH.Clearnet 
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implemented its collateral policy within the crisis-prone structure of the European repo 
market that contributed to the destabilisation of sovereign debt markets from 2010 to 
2012. The evidence gathered in this chapter point towards an understanding of spread 
movement that is deeply linked to the funding needs of banks in the euro area. Indeed, 
the widening of the spreads in the in the aftermath of margin calls suggests that investors 
were not only concerned with the sovereign default risk of the above-mentioned 
governments, as has often been assumed in the euro crisis literature and by policy makers. 
Rather, the widening of the spreads in the aftermath of LCH.Clearnet’s margin calls were 
also (and indeed, in the case of Ireland and Portugal, were primarily) driven by the banks’ 
concerns with funding liquidity risk. 
 
While this applies to different degrees in all the 4 cases examined above, it is best 
exemplified in Ireland and Portugal. Despite having secured a state bailout, which 
guaranteed public-debt servicing for the coming three years, the Irish and Portuguese 
spreads kept widening as a result of LCH.Clearnet’s margin calls. Hence, from the 
moment the bailouts were agreed, it is very plausible to assume that investors were no 
longer worried about the solvency of these two governments. This strongly suggests that 
the widening of the Irish and Portuguese spreads was taking place primarily as a result of 
how the margin calls impacted the liquidity of Irish and Portuguese sovereign bonds as 
collateral in repo transactions.  
 
The analysis conducted in this chapter also allowed us to understand other ways in which 
LCH.Clearnet impacted upon the development of the sovereign debt crises of Ireland, 
Portugal Italy and Spain. These findings are summarised in Table 3, reflecting my 
contribution to the euro crisis literature with respect to the impact that CCP-induced 
collateral crises can have on the euro area. First, LCH.Clearnet’s margin calls have led to 
an immediate widening in the spread three out of the four cases examined, suggesting that 
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the CCP’s actions have caused significant financial shocks during the euro crisis, 
contributing to the large waves of bond sell-offs during the period examined. 
 
(Table 3) Impact of LCH.Clearnet’s margin calls during the euro crisis 
 Ireland Portugal Italy Spain 
Immediately widened the spreads Yes Yes Yes No 
Reduced sovereign bonds liquidity Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Reduced banks’ funding liquidity Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Destabilised domestic banking systems Yes No No Yes 
Margin procyclicality Yes Yes No No 
Compromised public debt sustainability Yes No No No 
Political impact Yes No Yes Yes* 
*While there cannot be ascribed any short-term impact of margin calls on spreads in Spain, the increase of 
LCH.Clearnet’s collateral requirements did worsen the funding liquidity of Spanish domestic banks, 
contributing to Spain’s request of a bank bailout. 
 
Second, LCH.Clearnet’s margin calls are also highly likely to have reduced the liquidity 
of those sovereign bonds in repo markets that, in turn, increased the funding pressure of 
domestic banks in the euro area. Because repos represent the point of intersection between 
sovereign debt and bank funding, the increase in margin requirements on specific bonds 
made those securities more expensive to use as collateral and thus less liquid, which 
contributed to the increase in funding pressures on the banks of the euro area, particularly 
sovereign bond-rich domestic banks.  
 
Third, LCH.Clearnet’s margin policy did not destabilise the domestic banking system on 
every occasion, but only in Ireland and Spain. This reflects the much more distinctive 
banking dimension of the Irish and Spanish crises, which were rooted in housing and 
construction bubbles. In that respect, and fourth, another major difference is that whereas 
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Ireland and Portugal showed strong signs of margin procyclicality on their respective 
spreads, the same does not apply in the case of Italy and Spain. This is largely due to the 
much more frequent margin calls, and to the significantly higher overall increases in 
collateral requirements implemented by LCH.Clearnet Ltd vis-à-vis it’s continental sister, 
LCH.Clearnet SA. 
 
Fifth, LCH.Clearnet can also only be said to have contributed to compromising public 
debt sustainability in Ireland. That is because the procyclical element of its margin calls 
contributed to the widening of its spread to such a level that the Irish government also 
had to request a state bailout to finance its public spending, in addition to a financial 
assistance program for its ailing banks. When it comes to Portugal, Ireland’s most similar 
case study in respect of how margin calls were implemented and the effect they had on 
spread, margin calls were only implemented after the Portuguese government had 
requested a state and bank bailout. Hence this excludes any possible link between 
LCH.Clearnet’s margin policy and the public debt servicing sustainability in the 
Portuguese case. Italy did not ask for any form of financial aid to its European partners, 
while Spain only requested financial assistance programmes for its banking sector. Lastly, 
given the impact that its margin calls had on spreads, LCH.Clearnet’s actions are likely 
to have contributed to influencing a variety of political processes, namely the bailout 
request in Ireland, the dismissal of Berlusconi and the appointment of technocrat Mario 
Monti in Italy, and the bank bailout in Spain. 
 
In other words, LCH.Clearnet’s triggering of a CCP-induced collateral crisis has had a 
variety of impacts, with some similar and some different impacts on each of the countries 
examined. This is largely because of the substantially different nature of the crises in each 
of the case studies, their sovereign debt market and banking structures, as well as the sizes 
 276 
of the margin increases they received. Still, it can be concluded that LCH.Clearnet has 
retained a significant destabilising role in the sovereign debt markets of the euro area.  
 
I will now turn to the concluding chapter of this project. 
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Conclusions 
 
My concern and expectation is that the coming weeks will show that the 
development of the markets, government bonds and the economy of Italy will be 
so far-reaching that this will be a possible signal to voters not to vote for populists 
on the right or left.  
(EU Commissioner for Budget and Human Resources Günther Oettinger, on the 
outcome of the Italian general elections, 2018). 
 
Sovereign default risk perception remains, to this day, a key explanatory variable for 
market behaviour in the euro area. Shortly after the 2018 Italian general elections, 
resulting in a Eurosceptic and anti-establishment alliance between the Movimento 5 Stelle 
and the Lega, EU Commissioner Günther Oettinger made a statement during an interview 
with the German broadcaster Deutsche Welle. Oettinger suggested that such an electoral 
result would likely lead to financial market turbulence, which would push Italians not to 
vote for populist parties in the future (Anderson, 2018). Oettinger’s statement, which was 
initially mis-translated in English from German as ‘markets will teach Italy to vote for 
the right thing’, claimed that the policy proposals put forward by the then potential 
government formation could breach the EU’s fiscal rules, thus prompting a negative 
reaction on Italian sovereign bond prices. More specifically, Oettinger alluded to the fact 
that breaking the EU’s fiscal rules could jeopardise Italy’s public debt servicing 
sustainability, to the point where investors would lose confidence in the country’s 
solvency. In turn, according to the Commissioner, this could lead to large-scale sell-offs 
in government bonds, severely damaging Italy’s economy. 
 
These comments sparked outrage among both Italian and EU authorities, on the basis that 
Oettinger’s words disrespected Italy’s democratic will. For instance, following those 
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comments, the Movimento 5 Stelle’s leader and Minister of Economic Development, 
Labour and Social Policies Luigi Di Maio replied in a tweet:  
 
“Markets will teach you how to vote”. The words of European Commissioner 
#Oettinger are preposterous. These people treat Italy as a colony where they go 
on summer holidays. But in a few months the government of change will emerge, 
and it will finally make [Italy] respected Europe (Di Maio, 2018, my translation). 
 
Most notably, as in the words of the Lega’s leader and Minister of Interior Matteo Salvini 
on a Facebook live stream: 
 
…and so the stock market crashes and the spread goes up. Markets will teach you 
to vote better next time. A European Commissioner, paid by you guys…who 
suddenly speaks as if democracy was worth zero, as if it will be the markets, the 
people of the spread, of finance, to teach…Italians to vote better…should resign 
this afternoon (Salvini, 2018, my translation). 
 
Hence, while spread remains an important explanatory variable for market behaviour in 
the euro area, it has also taken on a more distinctive political connotation. As discussed 
in the introduction of the thesis, both pro-European and Eurosceptic forces in Italy keep 
employing spread as a proxy for market behaviour. However, it has now become a 
politically contested ground, in that the former sees it as a signal to maintain fiscal 
discipline in accordance to EU rules, whereas the latter sees it as a negative straitjacket 
that needs to be removed to free Italy from the markets’ constraints and implement their 
electoral promises (see Petrini, 2018; Spezzaferro, 2018). The ongoing political 
significance of spread as a proxy for market behaviour made the analysis conducted in 
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this project a necessary step in achieving a better understanding of what drives investors 
to sell government bonds in the euro area.  
 
The main conclusion drawn from this thesis is that spread can mean anything and nothing. 
There were numerous contextual factors that influenced investors’ pricing of sovereign 
bonds during the euro crisis, with market sentiment towards sovereign default and 
funding liquidity risk just two of them. Nevertheless, my research has shown that 
sovereign default risk was not the only key concern for investors when trading sovereign 
bonds in the euro area during the crisis. In some instances, sovereign default was not even 
their main fear. As demonstrated in the case of Ireland and Portugal, spreads widened in 
the aftermath of LCH.Clearnet’s margin calls even after these countries had secured a 
state bailout. This suggests that the sell-offs mainly took place because of the investors’ 
concern with the funding liquidity risk posed by the reduced value of the affected 
sovereign bonds as collateral to access short-term funding via repo. 
 
Thus, I argue that spread movements alone cannot be employed as a comprehensive 
indicator of market behaviour because of the variety of contextual factors that can 
influence bond price differentials in times of financial distress. Indeed, in order to explain 
how LCH.Clearnet contributed to widening the spreads, the analysis conducted in this 
thesis was built, on the one hand, on an in-depth understanding of the mechanisms 
underpinning the provision of funding liquidity in the euro area and, on the other, on a 
triangulation between quantitative and qualitative evidence.  
 
Therefore, I conclude that looking employing spread movements as a heuristic tool to 
understand market behaviour in its entirety is redundant. This claim goes in stark contrast 
with the studies on the euro crisis that employ spread as an overarching proxy for market 
behaviour, which also explicitly understand investors as being largely driven by fear of 
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sovereign default (e.g. Arghyrou and Tsoukalas, 2011; Lane, 2012; De Grauwe and Ji, 
2013; Pepino, 2015; Baldwin et al., 2015). Thus, I move beyond those studies by showing 
that sovereign bond yield spread movements also indicated fears regarding funding 
liquidity risk, which has not received nearly as much attention as sovereign default risk 
did.  
 
Having deconstructed the significance of spread as proxy for market behaviour, this 
project has provided a number of key findings that are pertinent for this projects’ research 
question, namely: what factors contributed to destabilising sovereign debt markets during 
the height of the euro crisis from 2010 to 2012? 
 
CCPs, repos, and sovereign debt market (in)stability in the euro area 
 
The main objective of this project was to put into question the uses of sovereign bond 
yield spread as an indicator of market perception of sovereign default risk during the euro 
crisis. The analysis developed throughout the previous five chapters demonstrated that 
the widening of the spreads from 2010 to 2012 was not only driven by considerations 
regarding public debt servicing sustainability, but also, and indeed, in some cases mostly, 
by concerns surrounding access to short-term funding.  
 
The analysis was developed in the following steps. Chapter 1 examined the different 
approaches undertaken in the interdisciplinary field of enquiry that I labelled the euro 
crisis literature. This represented a first comprehensive attempt at connecting the dots 
between scholars from different subjects and theoretical strands who debate the origin 
and unfolding of the euro crisis. I argued that spread movements are recurrently employed 
to describe the markets changing perception of sovereign default risk, despite a number 
of important differences with respect to what factors are identified as the trigger to those 
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fears. It is remarkable that such an understanding of spread is not only shared among a 
variety of disciplines, namely political science, economics, political economy and 
financial economics, but also across different theoretical strands and approaches, 
including orthodox and heterodox (post-Keynesian and Marxist) economics, rational 
choice and comparative political economy, as well as political scientists and institutional 
economists working on varieties of capitalism. I also claim that the fixation with 
understanding market behaviour primarily in relation to sovereign default risk is linked 
to the literature’s failure to examine the mechanisms underpinning the provision of short-
term funding in the euro area, specifically with respect to CCPs and repo contracts.  
 
Chapter 2 examined the functioning of CCPs and their relevance for financial stability. I 
showed that the role of central clearing in guaranteeing the performance of every contract 
has been a key feature in the development of financial markets since 18th century Japan. 
This has been retained by present-day CCPs, and also underpins the financial reform 
agenda for OTC derivatives put forward by G20 leaders in 2009. However, in Chapter 2 
I also demonstrated that the ways in which CCPs interpose between traders through 
counterparty substitution allows them to unilaterally impose margin requirements. In 
turn, this can reduce the liquidity available in the financial system during a crisis. Indeed, 
I found that the use of margin requirements by CCPs has contributed to exacerbating 
instabilities during periods of financial distress, which lead me to conclude that these 
actors need further examination with respect to issues regarding systemic stability. 
 
Chapter 3 examined the development of the modern repo market in order to show how 
repo contracts can become a crisis-transmission channel. I showed that repos have been 
closely linked to the provision of short-term funding since the New York Fed began using 
these instruments to refinance banks in the 1920s. I discussed how the development of 
repos after the end of World War II has been closely linked to the separation between 
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fiscal and monetary policy, whereby the central banks’ use of high interest rates to combat 
inflation has made repos a much more affordable source of funding. I thus showed how 
expanding the use of sovereign bonds as collateral in repos has brought sovereign debt 
and bank funding ever closer together.  
 
Yet, in light of the events surrounding the GFC, I showed that collateralised finance can 
also become a source of systemic instability. The sudden lack of repo collateral triggered 
margin calls that, in a procyclical way, further reduced the availability and value of 
collateral, which curtailed access to repo funding to the point that the US banking system 
became insolvent. Hence, I concluded that repos are particularly relevant for our 
understanding of the euro crisis, because of how they are connected to both the funding 
liquidity of banks, and to sovereign debt through their use as collateral. 
 
Chapter 4 brought attention back to Europe by examining the architecture of the European 
repo market. The main argument I made here is that the politics surrounding the evolution 
of European financial integration has made the sovereign debt markets of the euro area 
prone to what I defined as CCP-induced collateral crises. I first examined how the 
political imperative of financial integration by the EC and the ECB has placed repos and 
sovereign bonds as the cornerstones for the creation of a single European financial space, 
which would greatly enhance cross-border lending and make government debt the 
dominant collateral. Specifically, the ways in which the EC and the ECB pushed for 
market-based practices when handling sovereign collateral has dramatically changed how 
collateral was previously managed by most European central banks, who did not employ 
these practices. Crucially, this shift retains an important political connotation, with regard 
to the direction taken by European economic integration between the 1990s and the early 
2000s. Handling sovereign bonds according to market-based practices needs to be 
contextualised within the EC and ECB’s political strategies to please Germany’s 
 283 
insistence with market discipline to move forward with monetary as well as financial 
integration. I argued that while these strategies succeeded in co-opting Germany in 
strengthening European economic integration, they also exposed sovereign collateral to 
price volatility in financial markets. 
  
I thereafter assessed the different interests at stake in the consolidation of the European 
exchange industry, whose negotiations and compromises led to the creation of 
LCH.Clearnet. On the one hand, the insistence of the Bourse de Paris on retaining central 
clearing technologies against the vision of Deutsche Börse and, on the other hand, the 
compromises between users and exchanges in the LCH.Clearnet merger led to the 
creation of one of the world’s largest CCPs by clearing volume, which ended up 
dominating the euro-denominated repo industry. Hence, I claim that such arrangements 
have exposed the sovereign debt markets of the euro area to the potential collateral shocks 
of LCH.Clearnet in repo transactions. 
 
Chapter 5 brought all of the abovementioned findings together, assessing the involvement 
of LCH.Clearnet during the euro crisis. The main objective of this chapter was to assess 
the impact of LCH.Clearnet’s margin calls on the Irish, Portuguese, Italian and Spanish 
crises. In order to triangulate my analysis, I contextualised daily movements of spread in 
relation to a variety of qualitative and quantitative evidence, that were specific to each 
case study. I found that the margin calls implemented by LCH.Clearnet likely contributed 
to an immediate widening in the spread of all of the case studies examined, with the 
exception of Spain, where bond sell-offs took place at a later stage because of the 
domestic banks’ strong ownership of, and reliance on, Spanish sovereign debt. In light of 
what was discussed in previous chapters, I argue that LCH.Clearnet’s margin calls 
contributed to destabilising sovereign bond markets in the euro area. This is because the 
increases in collateral requirements on government bonds directly reduced the value, and 
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thus the liquidity, of those securities as collateral in short-term funding operations via 
repos. 
 
Original contributions 
 
The euro crisis literature seeks to understand the roots and the dynamics of the euro crisis, 
largely by examining the factors that have contributed to eroding market confidence in 
public debt servicing sustainability. It is argued, in this literature, that sovereign solvency 
was one of the most important factors that influenced market sentiment towards 
government bonds during the euro crisis, which became reflected in the widening of the 
spreads. Despite the different positions on the issue, the literature is seemingly unable to 
escape from anchoring market behaviour to fear of sovereign default.  
 
The main contribution of this project was to the euro crisis literature, where I provided a 
more nuanced conceptualisation of what drove investors to sell-government bonds, and 
thus widen the spreads, during the euro crisis. I contributed to the debate emphasising the 
dimension of short-term funding as another key driver for the large-scale sovereign bond 
sell-offs that affected the euro area. In answering the research question, this project 
suggested that the ways in which LCH.Clearnet implemented its collateral policy in the 
crisis-prone structure of the European repo market contributed to destabilising sovereign 
debt markets. This is because LCH.Clearnet compromised the use of specific sovereign 
bonds as collateral in repo funding operations. Hence, the widening of the spreads from 
2010 to 2012 was not just an indication of market sentiment towards sovereign default 
risk, but also of their concerns with using sovereign bonds to meet their funding needs. 
This is a key contribution to the euro crisis literature, because it provides a more nuanced 
understanding of what investors feared during the unfolding of the euro crisis.  
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More generally, the analysis conducted in this project began unpacking the meaning of 
the ‘markets’ within the euro crisis literature. Firstly, I argue that the markets –understood 
as the actors that contributed to a widening of the spreads by purchasing and selling 
government bonds–were largely banks lending to each other in short-term repo funding 
operations. Secondly, as discussed in Chapter 5, there was a stark divide between the 
interests and necessities among the banks in the euro area.  
 
On the one hand, the funding liquidity of domestic banks was impacted the hardest by 
LCH.Clearnet’s increases in collateral requirements, because of their relatively higher 
ownership in the sovereign debt of the country they were headquartered in (the so-called 
home bias). In that respect, LCH.Clearnet – owned by large international financial 
conglomerates at the time – was acting on behalf of international banks who could sell 
the affected government bonds more freely, because they were not affected by the same 
home bias of domestic banks. On the other hand, the ways in which LCH.Clearnet’s 
margin calls led to a widening of the spreads was different in Ireland, Portugal, Italy, and 
Spain, depending on the sovereign debt exposure and the funding status of each national 
banking system.  
 
Therefore, I conclude that spread movements meant very different things in each country 
examined, which, in turn, provides a much more heterogenous understanding of ‘the 
markets’ and how they were behaving during the euro crisis. Recalling the words of Ian 
Hardie, who opposed an understanding of the market ‘as a single entity, with common 
actions and policy preferences’, I argue that the markets in the euro area ‘is in reality 
made up of multiple, heterogeneous actors, often lacking any unity of opinion or purpose’ 
(Hardie, 2006: 55). 
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A second contribution I made to the euro crisis literature is providing a review of the 
ways different disciplines and approaches discuss the origins and development of the euro 
crisis. This contribution is made in Chapter 1, which subdivides the literature into three 
macro groups: the domestic-level explanations, the European-level explanations, and the 
financial economics literature. I argue that both the domestic- and European-level 
explanations largely ascribe the sovereign debt market instabilities experienced in the 
euro area to the deterioration of macroeconomic fundamentals; however, they differ in 
either blaming primarily domestic or European weaknesses in economic governance.  
 
The financial economics literature, in contrast, advances the debate by shedding light on 
a slightly more psychological element regarding the behaviour of financial market actors 
during the crisis. This scholarship shows that investors became more sensitive to 
deteriorating fundamentals after the GFC because they began to suddenly fear a higher 
possibility of sovereign default. Despite these differences, my categorisation spots a key 
commonality that is widely present in these varying approaches. Whatever the causes, I 
found that most scholars ascribe the widening of the spreads to the deteriorating market 
confidence in the sovereign solvency of countries in the euro area. Analysing the literature 
along those lines has not been conducted before, which makes understanding the euro 
crisis debate through the lens of market behaviour a novel approach in this 
interdisciplinary project. 
 
A third contribution made to the euro crisis literature is my argument that the repo market 
is a source of systemic instability. The role played by repo contracts is largely overlooked 
in the literature, as most research simply limits itself to acknowledging the declining 
liquidity of repo markets during the crisis, without actually examining why that was the 
case. In Chapter 3, I contribute to our understanding of market instabilities during the 
euro crisis by showing that repos can act as a crisis transmission channel during times of 
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financial distress. That is because repo markets can be subjected to collateral crises, 
whereby the liquidity of specific assets used as guarantee gets greatly reduced, in turn 
exacerbating liquidity squeezes. While this contribution is developed theoretically in 
Chapter 3, it is demonstrated in Chapter 5, where I show that the reduced liquidity of 
certain sovereign bonds as collateral in repo transactions increased the funding pressures 
of banks in the euro area. 
 
Fourth, this thesis contributed to the narrower scholarship on the political economy of 
global finance, as well as to the euro crisis and EU integrations literatures more broadly, 
by showing that the position of CCPs in financial markets can be detrimental to systemic 
stability in times of economic turbulence. Generally speaking, CCPs are severely 
understudied in these literatures, which is significant given the importance of these 
institutions for the development of markets since the 18th century. On the one hand, 
Chapter 2 shows that the position of CCPs as the buyers to all sellers and the sellers to all 
buyers allows them to exercise a significant amount of power over investors through the 
unilateral imposition of margin requirements, which contributed to the exacerbation of 
liquidity squeezes several times during the 20th century. On the other hand, Chapter 4 
showed how the position of LCH.Clearnet in the European repo market has contributed 
to making the sovereign debt markets of the euro area particularly prone to systemic 
instabilities. 
 
Fifth, this thesis contributed to the subgroup of the euro crisis literature that I labelled 
‘European-level explanations’. The main argument portrayed by scholars in this group is 
that the introduction of the euro has crystallised an asymmetric trade regime. Through 
bringing together different economies with different growth models, inflation rates, and 
wage setting mechanisms, the monetary union has polarised the euro area into a surplus 
and export-oriented core, and a deficit, bubble- and debt-oriented periphery. According 
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to this view, this asymmetric regime contributed to worsening macroeconomic 
fundamentals once credit halted in the aftermath of the GFC. This scholarship argues that 
the deterioration of macroeconomic fundamentals, as caused by the introduction of the 
euro, contributed to eroding market confidence in public debt servicing sustainability 
during the euro crisis. In short, a great deal of attention was paid to the imbalances 
generated by European monetary integration. 
 
I contributed to this body of research by arguing that it was not just monetary integration 
that has exposed the sovereign debt market of the euro area to systemic instabilities, but 
also the ways in which European financial integration was conducted. In Chapter 4, I 
showed that the politics underpinning the creation of a single European financial space 
has exposed the sovereign debt markets of the euro area systemic vulnerabilities. On the 
one hand, the EC and ECB’s political imperative of financial market integration through 
market-based practices has exposed sovereign collateral to sudden price shocks in 
financial markets. On the other hand, the different interests at stake in the consolidation 
of the European exchange industry has contributed to concentrating almost the entire repo 
industry in LCH.Clearnet, which allows for a single CCP to exert a significant amount of 
influence over the cost and availability of specific collateral markets. Hence, I argue that 
the specific way in which the European financial markets were integrated exposed the 
sovereign debt markets of the euro area to the potential collateral shocks by CCPs in repo 
markets, or what I called CCP-induced collateral crises. 
 
Policy suggestions 
 
In conclusion, I argue that the policy responses to the crisis have been unsuccessful in 
overcoming the vulnerabilities existing in European financial markets. While the 
reduction in public expenditure may have helped to restore confidence in public debt 
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servicing sustainability, spending cuts do not provide an effective guarantee the liquidity 
of sovereign bonds in repo markets. This is important in the light of this thesis’ findings, 
as I demonstrated that it was not just sovereign solvency that drove investors to sell 
government bonds during the euro crisis, but also the reduced value of these securities in 
accessing short-term funding via repo. That is because spending cuts by governments did 
not, and indeed will not, ensure the liquidity of a country’s sovereign debt in repo 
transactions in the middle of a collateral crisis.  
 
Hence, I propose an understanding of the euro crisis that goes beyond ascribing sovereign 
debt market instabilities to the declining confidence of investors towards public debt 
servicing sustainability. Rather, this thesis emphasises the structural vulnerabilities that 
affect the provision of short-term funding in European financial markets. By suddenly 
reducing the liquidity of specific government bonds as collateral in repo operations, the 
vulnerability of European finance to CCP-induced collateral-crises can severely 
destabilise sovereign debt markets.  
 
The post-crisis reforms, such as heighted bank deposit protection, strengthened financial 
supervision, and the framework for the recovery and resolution of banks in the euro area 
neither acknowledge, nor tackle, the collateral crisis-prone architecture of the European 
repo market. Therefore, policy proposals should instead aim at reducing the extent to 
which sovereign bonds in the euro area can be affected by the procyclical collateral 
practices of single systemic actors like, LCH.Clearnet. This could be achieved by, first, 
imposing a limit on the size and the frequencies of CCP’s increases in collateral 
requirements, which would materially reduce the impact of such practise on the price of 
government debt. As a matter of fact, ESMA has recently called for strengthening 
regulatory efforts to limit the procyclicality of the CCPs’ margins (ESMA, 2018). 
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Second, regulation could aim at reducing the concentration of repo exposure in single 
CCPs, by distribute a higher proportion of the market among institutionally-separate 
entities. As I discussed in Chapter 2, a similar issue was recognised by the FSB on a study 
on CCP interdependencies (FSB, 2017). A more equal and non-interconnected 
redistribution of repo exposures would significantly reduce the susceptibility of sovereign 
bonds’ prices to the collateral practices of individual, large CCPs. Third, and perhaps 
more challenging, in order to properly break the link between sovereign debt and bank 
funding, the European repo markets need to slowly phase-out their dependence on 
sovereign bonds as collateral. This proposal is certainly ambitious and very difficult to 
implement. Issues would arise from finding another widely available, and most 
importantly, highly liquid source of collateral, to preventing capital flights from one 
sovereign debt market to another.  
 
A solution, which could resolve both issues mentioned above, would be sovereign debt 
mutualisation with the introduction of a single government bond for the whole euro area, 
guaranteed by either the ECB or by the member states themselves (see Tilford, 2011). In 
order to overcome criticism, mainly by German authorities, that such a regime would 
weaken fiscal discipline, a quantitative limit could be introduced to the amount of 
mutualised bonds that a government in the euro area can issue, after which it would be 
the country alone liable for debt repayment (see Chrysoloras and Weber, 2018). A similar 
proposal was recently put forward by the EC, which proposed the introduction of 
sovereign bond-backed securities (SBBS), a type of low-risk liquid asset that would be 
backed by a pool of government bonds in the euro area. In the words of the EC: 
 
SBBS would be a new type of asset created by the private sector based on a pre-
defined pool of sovereign bonds of the Euro area Member States. In practice, a 
private sector entity, created solely to issue and manage SBBS, would buy euro 
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area sovereign bonds on the market and bundle them into higher or lower risk 
securities. Investors could buy higher or lower risk packages, according to their 
risk appetite (EC, 2018). 
 
The EC proposed subdividing these securities into a so-called ‘senior’ tranche, making 
70% of the whole issuance composed by the lower-yielding, more liquid bonds, with the 
remaining 30% to be divided among different ‘junior’ issuers, i.e. the higher yielding 
sovereign bonds. The EC’s initiative would be based upon a half-way type of debt 
mutualisation, whereby: 
 
the highest-risk securities (known as 'junior') would be first in line to bear any 
losses on the underlying pool should they arise, but would in exchange pay 
investors a higher return. Senior securities would be low-risk, as they would bear 
losses only in the (very unlikely) case that the junior tranche has to be fully written 
off to absorb the losses (ibid.) 
 
In short, the senior issues would become the debt repayors of last resort. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, these plans were quickly turned down in Germany. Markus Ferber, a 
German policymaker and vice-chairman of the European Parliament Committee on 
Economic and Monetary Affairs, worried that such a move would eventually lead to full 
joint liability; thus, he considered SBBS as the first step for the (unacceptable) proposal 
of debt mutualisation (see Guarascio, 2018). 
 
Hence, considering what I discussed in Chapter 4, a question arises as to whether the 
weakness affecting European finance could ever be remedied. The imperative for 
financial market integration, which had to gather political support from both France and 
Germany, has led to a specific repo market architecture that is unable to reconcile cross-
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border repo liquidity with sovereign debt market stability. In the absence of European-
wide political support, particularly in Germany, for debt mutualisation, the prospect for a 
radical transformation of collateral policies in the euro area is very unlikely. This leaves 
changes in collateral management practices and repo exposure diversification among 
multiple CCPs discussed above the only viable options, to strengthen the stability of the 
European repo market and, in turn, of the sovereign debt markets of the euro area. 
 
Proposals for further research 
 
Finally, I would like to propose new avenues for further research. First, as this thesis is 
mainly focused on the involvement of LCH.Clearnet, further research could instead 
assess the impact on sovereign debt markets of other large CCPs in the euro area, such as 
Eurex clearing. Europe hosts a number of large CCPs, although comparatively smaller 
than LCH.Clearnet, which means that there is scope to compare the collateral 
management practices of different CCPs in the euro area, as well as to evaluate their own 
impact on sovereign debt markets and beyond. Second, more quantitative work should be 
conducted to quantify the exact impact of margin calls on sovereign bond prices. Indeed, 
one of the limitations of the analysis conducted in Chapter 5 was the lack of a precise 
quantification of the impact of LCH.Clearnet’s margin calls on spread. As I mentioned at 
the beginning of the chapter, this limitation was in part dictated by the lack of a large 
enough sample size, which would allow estimation of the size of the effect of the margin 
calls. Yet, this could be overcome by aggregating the margin call data implemented by 
multiple CCPs in the euro area, on much longer time frames. This approach would make 
it possible to increase the sample size of the margin calls, which would permit the 
development of an auto-regressive time-series model that could quantify the impact of 
margin calls on spread.  
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To conclude, more research is also needed to understand the specific ways in which the 
uses of spread as a representation of market sentiment towards sovereign default risk 
mediates political processes. The anecdotes, that I presented in the introduction and 
conclusion chapters of this thesis, are merely a reflection of the more active discursive 
role played by spread and fear of default since the euro crisis. For instance, rising spread 
and perceived heightened sovereign default risk greatly contributed to adding pressure on 
Silvio Berlusconi to resign. Likewise, the ways in which Mario Monti thereafter 
employed spread targets as informal policy objectives provided legitimacy to his 
technocratic appointment.  
 
Hence, more research could be conducted to understand the interconnections between the 
(perceived) functioning of market mechanisms, political authority and legitimacy. As a 
matter of fact, the research that I conducted in this thesis ended precisely where I 
originally expected to begin when I started my PhD programme four years ago. This 
thesis originally planned to understand and contextualise the discursive role played by 
references to spread in the political transition from Silvio Berlusconi to Mario Monti. 
Thus, while the planning of that project ended up evolving into the thesis presented here, 
the finding provided above calls for more scholarly efforts to better understand the 
interconnection between market mechanisms, politics, and our own assumptions about 
market behaviour. 
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Appendix I – margin calls 
and spread 
Ireland 
Date 
10-Year 
Spread 
(daily) Margins 
05-Oct-2010 421.0 
 
06-Oct-2010 431.6 
 
07-Oct-2010 434.5 
 
08-Oct-2010 427.5 
 
10-Oct-2010 427.5 
 
11-Oct-2010 415.0 
 
12-Oct-2010 433.0 
 
13-Oct-2010 426.1 
 
14-Oct-2010 399.5 
 
15-Oct-2010 382.3 
 
18-Oct-2010 369.5 
 
19-Oct-2010 392.6 
 
20-Oct-2010 396.4 
 
21-Oct-2010 414.9 
 
22-Oct-2010 413.6 
 
25-Oct-2010 409.4 
 
26-Oct-2010 399.5 
 
27-Oct-2010 428.8 
 
28-Oct-2010 436.1 
 
29-Oct-2010 447.7 
 
01-Nov-2010 476.3 
 
02-Nov-2010 491.3 
 
03-Nov-2010 513.2 
 
04-Nov-2010 538.3 
 
05-Nov-2010 534.0 
 
08-Nov-2010 562.6 
 
09-Nov-2010 566.3 
 
10-Nov-2010 650.1 15% 
11-Nov-2010 682.1 
 
12-Nov-2010 587.3 
 
15-Nov-2010 552.4 
 
16-Nov-2010 594.9 
 
17-Nov-2010 580.2 30% 
18-Nov-2010 558.2 
 
19-Nov-2010 560.1 
 
21-Nov-2010 560.1 
 
22-Nov-2010 566.7 
 
23-Nov-2010 602.8 
 
24-Nov-2010 640.7 
 
25-Nov-2010 652.3 45% 
26-Nov-2010 662.2 
 
28-Nov-2010 662.2 
 
29-Nov-2010 669.6 
 
30-Nov-2010 689.5 
 
01-Dec-2010 647.5 
 
02-Dec-2010 591.5 
 
03-Dec-2010 561.9 
 
06-Dec-2010 557.8 30% 
07-Dec-2010 540.0 
 
08-Dec-2010 523.9 
 
09-Dec-2010 521.7 
 
10-Dec-2010 532.0 
 
13-Dec-2010 530.5 
 
14-Dec-2010 537.9 
 
15-Dec-2010 531.1 
 
16-Dec-2010 538.7 
 
17-Dec-2010 556.8 
 
20-Dec-2010 576.8 
 
21-Dec-2010 611.1 
 
22-Dec-2010 620.9 
 
23-Dec-2010 624.7 
 
24-Dec-2010 
  
27-Dec-2010 
  
28-Dec-2010 
  
29-Dec-2010 631.1 
 
30-Dec-2010 631.0 
 
31-Dec-2010 
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03-Jan-2011 
  
04-Jan-2011 633.7 
 
05-Jan-2011 630.1 
 
06-Jan-2011 628.7 
 
07-Jan-2011 643.2 
 
10-Jan-2011 624.4 
 
11-Jan-2011 596.3 
 
12-Jan-2011 553.9 
 
13-Jan-2011 548.0 
 
14-Jan-2011 549.7 
 
17-Jan-2011 552.7 
 
18-Jan-2011 579.8 
 
19-Jan-2011 585.8 
 
20-Jan-2011 575.0 
 
21-Jan-2011 572.7 
 
24-Jan-2011 571.5 
 
25-Jan-2011 572.2 
 
26-Jan-2011 576.7 
 
27-Jan-2011 591.3 
 
28-Jan-2011 596.8 
 
31-Jan-2011 599.5 
 
01-Feb-2011 583.8 
 
02-Feb-2011 556.3 
 
03-Feb-2011 567.1 
 
04-Feb-2011 563.2 
 
07-Feb-2011 563.8 
 
08-Feb-2011 567.0 
 
09-Feb-2011 569.7 
 
10-Feb-2011 579.0 
 
11-Feb-2011 579.9 
 
14-Feb-2011 584.3 
 
15-Feb-2011 593.5 
 
16-Feb-2011 592.0 
 
17-Feb-2011 604.5 
 
18-Feb-2011 592.0 
 
21-Feb-2011 594.5 
 
22-Feb-2011 594.9 
 
23-Feb-2011 598.6 
 
24-Feb-2011 617.3 
 
25-Feb-2011 620.0 
 
28-Feb-2011 619.5 
 
01-Mar-2011 628.2 
 
02-Mar-2011 616.8 
 
03-Mar-2011 606.1 
 
04-Mar-2011 612.7 
 
07-Mar-2011 614.5 
 
08-Mar-2011 626.1 
 
09-Mar-2011 627.7 
 
10-Mar-2011 628.6 
 
11-Mar-2011 650.5 
 
14-Mar-2011 626.2 
 
15-Mar-2011 640.4 
 
16-Mar-2011 656.3 
 
17-Mar-2011 649.2 
 
18-Mar-2011 645.6 
 
21-Mar-2011 643.6 
 
22-Mar-2011 658.7 
 
23-Mar-2011 655.9 
 
24-Mar-2011 684.6 35% 
25-Mar-2011 688.1 
 
28-Mar-2011 681.5 
 
29-Mar-2011 682.7 
 
30-Mar-2011 682.5 
 
31-Mar-2011 689.1 
 
01-Apr-2011 690.8 45% 
04-Apr-2011 669.9 
 
05-Apr-2011 657.9 
 
06-Apr-2011 610.1 
 
07-Apr-2011 593.7 
 
08-Apr-2011 591.8 
 
11-Apr-2011 575.6 
 
12-Apr-2011 581.6 35% 
13-Apr-2011 577.4 
 
14-Apr-2011 587.2 
 
15-Apr-2011 630.8 
 
18-Apr-2011 658.0 
 
19-Apr-2011 662.4 
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20-Apr-2011 717.2 
 
21-Apr-2011 723.4 
 
26-Apr-2011 744.1 45% 
27-Apr-2011 746.7 
 
28-Apr-2011 747.2 
 
29-Apr-2011 748.0 
 
02-May-2011 
  
03-May-2011 731.6 
 
04-May-2011 720.6 
 
05-May-2011 735.6 55% 
06-May-2011 755.4 
 
09-May-2011 797.2 
 
10-May-2011 756.8 
 
11-May-2011 757.0 
 
12-May-2011 764.8 
 
13-May-2011 777.6 
 
16-May-2011 732.9 
 
17-May-2011 732.6 
 
18-May-2011 729.0 
 
19-May-2011 732.6 
 
20-May-2011 764.2 
 
23-May-2011 808.9 
 
24-May-2011 815.7 
 
25-May-2011 823.9 65% 
26-May-2011 845.2 
 
27-May-2011 810.4 
 
30-May-2011 834.3 
 
31-May-2011 807.2 
 
01-Jun-2011 804.0 
 
02-Jun-2011 802.6 
 
03-Jun-2011 770.6 
 
06-Jun-2011 
  
07-Jun-2011 759.5 
 
08-Jun-2011 797.0 
 
09-Jun-2011 803.3 
 
10-Jun-2011 837.3 
 
13-Jun-2011 845.5 75% 
14-Jun-2011 858.8 
 
15-Jun-2011 868.6 
 
16-Jun-2011 889.9 
 
17-Jun-2011 883.8 
 
20-Jun-2011 877.4 
 
21-Jun-2011 861.9 
 
22-Jun-2011 886.0 
 
23-Jun-2011 909.9 
 
24-Jun-2011 926.0 
 
27-Jun-2011 950.5 
 
28-Jun-2011 960.5 80% 
29-Jun-2911 972.5  
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Portugal 
Date 
10-Year 
Spread (daily) Margins 
05-Oct-2010 381.0 
 
06-Oct-2010 387.2 
 
07-Oct-2010 390.0 
 
08-Oct-2010 385.1 
 
11-Oct-2010 375.1 
 
10-Oct-2010 375.1 
 
12-Oct-2010 384.9 
 
13-Oct-2010 371.5 
 
14-Oct-2010 362.2 
 
15-Oct-2010 325.0 
 
18-Oct-2010 300.6 
 
19-Oct-2010 310.4 
 
20-Oct-2010 314.7 
 
21-Oct-2010 324.6 
 
22-Oct-2010 325.2 
 
25-Oct-2010 306.7 
 
26-Oct-2010 298.6 
 
27-Oct-2010 318.4 
 
28-Oct-2010 324.5 
 
29-Oct-2010 327.9 
 
01-Nov-2010 353.2 
 
02-Nov-2010 367.6 
 
03-Nov-2010 377.7 
 
04-Nov-2010 412.1 
 
05-Nov-2010 399.5 
 
08-Nov-2010 428.0 
 
09-Nov-2010 432.0 
 
10-Nov-2010 456.9 
 
11-Nov-2010 476.9 
 
12-Nov-2010 426.2 
 
15-Nov-2010 421.8 
 
16-Nov-2010 427.0 
 
17-Nov-2010 406.1 
 
18-Nov-2010 400.0 
 
19-Nov-2010 408.9 
 
21-Nov-2010 408.9 
 
22-Nov-2010 401.6 
 
23-Nov-2010 437.0 
 
24-Nov-2010 453.4 
 
25-Nov-2010 437.3 
 
26-Nov-2010 426.7 
 
28-Nov-2010 426.7 
 
29-Nov-2010 450.5 
 
30-Nov-2010 446.2 
 
01-Dec-2010 400.8 
 
02-Dec-2010 349.0 
 
03-Dec-2010 310.7 
 
06-Dec-2010 316.2 
 
07-Dec-2010 306.8 
 
08-Dec-2010 320.6 
 
09-Dec-2010 317.1 
 
10-Dec-2010 338.6 
 
13-Dec-2010 335.8 
 
14-Dec-2010 345.4 
 
15-Dec-2010 342.6 
 
16-Dec-2010 341.0 
 
17-Dec-2010 343.5 
 
20-Dec-2010 354.0 
 
21-Dec-2010 358.3 
 
22-Dec-2010 364.2 
 
23-Dec-2010 369.2 
 
24-Dec-2010 369.2 
 
27-Dec-2010 371.7 
 
28-Dec-2010 364.5 
 
29-Dec-2010 373.6 
 
30-Dec-2010 380.9 
 
31-Dec-2010 380.9 
 
03-Jan-2011 376.0 
 
04-Jan-2011 375.2 
 
05-Jan-2011 376.0 
 
06-Jan-2011 402.7 
 
07-Jan-2011 435.3 
 
10-Jan-2011 405.4 
 
11-Jan-2011 387.2 
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12-Jan-2011 367.7 
 
13-Jan-2011 363.4 
 
14-Jan-2011 365.0 
 
17-Jan-2011 364.9 
 
18-Jan-2011 379.1 
 
19-Jan-2011 363.3 
 
20-Jan-2011 351.8 
 
21-Jan-2011 345.4 
 
24-Jan-2011 354.9 
 
25-Jan-2011 367.5 
 
26-Jan-2011 367.8 
 
27-Jan-2011 376.6 
 
28-Jan-2011 377.6 
 
31-Jan-2011 385.9 
 
01-Feb-2011 365.0 
 
02-Feb-2011 341.5 
 
03-Feb-2011 358.9 
 
04-Feb-2011 378.9 
 
07-Feb-2011 379.2 
 
08-Feb-2011 385.4 
 
09-Feb-2011 391.7 
 
10-Feb-2011 394.7 
 
11-Feb-2011 394.6 
 
14-Feb-2011 406.3 
 
15-Feb-2011 405.3 
 
16-Feb-2011 409.6 
 
17-Feb-2011 420.4 
 
18-Feb-2011 414.5 
 
21-Feb-2011 426.4 
 
22-Feb-2011 425.6 
 
23-Feb-2011 432.5 
 
24-Feb-2011 435.6 
 
25-Feb-2011 435.8 
 
28-Feb-2011 427.1 
 
01-Mar-2011 424.4 
 
02-Mar-2011 420.1 
 
03-Mar-2011 418.9 
 
04-Mar-2011 425.2 
 
07-Mar-2011 427.2 
 
08-Mar-2011 432.1 
 
09-Mar-2011 434.4 
 
10-Mar-2011 438.0 
 
11-Mar-2011 454.6 
 
14-Mar-2011 443.3 
 
15-Mar-2011 447.5 
 
16-Mar-2011 463.8 
 
17-Mar-2011 457.9 
 
18-Mar-2011 434.4 
 
21-Mar-2011 426.1 
 
22-Mar-2011 443.9 
 
23-Mar-2011 466.9 
 
24-Mar-2011 469.1 
 
25-Mar-2011 482.6 
 
28-Mar-2011 488.6 
 
29-Mar-2011 491.3 
 
30-Mar-2011 506.9 
 
31-Mar-2011 549.6 
 
01-Apr-2011 564.9 
 
04-Apr-2011 553.2 
 
05-Apr-2011 561.1 
 
06-Apr-2011 540.8 
 
07-Apr-2011 541.8 15% 
08-Apr-2011 545.3 
 
11-Apr-2011 547.2 
 
12-Apr-2011 544.7 
 
13-Apr-2011 562.2 
 
14-Apr-2011 571.2 
 
15-Apr-2011 589.9 
 
18-Apr-2011 607.6 
 
19-Apr-2011 624.4 
 
20-Apr-2011 631.8 25% 
21-Apr-2011 685.3 
 
26-Apr-2011 697.8 35% 
27-Apr-2011 699.5 
 
28-Apr-2011 700.0 
 
29-Apr-2011 702.7 
 
02-May-2011 697.8 
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03-May-2011 694.4 
 
04-May-2011 671.7 
 
05-May-2011 691.6 
 
06-May-2011 695.7 
 
09-May-2011 732.9 
 
10-May-2011 756.4 45% 
11-May-2011 779.6 
 
12-May-2011 688.0 
 
13-May-2011 688.0 
 
16-May-2011 668.5 
 
17-May-2011 683.8 
 
18-May-2011 659.8 
 
19-May-2011 668.3 
 
20-May-2011 699.0 
 
23-May-2011 727.8 
 
24-May-2011 735.3 
 
25-May-2011 745.8 
 
26-May-2011 743.3 
 
27-May-2011 743.8 
 
30-May-2011 749.5 
 
31-May-2011 732.1 
 
01-Jun-2011 725.9 
 
02-Jun-2011 727.8 
 
03-Jun-2011 733.3 
 
06-Jun-2011 739.6 
 
07-Jun-2011 732.7 
 
08-Jun-2011 762.3 
 
09-Jun-2011 779.6 
 
10-Jun-2011 814.7 
 
13-Jun-2011 818.7 65% 
14-Jun-2011 824.1 
 
15-Jun-2011 861.7 
 
16-Jun-2011 860.2 
 
17-Jun-2011 878.3 
 
20-Jun-2011 919.2 
 
21-Jun-2011 918.0 
 
22-Jun-2011 929.3 
 
23-Jun-2011 974.3 
 
24-Jun-2011 971.3 
 
27-Jun-2011 1,002.7 
 
28-Jun-2011 970.5 80% 
 
  
 300 
Italy 
Date 
10-Year 
Spread (daily) Margins 
03-Oct-2011 372.9 
 
04-Oct-2011 377.5 
 
05-Oct-2011 369.4 
 
06-Oct-2011 351.8 
 
07-Oct-2011 352.7 
 
10-Oct-2011 349.3 
 
11-Oct-2011 354.3 
 
12-Oct-2011 354.7 
 
13-Oct-2011 370.8 
 
14-Oct-2011 360.1 
 
17-Oct-2011 370.9 
 
18-Oct-2011 386.5 
 
19-Oct-2011 384.1 
 
20-Oct-2011 399.0 
 
21-Oct-2011 377.5 
 
24-Oct-2011 383.5 
 
25-Oct-2011 389.1 
 
26-Oct-2011 388.8 
 
27-Oct-2011 366.6 
 
28-Oct-2011 382.3 
 
31-Oct-2011 409.2 
 
01-Nov-2011 455.3 
 
02-Nov-2011 434.1 
 
03-Nov-2011 426.5 
 
04-Nov-2011 454.4 
 
07-Nov-2011 474.2 
 
08-Nov-2011 490.9 11.65% 
09-Nov-2011 557.9 
 
10-Nov-2011 522.0 
 
11-Nov-2011 465.9 
 
12-Nov-2011 465.9 
 
14-Nov-2011 488.7 
 
15-Nov-2011 529.0 
 
16-Nov-2011 519.5 
 
17-Nov-2011 498.5 
 
18-Nov-2011 473.6 
 
21-Nov-2011 478.9 
 
22-Nov-2011 489.0 
 
23-Nov-2011 498.6 
 
24-Nov-2011 493.6 
 
25-Nov-2011 504.9 
 
28-Nov-2011 487.0 
 
29-Nov-2011 491.7 
 
30-Nov-2011 480.2 
 
01-Dec-2011 440.8 
 
02-Dec-2011 441.9 
 
04-Dec-2011 441.9 
 
05-Dec-2011 415.8 
 
06-Dec-2011 409.9 
 
07-Dec-2011 444.1 
 
08-Dec-2011 430.5 8.15% 
09-Dec-2011 435.6 
 
12-Dec-2011 501.6 
 
13-Dec-2011 496.0 
 
14-Dec-2011 524.6 
 
15-Dec-2011 505.7 
 
16-Dec-2011 509.3 
 
19-Dec-2011 494.7 
 
20-Dec-2011 462.3 
 
21-Dec-2011 483.9 
 
22-Dec-2011 488.5 
 
23-Dec-2011 504.4 
 
27-Dec-2011 506.0 
 
28-Dec-2011 506.7 
 
29-Dec-2011 513.9 
 
30-Dec-2011 518.4 
 
02-Jan-2012 500.5 
 
03-Jan-2012 501.8 
 
04-Jan-2012 502.4 
 
05-Jan-2012 522.1 
 
06-Jan-2012 528.0 
 
09-Jan-2012 527.1 
 
10-Jan-2012 528.8 
 
11-Jan-2012 521.8 
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12-Jan-2012 484.5 
 
13-Jan-2012 491.2 8.3% 
16-Jan-2012 495.5 
 
17-Jan-2012 470.5 
 
18-Jan-2012 466.7 
 
19-Jan-2012 460.5 
 
20-Jan-2012 433.5 
 
23-Jan-2012 411.9 
 
24-Jan-2012 419.0 
 
25-Jan-2012 425.2 
 
26-Jan-2012 414.9 
 
27-Jan-2012 398.9 
 
30-Jan-2012 425.1 
 
31-Jan-2012 415.5 
 
01-Feb-2012 386.7 
 
02-Feb-2012 378.5 
 
03-Feb-2012 372.5 
 
06-Feb-2012 372.6 
 
07-Feb-2012 370.2 
 
08-Feb-2012 358.4 
 
09-Feb-2012 346.6 
 
10-Feb-2012 363.0 
 
13-Feb-2012 361.7 
 
14-Feb-2012 365.8 
 
15-Feb-2012 382.6 
 
16-Feb-2012 381.7 
 
17-Feb-2012 363.2 
 
20-Feb-2012 350.5 
 
21-Feb-2012 346.8 
 
22-Feb-2012 358.7 
 
23-Feb-2012 363.1 
 
24-Feb-2012 357.6 
 
27-Feb-2012 362.9 
 
28-Feb-2012 357.6 
 
29-Feb-2012 335.4 
 
01-Mar-2012 306.4 
 
02-Mar-2012 310.9 
 
05-Mar-2012 313.4 
 
06-Mar-2012 327.7 
 
07-Mar-2012 319.8 
 
08-Mar-2012 303.5 
 
09-Mar-2012 303.9 
 
12-Mar-2012 313.6 
 
13-Mar-2012 305.7 
 
14-Mar-2012 291.0 
 
15-Mar-2012 287.5 
 
16-Mar-2012 281.3 
 
19-Mar-2012 278.7 
 
20-Mar-2012 282.8 
 
21-Mar-2012 298.7 
 
22-Mar-2012 318.4 
 
23-Mar-2012 318.2 
 
26-Mar-2012 308.4 
 
27-Mar-2012 325.5 
 
28-Mar-2012 326.1 
 
29-Mar-2012 342.3 
 
30-Mar-2012 332.8 
 
02-Apr-2012 327.9 
 
03-Apr-2012 333.0 
 
04-Apr-2012 351.3 
 
05-Apr-2012 370.3 
 
10-Apr-2012 396.4 
 
11-Apr-2012 378.7 
 
12-Apr-2012 360.5 
 
13-Apr-2012 377.4 
 
16-Apr-2012 386.3 
 
17-Apr-2012 372.9 
 
18-Apr-2012 377.2 
 
19-Apr-2012 388.1 
 
20-Apr-2012 391.5 
 
23-Apr-2012 410.4 
 
24-Apr-2012 397.3 
 
25-Apr-2012 390.0 
 
26-Apr-2012 394.9 
 
27-Apr-2012 394.4 
 
30-Apr-2012 385.3 
 
02-May-2012 394.3 
 
03-May-2012 389.6 
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04-May-2012 386.0 
 
07-May-2012 382.5 
 
08-May-2012 407.7 
 
09-May-2012 426.6 
 
10-May-2012 412.8 
 
11-May-2012 415.0 
 
14-May-2012 441.8 
 
15-May-2012 455.7 
 
16-May-2012 447.1 
 
17-May-2012 454.4 
 
18-May-2012 451.2 
 
21-May-2012 448.7 
 
22-May-2012 424.9 
 
23-May-2012 442.4 
 
24-May-2012 432.8 
 
25-May-2012 442.4 
 
28-May-2012 451.0 
 
29-May-2012 453.1 
 
30-May-2012 478.1 
 
31-May-2012 482.2 
 
01-Jun-2012 467.7 
 
04-Jun-2012 444.1 
 
05-Jun-2012 441.9 
 
06-Jun-2012 436.9 
 
07-Jun-2012 432.2 
 
08-Jun-2012 445.6 9.5% 
11-Jun-2012 471.1 
 
12-Jun-2012 476.0 
 
13-Jun-2012 472.0 
 
14-Jun-2012 467.6 
 
15-Jun-2012 449.7 
 
18-Jun-2012 463.6 
 
19-Jun-2012 439.9 
 
20-Jun-2012 413.4 
 
21-Jun-2012 419.1 
 
22-Jun-2012 420.0 
 
25-Jun-2012 453.4 
 
26-Jun-2012 466.1 
 
27-Jun-2012 464.2 
 
28-Jun-2012 467.6 
 
29-Jun-2012 419.6 
 
02-Jul-2012 422.3 
 
03-Jul-2012 411.8 
 
04-Jul-2012 430.2 
 
05-Jul-2012 455.9 
 
06-Jul-2012 469.0 
 
09-Jul-2012 477.5 
 
10-Jul-2012 462.6 
 
11-Jul-2012 453.4 
 
12-Jul-2012 466.2 
 
13-Jul-2012 478.9 
 
16-Jul-2012 488.4 
 
17-Jul-2012 479.5 
 
18-Jul-2012 486.0 
 
19-Jul-2012 478.2 
 
20-Jul-2012 499.5 
 
23-Jul-2012 514.3 11.65% 
24-Jul-2012 531.8 
 
25-Jul-2012 518.5 
 
26-Jul-2012 471.8 
 
27-Jul-2012 455.9 
 
30-Jul-2012 462.0 
 
31-Jul-2012 477.6 
 
01-Aug-2012 452.7 
 
02-Aug-2012 499.7 
 
03-Aug-2012 465.4 
 
06-Aug-2012 459.3 
 
07-Aug-2012 449.0 
 
08-Aug-2012 447.0 
 
09-Aug-2012 439.8 
 
10-Aug-2012 453.1 
 
13-Aug-2012 447.8 
 
14-Aug-2012 438.0 
 
15-Aug-2012 438.0 
 
16-Aug-2012 426.5 
 
17-Aug-2012 429.9 
 
20-Aug-2012 428.6 
 
21-Aug-2012 410.4 
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22-Aug-2012 418.8 
 
23-Aug-2012 433.2 
 
24-Aug-2012 438.6 
 
27-Aug-2012 435.4 
 
28-Aug-2012 447.2 
 
29-Aug-2012 439.0 
 
30-Aug-2012 445.9 
 
31-Aug-2012 451.8 
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Spain 
Date 
10-Year 
Spread 
(daily) Margins 
02-Jan-2012 325.9 
 
03-Jan-2012 339.7 
 
04-Jan-2012 358.7 
 
05-Jan-2012 380.4 
 
06-Jan-2012 391.0 
 
09-Jan-2012 373.0 
 
10-Jan-2012 366.3 
 
11-Jan-2012 355.1 
 
12-Jan-2012 335.6 
 
13-Jan-2012 349.6 
 
16-Jan-2012 344.7 
 
17-Jan-2012 334.9 
 
18-Jan-2012 339.1 
 
19-Jan-2012 341.1 
 
20-Jan-2012 390.4 
 
23-Jan-2012 380.7 
 
24-Jan-2012 378.8 
 
25-Jan-2012 371.1 
 
26-Jan-2012 366.0 
 
27-Jan-2012 314.1 
 
30-Jan-2012 329.2 
 
31-Jan-2012 322.1 
 
01-Feb-2012 309.4 
 
02-Feb-2012 311.1 
 
03-Feb-2012 310.9 
 
06-Feb-2012 309.8 
 
07-Feb-2012 315.1 
 
08-Feb-2012 324.8 
 
09-Feb-2012 318.5 
 
10-Feb-2012 334.3 
 
13-Feb-2012 333.6 
 
14-Feb-2012 338.1 
 
15-Feb-2012 356.9 
 
16-Feb-2012 348.1 
 
17-Feb-2012 336.1 
 
20-Feb-2012 321.8 
 
21-Feb-2012 317.7 
 
22-Feb-2012 315.7 
 
23-Feb-2012 316.3 
 
24-Feb-2012 314.9 
 
27-Feb-2012 319.2 
 
28-Feb-2012 323.8 
 
29-Feb-2012 314.6 
 
01-Mar-2012 300.5 
 
02-Mar-2012 311.5 
 
05-Mar-2012 315.1 
 
06-Mar-2012 337.1 
 
07-Mar-2012 330.4 
 
08-Mar-2012 328.2 
 
09-Mar-2012 319.9 
 
12-Mar-2012 328.0 
 
13-Mar-2012 332.0 
 
14-Mar-2012 321.7 
 
15-Mar-2012 323.1 
 
16-Mar-2012 313.1 
 
19-Mar-2012 317.0 
 
20-Mar-2012 318.0 
 
21-Mar-2012 340.5 
 
22-Mar-2012 357.4 
 
23-Mar-2012 350.7 
 
26-Mar-2012 336.6 
 
27-Mar-2012 344.8 
 
28-Mar-2012 348.6 
 
29-Mar-2012 364.7 
 
30-Mar-2012 355.5 
 
02-Apr-2012 354.2 
 
03-Apr-2012 363.8 
 
04-Apr-2012 389.2 
 
05-Apr-2012 405.0 
 
06-Apr-2012 405.0 
 
09-Apr-2012 405.0 
 
10-Apr-2012 427.0 
 
11-Apr-2012 415.8 
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12-Apr-2012 405.6 
 
13-Apr-2012 423.1 
 
16-Apr-2012 433.3 
 
17-Apr-2012 414.6 
 
18-Apr-2012 412.6 
 
19-Apr-2012 423.9 
 
20-Apr-2012 425.7 
 
23-Apr-2012 438.1 
 
24-Apr-2012 419.2 
 
25-Apr-2012 407.8 11.2% 
26-Apr-2012 416.4 
 
27-Apr-2012 414.4 
 
30-Apr-2012 411.6 
 
01-May-2012 411.6 
 
02-May-2012 427.6 
 
03-May-2012 416.9 
 
04-May-2012 416.3 
 
07-May-2012 417.4 
 
08-May-2012 429.6 
 
09-May-2012 458.7 
 
10-May-2012 444.3 
 
11-May-2012 448.4 
 
14-May-2012 482.0 
 
15-May-2012 488.3 
 
16-May-2012 479.7 
 
17-May-2012 489.9 
 
18-May-2012 482.5 11.8% 
21-May-2012 484.4 
 
22-May-2012 461.2 
 
23-May-2012 481.6 
 
24-May-2012 477.5 
 
25-May-2012 497.4 
 
28-May-2012 513.0 
 
29-May-2012 507.2 
 
30-May-2012 540.4 
 
31-May-2012 537.1 
 
01-Jun-2012 534.2 
 
04-Jun-2012 518.7 
 
05-Jun-2012 509.0 
 
06-Jun-2012 501.8 
 
07-Jun-2012 470.8 
 
08-Jun-2012 491.4 
 
09-Jun-2012 491.4 
 
11-Jun-2012 520.5 
 
12-Jun-2012 531.7 
 
13-Jun-2012 526.1 
 
14-Jun-2012 544.9 
 
15-Jun-2012 542.6 
 
18-Jun-2012 578.5 
 
19-Jun-2012 555.0 
 
20-Jun-2012 512.1 
 
21-Jun-2012 504.8 
 
22-Jun-2012 484.3 
 
25-Jun-2012 518.1 
 
26-Jun-2012 518.4 
 
27-Jun-2012 534.0 
 
28-Jun-2012 544.7 
 
29-Jun-2012 491.5 
 
02-Jul-2012 487.9 
 
03-Jul-2012 478.3 
 
04-Jul-2012 495.0 
 
05-Jul-2012 538.3 
 
06-Jul-2012 561.3 
 
09-Jul-2012 573.0 
 
10-Jul-2012 545.2 
 
11-Jul-2012 542.8 
 
12-Jul-2012 536.5 
 
13-Jul-2012 532.7 
 
16-Jul-2012 556.0 
 
17-Jul-2012 548.6 
 
18-Jul-2012 569.2 
 
19-Jul-2012 579.9 
 
20-Jul-2012 613.8 
 
23-Jul-2012 635.6 12.2% 
24-Jul-2012 645.3 
 
25-Jul-2012 619.9 
 
26-Jul-2012 562.1 
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27-Jul-2012 538.8 
 
30-Jul-2012 524.6 
 
31-Jul-2012 548.8 
 
01-Aug-2012 525.5 
 
02-Aug-2012 587.6 
 
03-Aug-2012 576.8 
 
06-Aug-2012 541.9 
 
07-Aug-2012 542.0 
 
08-Aug-2012 556.1 
 
09-Aug-2012 547.7 
 
10-Aug-2012 556.5 
 
13-Aug-2012 545.2 
 
14-Aug-2012 525.2 
 
15-Aug-2012 511.3 
 
16-Aug-2012 499.2 
 
17-Aug-2012 500.6 
 
20-Aug-2012 487.5 
 
21-Aug-2012 467.5 
 
22-Aug-2012 482.6 
 
23-Aug-2012 502.4 
 
24-Aug-2012 511.7 
 
27-Aug-2012 502.3 
 
28-Aug-2012 513.7 
 
29-Aug-2012 510.5 
 
30-Aug-2012 527.7 
 
31-Aug-2012 539.3 
 
03-Sep-2012 552.1 
 
04-Sep-2012 521.9 
 
05-Sep-2012 503.3 
 
06-Sep-2012 448.9 
 
07-Sep-2012 415.1 
 
10-Sep-2012 417.4 
 
11-Sep-2012 417.9 
 
12-Sep-2012 399.8 
 
13-Sep-2012 407.5 
 
14-Sep-2012 410.8 
 
17-Sep-2012 432.3 
 
18-Sep-2012 430.6 
 
19-Sep-2012 411.8 
 
20-Sep-2012 422.8 
 
21-Sep-2012 419.4 
 
24-Sep-2012 412.6 
 
25-Sep-2012 421.7 
 
26-Sep-2012 463.9 
 
27-Sep-2012 451.0 
 
28-Sep-2012 454.3 
 
01-Oct-2012 441.2 
 
02-Oct-2012 430.8 
 
03-Oct-2012 436.0 
 
04-Oct-2012 445.0 
 
05-Oct-2012 418.3 
 
08-Oct-2012 424.9 
 
09-Oct-2012 433.2 
 
10-Oct-2012 431.5 
 
11-Oct-2012 425.3 
 
12-Oct-2012 417.8 
 
15-Oct-2012 436.8 
 
16-Oct-2012 426.5 
 
17-Oct-2012 386.0 
 
18-Oct-2012 374.5 
 
19-Oct-2012 377.7 
 
22-Oct-2012 388.7 
 
23-Oct-2012 406.4 
 
24-Oct-2012 403.6 
 
25-Oct-2012 401.5 
 
26-Oct-2012 406.6 
 
29-Oct-2012 418.2 
 
30-Oct-2012 419.0 
 
31-Oct-2012 415.1 
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